305 U.S. 32 (1938)
In 1909 petitioner and respondent married and lived together in the District of Columbia until about the time he brought suit for limited divorce.1 They had a son and a daughter.2 On October 29, 1925, the supreme court of the District of Columbia granted petitioner a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of cruelty, awarded custody of the son to him and of the daughter to her, and directed him to pay $300 a month for support of wife and daughter.3
Petitioner brought suit in the circuit court of Arlington County, Virginia, alleging that he was a resident of that State for the requisite time.4 On June 26, 1929, the circuit court entered a decree granting him an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion after finding that he had been a resident of Virginia for the requisite time and that respondent had willfully deserted him since February 24, 1925.5 Process was served personally on respondent in the District of Columbia.6 She filed a plea stating she appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction, alleging that neither party had been a resident of Virginia for a year before suit and that his residence was a fraud upon the court.7
The Virginia court referred the cause to a commissioner in chancery who, after taking testimony pursuant to a stipulation of counsel limiting inquiry to the jurisdictional facts raised in the plea, reported that petitioner was a bona fide resident and the court had jurisdiction.8 Respondent filed exceptions reiterating the allegations of her plea.9 After a hearing the court overruled the exceptions, confirmed the report, found it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, and granted respondent time to file an answer, which she did not do.10 The final Virginia decree granted petitioner absolute divorce, divested respondent of rights in his property, and required him to pay $150 per month for support of the daughter.11
On December 30, 1929, petitioner applied to the District court to set aside or modify its 1925 decree on the basis of the Virginia decree.12 The application was denied and affirmed on appeal without any question as to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court being considered or decided.13 On April 16, 1935, petitioner filed another application citing the Virginia decree, the daughter's marriage, and diminution of his income.14 After a hearing at which respondent sought to introduce evidence that petitioner went to Virginia solely to obtain a divorce and never became a bona fide resident there, the trial court denied relief.15 The court of appeals held that the Virginia court did not have full jurisdiction and its decree was not entitled to full faith and credit, and remanded for further proceedings.16
Whether the Virginia court's finding that petitioner was a bona fide resident of Virginia for the requisite period is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District of Columbia?17
The full faith and credit clause requires that judicial proceedings in each State shall be given full faith and credit in the courts of every other State.18 The Act of May 26, 1790 declares that authenticated judicial proceedings shall have such faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.19 A court's determination of domicile after the parties have litigated that question is binding upon them in subsequent proceedings.20
Yes. Petitioner and respondent married in 1909 and lived together in the District of Columbia until about the time he brought suit for limited divorce. They had a son and a daughter. On October 29, 1925, the supreme court of the District of Columbia granted petitioner a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of cruelty. The decree awarded custody of the son to him and of the daughter to her and directed him to pay $300 a month for support of wife and daughter.
Petitioner brought suit in the circuit court of Arlington County, Virginia, alleging that he was a resident of that State for the requisite time. On June 26, 1929, the circuit court entered a decree granting him an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion after finding that he had been a resident of Virginia for the requisite time and that respondent had willfully deserted him since February 24, 1925. Process was served personally on respondent in the District of Columbia. She filed a plea stating she appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction, alleging that neither party had been a resident of Virginia for a year before suit and that his residence was a fraud upon the court.
The Virginia court referred the cause to a commissioner in chancery who, after taking testimony pursuant to a stipulation of counsel limiting inquiry to the jurisdictional facts raised in the plea, reported that petitioner was a bona fide resident and the court had jurisdiction. Respondent filed exceptions reiterating the allegations of her plea. After a hearing the court overruled the exceptions, confirmed the report, found it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, and granted respondent time to file an answer, which she did not do. On December 30, 1929, petitioner applied to the District court to set aside or modify its 1925 decree on the basis of the Virginia decree. The application was denied and affirmed on appeal without any question as to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court being considered or decided. On April 16, 1935, petitioner filed another application citing the Virginia decree, the daughter's marriage, and diminution of his income. After a hearing the trial court denied relief. The court of appeals held that the Virginia court did not have full jurisdiction and its decree was not entitled to full faith and credit, and remanded for further proceedings. Because respondent litigated the domicile issue in Virginia by filing a plea, introducing evidence, filing exceptions, and seeking to uphold her challenge, the finding of the Virginia court that petitioner was a bona fide resident is binding upon her in the courts of the District of Columbia.21
The Virginia court's finding that petitioner was a bona fide resident of Virginia for the requisite period is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District of Columbia.22
Whether respondent's plea and conduct in the Virginia proceedings constituted a special appearance limited to challenging jurisdiction or a submission to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court?23
No. Respondent's plea and conduct in the Virginia proceedings constituted a submission to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court.2627 The plea asserted that petitioner lacked the required domicile and prayed that the court take no further cognizance of the action.28 The court referred the cause to a commissioner pursuant to argument of counsel.29 Counsel stipulated that the commissioner should ascertain only the facts raised by the plea.30
After the commissioner reported in favor of jurisdiction, respondent filed exceptions and participated in a hearing on the report and exceptions.31 The court overruled the exceptions and granted respondent time to file an answer, which she did not do.32 She later sought to introduce evidence on the merits in the District court but did not appeal the Virginia decree.33 Her participation in litigating the jurisdictional facts and her failure to limit her involvement strictly to a special appearance show that she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court.34
Respondent's plea and conduct in the Virginia proceedings constituted a submission to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court.
Whether the Virginia decree granting petitioner an absolute divorce is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the District of Columbia?35
The full faith and credit clause and the implementing Act of May 26, 1790 require that a decree of divorce rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties be given the same effect in the courts of another jurisdiction as it has in the state where rendered.36
Yes. The Virginia court found that petitioner was a resident of Arlington County, Virginia for the requisite time and that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.37 Respondent appeared in the Virginia proceedings, litigated the question of domicile, and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.38 The court granted petitioner an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, divested respondent of rights in his property, and required him to pay $150 per month for support of the daughter.39
Because the Virginia court had jurisdiction, its decree is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the District of Columbia.40 Petitioner is therefore entitled as a matter of right to have the Virginia decree given effect in the District court.41
The Virginia decree granting petitioner an absolute divorce is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the District of Columbia.42
Whether the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Haddock v. Haddock such that the Virginia decree must be given effect in the District of Columbia?43
A divorce decree obtained in the state of the husband's domicile is entitled to full faith and credit in another jurisdiction when the wife has been given actual notice, has appeared and litigated the question of domicile, and has been adjudged at fault in disrupting the marital relation, unlike the situation in Haddock v. Haddock where the wife remained in the state of the matrimonial domicile, did not appear, and was not at fault.44
Yes. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Haddock v. Haddock.45 In Haddock the husband fled the state of the marriage immediately after the ceremony, the wife remained in New York, and she did not appear in the Connecticut proceeding.46 Here petitioner and respondent lived together in the District of Columbia until the 1925 limited divorce.47
Petitioner established domicile in Virginia, gave respondent actual notice by personal service, and she appeared and litigated the domicile question.48 The Virginia court adjudged that respondent had willfully deserted petitioner for more than three years.49 In view of these facts and of her conduct adjudged repugnant to the marital relation, the Virginia domicile was sufficient to entitle petitioner to a divorce having the same force in the District as in Virginia.50
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Haddock v. Haddock such that the Virginia decree must be given effect in the District of Columbia.51