541 U.S. 509 (2004)
In August 1998, respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this action against the State of Tennessee and several Tennessee counties.1 They alleged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.2 Both respondents are paraplegics who use wheelchairs for mobility.3 They claimed that they were denied access to and the services of the state court system by reason of their disabilities.4
Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator.5 At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom.6 When Lane returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom.7 He consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear.8
Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to several county courthouses.9 As a result, she has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process.10 Respondents sought damages and equitable relief.11 The State moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.12 The District Court denied the motion without opinion, and the State appealed.13
The United States intervened to defend Title II's abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.14 On April 28, 2000, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an order holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett.15 In Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA.16 It left open the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for money damages under Title II.17
Following the Garrett decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard argument in a Title II suit brought by a hearing-impaired litigant.18 The litigant sought money damages for the State's failure to accommodate his disability in a child custody proceeding.19 A divided court permitted the suit to proceed despite the State's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity.20 Following the en banc decision in Popovich, a panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the District Court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss in this case.21 The order explained that respondents' claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles.22
In response to a petition for rehearing arguing that Popovich was not controlling because the complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion.23 It explained that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to the courts.24 It also explained that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.25 The panel did not, however, categorically reject the State's submission.26 It instead noted that the case presented difficult questions that cannot be clarified absent a factual record, and remanded for further proceedings.27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the case.28
Whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA?29
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private parties against a State unless the State consents to the suit or Congress validly exercises its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the State's immunity.30 In determining whether Congress has validly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, a court must answer two questions. First, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity. Second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.31
Yes. The ADA specifically provides that a State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.32 This statutory language leaves no doubt about Congress's intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. The first question is therefore answered in the affirmative based on the clear text of the statute.
Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA.33
Whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in authorizing private suits for damages against the States under Title II of the ADA as applied to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts?34
Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its section 5 power.35 Legislation must be congruent and proportional to the unconstitutional injury being addressed.36 The first step is to identify the scope of the constitutional right at issue, which here is the fundamental right of access to the courts protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to petition for redress of grievances.37
Yes. The right of access to the courts is an aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment's right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.38 The right is also fundamental to a democratic society.39 The State must afford the disabled meaningful access to its judicial system.40 The legislative record of the ADA includes numerous examples of the exclusion and irrational treatment of the disabled in the administration of justice.41
The history of the ADA demonstrates that Congress was presented with evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional treatment of the disabled in the administration of state services and programs, including the judicial system.42 Given the pervasiveness of the discrimination against the disabled and the evidence before Congress of a pattern of exclusion and irrational treatment, Title II as applied to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts is a congruent and proportional response to the constitutional violations that Congress sought to remedy.43 Title II requires only reasonable modifications to public services and programs to avoid discrimination against the disabled and does not require the States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to the disabled.44 The remedy is limited in that it applies only to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.45
Title II of the ADA, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's provisions.46
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Souter joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to emphasize that the history of the ADA and the evidence of discrimination against the disabled in the administration of justice provide ample support for Congress' determination that prophylactic legislation was necessary.47 He noted that if the Court engaged in a more expansive enquiry, the evidence would underscore the appropriateness of action under section 5 to address the situation of disabled individuals before the courts.48 This evidence would show that the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very discrimination subject to congressional remedy under section 5.49
Souter pointed to historical examples such as Buck v. Bell and other laws compelling sterilization and institutionalization that were judicially sustained yet reflected a failure to account for individual capacities.50 He concluded that sustaining Title II represents a welcome step away from the judiciary's prior endorsement of blunt instruments imposing legal handicaps.51
Joined by Souter And Breyer
Justice Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion and stressed that the ADA represents a valid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly as applied to cases involving access to the courts, a right of fundamental importance.52 She explained that Congress understood that including individuals with disabilities among people who count in composing We the People would sometimes require not blindfolded equality but responsiveness to difference and accommodation.53 Ginsburg highlighted that the Act comprises three parts prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services, and public accommodations.54
She noted that the Court responded with fidelity to the ADA's accommodation theme in prior cases and that legislation calling upon all government actors to respect the dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with federalism.55 Ginsburg concluded that the record before Congress sufficed to warrant the barrier-lowering national solution elected by the People's representatives.56
Joined by Kennedy And Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented and argued that the legislative record is insufficient to demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States against the disabled in the administration of justice.57 He contended that the Court's decision represents an unwarranted expansion of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and is irreconcilable with Garrett.58 Rehnquist maintained that the first step of the congruence and proportionality inquiry requires identifying the scope of the constitutional right at issue and that the majority set out on a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination rather than focusing on due process violations.59
He noted that much of the evidence concerns nonstate governments and that the record lacks any real evidence that Congress was responding to actual due process violations in access to the courts.60 Rehnquist concluded that Title II can only be understood as a congressional attempt to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court.61
Justice Thomas joined the Chief Justice's dissent and agreed that Title II of the ADA cannot be a congruent and proportional remedy to the States' alleged practice of denying disabled persons access to the courts.62 He noted that Congress failed to identify any evidence of such a practice when it enacted the ADA and that Title II regulates far more than the provision of access to the courts.63 Thomas continued to believe that Hibbs was wrongly decided and wrote separately to disavow any reliance on Hibbs in reaching this conclusion.64
He emphasized that the statute is not congruent and proportional to any pattern of constitutional violations by the States and that the near-total lack of actual constitutional violations in the congressional record is reminiscent of Garrett.65
Justice Scalia dissented and argued that the congruence and proportionality standard is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.66 He stated that section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and that one does not enforce a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed to the same end.67 Scalia would replace the congruence and proportionality test with a clearer standard under which Congress may impose prophylactic section 5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations.68
He concluded that Title II goes beyond enforcement to prophylaxis and is plainly of the latter sort.69 Scalia would apply the permissive McCulloch standard only to measures directed against racial discrimination by the States.70