Concept
Qualified Privileges
Defenses and privileges to defamation
Qualified Privileges
A qualified privilege protects a defamatory statement made on an occasion where the law wants information to move. The policy, as the scope note to § 593 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states it, is that true information must be given whenever it is reasonably necessary to protect one's own interests, the interests of third persons, or certain interests of the public, and the law shields an appropriate effort to supply that information from liability for the misinformation it contains.1 Prosser describes the trade. The defendant acts in furtherance of an interest of social importance, which deserves protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation, and that interest may belong to the defendant, to a third person, or to the public.2 When the interest is paramount, the immunity may be absolute. When it weighs less, the immunity is qualified and conditional on good motives and reasonable behavior.3 The English decision in Toogood v. Spyring is the usual source of the tradition. It recognized a defense, dependent on the absence of actual malice, for a defamatory communication fairly made in the discharge of a public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of the speaker's own affairs where the speaker's interest is concerned.4
The reason for tolerating some misinformation lies in how information moves. A speaker who could be sued for any inaccuracy would hold back a warning, a candid reference, or a report of suspected wrongdoing until certain, and the people who need the information would get it late or not at all.
The conditions give the privilege its name. A qualified privilege protects the speaker only when exercised for the purpose for which it is given and with reasonable care that no more harm is done to the interests of others than that purpose requires.5 The immunity is forfeited if the defendant steps outside the scope of the privilege or abuses the occasion.6 That requirement separates qualified privileges from the absolute privileges taught above, which attach to the occasion and survive any inquiry into the speaker's state of mind. At common law the marker of abuse was actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for its truth, and courts recognize other grounds besides malice on which the privilege can fail.7 The structure follows from the purpose. The privilege exists to get honest information to someone who needs it, so a speaker who knows the statement is false, or who uses the occasion to injure the plaintiff, no longer serves the interest that justified protection.
The standard illustration is an employer who gives an unfavorable reference about a former employee to a prospective employer. The statement is made in good faith between people who share an interest in the subject, and the privilege can be lost on a showing of malice or bad faith.8
The occasion is identical in both versions. Only the speaker's state of mind differs, and that difference decides whether the protection survives.
Qualified privilege is also where most of the day-to-day litigation over defamation defenses arises. Decisions on whether a statement was made on a privileged occasion are very numerous and usually turn on the facts, and these privileges operate mainly in cases of non-media publication.9 Because the only outer limits are the generalities of Toogood and the Restatement overview, definite rules are hard to extract from the cases. The older formula that a speaker has a legal, moral, or social duty to speak does little analytical work, since it begs the question of what duties a person has. A more reliable method is to identify the particular interest the publication served and weigh it against the risk of reputational loss.10
Two procedural points frame every problem in this area. The defendant must prove the circumstances that create the privilege once the issue is properly raised, and if the defendant does so, the plaintiff may still prevail by proving that the privilege was abused.11 The constitutional fault rules overlap with that second step. Where the plaintiff must now prove in the first instance an element such as reckless falsehood, which once mattered only when the defendant raised the privilege, the privilege analysis can become superfluous or at least less important to the outcome.12
The subsections below take the privileged occasions one at a time and then turn to the ways a qualified privilege is lost, beginning with the privilege that protects the publisher's own interest.
Publisher's Own Interest
Section 594 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a publication conditionally privileged when the circumstances lead the publisher correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information affecting a sufficiently important interest of the publisher, and that the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful protection of that interest.13 The privilege answers a common predicament. A person whose goods have been taken, whose safety is threatened, or whose business is in danger often has to tell someone, and the person told may be able to help. Because the privilege is conditional, it protects the speaker only while the occasion serves its proper purpose, a limit taken up in the last two subsections of this part.
Each half of the rule has its own reason. The words correctly or reasonably judge the speaker by how matters appeared at the time of speaking. A speaker who had to be right about the threat before warning anyone would wait for certainty, and by then the warning might protect nothing, so a reasonable belief suffices even when events prove it mistaken. The importance requirement reflects what the plaintiff pays: a false statement injures reputation without compensation, so the value of the speaker's interest is weighed against the harm to the plaintiff's reputation if the statement is false.14 The requirement that the recipient's knowledge serve the interest ties that harm to a benefit, because a statement to someone who cannot help imposes the cost and secures nothing in return.
The interests that qualify include:
- any lawful business or pecuniary interest, other than an interest in competing for prospective advantage;
- the publisher's bodily security;
- a present interest in land, chattels, or intangible property;
- the publisher's family;
- the publisher's own reputation.15
In ordinary disputes, the privilege covers a reasonable effort to recover stolen goods, to collect money owed or stop others from collecting it, to protest mismanagement of a concern in which the speaker has a financial stake, or to protect the speaker's own safety.16 In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Watson, an employer accused one employee, in front of others, of stealing from the employer. In Gardner v. Standard Oil Co. an employer warned its employees that the plaintiff was of bad character. In Denardo v. Bax a worker told coworkers that she believed a colleague was stalking her.17 Each speaker had a personal stake, and each audience could act on what it heard by being careful, staying away, or watching for trouble.
One business interest is carved out. A lawful business or pecuniary interest qualifies, but an interest in competing for prospective advantage does not, and defaming a rival to obtain customers is the standard example of what falls outside.18 The line follows the function of the privilege. Protecting something the speaker already holds answers a loss that is under way, while a campaign to win business the speaker does not yet hold would turn every disparaging sales pitch into a privileged occasion.
Section 594 also supports a second occasion that concerns reputation itself. Comment k extends the privilege to a person who reasonably believes that another has unlawfully invaded the person's interest in reputation and that the defamatory matter published about the other is reasonably necessary for self-defense, and the comment's own example is a reply that calls the accuser an unmitigated liar.19 The reason resembles the reason for physical self-defense. A person accused in public cannot easily stay silent, because silence may be read as agreement, and the audience that heard the attack is already alert to the controversy. The accuser invited an answer, and a vigorous answer reaches listeners primed to weigh both sides.
The reply may be more than a bare denial. In Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. the plaintiff accused the defendant in-laws of molesting their grandchild, the defendants answered that the plaintiff was “sick” and that the plaintiff's comments came “from the bottom of a cesspool,” and the Fourth Circuit held that answer a proportionate response.20 The privilege therefore lets a defendant attack the accuser's motives to explain why the accusation was made, and it is not limited to saying that the accuser is mistaken.21 The edges of the reply privilege are less settled than its core. Courts borrow the questions asked about physical self-defense: how vigorous the original attack must have been, whether it must itself have been defamatory, what follows if it was true or privileged, whether the reply must address the same subject, how much verbal force is allowed, and whether the privilege reaches a person defending someone else.22 Because those questions lack settled answers, an exam answer should anchor the analysis in relevance and proportion, the two limits taken up next.
The reply privilege carries the limits of the general rule. It authorizes a defendant to meet the attack, and it does not authorize a fresh attack on the same subject or on a different one.23 The reply must be relevant to the interest being defended and must go to appropriate recipients, and what counts as reasonable depends partly on the importance of the interest and partly on the need to publish at all, with some courts possibly confining the privilege to a well-defined group of recipients.24 Relevance is the limit most likely to decide a problem. A reply that accuses the accuser of beating a spouse adds a charge with no connection to the accusation being answered, so the privilege does not extend to it, and Sternberg Mfg. Co. v. Miller, DuBrul & Peters Mfg. Co. is cited for comparison on that limit.25 Set beside Foretich, the contrast shows which fact moves the answer. The in-laws' insults went to the credibility and motives of the person accusing them, which was the subject of the attack, while a charge about a marriage reaches a subject the original accusation never raised.
As with every privilege, the defendant must prove the circumstances that create it once the issue is properly raised. Here that means the interest at stake, the reasonable belief that it was at stake, and the recipient's ability to help protect it.26 Proof of those circumstances only opens the privilege. Whether the speaker knew the statement was false, spoke from an improper purpose, or published more widely than the interest required decides whether the privilege survives.
Recipient and Third-Person Interest
Section 595 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts extends conditional protection to a speaker who has no stake of his or her own to defend. An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that there is information affecting a sufficiently important interest of the recipient or a third person, and that the recipient is someone to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to publish the defamatory matter or to whom its publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct.28 Under § 594 the interest belongs to the speaker, so what the speaker stands to lose explains why speaking was proper. Here the interest belongs to the listener or to someone else, and a rule built on another person's interest needs a further ingredient to show why it is this speaker's place to tell this listener.
Each half of the rule has its own logic. The first half exists because a false statement injures reputation without compensation, so the interest the information protects must weigh enough to justify the risk, and sometimes that weight depends on the relationship between speaker and recipient.29 The phrase correct or reasonable belief judges the speaker by how matters appeared at the time, which protects a person who warns of a danger that later proves illusory. The second half does the subtler work. Almost any piece of information touches some listener's interests, so an importance test standing alone would privilege nearly every piece of gossip. The requirement of a legal duty, or of publication within accepted standards of decent conduct, asks a different question: whether the relationship between this speaker and this listener makes the telling proper. That question keeps the privilege from swallowing the tort.
The settings the cases recognize show both halves at work:
- fiduciaries discharging their duties;
- reports to the proper authorities that the speaker believes the plaintiff is about to commit a crime against another;
- in most states, reports by credit agencies;
- communications among members of a trade association;
- reports to an employer about the character or conduct of a present or prospective employee;
- communications to a close friend about the character or conduct of a family member, made in response to a request for the information.30
Section 595(2) tells a court what to weigh in deciding whether a telling is within decent conduct. Two factors matter: whether the publication responds to a request rather than being volunteered, and whether a family or other relationship exists between the parties.31 A request shows that the recipient has identified the interest and chosen to rely on the speaker, so the speaker answers a need and does not decide alone that a listener ought to hear something damaging about another person. A relationship makes it likelier that the listener's stake is real and that speaking is an ordinary act of care between the two. Both are factors to weigh, and neither decides the question alone, so a speaker who answers an inquiry is not automatically protected and one who volunteers is not automatically exposed.32 A stranger might be privileged to warn the recipient that the plaintiff is planning to kill the recipient, yet not privileged to tell the recipient that the recipient's spouse was flirting with men at a tavern. The first warning concerns an interest weighty enough to make speaking decent even when no one asked, while the second is idle gossip.33 Some occasions make volunteering appropriate as well, and a decision involving a landlord who was informed that a tenant was undesirable is cited for that proposition.34
The employer reference is the clearest application, and it shows the request factor and the interest requirement working together. Courts recognize a privilege to answer a prospective employer's inquiry about the plaintiff's character or fitness for the position, and Kevorkian v. Glass is among the decisions recognizing that rule.35 The reasons are short. The prospective employer is about to make a hiring decision whose quality depends on information the former employer is well placed to supply, so the recipient's interest is real. The inquiry came from the recipient, so the former employer is responding to an identified need and has not invented one. The benefit also runs beyond the speaker. In Gardner v. Slade, a case about a domestic servant, the court observed that the privilege does not exist only for the benefit of the person giving the character, because the applicant and the hirer both benefit when characters are readily given, and the public has an interest that they be.36 The cost of denying the privilege shows up in practice. Fear of defamation suits has led many former employers to confirm only dates of employment and last position held, and some will not disclose even salary, which is exactly the silence the privilege is meant to remove.37
The contrast case is Watt v. Longsdon. A letter from a man named Browne, which had itself come from a very doubtful source, accused the plaintiff of gross marital infidelity, drunkenness, and dishonesty, and the defendant, a friend of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's wife, passed those accusations on to the wife.38 Lord Justice Greer held that no right-minded person in the defendant's position would have thought it right to communicate such charges without corroboration and without first approaching the plaintiff, so the occasion was not privileged as to the wife.39 The wife plainly had an interest in what was said about her husband, and the defendant was a friend of both, yet the privilege failed. Compared with the employer reference, nothing prompted the communication, the source was unreliable, the accusations were grave and unchecked, and the telling answered no decision the recipient had to make. Burton v. Mattson, another case of personal gossip, is cited alongside Watt for the point that volunteered statements of that kind are not privileged, and Watt is also cited for the point that no privilege covers passing along to the affected spouses all the gossip one hears socially.40
The same letter fared differently as to other recipients. The court found that the defendant and the company's chairman, and the defendant and Browne, shared a common interest that made those occasions privileged, although it also found evidence from which a jury could find malice.41 Privilege is therefore assessed publication by publication, according to who received the words, a point that returns with the common-interest privilege in the next subsection. The usual exam error is to treat friendship, or the mere existence of a listener with some stake, as enough, when § 595 also asks whether this particular telling was within generally accepted standards of decent conduct.
Credit reporting applies the same logic to commerce. In Smith v. Thomas the court reasoned that if confidential communications between tradespeople about the solvency of a third person whom the inquirer was about to trust were not protected, no one would answer such an inquiry, and commercial stability would suffer.42 A bank is likewise privileged to answer an inquiry about a customer's credit from someone who has been asked to sell the customer goods.43 The privilege has been extended to commercial credit agencies. In Shore v. Retailers Commercial Agency the Massachusetts court reasoned that agencies supply a legitimate business need and that, without protection, few would furnish the information and the cost would be prohibitive. That view is the majority one, with only Georgia and Idaho denying that a conditional privilege attaches to credit reports.44 The extension has a limit that returns to the interest requirement, because the Shore court did not hold the privilege applicable where an agency publishes generally to subscribers who have no particular interest in the report.45 An interested subscriber stands where the prospective employer stands, and an uninterested one stands where the audience for gossip stands.
Proof that the occasion exists only opens the privilege. Because § 613(2) assigns the burden to the defendant, the former employer or other speaker must prove the circumstances that create it, which here means the interest affected, the reasonable belief that it was affected, and the request or relationship that makes the telling decent.46 The privilege then survives only if it is used properly. An employer loses it by communicating information known to be false or by acting in reckless disregard of its truth, by failing to act for the purpose the privilege serves, or by disclosing adverse information more broadly than legitimate employment purposes require.47 Those grounds are taken up in the subsections on abuse that follow. Where the applicant authorized the reference, consent can supply protection too, though consent to a reference is generally understood to create only a qualified privilege.48
Common and Family Interest
Section 596 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a defamatory communication conditionally privileged when the circumstances lead the publisher correctly or reasonably to believe that another person who shares a common interest in the subject is entitled to know the information.50 The rule has two parts, and each does its own work. The shared interest is what makes the occasion worth protecting, because people who hold a stake in the same business, property, or congregation cannot manage it unless they can talk to one another about what is going wrong. The belief that the recipient is entitled to know ties this telling to that stake, since the recipient's claim on the information comes from the interest the two hold together. A member who tells the other members that the treasurer has been mishandling funds is doing what membership asks.
The protection is justified by how groups learn of trouble. A member who suspects a problem rarely has proof, and a rule that punished every mistaken report would leave each member silent until certainty arrived, which often means after the group has lost the chance to act. The audience also limits the plaintiff's uncompensated loss, because the words reach only people who share the stake and can do something about the information. That confinement explains a difference from the recipient-interest privilege. There the speaker needs a further reason, such as a request or a relationship, to show that speaking was proper, whereas here the common interest itself supplies the recipient's entitlement, so courts allow more freedom to volunteer information.51
The settings the Restatement contemplates are intragroup communications. Business partners and associates may exchange information about employees and others, co-owners of real or personal property may communicate about their common interest in it, and members of religious, fraternal, and charitable organizations may discuss the qualifications of officers and of other or prospective members, as well as the association's activities.52 Courts have carried the privilege to many other groups, including these:
- Labor unions and church members, as in Bereman v. Power Publishing Co. and Slocinski v. Radwan.53
- Shareholders, as in Park v. Hill, where an unsuccessful bidder for control of a bank wrote to the other shareholders about the bank's president, protecting his own financial interest and a common interest with them.54
- Creditors of the same debtor, as in Smith Bros. & Co. v. W.C. Agee & Co.55
- Evaluation committees, such as the faculty committee in Colson v. Stieg and the student committee in Doe v. Gonzaga University.56
- Physicians and their health plans communicating about patients' medical records, as in Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc.57
The interest has to be real, and friendship does not create one. In Count Joannes v. Bennett the defendant was the family's former pastor and an intimate friend, and the daughter's father persuaded him to write her a letter urging her to call off her engagement to the plaintiff.58 The Massachusetts court held the letter unprivileged, because although the writer acted from laudable motives, he was no longer the daughter's pastor and was related to her only as a friend.59 The court reasoned that if communications could be protected merely because the speaker held friendly relations with the listener, “a wide door would be left open by which indiscriminate aspersion of private character could escape with impunity.”60 Friendship is nearly universal among people who talk to one another, so a privilege that attached to it would attach to almost every conversation about another person's character, and the exception would swallow the tort. The shared-interest requirement keeps the privilege to occasions with a defined audience and a reason to speak.
Interests that merely overlap fall short as well. In Kelley v. Tanoos the defendant discussed with the plaintiff's employer, a school, the idea that the plaintiff might have fired a weapon at the defendant. The defendant's interest lay in establishing the plaintiff's guilt, while the school's lay in repairing the strained relations the shooting had caused, so no common-interest privilege applied.61 The two cared about the same events and still did not hold a stake in the same subject. Courts also tend to confine the privilege to limited, clearly defined groups with a definite relationship to the publisher. In Konikoff v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America the Second Circuit declined to decide whether an interest privilege could reach a publication to the general public through the media, observing that New York law had so far confined it to such groups.62
Section 597 applies the same logic to families. A communication is conditionally privileged when the circumstances lead the publisher correctly or reasonably to believe that the recipient's knowledge will help protect the well-being of a member of the publisher's own immediate family.63 It is also privileged when the publisher reasonably believes that the recipient's knowledge will help protect the well-being of a member of the immediate family of the recipient or of a third person, provided the recipient has requested the information or is a person to whom its communication is otherwise within generally accepted standards of decent conduct.64 The two branches demand different things because they differ in who stands to lose. In the first branch the publisher speaks to protect the publisher's own family, so the speaker's stake does the work that a request or relationship does elsewhere. In the second the publisher acts for someone else's family, and the added condition of a request or decent conduct keeps the privilege from reaching intermeddlers who merely have unwelcome news to deliver, which is the same gate that governs the recipient-interest privilege. Both branches rest on the fact that family members have the closest stake in one another's safety and honesty, and a spouse or parent who is never told of a serious danger cannot act on it.
The standard examples show the second branch at work. A speaker who tells his sister that he has seen her husband in the company of prostitutes is conditionally privileged, and so is a minister who writes an unsolicited letter to a father telling him that his child's fiancé is a felon.65 The minister's letter went out without a request, which shows that the decent-conduct alternative can be met when a parent has an evident need to know of a danger to a child's well-being. A parent's concern for a child supports the privilege in other settings too, and in O'Connor v. Burningham the court recognized a familial privilege when parents criticized the behavior of their daughters' basketball coach to the school board.66 The family tie does not decide the case by itself. Watt v. Longsdon refused a privilege for relaying the gossip one hears socially to the spouses it concerns, and the sister example differs on the facts that matter: the brother saw the conduct himself and speaks to his own sibling, so his belief that the telling protects her is reasonable and the telling is decent.67
Both privileges are conditional, so a plaintiff who faces a proven occasion can still defeat the defense by showing that the privilege was abused, through knowing falsity, reckless disregard, improper purpose, or excessive publication. Those grounds are taken up in the subsections that follow. The first step belongs to the defendant, since § 613(2) assigns the defendant the burden of proving the circumstances necessary for the privilege once the issue is properly raised.68 Here that means proving the shared interest and the reasonable belief that the recipient was entitled to know, or the family relationship and the well-being at stake.
Public Interest Reports
Section 598 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts protects the citizen who carries information to someone able to act on it. A defamatory communication is conditionally privileged when the circumstances lead the publisher correctly or reasonably to believe that a sufficiently important public interest requires its communication to a public officer or other person who is authorized or privileged to take action if the information is true.70 The usual example is a report of a crime or an anticipated crime to the police. The same privilege covers reporting misconduct or incompetence by a public official or employee and petitioning a legislature for action.71 Because the privilege is conditional, it lasts only while the speaker uses the occasion for its purpose, a limit taken up in the subsections on losing a privilege.
Each half of the rule has its own reason. The words correctly or reasonably judge the speaker by what the speaker knew at the time of speaking. A person who sees a theft or suspects an official of misusing funds rarely has proof, and a citizen who had to be right before reporting would wait for certainty while the authorities who could have stopped the harm learned nothing. The limit on recipients does the subtler work. A false accusation damages reputation without compensation to the person accused, so the law accepts that cost only when the accusation reaches someone who can do something about it if it is true. A citizen's complaint about a supposed crime is necessarily defamatory, yet when it goes to officials with authority to deal with the case it is at least qualifiedly privileged.72 The same words repeated to bystanders impose the same reputational cost and secure nothing in return.
The edges of the recipient requirement have been tested in two ways. One extension would cover a report to a private person who would be authorized or privileged to deal with the matter if the report were true, and that extension follows the logic of the rule. The other would cover a citizen who, with police authorization, repeats defamatory statements to third persons during an investigation, and it carries a risk. It lets police delegate to an eager citizen the power to decide when a privilege exists, and it may allow officials to foster defamation through a willing private party.73
Most states treat a report of a suspected crime as qualifiedly privileged, but a minority hold that a report to the police is absolutely privileged, on the analogy to statements made in or in preparation for judicial proceedings.74 The recipient can decide which side of the line a case falls on, because a communication to a prosecutor during an ongoing investigation can be likened to statements before a grand jury. Alabama illustrates the split. In Cutts v. American United Life Insurance Co. the court applied an absolute privilege to an answer to a prosecuting attorney's investigative question, and in the same year, in Tidwell v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., it applied only a qualified privilege to a report to the police.75 Whichever view a jurisdiction takes, a privileged report does not bar a claim for malicious prosecution. The privilege may cut off defamation liability, yet a person falsely accused can still sue if the charge actually produced a prosecution without probable cause and the other elements of that tort are shown, so an exam answer should treat the two claims separately.76
Section 598A extends conditional protection down the ranks of government. Lower-level state and local employees who are not entitled to an absolute privilege have a conditional privilege for communications required or permitted in the performance of their duties.77 As with every privilege, the defendant must prove the circumstances that create it once the issue is properly raised, which here means the reasonable belief, the public interest at stake, and a recipient with authority to act.78 The plaintiff may still prevail by showing abuse, such as knowledge that the statement was false, reckless disregard for its truth, a purpose other than the one the privilege serves, or publication beyond the persons who needed to know.79
Fair Report of Proceedings
Section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts privileges defamatory matter published in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern, if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.81 The rule goes by several names, among them the reporter's privilege, the fair-report privilege, and the record-libel privilege, and although the news media use it most, it protects anyone who describes official acts and proceedings.82 It fills a gap that the truth defense leaves open. A publisher who repeats another person's accusation cannot defend by proving only that the accusation was made, because the substance of what was reported must be shown to be true.83 A newspaper that prints what a witness said in open court would therefore have no answer when the witness's charge was false. The privilege supplies one for reports of official occurrences and reaches no further, since the common law never recognized a privilege to report an event merely because it was newsworthy.84
Three rationales support the privilege, and they also explain its conditions. The agency rationale protects the press when it reports official actions and statements that members of the public could have witnessed for themselves. The public-supervision rationale lets the news media serve as a check on the power of government. A general public-interest rationale covers reports of important events that are not official actions.85 The agency idea does the most work in explaining why accuracy and fairness are required. Few citizens can attend every trial or read every filing, so a reporter acts as a stand-in for readers who cannot examine the record themselves.86 A stand-in serves its purpose only while the account matches what it stands in for. A report that misdescribes the proceeding gives readers a false picture of what the government did, and the public scrutiny the privilege exists to support then runs on misinformation.
Because the privilege attaches to the report, the report is measured against the proceeding and never against the facts the proceeding was about. In Rosenberg v. Helinski the Maryland court stated the rule that the privilege applies even if the reporter of defamatory statements made in court believes or knows them to be false, and that it is abused only if the report fails the test of fairness or accuracy.87 The reporter is a conduit for information that citizens have a right to see for themselves, so a reporter who knows that a statement in a legislative document is false still keeps the privilege.88 The Supreme Court's decisions in Time, Inc. v. Pape and Time, Inc. v. Firestone fit that picture. Neither was concerned with whether the defamatory charge was true or how carefully the defendant checked it, and the defendant would apparently not have been liable even if it knew the plaintiff was innocent, so long as the report of the official record was fair and accurate.89 In Milligan v. United States the Sixth Circuit likewise held a report of arrests privileged even though police errors had led to the plaintiff's wrongful arrest.90 The usual exam error is to ask whether the person quoted told the truth. The privilege asks whether the report matches the proceeding.
The constitutional cases add a layer that attaches to the report. Pape and Firestone impose a constitutional requirement of fault in failing to make the report fair and accurate.91 In Pape a magazine summarized a federal commission's catalogue of police-brutality complaints and stated the allegations of one complaint as fact, and the Court held that omitting the word “alleged” did not by itself support a finding of actual malice, because the omission adopted one of several rational readings of an ambiguous document.92 Firestone, which involved a private figure, ended in reversal because no finding of fault had been made.93 A report that is inaccurate or unfair loses the common-law privilege, although the constitutional fault rules may still protect the publisher.94
Accuracy and fairness are separate requirements. Accuracy means substantial correctness. Comment f to § 611 does not demand exactness in every immaterial detail, or the precision of technical or scientific reporting, and asks only whether the report conveys to readers a substantially correct account of the proceedings.95 That standard resembles the substantial-truth test taught earlier, under which a difference between statement and truth matters only if it would affect the plaintiff's reputation differently.96 The comparison runs in a different direction, however. The truth cases compare the statement with the plaintiff's conduct, whereas here the report is compared with the proceeding, so accuracy is judged as an account of the proceeding and not as a description of the plaintiff's conduct or character.97 Fairness means balance. A report can be accurate in every sentence and still be so edited and cut down that it misrepresents the proceeding.98 Fairness therefore requires that the report substantially represent the matter in the record and supply enough context that the inevitable summary and omissions do not distort the overall picture.99 Within that limit the reporter may choose which portions to report, so the privilege demands an abridgement that is not decidedly one-sided or so selective as to mislead, and it does not demand a transcript.100
The privilege covers the report and nothing the reporter adds. Defamatory additions by the reporter, even when they relate to the proceeding, fall outside it.101 In Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co. the court applied the privilege to a fair and accurate report of remarks made to a city council but refused to apply it to the parts of the article that reported events other than those that occurred at the council meeting.102 The article therefore had two layers, an account of what the council heard that was privileged and outside material that had to stand on some other footing. A reporter who wants protection for the outside material needs a different defense, because the agency and supervision rationales reach only what readers could have seen in the proceeding for themselves.
Since the test looks to the report, the reporter's ill will does not defeat the privilege under the Restatement (Second). The older common-law formulation treated the privilege as qualified and lost by publication actuated by malice, meaning ill will, spite, or a purpose to cause injury, and it might also have treated publication of statements known to be false as abuse.103 Under the Second Restatement neither is an abuse, which in effect makes the privilege absolute, conditioned only on accuracy and fairness.104 Moreno and Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc. follow that approach, while Thomas v. Telegraph Publishing Co. is contrary authority.105 The Tennessee Supreme Court took the same view in Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., reasoning that letting a showing of actual malice defeat the privilege would undermine its purpose of keeping the public apprised of proceedings it did not attend.106 An inquiry into motive adds nothing the accuracy test does not already supply, because the public's stake in learning what happened is the same whatever the reporter felt, and a report can be laid beside the record and checked.
Several questions about the scope of the privilege are unsettled, and a good answer names the split and the reason behind each side. The first concerns pleadings. Comment e to § 611 and a number of courts hold that a pleading cannot be reported, even accurately, until it has been subjected to some judicial action, because an intentional defamer could file a defamatory pleading, which the absolute judicial privilege protects, and then spread it under the fair-report privilege.107 A number of more recent decisions, such as Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., hold that the privilege applies as soon as the action is commenced, on the footing that the public may read filed documents for itself and the reporter acts as its agent.108 The second question concerns self-reports. Some courts extend the privilege to a witness or pleader who publishes the witness's own testimony or pleadings, so long as the publication is not corruptly designed to foster defamation, while the Restatement says that a person cannot confer the privilege upon himself, a position with support in the Seventh Circuit's Republic Tobacco decision.109 The dispute arises where this privilege meets the judicial-proceedings privilege. A litigant who hands the press the litigant's own filing has, as the earlier discussion showed, no absolute privilege for that act, and the question is whether the fair-report privilege can take its place.
A third group of questions concerns what counts as an official occurrence. The privilege plainly covers fair reports of judicial, legislative, and executive proceedings, arrests, hearings of public bodies, and documents open to public inspection such as police reports.110 Whether it also covers reports of what officials say about government business, such as police statements to the press about arrests and investigations, divides the courts, although the wider view appears now to prevail.111 Some authority, including Thomas, suggests the extension may stop at remarks that are part of an officer's official duties and exclude remarks about the facts of an investigation or the police case against the plaintiff.112 A report built on an unofficial or anonymous source carries its own risk, because the source may not describe the official action accurately and fairly, and the report then falls outside the privilege. Howell v. Enterprise Publishing Co. applied the privilege to reports from anonymous sources describing closed-door proceedings but gave that warning.113 Section 611 also reaches a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern. Courts have protected reports of a candidate's words at a political rally, while a private stockholders' meeting has been held outside the privilege.114 Extending the privilege to non-governmental meetings is debatable, since the privilege rests largely on the public's interest in supervising government.115
Neutral reportage would go further than the fair-report privilege by protecting accurate reports of newsworthy accusations even when no official proceeding is involved. As noted in the discussion of repetition, the doctrine originated in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., the Supreme Court has not addressed it, and a number of courts have rejected it.116 Courts that accept it disagree about its limits, including whether it reaches accusations against private figures and whether the accuser must be a responsible, prominent person or organization.117 The fair-report privilege has an anchor that neutral reportage lacks, an official occurrence the public could check. A report of a private group's charge therefore remains subject to the repeater rule unless the jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine.
As with every privilege, the defendant carries the burden of proving the circumstances that bring the report within it. Here that means identifying the official proceeding or open meeting the report describes and showing that the report tracked it.118
Fair Comment
At common law, a statement of opinion that damaged reputation was actionable on the same terms as a statement of fact, and the privilege of fair comment developed to protect critics from that exposure. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. the Supreme Court traced the history. A plaintiff needed to allege only an unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matter, and the common law drew no line between fact and opinion.120 Concern that burdensome defamation law would stifle valuable public debate led courts to treat fair comment as an affirmative defense, which gave legal immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when the opinion rested on true or privileged facts.121 Comment was privileged when it concerned a matter of public concern, rested on true or privileged facts, represented the speaker's actual opinion, and was not made solely to cause harm.122 Because the privilege is an affirmative defense, the speaker must establish those circumstances once the issue is properly raised.123
Each condition answers a different risk. The public-concern requirement confines the privilege to the discourse that most needs room, and the privilege let a publisher criticize public officials and public figures and discuss scientific, artistic, literary, and dramatic subjects, on the view that the freer the criticism, the better for the public welfare.124 The privilege also tolerated harsh comment, because fairness required only that the criticism rest on true facts and express, within wide bounds, what an honest-minded person might conclude, and the opinion did not have to be reasonable.125 The two conditions that go to the speaker's purpose guard against the opposite risk, since the privilege could be lost if the criticism did not represent the critic's actual opinion or was made solely to injure the person criticized.126 A critic who does not hold the view stated contributes nothing of value to public debate, and a comment with no purpose except injury contributes nothing the privilege exists to protect.
The requirement of true or privileged facts does the subtlest work, because it explains why the privilege reaches inference from facts and withholds protection from bare assertion. When the facts are stated and the comment appears as an inference drawn from them, the reader has the grounds before him and can judge whether the inference is warranted, so an unjust comment falls harmless.127 When a writer instead states a bare conclusion, or mixes fact and comment so that the line between them is unclear, the reader assumes that the writer knows adequate grounds that were never disclosed.128 In Beattie v. Fleet National Bank a bank's appraiser reviewed a real estate appraisal and concluded that its data combined to give such a misleading indication of value as to be considered fraudulent. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held the letter not actionable, because the opinion rested on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, including a seven-page memorandum that set out the appraisal's perceived deficiencies.129
The label “opinion” supplies none of this protection by itself. The Court in Milkovich gave the example of a speaker who says, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” and explained that the speaker implies knowledge of facts leading to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.130 Couching the charge in terms of opinion does not dispel that implication, and the statement can damage reputation as much as the flat charge does.131 Even the common-law privilege never extended to a false statement of fact, whether expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion.132 The Court contrasted that example with the statement that Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin. That statement discloses its basis and carries no provably false factual connotation, so it would not be actionable.133 The usual exam error is to treat the word “opinion” as the end of the analysis, when the question is what facts the statement states or implies and whether those facts are true.
Fair comment no longer carries the load it once did. Milkovich declined to add a separate constitutional privilege for anything labeled opinion, reasoning that existing doctrine already secures the needed breathing space. A statement on a matter of public concern must be provable as false, statements that cannot reasonably be read as stating actual facts, such as rhetorical hyperbole, are protected, the fault requirements of the constitutional cases apply, and appellate review is independent.134 Those rules do the work fair comment once did, which is why the common-law privilege is regarded as largely subsumed under the constitutional right to express opinion.135 The constitutional cases do not stop a state from deciding cases under common-law fair comment rules or from expanding them to protect opinion beyond what the Constitution requires, and Milkovich may revive that tradition in a form shaped by the First Amendment.136 The constitutional treatment of opinion is taken up with the constitutional limits on defamation.
Falsity Knowledge and Malice
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 supplies the first test for abuse of a conditional privilege: a publisher who speaks on a privileged occasion loses the protection by knowing that the defamatory matter is false or by acting in reckless disregard of its truth.138 Proof of the occasion, which § 613(2) assigns to the defendant, only opens the privilege, and the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that it was abused.139 The publisher's state of mind comes first among the grounds of abuse because the privilege exists to get honest information to someone who needs it. A speaker who knows the statement is false is not supplying information at all, and the reason for tolerating an occasional mistake does not reach a speaker who is not mistaken.
All jurisdictions agree on the floor of this rule. A defendant cannot claim a qualified privilege for a statement the defendant knows to be false or does not believe to be true.140 The chief limitation on the interest privileges taught above therefore begins with sincere belief, and jurisdictions divide only over what more is required above that floor.141
Recklessness is the harder line, because it describes a state of mind short of knowledge. In the Maryland litigation over the Sindorf telephone call, an officer of Jacron Sales Co. told a competitor's president that a former salesman had been fired, when the record showed only that the salesman had resigned. The court reasoned that asserting a firing as fact without knowing whether it was true could be found to be reckless disregard of the truth, so the abuse question belonged to the jury and a directed verdict for the defendant was error.142 The court added that a publisher's motive is examined more closely when the statement was volunteered than when it answered an inquiry, which echoes the request factor that governs the recipient-interest privilege.143
Carelessness alone falls short of recklessness. Courts applying the reckless-disregard test say that simple negligence, poor judgment, or hasty action does not cause loss of the privilege.144 In Horning v. Hardy, a Maryland dispute over title to land, the owners were privileged to assert their claim, and the opposing parties argued that the owners' failure to verify the boundaries or to obtain expert advice showed reckless disregard. The court answered that a mere failure to investigate is not sufficient evidence of it.145 The reason is that recklessness looks at what the speaker actually had in mind, and a careless speaker usually believed what was said. A privilege that vanished whenever an honest speaker proved to be wrong would protect almost no one, and speakers would fall back on the silence the privilege is meant to prevent.
The usual exam error is to treat falsity, or a failure to check, as abuse in itself. A qualified privilege exists to protect statements that later prove untrue, so the question is what the publisher knew or consciously ignored when speaking.
The test just described was not the only one in use. Before Gertz, a majority of American courts measured abuse objectively and asked whether the publisher had reasonable grounds for believing the statement true, while a sizeable minority, following English practice, asked only whether the publisher acted in good faith and without reckless disregard.146 Under the objective test, a carelessly formed belief destroyed the privilege. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. then established that liability could not attach unless the plaintiff proved the defendant was at fault.147 Once the plaintiff must already prove at least negligence, which is a failure to use reasonable care, an objective reasonable-grounds test asks the same question a second time. Every plaintiff who proved fault would also prove abuse, and a defendant who proved the privileged occasion would gain nothing from it. That is why § 600 adopted reckless disregard, a choice that numerous courts have followed.148 Comment c to § 593 makes the same point from the other direction: if the balance of interests calls for liability when a publisher fails to use due care, a conditional privilege is not needed and should not be held to apply.149
How much work the privilege still does depends on which fault rule the plaintiff already faces. Where Sullivan applies, the plaintiff must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in the first instance, which is the same state of mind that would have defeated the privilege, so the privilege is partly or wholly irrelevant.150 An Oklahoma decision draws the conclusion that a conditional privilege has no significance for a plaintiff already held to that standard.151 Where negligence is the constitutional floor, the privilege keeps independent force, because reckless disregard is the higher standard. The Maryland court in Jacron reasoned that the negligence standard of Gertz is subsumed in the higher standard for proving malice, so a plaintiff who proves only negligence cannot overcome a privilege that requires recklessness.152 The Virginia Supreme Court in Gazette, Inc. v. Harris adopted the Gertz negligence standard and still maintained the defense of conditional privilege.153
The privilege matters most where no constitutional fault rule applies. When speech involves a matter of purely private concern, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss leaves the common-law rules in place and the plaintiff need prove no fault, so the privilege and its abuse test decide real cases. The Restatement's reasoning for choosing reckless disregard does not fully reflect that exception.154 A student who assumes the privilege disappeared after Gertz has therefore overstated the point, and a student who assumes negligence defeats it has understated the privilege.
Some courts add a second route to forfeiture. A Maryland decision describes the privilege as lost either by constitutional malice, meaning knowing falsehood or reckless disregard, or by common-law malice in the form of spite or ill will.155 Other courts hold that either ill will or recklessness suffices.156 The Restatement addresses motive through a separate requirement that the publisher act for the purpose that gives rise to the privilege, and the next subsection takes that up.157 One narrow rule also depends on state of mind. Under § 602, a publisher may be privileged to pass on a defamatory rumor or suspicion even while believing or knowing it to be untrue, if the publisher states it as rumor or suspicion rather than as fact and the publication is reasonable in light of the relation of the parties, the importance of the interests, and the harm likely to result.158
Purpose and Excessive Publication
The second way a qualified privilege is lost depends on how the publisher used the occasion, whatever the publisher believed about the statement. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is no conditional privilege unless the publisher communicates the defamatory matter for the purpose of protecting the interest that gives rise to the privilege, which is the rule of § 603, and reasonably believes the publication necessary for that purpose, which is the rule of § 605.160 Two companion rules police the edges of the occasion. Under § 604 the privilege fails to the extent that the publisher knowingly publishes the matter to a person outside its scope, unless the publisher reasonably believes the publication is a proper means of communicating it to a proper person. Under § 605A the privilege is lost to the extent that the publisher adds unprivileged matter, and the entire privilege falls if the added matter cannot be severed.161 The four sections state a single idea. The previous subsection asked what the publisher knew about the truth of the statement, and this one asks what the publisher did with the occasion, so a speaker who sincerely believes every word can still lose the protection by straying beyond the reason for it.
The reason runs through what each side gives up. A conditional privilege carries information to someone who needs it in order to protect a particular interest, and the plaintiff pays for that carriage with reputational harm that no one compensates if the statement is false. The price is justified only so far as the publication serves the interest. When the publisher pursues some other objective, the plaintiff's loss buys nothing. When the words reach people who have no part in the interest, the injury to reputation grows while the protection of the interest stays where it was. When the publisher adds a remark the interest does not call for, that remark imposes the same cost for the same lack of return. Courts state the condition in these terms: the privilege must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose, and it is forfeited when the publisher steps outside its scope or abuses the occasion.162 Without those limits, any speaker with a colorable interest could broadcast an accusation to anyone and call it privileged.
The first two rules divide the inquiry between what the publisher was trying to do and what the publisher could reasonably think was needed. Purpose asks about the objective that actually drove the publication, and a publisher whose aim was to injure the plaintiff or to gain some unrelated advantage is not using the occasion for the protected interest. Courts phrase the point differently. Some say the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily to further the protected interest, and others say that ill will as such is not what destroys the privilege, since the publisher has forfeited it by going beyond the purpose for which it exists.163 The requirement of a reasonable belief in necessity does the subtler work, because it supplies an objective check on a stated purpose. A publisher can sincerely say the aim was to protect an interest and still have had no reasonable ground for thinking this particular telling was needed to do it, and the belief requirement keeps a protective label from legitimizing a gratuitous broadcast.
In Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co. the purpose question arose on a real record. Fridkis, who spoke for Jacron, telephoned Brose at a competing company with whom he had a close personal and business relationship, and the call concerned Sindorf, a former employee of the Jacron group. The Maryland court held that a qualified privilege arose as a matter of law, whether it rested on a duty owed or on a common interest, because a former employer who speaks to a new or prospective employer about a former employee is discharging a duty.164 The privilege was nonetheless defeasible. The court reasoned that a publisher is liable if the statement is made to accomplish a distinct objective that may be legitimate in itself but lies outside the privilege, and it concluded that a reasonable person could find the call was an effort to pressure Sindorf into returning material he was holding, or simply a way to learn, at a third person's request, the date of Sindorf's employment elsewhere.165 The recipient was a person who could properly receive information about a former employee, so the occasion was sound, and the privilege still failed on that view of the evidence because the call was serving a different end. An objective that is lawful, even sympathetic, falls outside the privilege when it is not the interest that created the occasion.
The court also listed the circumstances that bear on abuse. All relevant circumstances are admissible, including the publisher's reasonable belief in the truth of the statements, the excessive nature of the language used, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties.166 Each item calls for an inference about why and to whom the publisher spoke, so the question of abuse usually belongs to the jury. The court explained that malice is a jury question unless the evidence and every fair inference from it lead to a conclusion on which reasonable minds could not differ, and it reversed a directed verdict for the defendant and ordered a new trial.167 The work divides in a way worth holding onto. Whether the occasion is privileged is for the court as a matter of law when the facts are undisputed, while abuse of the occasion goes to the jury whenever reasonable minds could differ.168
The scope rule applies the same reasoning to the audience. The privilege does not include publication to anyone other than those whose hearing of the matter is reasonably believed to be necessary or useful in furthering the interest.169 Employment cases apply that limit directly, holding that an employer loses the privilege by disclosing adverse information more broadly than legitimate employment purposes require.170 A letter about a church member that went to the congregation and also to others in the wider community, as in Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the United Methodist Church, would have drawn the same line, since the congregation shares the interest and the community does not.171 Some courts fold excessive publication into the malice inquiry as one more sign of ill will, and others apply § 604 as an independent ground of forfeiture, yet either route reaches the same result once the audience went beyond those who needed to know.172
The rule does not demand a perfect method, and that limit keeps it from punishing ordinary business practice. Section 604 excepts a publisher who reasonably believes the publication is a proper means of communicating the matter to a proper person, and its focus on knowing publication leaves accidents out of the count.173 Any reasonable and appropriate method of publication that fits the purpose may be used, so dictating a privileged business letter to a stenographer can be privileged. A person with no privilege to receive the letter who incidentally reads or overhears it creates no liability if the method was reasonable and appropriate.174 The difference from the bakery owner's announcement lies in the publisher's choice: the stenographer is a means of reaching the proper recipient, while the lunch crowd was an additional audience the owner chose to reach.
The last rule, § 605A, applies the same logic to content. A privileged occasion covers the information the occasion calls for, and a defamatory remark the interest does not need receives no protection merely because it was delivered in the same conversation. The privilege is lost to the extent of the added matter, and if the added matter cannot be severed from the privileged part, the entire privilege is lost.175 The severability condition has a practical reason. A court can set a separate insult aside and leave the protected answer standing, but it cannot remove words fused with the protected charge without rewriting what was said, and a rule that let protection follow the fused words would let a publisher shelter unprotected matter by weaving it into protected matter.
The defendant carries the burden under § 613(2) of proving the circumstances that create the occasion, so the five steps begin only after that showing, and they then test whether the occasion was used properly.176 The usual exam error is to stop once the occasion is recognized, as when the speaker is a former employer and the listener has a hiring decision to make, and to call the statement privileged. The facts that decide the problem are the ones that come after: what the speaker was really after, how many people heard it, and whether an unrelated remark rode along. Disputes over those facts are ordinarily resolved by a jury, so an answer that reaches them should say that abuse is a question for the jury and not a ruling the court makes on the pleadings.