Concept
Appropriation of Name or Likeness
Invasion of privacy torts
Appropriation of Name or Likeness
Appropriation was the first type of invasion of privacy that courts recognized,1 and it asks the simplest question of the four: what did the defendant do with the plaintiff’s identity? Warren and Brandeis proposed in 1890 that a right of privacy would protect a person’s appearance, sayings, acts, and personal relations against the abuses of the press.2 The Restatement now lists appropriation second among the four ways of invading that right, after intrusion upon seclusion.3
The claim also demands less of the plaintiff than its neighbors do. Disclosure requires publicity about the plaintiff’s private life, and false light requires a false portrayal; each also requires that the publicity be highly offensive to a reasonable person.4 Section 652C requires none of these. The wrong is complete when the defendant puts the plaintiff’s identity to work for the defendant’s own ends.
This section covers the elements of the claim, the First Amendment limit that separates reporting from selling, and the contrast with the right of publicity, the economic claim that reaches much of the same conduct.
Rule and Elements
Section 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes liable anyone who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.5 Each phrase carries weight. The object is the plaintiff’s name or likeness, the verb requires that the defendant take it, and the closing phrase requires that the taking serve the defendant. Because the wrong lies in the use, this subsection asks what counts as a use, whose benefit it must serve, and what else the plaintiff must prove.
The tort protects two interests. When the defendant’s benefit is commercial, the main interest at stake is the economic value of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, and the wrong resembles taking property without consent; but the appropriation is a wrong even when the use is not commercial.6 The tort also aims to prevent the unjust enrichment that comes from taking the goodwill attached to a person’s identity, and the discomfort of unexpectedly becoming an object of public attention.7 Two consequences follow. The wrong is the use, so falsity is no part of the claim. Anyone can be made an object of public attention, so fame is no part of it either.
Courts turn the language of § 652C into elements. In Staruski v. Continental Telephone Co. the trial judge drew jury instructions from § 652C, and the court observed that the section restates a rule that has evolved since the early years of the century in New York and Georgia and is now recognized by case law or statute in virtually all jurisdictions.8 The Colorado Civil Jury Instructions, applied in Joe Dickerson & Associates, LLC v. Dittmar, divide the tort into five elements.9
The last two elements apply ordinary tort principles, and the later treatment of damages explains how mental distress and economic loss are measured. The first three are where appropriation cases are won and lost.
A plaintiff need not be famous. Recent cases applying § 652C permit recovery by plaintiffs who were not well known, and in Tellado v. Time-Life Books a publisher could be liable for using, without permission, a photograph of an anguished soldier in promotional material for a series of books on the Vietnam War, though neither his name nor his face was known to the public.10 The leading early case, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., involved an insurance company’s advertisement that used the photograph of a plaintiff who was in no sense a public character.11 A stranger whose face appears in an advertisement loses control over that image whether or not anyone else would pay to use it. Appropriation is therefore not only a celebrity’s tort; the right of publicity, which centers on the commercial value of fame, receives its own treatment later in this chapter.
Truth gives no defense to an appropriation claim. In Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins a real estate brokerage was held liable for advertising a house as the former home of a prominent professional football player, and liability for advertising use of a person’s name attaches even when the person has an actual connection to what is advertised.12 The brokerage borrowed a name to sell houses, and a true advertisement borrows just as much as a false one. This separates the branch from false light, where falsity is an element.
A mere mention is not an appropriation. The incidental use of a person’s name is not grounds for liability; the defendant becomes liable only on making use of the name to pirate the plaintiff’s identity for some advantage of the defendant’s own.13 For the same reason there is no liability for the mere use of the same name as the plaintiff’s, as in Swacker v. Wright, which involved a novel, and Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., which involved a comic strip.14 Plaintiffs have also lost when defendants sold lists of names and spending habits, because the name of a particular individual has little or no value, so the defendant has not appropriated that value for its own benefit.15
The defendant’s own benefit need not be commercial. The usual form of the wrong is the use of a name or likeness to advertise the defendant’s business or product, but apart from statute the rule also applies when the defendant uses the identity for its own purposes even though the use is not commercial and the benefit is not pecuniary.16 Courts not restricted by statute have allowed recovery in State ex rel. Lafollette v. Hinkle, where a political party used the plaintiff’s name as its candidate for office, in a case of forging the plaintiff’s name to an income tax return, and for impersonating the plaintiff or falsely claiming a family relationship to obtain money, property, credit, or confidential information.17
Statutes narrow the tort in some states, so the answer there depends on the jurisdiction. New York’s statute limits actions to appropriations for advertising or trade purposes, and a plaintiff whose name was used for a non-commercial advantage has no claim under it.18 A common-law state that follows § 652C has no such ceiling, and the same facts state a claim there.
A plaintiff seeking damages for mental suffering need not prove that her identity had value before the defendant used it. Colorado’s instructions include an element that the defendant sought to take advantage of the value attached to the plaintiff’s name or likeness, and in Dittmar the defendant relied on it. A newsletter had published the plaintiff’s name and photograph, and the defendant argued that summary judgment was proper because she offered no evidence that her name or likeness had any value.19 The Colorado Supreme Court did not require such proof. A person whose identity has no commercial value can still suffer mental anguish from an unauthorized use, and few courts have required proof of the value of the plaintiff’s identity as a prerequisite to recovery for that harm.20 The own-benefit element remains in place, and the plaintiff lost anyway, because the court held the newsletter privileged, the limit taken up next.21
Newsworthiness Limit
Read literally, § 652C would reach every newspaper that prints a person’s name beside a story and sells more copies because of it, since the paper has used the identity for its own benefit.23 The First Amendment prevents that result. A use of a name or likeness is privileged when it is made in the context of, and reasonably relates to, a publication about a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern.24 Newsworthiness is generally an extremely successful defense, because courts have broadly construed what is of legitimate public concern.25
The privilege exists because, for the news and entertainment media, commercial profit and free speech are inextricably linked, so a purely commercial appropriation cannot always be told apart from legitimate reporting of matters of public interest.26 If a publisher’s profit were enough for liability, every sale of a newspaper would appropriate the people it names, and a rule that broad would preclude the publication of much news.27 The law therefore asks what the publication communicates. A report on public affairs carries a speech interest that the First Amendment protects, while an advertisement that borrows a name to sell a product reports nothing to the public.
Joe Dickerson & Associates, LLC v. Dittmar shows the privilege at work. The plaintiff, a secretary at a brokerage firm, had stolen a customer’s bearer bonds and was later convicted of theft.28 Dickerson, who ran a private investigation firm, published a newsletter article that told the story, described his investigation of her, and printed her name and photograph. Her complaint concerned the republication of these facts with her name and picture in what she called an “infomercial” designed to promote his firm and attract business, so that the article was primarily commercial and unprotected.29 The Colorado Supreme Court held the use privileged. The article concerned the facts of her crime and conviction, which are matters of legitimate public concern, and the defendant’s own commercial benefit did not change that.30
Many uses mix information with salesmanship, so the court supplied a test for them. A court asks whether the character of the publication is primarily noncommercial, in which case the privilege applies, or primarily commercial, in which case it does not, and an article with commercial undertones may still be protected if it concerns a legitimate matter of public concern.31 Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction, and the content of the speech, not the speaker’s motivation, decides whether it is commercial. The classification is ordinarily a question of law.32
The fourth question does the most work in practice, because every news publisher profits from what it prints. A profit motive does not turn a report on a matter of public concern into commercial speech, and to be actionable the use of a plaintiff’s identity must be more directly commercial than appearing in a periodical that operates for profit.33 The usual exam error is asking whether the publisher made money from the use, a question that every newspaper, magazine, and newsletter answers yes. A defendant who intends to profit is still protected so long as the contents of the speech qualify for protection.34
The privilege does not depend on the form of the publisher. Freedom of the press reaches every sort of publication that provides a vehicle of information and opinion, so facts that were newsworthy when a local newspaper printed them stay newsworthy when a newsletter republishes them.35
Newsworthiness is also broad in subject. Books and magazine articles about public figures may use their names and photographs without liability, so long as the work is not false.36 Almost any information about a well-known public figure or public official is treated as newsworthy, as is any person’s recent involvement in criminal behavior, which is why the conviction in Dittmar qualified.37 The breadth has an edge, because not every matter that might interest readers counts as newsworthy.
Public figures receive less protection from the tort than private plaintiffs do. Entertainers and other public figures must tolerate use of their names and likenesses when publicity is given to their exploits, yet simply employing a celebrity’s image for commercial purposes remains an appropriation. The exception is the defendant who subjects the image to artistic or expressive “transformation,” in which case the expression may have First Amendment protection. Since celebrities are the people whose images help sell products, the damages they win in a successful appropriation suit may be substantial.38
Advertising falls on the other side of the line. A business that uses a person’s name or picture in its own advertisement is liable even when the person has a real connection to what is advertised.39 The privilege of a news article also stays behind when the article is lifted into a sales pitch: reproducing a news article containing the plaintiff’s name or photograph in an advertisement can give rise to liability, as in Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc. and Flores v. Mosler Safe Co.40 The article was primarily noncommercial when the newspaper printed it, and a business that reprints it to promote its own goods or services has changed the character of the use, which is the thing the Dittmar test examines.
Advertising for a media work is the one setting in which an advertisement is protected. An advertisement for a book, periodical, film, or broadcast may include, without liability, the name or picture of a person who is depicted or written about in the work being advertised, as in Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc. and Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co.41 The exception follows from the privilege itself. If the work may lawfully depict the person, a rule forbidding the advertisement to show what the work contains would drain the privilege of its value. The reasoning depends on the work actually involving the plaintiff. In Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. the cover of a pornographic magazine falsely stated that the issue included a photograph of the plaintiff, and liability followed because the magazine held nothing about the plaintiff to which the privilege could attach.42
Inside the media work, the same logic applies. Including a person’s name or likeness in the non-advertising content of a publication usually results in no appropriation liability, as in Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., which involved a magazine article.43 The tort may return when the use has no connection to the content, which is why the Colorado test asks whether the use reasonably relates to the newsworthy matter. In Finger v. Omni Publications International, Ltd., a photograph of a large family illustrated a magazine report that caffeine might enhance fertilization rates, and there may be liability if there was no real relationship between the illustration and the article, although that claim may fit better under false light than under appropriation.44
Right of Publicity Contrast
Section 652C treats appropriation as a privacy tort, but a second claim covers much of the same conduct on an economic theory. The right of publicity is a right to prevent unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person’s name, likeness, or other elements of identity. It is classed as an economic tort, found in the Restatement of Unfair Competition (§§ 46–49) rather than the Restatement of Torts, and courts in many but not all jurisdictions recognize it.46 A single advertisement can support both claims, so an answer must say which interest the plaintiff is asserting. The two claims differ in what they protect, who may hold them, what identity they cover, and what damages they award.
They differ first in the interest protected. The appropriation tort aims to prevent unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill and to prevent the discomfort of unexpectedly becoming an object of public attention.47 The right of publicity keeps the first aim and drops the second. It protects people whose identity has commercial value, usually but not always people with a high public profile, and it limits the ability to profit from a person’s fame without consent, so a plaintiff need not show any impairment of privacy.48 A false suggestion that the plaintiff created or endorsed what the defendant sells can support the action, but falsity is not required for liability.49
They differ second in who may hold the claim. The right of privacy is personal, not assignable, and not enforceable after a person’s death. The right of publicity can be assigned in whole or part and enforced by the assignee, and the prevailing position is that it attaches to deceased as well as living persons.50 Survival took time to win. Early decisions such as Lugosi v. Universal Pictures turned heirs away. One court that refused to recognize a right enforceable after death pointed to the practical problems of judicial line-drawing, such as how long the right would last, and reasoned that “the memory, name and pictures of famous individuals should be regarded as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity available in the free market system.”51 Most courts now go the other way. In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc. the plaintiffs challenged the sale of memorial busts in Dr. King’s image, and the prevailing position treats the right as attaching to the dead as well as the living.52 A considerable number of states have enacted statutes that provide for a survivable right of publicity or privacy, name who can be a plaintiff, and set a definite but long limit on its duration, which in California is seventy years after death.53
They differ third in damages. Damages in a publicity action clearly extend to economic losses and to the commercial value of what the defendant gained by the wrongful use.54
They differ fourth in the identity they cover. Section 652C speaks of a name or likeness, while the right of publicity reaches further. Courts have found actionable the imitation of a singer’s voice in a radio commercial in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. and a sound-alike voice in Midler v. Ford Motor Co. They have also found liability for a nickname used as a product name in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., for a racing car bearing a noted driver’s distinct markings in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and for a catchphrase from a television host’s show used to name portable toilets in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.55 In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so, and that a rule limited to nine methods of appropriation merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.56 The usual exam error is to reject a publicity claim because the advertisement showed no name or face, or because a famous plaintiff lost no privacy.
The sharpest constitutional test of the publicity right came in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., where a television station filmed a performer’s entire human cannonball act and showed it on the evening news over his objection. The Ohio Supreme Court held the station privileged to report matters of public interest, and the United States Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without consent, and it compared the case to filming and broadcasting a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner.57
The Ohio court had relied on Time, Inc. v. Hill, a false light case that required proof of knowing or reckless falsity.58 The Supreme Court distinguished that case on two grounds. The first concerns the interest protected. False light protects reputation, with overtones of mental distress as in defamation, while the right of publicity protects the performer’s proprietary interest in his act, in part to encourage such entertainment, which resembles the goals of patent and copyright law.59 Those regimes grant limited monopolies to promote creative activity, and a performer whose whole act anyone may broadcast free of charge loses what audiences would otherwise pay to see.60 The second concerns how much the claim interferes with public information. In a false light case the only way to protect the interests involved is to minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in a publicity case the only question is who gets to do the publishing, and Zacchini sought damages for the broadcast, not an injunction against it.61
The decision leaves a good deal open. The Court said that the state right of publicity would not stop the station from reporting the newsworthy facts about the act, and it declined to say where the line falls in other situations.62 A station that tells viewers about the stunt and the crowd it drew therefore stays on the protected side, and one that airs the entire act does not, which refines the newsworthiness limit from the previous subsection. A broadcast might also raise the value of the act by stimulating interest in seeing it live, in which case the performer could not prove damages and would recover nothing.63
Beyond broadcast cases, the decisions on what violates the publicity right largely track those on tortious appropriation. Using a person’s identity without consent in advertising, marketing, or product labels draws liability, while the informational and entertainment content of media does not, and neither do original works of art or fiction, even though books and films about celebrities trade on fame. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, which concerned a fictionalized account of Agatha Christie’s disappearance, and Rogers v. Grimaldi, which concerned the film Ginger and Fred, illustrate the protected side.64 The identity can also be used without liability in advertising, marketing, or labeling media works in which the person is depicted, written about, or has performed.65
A stem that pairs a plaintiff with an unauthorized use should be sorted by asking what the plaintiff is complaining about. A complaint of humiliation at becoming an object of public attention points to the privacy tort, which protects only a living person. A complaint that someone else is collecting the profit from an identity points to the publicity right, which survives death in most states and extends to a voice, a nickname, and other indicia of identity. In either case, the defendant’s strongest answer will usually come from the content of the use, so the next question is whether it was news or expression about the plaintiff or a sale built on the plaintiff’s identity.