In 1909 petitioner and respondent married and lived together in the District of Columbia until about the time he brought suit for limited divorce. They had a son and a daughter. On October 29, 1925, the supreme court of the District of Columbia granted petitioner a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of cruelty, awarded custody of the son to him and of the daughter to her, and directed him to pay $300 a month for support of wife and daughter.
Petitioner brought suit in the circuit court of Arlington County, Virginia, alleging that he was a resident of that State for the requisite time. On June 26, 1929, the circuit court entered a decree granting him an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion after finding that he had been a resident of Virginia for the requisite time and that respondent had willfully deserted him since February 24, 1925. Process was served personally on respondent in the District of Columbia. She filed a plea stating she appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction, alleging that neither party had been a resident of Virginia for a year before suit and that his residence was a fraud upon the court.
The Virginia court referred the cause to a commissioner in chancery who, after taking testimony pursuant to a stipulation of counsel limiting inquiry to the jurisdictional facts raised in the plea, reported that petitioner was a bona fide resident and the court had jurisdiction. Respondent filed exceptions reiterating the allegations of her plea. After a hearing the court overruled the exceptions, confirmed the report, found it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, and granted respondent time to file an answer, which she did not do. The final Virginia decree granted petitioner absolute divorce, divested respondent of rights in his property, and required him to pay $150 per month for support of the daughter.
On December 30, 1929, petitioner applied to the District court to set aside or modify its 1925 decree on the basis of the Virginia decree. The application was denied and affirmed on appeal without any question as to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court being considered or decided. On April 16, 1935, petitioner filed another application citing the Virginia decree, the daughter's marriage, and diminution of his income. After a hearing at which respondent sought to introduce evidence that petitioner went to Virginia solely to obtain a divorce and never became a bona fide resident there, the trial court denied relief. The court of appeals held that the Virginia court did not have full jurisdiction and its decree was not entitled to full faith and credit, and remanded for further proceedings.
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