Concept
Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Invasion of privacy torts
Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a defendant liable for invasion of privacy when the defendant gives publicity to a matter concerning another person’s private life, if the matter is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public.1 The Restatement lists this branch third among the four ways to invade the right of privacy, after intrusion and appropriation and before false light.2 The section yields four elements: publicity, concerning the plaintiff’s private life, highly offensive to a reasonable person, and not of legitimate concern to the public.3 A plaintiff who proves the first three and loses on the fourth recovers nothing.
The matter publicized is true, and that fact shapes everything else in this tort. Section 652D never asks whether the information is false, while false light adds falsity and a fault requirement as elements of its own.4 Truth is therefore no defense, because the plaintiff complains of exposure, and an accurate story exposes more completely than an inaccurate one. For the same reason this branch meets the heaviest constitutional resistance of the four, since the defendant is a publisher reporting accurate facts.
The fourth element carries the burden of protecting that speech. If a jury could award damages whenever an accurate report embarrassed its subject, the press would answer to the jury’s view of what the public ought to hear. The law instead denies recovery, even on facts that are true, private, and humiliating, whenever the public has a legitimate concern in knowing them. The first three elements decide whether an invasion occurred, and the fourth decides whether the law will remedy it.
The subsections take the elements in order. Publicity comes first because it separates this tort from intrusion: a disclosure confined to one person or a small circle lacks the audience this branch demands, however private the subject. The section then covers the private-life, offensiveness, and public-concern elements, the constitutional limit that applies when the information came from public records, and finally the doubts about the tort’s survival and the related claim for breach of confidence.
Publicity Requirement
The plaintiff must first prove that the defendant gave the matter publicity, and the Restatement uses that word differently from the “publication” of defamation. Publication in the defamation sense is any communication by the defendant to a third person. Publicity means that the matter is made public, either by communicating it to the public at large or to so many persons that it must be regarded as substantially certain to become public knowledge.5 The means of communication may be oral, written, or anything else; the difference is whether the communication reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.6
The two terms differ because the two torts injure differently. A defamatory statement damages reputation as soon as one other person hears and believes it. The disclosure tort injures by exposure, and a fact told to one person or a small group has not yet left the plaintiff’s private world. The Restatement draws the line there: communicating a fact about the plaintiff’s private life to a single person, or even to a small group, is not an invasion of privacy.7 The requirement also keeps the tort aimed at broad dissemination, because a rule that reached every confidence passed along in conversation would turn ordinary talk into liability.
The decided cases fall along a spectrum of audience size, and the two ends are easy. Publicity clearly exists when the matter appears in a mass-media publication or broadcast, even to a fairly small readership or audience, because the medium is a channel to the public.8 A newspaper that prints the details of a private person’s extramarital sex life reaches the public through its ordinary channel, and no one counts readers. Publicity is absent, at the other end, when the communication went to one individual or a small number of persons.9 In Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, a creditor telephoned the debtor’s employer to ask for help collecting a debt, and disclosure to that one listener was not an invasion of privacy.10 Privilege could explain that result too, since a creditor has a legitimate interest in collecting what it is owed, but the publicity analysis reaches the same place alone.
Between the ends, headcount does not sort the cases. In Kinsey v. Macur, letters sent to at most twenty people were sufficient publicity, while in Sherr v. HealthEast Care System communication to between thirty-five and forty individuals was not.11 The larger audience lost because the question is whether the matter was substantially certain to become public knowledge, and the number of recipients is only evidence on that question. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc. applies the same question to faxes carrying the plaintiffs’ Social Security numbers to sixteen terminals in six states. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the requirement unmet because the information was not substantially certain to become public.12 Nothing in that limited distribution made wider circulation certain, and a plaintiff who cannot show that certainty has shown only disclosure to some people.
Because the test looks to what the defendant made substantially certain, the defendant answers for the audience the defendant chose, not for every later retelling. A defendant who communicated with only one person or a few is usually not held responsible for publicity that results from repetition by others, as in Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA.13 The answer changes when the defendant knowingly gave the private fact to a journalist, who can be expected to publicize it, as in Arroyo v. Rosen.14
The internet forces courts to apply the audience test where the number of actual readers is hard to know. Some opinions have assumed, with little discussion, that posting something online gives it publicity.15 Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P. examined the question in detail. The majority, relying on comment a, concluded that a publicly accessible web page satisfies the publicity requirement because it is a communication directly to the public, and it held that the number of people who actually viewed the page was irrelevant.16 A concurring opinion called this overbroad because it treats all internet sites alike, although some sites are not meant to reach many people and are not in fact viewed by many.17 The majority’s logic matches the mass-media end of the spectrum, since a posting anyone can open is aimed at the public and a plaintiff should not have to count clicks. The concurrence leaves room to distinguish a page anyone can open from one that only a few people were meant to see.
A minority approach relaxes the audience requirement when the recipients are a “particular public” whose knowledge of the facts would be especially embarrassing to the plaintiff. The reasoning starts from experience: people are often more distressed by revelation to those with whom they have a social or business relationship than by revelation to strangers.18 Beginning with Beaumont v. Brown, courts in a few states have found sufficient publicity when facts reached fellow employees, club members, church members, neighbors, or family, and Miller v. Motorola, Inc. is a further example.19 Minnesota rejected the approach in Bodah.20 The objection from the tort’s structure is that publicity separates making a matter public from merely sharing it, and once a small audience counts whenever it matters to the plaintiff, the element stops screening out ordinary talk at work and in the neighborhood.
Employment disputes show the split most clearly, because the people who hear about an employee are usually coworkers. In Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., the court said that a plaintiff with a special relationship to the recipients may satisfy publicity by disclosure to a small number of people, and in Pachowitz v. LeDoux a medic’s disclosure of the plaintiff’s drug overdose to a friend who was also a coworker was sufficient.21 By contrast, in C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., applying Minnesota law, a manager’s disclosure to coworkers of the embarrassing grounds for the plaintiff’s medical leave was not enough.22 Most courts require that the private information be made widely public, with disclosure to people outside the workplace who have no need to know it, and they weigh the degree of exposure, the sensitivity of the facts, and the need for legitimate business communication.23 A psychologist’s letter reviewed only by supervisors with a direct interest in the plaintiff’s employment therefore did not meet the requirement.24
Publicity also presupposes that the audience can tell whom the matter concerns. There is publicity concerning the private life of another only when that person is identifiable to the recipients of the communication, and courts have refused recovery where the plaintiff could not be identified as the subject.25 The reason follows from the injury, which is the exposure of a particular person. If the audience cannot connect the matter to the plaintiff, no one has been exposed to them, however widely the matter circulated.
Some courts relax the audience requirement when the defendant obtained the information improperly, or disclosed it in breach of a fiduciary, confidential, or contractual duty not to do so, so that a dissemination short of publicity may still support a claim.26 Where the wrong is a betrayal of trust, the injury does not depend on how many people were told, which is why the audience rule bends. The last subsection of this section returns to that breach-of-confidence route.
The usual exam error is to borrow the defamation standard and treat a statement to one coworker or one creditor as enough. Defamation asks only whether a third person heard the statement, while this tort asks whether the matter was made public.
Private Facts Only
Section 652D reaches publicity given to “a matter concerning the private life of another,” and that phrase limits the tort as much as it describes it.28 Comment b states the limit: the rule applies only to the private, as distinguished from the public, life of the individual, and there is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information that is already public.29 The comment’s examples of public-record matters include a date of birth, a marriage, a military record, a license to practice medicine or drive a taxicab, and the pleadings the plaintiff has filed in a lawsuit. A record closed to public inspection, such as an income tax return, is not public, and publicizing it invades privacy because the publicity is what makes the matter public.30
The limit follows from what the tort protects. Disclosure injures by exposure, and a record open to public inspection has already exposed the fact, so a defendant who repeats it takes nothing that any member of the public could not collect. The limit also protects speech about public life, since a rule letting plaintiffs sue over the repetition of a pleading, a license, or a marriage record would suppress commentary on public records. The private-life element screens out those claims before offensiveness and public concern come into play, and the Constitution adds its own limit on liability for information drawn from public records, which a later subsection develops.
The working distinction separates a matter that is private, in the sense that it is not known or available beyond a small number of persons, from one that is public, in the sense that it is known or available to the public generally or to many of its members.31 Public matters include what appears in open public records and what is visible when a person is in or seen from a public place. Information posted on social networking websites is likewise treated as not private, because facts already known or available to the public carry no liability.32
Availability decides the record cases, and the number of people who have read the record does not. A detail in a courthouse file that almost no one has opened is still a matter of public record, and publicizing it is not publicizing private life.33 A record closed to the public receives different treatment.
Public records and public sights are the easy cases, because anyone can check availability. The hard cases involve a fact that appears in no record and shows in no public place but is already known to some people, and the decisions show how courts work through that middle. In Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, a television broadcast revealed that the plaintiff had AIDS, a fact already known to his family, a number of friends, medical personnel, and members of an AIDS support group. A majority of the court affirmed a judgment for him, although dissenting judges would have rejected the claim because his condition was already so widely known.34 In Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, the plaintiff had told selected neighbors, friends, family members, and the officials investigating a murder that she had discovered the victim’s body, and the court decided that this telling did not make the fact public.35
Two other decisions went the other way on facts that look similar at first. In Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., the plaintiff’s romantic relationship with a married man was held a public fact, because the couple appeared in public together and eventually lived together.36 In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., the plaintiff’s principal grievance was that publicity about his sexual orientation had made it known to his family, and the claim failed in part because it was widely known in San Francisco and elsewhere that he was gay.37
What separates the pairs is who controlled the spread of the fact and how far it had gone. The plaintiffs in Kubach and Times Mirror had chosen the people who knew, and those people were relatives, friends, caregivers, fellow patients, or investigators with a reason to hear, so the fact stayed inside a circle the plaintiff drew. In Chisholm the plaintiff’s own conduct carried the relationship into public view, and in Sipple the fact was already known across a city, so the circle had broken before the defendant acted. Secrecy is not all-or-nothing, which is why the line falls here. A rule that treated telling a doctor, a support group, or a friend as the end of privacy would punish people for seeking help and comfort, and a rule that kept a fact private as long as some people did not know it would let a plaintiff suppress what the community already knew. An exam answer on a middle case should therefore name the facts pointing each way, because courts have divided on them, as the dissent in Kubach shows.
This element and the publicity element look at opposite ends of the same timeline. Publicity asks about the audience the defendant reached, and the private-matter element asks about the audience that already knew before the defendant acted. A small audience on the defendant’s side defeats publicity, a small audience on the plaintiff’s side leaves the matter private, and the analysis must keep the two apart.
A criminal record raises a question of time. A conviction may qualify as private when the person has kept a clean record for a fair amount of time since, because criminals are objects of legitimate public interest for a period after their conduct brings them to public attention, but the conduct no longer deserves that attention once they return to lawful life. A recent crime, by contrast, is likely to be treated as a matter of public record.38 The default for an open record remains that it is not private, and the clean-record refinement belongs with the newsworthiness analysis in the later subsection on legitimate public concern.
Steps two and five carry most of the weight in practice. Step two ends the claim quickly when a record is open, and step five is where courts divide and where an answer earns credit for naming the facts that point each way.
Highly Offensive Disclosure
Section 652D makes disclosure actionable only if the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.40 The text attaches the offensiveness to the matter, but the working question is whether publicizing the private matter would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.41 This element asks something different from the two before it. Publicity and private life ask whether a private matter was made public, and offensiveness asks whether the exposure is a serious enough injury for the law to redress.
The bar is high because the information is true. Truth is no defense, so accuracy cannot separate liability from freedom to speak, and something else must separate actionable exposure from the ordinary embarrassment that accurate reporting often causes. The element has two parts. “Highly offensive” sets the level of injury and excludes the merely uncomfortable or unflattering, and “reasonable person” sets an objective yardstick, so the plaintiff’s own sensitivity does not fix the limit everyone else must observe. A speaker can then judge beforehand whether a statement about a neighbor or an employee is safe.
In practice the requirement confines liability to verbal and visual revelations of the most intimate, sensitive, or embarrassing personal matters.42 Sexual matters, medical or physical conditions, and nudity form the core. Publicizing a plaintiff’s financial condition or transactions, the fact of being the victim of a serious crime, or misconduct (or an allegation of misconduct) that is not a matter of legitimate public interest when publicized could also be found highly offensive, depending on the matter revealed and the context.43 These categories share a feature: people ordinarily guard such facts from everyone except those closest to them, and exposing them takes away control over how one is seen in a way an ordinary person would strongly resent. Publicizing a private person’s sexual orientation, an extramarital affair, or a fatal illness therefore sits well inside the requirement.44
The cases that fall short show where the line lies. Police surveillance of lawful activity would offend many people, yet no cause of action arises when what is publicized is the plaintiff’s attendance at union meetings, as opposed to something as personal and sensitive as sexual orientation, an extramarital affair, or a fatal illness.45 Courts have likewise ruled that publicity was not highly offensive, or could not be found so, in Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., which involved the plaintiff’s overnight hotel stay and the charges on the receipt; in Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., which involved a public romantic relationship with a married man; in Sandler v. Calcagni, which involved plastic surgery on the nose; and in Brown v. CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C., which involved a Drug Enforcement Agency and police investigation of a physician.46 The category label does not decide these cases. A cosmetic procedure on a visible feature is medical in a technical sense yet falls at the low end of the range, while a fatal illness the plaintiff has told only family falls at the high end. What separates the two lists is how intimate the matter is and how closely people keep it.
The objective standard also decides cases in which the plaintiff’s reaction is sincere but unusual. In Bitsie v. Walston, the plaintiff’s family held traditional Navajo beliefs about taking a child’s photograph, and the court held those beliefs insufficient to make publication highly offensive where the defendant newspaper did not know of them.47 The family’s feeling was real, but the standard asks how a person of ordinary sensibilities would react, and a rule keyed to private beliefs would require publishers to anticipate convictions they have no way to learn.
When no court has definitively ruled on whether a particular kind of publicity is highly offensive, the trier of fact, whether jury or trial judge, decides.48 The decisions above explain why many claims end earlier, since a court that has already held a type of matter not highly offensive, such as a hotel receipt, can resolve the issue as a matter of law. Employment cases treat the requirement as a separate hurdle even after the plaintiff shows that a private matter reached the workplace: the private matter disclosed publicly must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.49
A defendant who is not a media organization may also use the reason for disclosing to reduce the offensiveness of the publicity. A reasonable person reacts differently to a fact passed to someone who needs it than to the same fact spread for idle exposure. In Werner v. Kliewer, a physician told the judge in a patient’s divorce and child custody case about the patient’s psychiatric problems, which illustrates how the reason for a disclosure can bear on offensiveness.50 The alternative is a qualified privilege to communicate information to protect a legitimate interest, borrowed from defamation law through § 652G.51 Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. found such a privilege for medical information supplied with a life insurance application and passed to a medical information bureau, and Young v. Jackson held a nuclear power station supervisor privileged to tell workers that the plaintiff was hospitalized because of a hysterectomy, in order to allay fears that radiation had injured her.52 A media defendant’s justification is usually litigated through the public-concern element, which the next subsection takes up.
The usual exam error is to answer this element by saying the plaintiff was upset or embarrassed. That describes the plaintiff’s reaction and never reaches the question the element asks, which is whether an ordinary person would find the publicity of this matter highly offensive.
Legitimate Public Concern
The last requirement of § 652D keeps the tort away from information the public is entitled to have. A defendant is liable only if the matter publicized is not of legitimate concern to the public, so a plaintiff who has shown publicity, a private matter, and a highly offensive exposure has proved only that something sensitive was revealed.54 The Restatement asks whether the public had a claim to know it by looking to the community: account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community, and in the last analysis the standard is a matter of community mores. The line falls where publicity stops giving the public information to which it is entitled and becomes a “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”55 That phrase marks the floor, and everything above it, a very large territory, counts as legitimate public concern.
The plaintiff’s wish for silence is present in every disclosure case, so it cannot separate the claims that should succeed from the claims that should fail, and the community’s standards do that work instead. A second reason for the breadth lies in who would otherwise do the sorting. Editors decide what the public should hear, and what one reader finds newsworthy another finds tedious, so if a jury could award damages whenever it later concluded that a true story was not worth telling, an editor weighing a borderline story would have to predict that verdict and would often drop the story. The law therefore defines legitimate concern generously, to include information published for education, amusement, or enlightenment, and courts have refused to distinguish news that informs from news that entertains.56 Avoiding conflict with the First Amendment is a further reason, and it produces deference to editorial judgment, since “it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered.”57 A conventional media defendant who publishes true information therefore seldom loses.58
One consequence of that breadth is the nexus rule. A fact is covered if it has substantial relevance to, or a connection with, a topic of legitimate public concern, and a person’s link to such a topic is itself usually treated as newsworthy even when the person is only one example among many.59 The reasoning follows from how stories are told: a report on an institution or an event reaches readers through the people it affects, and a rule forcing the publisher to anonymize them would strip out the detail that makes the report credible. In Howard v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., a newspaper report on deficiencies at a county home identified the plaintiff as one of the residents who had been involuntarily sterilized, and the Iowa court found that the identification gave readers a personalized frame of reference, lent the report specificity and credibility, and could not reasonably be held devoid of news value.60 Courts do not apply the rule uniformly. Some have refused to dismiss claims in which a broadcast on a prosecutor’s victim assistance program identified plaintiffs as victims of domestic violence, in Baugh v. CBS, Inc., or in which a report on a hospital’s in vitro fertilization program identified participants, in Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis.61
The connection must also reach the particular detail published, and two decisions show where it gives out. In Jackson v. Mayweather, the California Court of Appeal held that a boxer’s social media posts about the end of his former fiancée’s pregnancy fell within the broad newsworthiness privilege, given her high profile and her own voluntary disclosure of many aspects of her personal life. It drew the line at his publication of sonogram photographs of the twins she had been carrying, because publishing those images served no legitimate public purpose even when entertainment news is counted.62 In Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., a woman had taken part in a news broadcast about the risks and benefits of plastic surgery, and the Utah Supreme Court refused summary judgment on whether that appearance created a legitimate public interest in explicit nude photographs of her surgical results, because reasonable minds could differ.63 A newsworthy subject licenses the facts that help tell the story, while intimate images that add nothing to it remain open to challenge.
Newsworthiness also widens with the plaintiff’s role in public life. For a person who has assumed or sought a prominent place in society, the public’s legitimate interest may extend beyond the matters the person made public and include information that would otherwise be private, as comment e to § 652D explains.64 A court found public interest in a popular actress’s life broad enough to include her Los Angeles home address in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., and the interest can reach relatives and associates, as when a publication recounted, eighteen years later, the plaintiff’s brief teenage marriage to a girl who became a prominent actress, in Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.65 A public role invites public judgment of the person, and the information the public uses to judge is not limited to what the person chose to release.
Fame that has faded tests that principle, and Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. is the leading illustration. William James Sidis was a famous child prodigy who lectured to mathematicians at eleven and graduated from Harvard at sixteen, and he later lived as an obscure clerk who avoided public attention.66 The New Yorker ran a “Where Are They Now?” sketch that accurately traced his life, down to the untidiness of his hall bedroom, his manner of speech, and his collection of streetcar transfers.67 The Second Circuit conceded that under the strict standards of Warren and Brandeis his privacy had been invaded, yet it declined to give private life an absolute immunity from the press. It reasoned that his achievements made public attention permissible even if he disliked it, and that his later history, which answered whether he had fulfilled his early promise, remained a matter of public concern.68 Truthful comment on the dress, speech, habits, and ordinary personality of such a person will usually stay within the line, but the court reserved a limit: revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency.69 The court added that proof of actual malice would not change the result, because a truthful statement does not become actionable merely because it is uttered maliciously.70
Courts disagree about how long fame lasts, and some let the jury decide whether a person’s fame or infamy has faded enough to make a disclosure offensive.71 The question was sharpest for criminal pasts. Melvin v. Reid let a former prostitute who had been tried for murder and acquitted sue over a film about her past, and Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n let a rehabilitated criminal sue over a magazine story, reasoning that the facts of the incident were in the public domain but the identification of the actor was not.72 Briscoe was later overruled in Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and the combined effect of those decisions is to exclude almost all liability for reporting that a person was once convicted, jailed, charged, or arrested, however minor the offense and however long the plaintiff has since lived lawfully, at least when the report rests on official information.73 The constitutional rule behind that exclusion is the subject of the next subsection, and it narrows the clean-record refinement noted earlier considerably.
Newsworthiness is broader still for people who acquired public attention without seeking it, such as the victim or perpetrator of a crime, a person accused of a crime or otherwise a party or witness in a judicial proceeding, the victim of an accident or catastrophe, or someone who performed a heroic deed.74 These plaintiffs did nothing to invite attention, which makes the rule look harsh, but the event is what the public has a legitimate interest in, and its participants cannot be edited out without changing the event. Sipple shows the rule at work. Sipple grabbed or struck the arm of Sarah Jane Moore as she tried to shoot President Ford in 1975, and a newspaper column then disclosed that he was gay, which his family learned from the column. The court affirmed summary judgment for the publisher, because the information was widely known and the publications were prompted by legitimate political considerations, namely dispelling the false public opinion that gay people were timid, weak, and unheroic and raising the question whether the President was biased against a minority, and not by morbid and sensational prying.75 A concurring justice on a state supreme court, writing in a case where the majority rejected the tort altogether, stated the principle by quoting an earlier decision: there are times when one, “whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest.” The justice concluded that the plaintiffs, however much they wished to keep their personal histories out of public view, became a legitimate public concern when the central event occurred.76 An exam stem on this element usually turns on the plaintiff’s status, so the first task is to decide whether the plaintiff sought a public role, was drawn into a public event, or has no connection to any public matter.
Not everything published in informational or entertainment media qualifies as a matter of legitimate public concern, and that is why the floor matters.77 The clearest case below it is revenge porn, the posting, usually online, of intimate images of a former partner as revenge for ending the relationship. The images serve no legitimate public purpose and connect to no matter in which the public has a stake, so the privacy interest strongly outweighs any public interest and a cause of action would undoubtedly be available.78 In Patel v. Hussain, a jilted former partner uploaded secretly recorded sexual videos of his former girlfriend and told her in text messages that the videos would never go away, and a Texas appellate court affirmed a jury award of $500,000 in noneconomic damages for intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.79 Statutes in most states now make the conduct a crime or a civil wrong, so a plaintiff may also have a statutory route.80
The court and the jury divide the work of applying the standard. Many courts decide as a matter of law that the matter was of legitimate public concern, and in the absence of such a ruling newsworthiness goes to the trier of fact, with the burden on the plaintiff, since it is error to put the burden of proof on the defendant.81 A concurring justice who would have kept the tort defended the first step on the ground that the chilling effect on publishers is minimized if the issue is initially a question of law: when every reasonable person applying the proper standard would have to conclude that the matter was of legitimate concern, the publication is privileged and summary judgment is proper.82 Some decisions go further and treat the public-concern limit as a First Amendment rule in addition to a rule of tort law.83
Step two is where most fact patterns are won, but a student who stops there after labeling the plaintiff a public figure misses what Jackson v. Mayweather and Judge v. Saltz teach, which is that status still leaves the particular detail to be tested at step three.
Public Records and Cox
The First Amendment adds a ceiling to the disclosure tort that the tort’s own elements do not supply, and the decision that first set that ceiling is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. The question there was whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may allow damages for invasion of privacy caused by publishing the name of a deceased rape victim that had been publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.85 The earlier subsections explained that publicizing what is already public is no tort at all, because the matter is not private. Cox addresses what happens when a state’s law reaches that publicity anyway, and its answer is that the Constitution blocks liability for a defined class of information. This subsection marks the edges of that class, including the edges the Court left unmarked.
The facts explain why the claim drew sympathy. A 17-year-old girl was raped and did not survive, and six youths were indicted for murder and rape. Georgia made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name of a rape victim, and the press withheld her name before trial, perhaps because of that statute.86 Eight months later the defendants appeared in court and five pleaded guilty. A reporter named Wassell, who worked for station WSB-TV, learned the victim’s name from the indictments, which were made available for inspection in the courtroom, and broadcast it that day and again the next.87 The victim’s father sued, claiming that the broadcasts invaded his own privacy. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a common-law claim for public disclosure, left the question of invasion to the trier of fact, and agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not as a matter of law require judgment for the broadcasters.88
The United States Supreme Court held that a State may not impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from judicial records that are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and are themselves open to public inspection.89 Georgia had a statute protecting victims’ names, and the broadcasters still prevailed because the name came from an open court file. The holding is also narrower than the one the broadcasters requested. They urged a rule that the press may never be held liable for accurate information, however damaging, and the Court chose to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that the case presented, instead of deciding “the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”90
The reasons for the rule explain why it attaches to the source of the information. Each person has limited time and resources to watch the government at first hand, so each depends on the press to report its operations in convenient form, and official records open to the public are the basic data of those operations.91 Reports of judicial proceedings matter most of all, because press coverage helps guarantee fair trials and subjects the administration of justice to public scrutiny.92 If a state could punish the press for repeating what the court itself placed in a file open to any visitor, a reporter would have to guess which entries in an open record are safe to repeat, and the public would receive a filtered version of the court’s own work. The state keeps a way to protect sensitive information, since it controls what its own agencies put in open files, and an interest in privacy can almost always be served by keeping information out of the open record in the first place.93
The conclusion also matches the tort’s own boundaries, which is why Cox fits with the earlier subsection on private facts. The Court pointed out that the Restatement’s commentary denies liability for giving further publicity to matters of public record, and denies liability under the intrusion tort for examining a public record, so the interests in privacy fade when the information already appears on the public record.94 It added that a trial is a public event and, in the words of an earlier decision it quoted, “[t]hose who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.”95 Georgia’s action imposed sanctions on pure expression, the content of a publication, and truthful information from the public record has none of the features of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, such as fighting words, so the Court found the sanction unjustified.96
Later decisions carried the rule beyond trial records. The Court went past judicial files when it allowed media to publish the names of juveniles charged with a crime that were learned by monitoring a police radio, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., and to publish a rape victim’s name taken from a police report, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.97 In Florida Star, a reporter had lawfully copied a police report that mistakenly included the victim’s name, the newspaper printed it in violation of a Florida statute, and the Court held the publication not actionable on a negligence per se theory because it was truthful information about a matter of public interest.98 The difference from Cox lies in the source. A police report is not a record of judicial proceedings, so the special protection for reports of court proceedings was not available, and the Court relied on a broader formulation: when a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of it absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.99
That one qualification seldom changes an outcome. The interest that lost in Florida Star was the weighty one of protecting victims of sexual assault, and since a state can almost always protect privacy by controlling what its own agencies release, the qualification does little work in practice.100 The working rule is that it violates the First Amendment to award damages for media publication of information in an open public record or lawfully obtained from the government.101
Cox marks its own limits, and they matter as much as the rule. The Court stressed that the case did not involve appropriation, a physical intrusion, or private information that is also false, and that the version of the privacy tort before it is the one where privacy claims most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.102 It then recalled that Time, Inc. v. Hill had expressly saved the question whether truthful publication of very private matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally punished, and Cox left that question open as well.103 The broadcasters had argued that the First Amendment bars sanctions whether the information came from public records or from their own investigation, and because they prevailed on the narrower public-record ground, the Court did not address that contention.104 A third reservation concerns access: the Court implied nothing about a state policy that denies the public and press access to official records, such as juvenile-court records.105
The usual exam error is to read Cox as holding that accuracy always immunizes a publisher. The decision protects publication of information drawn from open public records, and the later cases extend the protection to truthful information about a matter of public significance that the publisher lawfully obtained from the government.106 A plaintiff whose information reached the publisher from a private source or through the publisher’s own investigation still has a claim to test against the elements covered in the previous subsections.
Viability and Breach of Confidence
Section 652D still states the disclosure tort in the terms the earlier subsections worked through: publicity given to a private matter that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public.108 Whether a given state will enforce that rule is a separate question, because the tort punishes the telling of true facts, and the Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.109 That open question gives state courts room to push back, and a few have used it to reject the tort outright. This subsection first explains why the tort’s standing is contested and then turns to breach of confidence, a distinct claim that reaches some disclosures the privacy tort cannot.
The leading rejection came in Hall v. Post. The Salisbury Post ran two articles about a couple’s search for the wife’s daughter, whom she and her former husband had abandoned in Rowan County seventeen years earlier. The second article reported that the child had been found, named her as Susie Hall and her adoptive mother as Mary Hall, and described a telephone encounter between the two families and the emotions on both sides.110 The Halls alleged that they fled their home to avoid the attention and that each sought psychiatric care for the resulting distress. The case was litigated as one of truthful disclosure, and the newspaper argued that liability would violate the First Amendment or, alternatively, that North Carolina should decline to adopt the tort at all.111
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that claims for invasion of privacy by publication of true but private facts are not cognizable in the state.112 The court had already recognized the appropriation branch, but it had never applied the two branches that arise from publicity, because those branches most directly affect the freedoms of speech and press.113 It did not answer the broader constitutional question. It found it enough that adopting the tort would add to the existing tensions between the First Amendment and the law of torts and would be of little practical value to anyone, and it observed that a reasonable argument could be made that true statements deserve no less protection than the false ones that already receive breathing space.114
A concurring justice agreed that the defendants should win but took the opposite view of the tort. He would have adopted the elements of § 652D, and he found summary judgment proper because the articles told a story of public interest: however much the plaintiffs wished to keep their histories private, they became a legitimate public concern when the child’s mother returned to look for her.115 The majority and the concurrence reach the same outcome by different routes, and the difference is the point of this subsection. Under the majority’s rule a North Carolina plaintiff never reaches the elements. In a state that follows the Restatement, the Halls’ claim would be tested against the legitimate-public-concern element, and the story of a mother’s search for her abandoned child would be a hard one for them to win on that element.
Other jurisdictions have rejected or confined the tort on different grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court refused to recognize it in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Companies, Inc., criticizing the ad hoc review of newsworthiness it requires, since one reader’s news is another’s tedium and some editors may think the community should see what the majority finds uninteresting or offensive.116 The Oregon court also objected that the publicity requirement singles out the print, film, and broadcast media for restraints that would not reach gossipmongers, letter writers, or “telephone tattlers.”117 New York, whose privacy statute covers only appropriation, has no private-facts claim, and a plurality in Indiana reasoned that emotional injury from disclosure is no worse than other emotional injury, so a plaintiff should recover, if at all, for intentional infliction of emotional distress.118 Later Indiana decisions suggest the state may yet recognize the tort, which shows how unsettled the question remains.119
The criticisms come from three different parts of the tort. The constitutional objection says that punishing accurate speech sits uneasily with the First Amendment. The administrative objection says that newsworthiness must be judged case by case, and that the publicity element aims the tort at publishers while leaving other speakers alone. The practical objection says that the tort delivers little: the North Carolina court thought juries were unlikely to find a defendant liable without also finding intentional infliction of emotional distress.120 The remedy is a money judgment after the harm is done, because an injunction against further publication would be an unconstitutional prior restraint, as in Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, and litigation also spreads the very facts the plaintiff wanted hidden.121
The resulting picture is lopsided. Plaintiffs’ prospects are low, especially once a case reaches an appellate court, and affirmance of a damages judgment is a rarity in the published decisions.122 Yet the North Carolina and Oregon decisions have not been adopted, or even much noticed, by courts in other states, so the tort remains one of the four privacy torts unless the Supreme Court holds that the First Amendment bars liability for publicizing true information.123 An exam fact pattern that is silent about the jurisdiction should therefore be analyzed under § 652D, and a rejection of the tort matters only when the question says the state has rejected it.
The decisions that reject the tort leave room for liability when the defendant is a wrongdoer in some respect other than publishing the truth, as where the defendant breaches a confidence, obtains the information wrongfully, or intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress.125 Breach of confidence is the first of those routes. It is a tort claim for revealing private information in violation of an obligation to keep it secret, and it is entirely distinct from the four privacy torts in the Restatement.126 Unlike the disclosure tort, it requires no publicity, so a defendant can be liable for telling a few people or only one, but it does require that the defendant have been under an obligation of confidence that the disclosure violated.127
The two requirements trade places between the torts. In the disclosure tort the injury is exposure, so the audience must be large, and in breach of confidence the injury is betrayal, so one listener can complete it. The filter that keeps the claim from reaching ordinary talk moves from how many people were told to whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of secrecy. Without that filter, anyone who repeated a sensitive fact could be sued. That is why many people who repeat sensitive personal information are under no such obligation and cannot be liable, and why breach of confidence is usually not a viable action against mass media or gossip.128
Courts in the United States have recognized the action mainly against health care professionals and employees with access to confidential medical information, as in Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C. and Biddle v. Warren General Hospital.129 The obligation can rest on professional ethics, on the patient’s expectation that medical details will be held in confidence, and on state-law privileges against disclosure of medical records.130 Similar grounds may support a claim against an attorney or an employee with access to confidential legal records; an accounting firm was held liable to a client in Waggenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., and banks have been held to owe confidence about customer accounts because that duty is implied in the contract with the customer.131
An expectation of secrecy cannot stand in for the duty. In Wynne v. Orcutt Union School District, a mother told her son’s teacher in strict confidence that the boy had a progressively disabling and eventually fatal disease that he did not yet know about, and the teacher’s disclosure of it to his classmates produced no liability because the teacher was under no duty of non-disclosure.132 The court in Evans v. Rite Aid Corp. likewise denied a claim for a pharmacy’s disclosure of a customer’s prescription, although Fanean v. Rite Aid Corp. and Anonymous v. CVS Corp. reached contrary results, so the pharmacy question is unsettled.133 Where a duty does exist, liability can follow an accidental revelation as well as a deliberate one, as when a psychiatrist’s book insufficiently disguised a patient’s identity in Doe v. Roe, or when a claim form stating that the plaintiff was treated for alcoholism detoxification went to the employer of the plaintiff’s husband in Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc.134
Even a real duty has limits. Cases against physicians accept exceptions when disclosure is considered necessary in the interests of the patient, of other individuals, or of the public, as when a physician was privileged to tell a small hotel’s proprietor that a guest had a contagious disease in Simonsen v. Swenson, or when a psychologist told the police and a boy’s family about a threat to the boy’s life in Oringer v. Rotkin.135 A disclosure made to head off a danger fits those exceptions, and a disclosure made only because the listener is close to the patient does not. With no danger to the patient, the spouse, or a third person, there is no general allowance to tell a patient’s spouse, as MacDonald v. Clinger held.136
Breach of confidence also rests on firmer constitutional ground than the disclosure tort. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., a source whom reporters had promised confidentiality sued the newspapers for publishing his identity, and the Supreme Court held, by a 5–4 vote, that liability on a promissory estoppel theory would not violate the First Amendment, emphasizing that the doctrine was a law of general application that did not single out the press.137 The objection that persuaded the North Carolina court, that the tort punishes publishers for telling the truth, carries less force when liability rests on the defendant’s own broken undertaking. Liability can also reach a person who induced a physician to breach the obligation, as in Alberts v. Devine and Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., or one who disclosed confidential information acquired by wrongful means.138