Concept
Coming to the Nuisance
Defenses and limits on nuisance liability
Coming to the Nuisance
Nuisance defendants often argue that they were there first. The feedlot owner points out that the subdivision came later, and the factory owner says the plaintiff bought the house knowing about the smoke. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D gives that argument a limited place: the fact that the plaintiff acquired or improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it came into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar the action, but it is a factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is actionable.1 Timing cannot end the case by itself, though it can affect how the case comes out.
The doctrine sits close to assumption of risk, which the preceding part covered, and the Restatement keeps the two separate. Section 840C makes the plaintiff’s assumption of risk a defense in a nuisance action to the same extent as in other tort actions.2 Section 840D then treats coming to the nuisance as a factor and nothing more, a pairing that one casebook note calls an equivocation.3 The cases bear out the separation. Defendants regularly allege that the plaintiff assumed the risk by buying next to an operating source of interference, and courts generally have not accepted the argument when the plaintiff bought in good faith and not for purposes of litigation.4
Three topics follow. The first, prior use as a factor, shows how the plaintiff’s arrival enters the question whether an interference is actionable. The second, Spur and conditional injunctions, shows courts adjusting the remedy instead of the liability when a developer has brought neighbors to an existing use. The third, right-to-farm statutes, covers the legislative response that gives agricultural operations a time-based defense.
Prior Use as a Factor
Section 840D does two jobs at once. It denies the defendant a complete defense based on the plaintiff’s arrival, and it keeps the arrival in the case as evidence on the question every private nuisance plaintiff must answer: whether the defendant’s use unreasonably and substantially interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land.5 Applying the factor requires knowing what the rule replaced and what makes the factor heavy or light in a particular dispute.
The majority rule covers public and private nuisances alike: the plaintiff is not barred by the sole fact of having bought property adjoining the nuisance.6 Chase v. Eldred Borough shows the rule at work. The plaintiff bought a house knowing that a town baseball field had operated for fifty years, and a hail of baseballs from an outfield twenty feet away kept landing on the property. The court found a nuisance and enjoined play until the town built a protective fence.7
Two concerns explain why courts rejected the older defense. The first is development. Almost all courts now refuse to treat coming to the nuisance as a defense because it would let first-in-time residents stifle new development in the community, and a number of them treat the plaintiff’s arrival as one factor in determining reasonableness instead.8 The second is property. A defendant who could insulate itself from nuisance law automatically by building a factory would gain a right to restrict the plaintiff’s potential use and enjoyment simply by being the first in the area to do more with its land than enjoy its natural condition. The result is the same when the plaintiff buys after the factory opens, because the seller’s land would lose market value if the buyer could not sue.9 The majority position therefore rests on the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use and control of her own land: a defendant cannot acquire, by unilateral conduct, an easement to cause damage to it, and accepting the defense would allow the “theft” of an incorporeal interest in real property.10
The rule is not absolute. Particularly when the other factors are more or less balanced, the fact that the plaintiff came to the nuisance may be important and even decisive.11 In East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, the plaintiff bought its property twenty years before suit, when the city was already polluting a slough, and the condition gradually worsened as the community grew. The city’s health depended in large measure on its sewage disposal, and there was no other way to dispose of it. The court denied the plaintiff both an injunction and damages.12 Set beside Chase, the difference lies on the other side of the scale. In Chase a fence could end a physical bombardment. In East St. Johns the defendant’s activity had no substitute, and the community’s health rested on it.
In Ensign v. Walls the defendant raised, bred, and boarded dogs on her premises, and most of the plaintiffs had moved into the neighborhood in recent years. She argued that, because she was already in business when they established their residences, they could not complain. The court answered that the circumstance may properly be taken into account in deciding whether the relief sought ought, in equity and good conscience, to be granted.13 The arrival was one consideration in the balance and not an answer to the claim.
Locality is the usual reason the factor decides cases. A court is much more likely to treat coming to the nuisance as a defense when the defendant’s activity suits the area where it occurs and the plaintiff’s own use is out of step with that area.14 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. fits that pattern. The court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an injunction because the plaintiff had moved into the area “with full knowledge that this region was especially adapted for industrial rather than residential purposes, and that factories would increase in the future,” and it deferred to local zoning authorities by declining to “condemn as a nuisance a business which is being conducted in an approved and expert manner, at the very spot where the council said it might be located.”15
Locality carries so much weight because the ordinary private nuisance depends on circumstances. A nuisance per se is an activity or condition that is a nuisance in itself and not permissible under any circumstances, a category that consists mainly, or perhaps solely, of uses prohibited by statute or regulation, and a lawful business is by definition not a nuisance per se. A nuisance in fact, or per accidens, is the ordinary private nuisance: an activity or condition that is out of place or is a nuisance because of the particular way it is carried on.16 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. put the idea memorably, describing a nuisance as a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.
Zoning supplies its own protection for prior uses, and the two should not be confused. Zoning ordinances typically allow land uses in place when the law is adopted to continue as legal nonconforming uses, although some uses, such as junkyards, unsightly billboards, and particularly noxious activities, must end immediately or within a short period.17 A later part of this chapter takes up zoning compliance. For now, note that zoning can preserve priority as a status, while nuisance law treats priority as one factor among several.
Because the arrival feeds the reasonableness inquiry, it has no counterpart outside nuisance. In Amaral v. Cuppels, a golf course owner sued for continuing trespass argued that the neighbors’ homes, which players near the ninth hole bombarded with balls, were built after the course. The court held that the discretionary principles of the coming-to-the-nuisance cases did not apply, because there is “no cognate notion of ‘coming to a trespass.’”18 Trespass protects the right to exclusive possession against physical invasion, and the same event frequently interferes with use and enjoyment too, so a plaintiff whose land is physically invaded can often frame the claim in trespass and avoid the weighing in which her arrival counts.19
The locality and foreseeability factors meet in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co., where a developer built a residential community beside a cattle feedlot that had operated for many years in a completely rural area outside Phoenix, and flies and odor made the adjoining portion almost unusable for residential purposes.25 The next part takes up how the court resolved that dispute.
Two answers go wrong in opposite directions. One ends the analysis by saying that the plaintiff came to the nuisance, which states the old rule. The other waves timing away because it is not a bar, which drops the factor. A sound answer says that the arrival is no bar and then weighs it against locality, knowledge, price, foreseeable growth, and whether the interference is new.
Spur and Conditional Injunctions
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. shows prior use working on the remedy instead of the liability. The Arizona Supreme Court gave the feedlot no immunity from suit and upheld an injunction against it, but it required the developer who brought the neighbors to the feedlot to pay for the feedlot’s departure.
The facts set up the dispute. By December 1967, Del Webb’s property had extended south to Olive Avenue, and Spur’s operation lay within 500 feet of that road. Webb sued, alleging that more than 1,300 lots in the southwest portion of Sun City were unfit for development and sale as residential lots because of the feedlot, which it called a public nuisance because flies and odor drifted over the southern part of the development on the prevailing south-to-north wind. Spur was then feeding between 20,000 and 30,000 head of cattle.27 The feedlot was a lawful business, and a lawful business is by definition not a nuisance per se. It became a nuisance in fact, an activity out of place, because a residential community grew up beside it.28
The court nevertheless required the feedlot to move, and it explained that Spur had to leave not because of any wrongdoing on its part but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the courts for the rights and interests of the public.29 Nothing suggested, when Spur and its predecessors located in western Maricopa County, that a new city would spring up full-blown alongside the feedlot and that the developer of that city would ask the court to order Spur to move.30
That left the cost of the move. The court held that Webb, having brought people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of Spur, must indemnify Spur for a reasonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down.31 In the terms of Calabresi and Melamed’s well-known framework, the case falls in Box 4: the activity was protected with a liability rule, and instead of allowing it to continue the court ordered it shut down and awarded the feedlot damages assessed by the court.32
The remedy added a possibility to the traditional menu. A conventional view held that a nuisance claim could be resolved in one of three ways: abate the activity by granting the plaintiff injunctive relief, let the activity continue if the defendant pays damages, or let it continue by denying all relief. Spur supplied a fourth rule, the converse of the second: abate the activity if the plaintiff pays damages.33 The second rule is the one in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., where the New York court ordered that the injunction issue unless the cement company paid permanent damages to the neighbors, so the plant kept running and the defendant paid.34 In Spur the feedlot stopped and the plaintiff paid, which is why the indemnity is called the reverse of Boomer.35 For the background and aftermath of Boomer, see the symposium and the Farber essay collected in the secondary literature.36
The indemnity follows from the reciprocal nature of nuisance law. The feedlot became a nuisance only because Webb developed residential property next door. The feedlot produced the smell, but Webb produced the people to be bothered by it.37 An unconditional injunction would have made the feedlot absorb a loss that someone else’s choice created. Treating the feedlot’s priority as automatic immunity would have been no better, because it would give the first user a right to restrict a neighbor’s use of land simply by being first in the area to do more with its own land than enjoy its natural condition.38 Economic commentary adds a reason why a court may fix the price itself. If holdouts mean neighbors demand too much, or information and organizing costs mean they demand too little, the presence or absence of a bargain does not reliably show whether an activity produces a net benefit or a net cost.39 Some commentators describe remedies of this kind as zoning by liability rule and ask how they relate to public zoning and to environmental regulation.40
The court limited the indemnity to a developer that, with foreseeability, brings into a previously agricultural or industrial area the population that makes an injunction against a lawful business necessary. It reasoned that, had Webb been the only party injured, coming to the nuisance would have barred Webb’s relief, and that a feedlot on the outskirts of a city that later grew toward it would bear the cost of abating the nuisance as to people who located within the city’s growth pattern.41 Neither setting matched the facts, since a developer had chosen to build a new town beside an operating feedlot.
The relationship to § 840D needs care on an exam. Section 840D treats arrival as a factor and not a bar, and Spur is consistent with that approach in one respect: the feedlot’s priority in time did not foreclose equitable relief.42 The court’s remark that coming to the nuisance would have barred a lone, injured Webb is stronger than the modern rule, and it is best read as showing how heavily a knowing arrival can weigh when no member of the public is hurt. In Spur itself, the weight of prior use appeared in the remedy.
The indemnity belongs to a wider family of conditional remedies. Courts have an undeniable power to enjoin nuisances and may, in their discretion, deny the injunction or grant it only on conditions.43 In Pendoley v. Ferreira, the court delayed injunctive relief against a piggery to allow “an orderly, rather than a hurried, liquidation of their pigs” and an “opportunity to find new premises.” In Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co., the defendant could keep using its factory only if it rearranged its heavy machinery to reduce the inconvenience to the plaintiff, and Hansen v. Independent School District No. 1 is a similar example of relief conditioned on the defendant’s conduct.44 The conditions in Pendoley and Quinn regulate the defendant’s timing or conduct. The condition in Spur is a payment owed by the plaintiff, an arrangement that commentators sometimes call a purchased injunction: the plaintiff may enjoin the defendant, but only if she is prepared to compensate the defendant for the loss incurred.45
Two mistakes are common. One reports that Spur holds that a plaintiff who comes to a nuisance loses, when the bar language described only a lone developer and the court granted the injunction anyway. The other says that plaintiffs pay whenever they arrive late, when the court limited indemnity to a developer that foreseeably brought population into the area.
Right-to-Farm Statutes
Almost every state has a right-to-farm statute that creates a special defense to nuisance liability. The details vary, but the general approach is the same: farms and other agricultural activities are immune from nuisance liability if the facts giving rise to the claim have existed for a specified period of time. In a sense, these statutes revive the coming-to-the-nuisance defense in the specialized context of agricultural nuisances.49 The revival matters because, under § 840D, an arriving plaintiff is only one factor in the balance, so a farm’s fate at common law remains uncertain.50 The statutes displace that balance, which the common law builds on two ideas: landowners may use and enjoy their land free of unreasonable interference, and they must use their own land so as not to injure adjacent owners.51
Farming operations are frequent targets of public and private nuisance suits by residential neighbors, and the conflicts have grown as the population has moved into the countryside. The farmers’ argument that the plaintiffs came to the nuisance has often not succeeded. When urban growth reaches the farmer’s doorstep, courts have found that the farmer must leave to make way for places for people to live, even where the operation meets applicable health and safety standards and is otherwise reasonable and consistent with traditional uses in the area. Hog farms and cattle feedlots are frequent targets, and courts treat such operations as high-risk ventures whose owners must foresee that they are living on borrowed time.52 The standard policy justification for the statutes responds to that pattern. When agricultural land becomes residential, new residents unfamiliar with rural life complain of odors, noise, dust, and insects, and the resulting lawsuits and local ordinances discourage farmers from investing in their farms and from remaining on them.53
An ordinary application shows the effect. A farmer, F, owns a large farm in an agricultural area and installs an irrigation system that he runs for twenty-five years. C buys the adjacent farm and soon discovers that F’s pumps make ear-splitting noise in the early morning hours. When C complains, F tells her that the pumps have been making the same noise for many years. In all probability, the state’s right-to-farm statute will prevent C from suing F on a private nuisance theory.54
The Illinois statute at issue in Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel shows the typical core:
No farm or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a private or public nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding area occurring after the farm has been in operation for more than one year, when such farm was not a nuisance at the time it began operation, provided, that the provisions of this Section shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any farm or its appurtenances.55
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute barred suits from anyone who came to the nuisance more than one year after the farm went into operation. The period ran from the time the farm first began operating, even against a plaintiff who bought her house only several years after the farm was established, so the plaintiff could obtain no injunction against flies from the longstanding farming operation.56
Each condition in the statute answers a different part of the farmer’s argument. Most statutes provide that agricultural operations that have been in existence longer than one year cannot become public or private nuisances because of changed conditions in the surrounding area, if they were not nuisances when they began and if they are properly managed.57 The statute answers one complaint only, that conditions around the farm have changed. A farm that was a nuisance from its first day, or one that is carelessly run, faces a different complaint, and the neighbor’s arrival date does not answer it. Riddle v. Lanser illustrates the point with a septic-waste operation: the odor came from taking in septic-tank waste, and the landowner’s later use of the waste as crop fertilizer did not bring the operation within the statute, because the statute shields farmers from claims that follow the creation of an agricultural operation and not from a nuisance that began first.
The statutes differ on the details. Farm expansion may be allowed to varying degrees, and some statutes allow unlimited expansion. Some list exceptions to the rule, and negligent operations typically are not exempt. Questions arise as to which kinds of operations qualify and whether changes in use remain protected. Some states protect all agricultural operations, while others protect operations used for specific purposes such as milk, eggs, or livestock. The statutes may also bar local governments from enacting zoning laws that would force an existing agricultural operation to close.58
The checklist also marks the difference from the common-law rule. Where a statute applies, a court never reaches the weighing that § 840D calls for, because the statute removes the claim. Where no statute applies, or a condition fails, the analysis falls back to § 840D, and the plaintiff’s arrival is weighed with the locality, the plaintiff’s knowledge, and the price paid.64 That is also the difference from Spur, where a court weighed the arrival and shaped the remedy, while a qualifying farm under a statute has nothing to weigh.
Several complications deserve a note. First, the statutes face constitutional objections. The Iowa Supreme Court found that one such statute unconstitutionally took away the right to sue for nuisance in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors.65 The objection echoes the common-law reasoning that a defendant cannot acquire, by its own conduct, an easement to cause damage to a neighbor’s land.66 Constitutional limits also restrict what may be abated as a nuisance in other settings. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that provided for abatement, as a public nuisance, of any “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspaper article about political and public figures, while acknowledging that freedom of the press is not absolute and that the state can punish abuses.67
Second, newer farm activities test the statutes’ reach. Several courts have asked whether noise from concerts or farm attractions counts as agriculture so as to preempt a cause of action. In Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the plaintiff presented a prima facie private nuisance claim over noise from concerts associated with a neighboring farm’s harvest festivals.68
Third, large animal operations strain the statutes’ original premise. Whether right-to-farm statutes succeed in protecting farm operations is open to question, and one study found them less effective than some hoped. Concentrated animal feeding operations, known as CAFOs, are particularly controversial. A large CAFO is one with more than 1,000 cows, 2,500 hogs, or 125,000 chickens, and many exceed these numbers. It is doubtful that legislators who enacted the statutes in the 1970s and 1980s meant to protect what some call factory farms.69 The broader change is that only about 20 percent of farms produce over 85 percent of the nation’s agricultural output, and there is a sense that the shift from family-dominated farms to corporate agriculture is destroying the attractive values of rural America.70