Also known as: abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity · abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity · abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity · Eleventh Amendment abrogation · 11th Amendment immunity abrogation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legislative override of state sovereign immunity from private suits in federal court. Valid abrogation requires Congress to act pursuant to its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than any Article I power.
Anita Ali, owner of a multistate insurance firm, sued the State of Redland Insurance Commission in federal court under a federal statute enacted solely under the commerce power that authorized damages against state regulators blocking approved plans. The commission moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The court granted the motion because the statute supplied no Fourteenth Amendment enforcement basis for overriding state immunity.
Aaron Adams, a depositor in a state-run prepaid tuition program, sued the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board in federal court for alleged misrepresentations under a federal statute. The board asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court dismissed the damages claim because Congress had not validly abrogated immunity through any proper constitutional source.
College Savings Bank is a New Jersey chartered bank located in Princeton, New Jersey. Since 1987 it has marketed and sold CollegeSure certificates of deposit designed to finance the costs of college education. College Savings holds a patent upon the methodology of administering its CollegeSure certificates. Respondent Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board is an arm of the State of Florida. Since 1988 it has administered a tuition prepayment program designed to provide individuals with sufficient funds to cover future college expenses. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act amends the Lanham Act by defining any person to include any State or state instrumentality. It provides that such state entities shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment or any other doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for violations of the Act. Remedies are available to the same extent as against nonstate entities. College Savings brought a patent infringement action against Florida Prepaid in United States District Court in New Jersey. In the same court College Savings also filed the instant action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its own tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAzure Solutions, a waste management company, sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in federal court under a federal environmental statute for cleanup costs at a state-owned site. Pennsylvania moved to dismiss asserting sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion because the statute rested on Article I authority insufficient to abrogate Eleventh Amendment protection.
For about 50 years, the predecessors of respondent Union Gas Co. operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a by-product. The plant was dismantled around 1950. A few years later, Pennsylvania took part in major flood-control efforts along the creek. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements to the property along the creek, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek. The coal tar began to seep into the creek, and the Environmental Protection Agency determined that the tar was a hazardous substance and declared the site the Nation's first emergency Superfund site. Working together, Pennsylvania and the Federal Government cleaned up the area, and the Federal Government reimbursed the State for clean-up costs of $720,000. To recoup these costs, the United States sued Union Gas under §§ 104 and 106 of CERCLA, claiming that Union Gas was liable for such costs because the company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar into the ground near Brodhead Creek. Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the Commonwealth was responsible for at least a portion of the costs because it was an owner or operator of the hazardous-waste site. Its flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contributed to the release of the coal tar into the creek. The District Court dismissed the complaint, accepting Pennsylvania's claim that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, finding no clear expression of congressional intent to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA. While Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended CERCLA by passing SARA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of these amendments. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the language of CERCLA, as amended, clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages and that Congress had the power to do so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 485 U. S. 958 (1988), and affirmed.
View caseAdrian Aguilar, a university professor, sued the Florida Board of Regents in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act seeking damages for forced retirement. The board moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The court granted the motion because the statute lacked a valid Fourteenth Amendment basis for abrogation.
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which initially applied only to private employers. In 1974 Congress amended the Act through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments to extend its substantive requirements to the States. Congress redefined the term employer to include a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State. The same legislation also amended the incorporated Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement provision to authorize suits against any employer including a public agency in federal or state court. In December 1994 Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, associate professors ages 57 and 58 at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, filed suit alleging age discrimination, retaliation for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and disparate impact from an evaluation system. In April 1995 J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., and other current and former faculty and librarians over age 40 at Florida State University and Florida International University filed suit against the Florida Board of Regents alleging that the failure to allocate previously agreed market-adjustment salary funds had a disparate impact on employees with longer service records. In May 1996 Wellington Dickson filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections alleging failure to promote him because of his age and in retaliation for grievances concerning age discrimination. The District Court in the MacPherson case granted the university's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The District Courts in the Kimel and Dickson cases denied the state defendants' motions to dismiss. The United States intervened in all three cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and held that the ADEA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.
View caseAnthony Arnold, a wheelchair user, sued the State of Tennessee in federal court under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act after being denied access to a courthouse. Tennessee moved to dismiss asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court denied the motion because the statute validly abrogated immunity as applied to the fundamental right of court access under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In August 1998, respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this action against the State of Tennessee and several Tennessee counties. They alleged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Both respondents are paraplegics who use wheelchairs for mobility. They claimed that they were denied access to and the services of the state court system by reason of their disabilities. Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When Lane returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom. He consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to several county courthouses. As a result, she has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process. Respondents sought damages and equitable relief. The State moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion without opinion, and the State appealed. The United States intervened to defend Title II's abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. On April 28, 2000, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an order holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. In Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA. It left open the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for money damages under Title II. Following the Garrett decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard argument in a Title II suit brought by a hearing-impaired litigant. The litigant sought money damages for the State's failure to accommodate his disability in a child custody proceeding. A divided court permitted the suit to proceed despite the State's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Following the en banc decision in Popovich, a panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the District Court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss in this case. The order explained that respondents' claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a petition for rehearing arguing that Popovich was not controlling because the complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion. It explained that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to the courts. It also explained that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The panel did not, however, categorically reject the State's submission. It instead noted that the case presented difficult questions that cannot be clarified absent a factual record, and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the case.
View caseCongress must clearly express its intent to subject states to suit and must act pursuant to a constitutional provision that authorizes abrogation. Only the enforcement power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment supplies that authority. Article I powers such as the commerce power are insufficient.
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No. A clear statement is necessary but not sufficient. Congress must also rely on a valid source of power, which means Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statutes resting solely on Article I authority cannot override Eleventh Amendment immunity even when they expressly authorize private damages actions.
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No. The Supreme Court has held that Congress's Article I powers, including the commerce power and the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, do not authorize abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Any valid abrogation must rest on the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power instead.
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