Concept
Utility of the Conduct
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Utility of the Conduct
The defendant's side of the Section 826(a) scale is built from three factors in Section 828 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In weighing the utility of conduct that causes an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, a court asks what social value the law attaches to the conduct's primary purpose, how well the conduct suits the character of the locality, and how impracticable it would be to prevent or avoid the invasion.1 Section 828 calls these factors important, so they guide the weighing. None is an element the defendant must prove, and a defendant can carry the balance while losing on one of them. Opinions applying the balance routinely quote the gravity list and the utility list together. Hendricks v. Stalnaker, for example, sets out the Section 827 gravity-of-harm factors in a footnote, and other opinions reproduce the first utility factor in the Restatement's own words.2
The gravity factors examine the invasion from the plaintiff's side of the property line: how much was lost, what kind of loss it was, how highly the law values the interest struck, how well that interest fits the neighborhood, and what avoiding the harm would cost the plaintiff. The utility factors reverse the view and ask what the defendant's side is worth. Each has a counterpart on the harm side. The value of the defendant's purpose answers the value of the plaintiff's invaded use, the fit of the defendant's conduct to the locality answers the fit of the plaintiff's use, and the difficulty of prevention for the defendant answers the difficulty of avoidance for the plaintiff.
The Restatement names the defendant's factors separately because that side has real work to do. Nearly every productive use of land sends something across the boundary, so a scale that measured only harm would let a neighbor stop almost any enterprise nearby. The utility factors pick out the interferences that society tolerates because the activity is worth having, belongs where it is, and cannot be made harmless at reasonable cost.3 Naming them also makes the defendant's side as concrete as the plaintiff's, so the trier of fact weighs facts about the activity instead of a general impression that it matters. In each subsection below, a factor that is present adds weight to the defendant's side, a factor that is absent adds none, and no single factor decides the balance.
Social Value of the Conduct
The first utility factor in Section 828 asks what social value the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct.4 The question concerns what the activity is for, whether supplying goods, processing a harvest, or generating power, and how much the law thinks that purpose is worth. The factor is the defendant's counterpart to the social value of the invaded use on the harm side. It sets how heavy the defendant's side can become, and the next two factors then ask whether the conduct fits its setting and whether the invasion could be prevented.
Living among neighbors requires accommodation, and this factor measures how much accommodation a purpose earns. Socially useful activities, particularly those of industry, commerce, and trade, are tolerated even though they impinge to some extent on the comfort and quiet of the people nearby, while other activities may fairly be required to bear the cost of the harm they cause.5 The mechanism turns on who gains and who pays. A plant's benefits reach many people at once, as workers, customers, and the regional economy, while its spillover falls on a handful of adjoining owners. A rule that made every spillover actionable regardless of purpose would let those few owners shut down what many depend on. The logic runs in reverse as well. Conduct with no useful purpose costs the neighbor something and returns nothing to anyone else, so no benefit sits on the scale against the harm, and the law has no reason to ask the neighbor to put up with it.
A cement factory marks the high pole. Cement production is crucial to the construction of homes and other buildings, so the purpose of running the factory carries heavy weight for the defendant.6 A coal-fired power plant that complies with every environmental regulation is another example. Its importance to the regional economy is the reason an orchid grower whose crop its emissions ruin will probably lose the nuisance suit.7 In both illustrations the defendant's purpose puts a great deal on the utility side, and the neighbor's loss is confined to a single use of land.
The low pole is a structure whose only function is to injure. Many jurisdictions prohibit a spite fence, a boundary-line fence or similar structure that serves no useful purpose and is erected with the intent to annoy a neighbor, and in Rice v. Cook a twelve-foot fence that blocked the neighbors' view was held to be one.8 A court that asks what value the law attaches to the purpose of such a fence finds nothing to attach, so the defendant's side of the scale starts empty and any significant harm stands alone. Section 829(a) goes further and treats conduct undertaken for the sole purpose of causing harm to the other as a separate route to unreasonableness, which a later section takes up.9
The value in question belongs to the purpose, and the defendant's private profit is a different quantity. Profit measures what the owner gains, while this factor measures what the activity contributes to people beyond the owner. If profit controlled, tolerance would run to whoever earns the most, and an enterprise whose benefits stop at its owner's door could claim as much accommodation as one that feeds a district. Courts frame the inquiry around usefulness. In Woods v. Khan, the first question the court asked about an egg-production facility was whether the defendants were engaged in “a useful enterprise.”10
A valuable purpose still does not guarantee that the defendant prevails. In Woods v. Khan the court held that the odors and flies from the egg-production facility were bothersome enough to justify injunctive relief once harm and utility were weighed, asking both whether the defendants ran a useful enterprise and whether the rural area was well suited to such a facility.11 In Dobbs v. Wiggins the circuit court found the defendant's land well suited to a dog kennel, yet it found that the barking invaded the neighbors' use and enjoyment and that the gravity of the harm outweighed the kennel's utility. It ordered the owner to cut the number of dogs to no more than six.12 The defendants in all four settings had useful enterprises, so the difference in results comes from the other side of the scale. The cement dust stunted one variety of flower and the power plant's emissions cost one grower a crop, while the odors and kennel noise intruded on the neighbors' ordinary use of their homes. Social value is a heavy weight on the defendant's side and nothing more, because the harm factors and the other two utility factors still count.
Not every jurisdiction counts this factor at all. In Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of a power plant operator's evidence that the utility of its operations outweighed the harm, on the view that the economic or social importance of the operation was of no consequence in the suit.13 In a state that follows that approach the inquiry looks to the level of the interference, and the first utility factor is never weighed. Even in states that follow the Restatement balance, a high-value purpose does not decide every case. Section 826(b) makes an intentional invasion unreasonable when the harm is serious and the cost of compensating for it would not make continuing the conduct infeasible, and the defendant's utility is irrelevant under that test.14 A student should therefore first identify which approach the jurisdiction follows and then, in a balancing state, ask what value the law attaches to the purpose of the defendant's conduct.
Suitability of the Conduct
The second utility factor in Section 828 asks whether the defendant's conduct suits the character of the locality.16 The locality is the surrounding area with its settled pattern of uses, and the question is whether the activity that produces the invasion belongs in that pattern. A fit adds weight to the utility side of the scale, and a mismatch removes it. Neighbors who settle in an area can anticipate the by-products of the uses it is known for and plan around them, so an activity that fits imposes a foreseeable burden that falls on everyone who chose to live there. An out-of-place activity imposes the same smoke, noise, or odor without that justification, and the defendant, who chose the site, could see the mismatch before the activity began.
The steel mill is the standard illustration. A mill in an industrial park is much less likely to be found an unreasonable interference with surrounding owners than the same mill in an otherwise completely residential area.17 The plant, the smoke, and the output are identical in the two settings, and the only difference is whether the neighborhood is one where such activity belongs. Conduct can also be so ordinary for its setting that a real loss carries no liability. In Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v. Corts, land left in its natural condition blocked a view and caused erosion, and the court found no nuisance.18
Students most often confuse this factor with its twin on the harm side, because the two share nearly all of their vocabulary. They differ in whose use is compared with the locality:
- Section 827(d), on the harm side, compares the plaintiff's particular use or enjoyment of land with the character of the locality, and a good fit adds weight to the gravity of the harm.19
- Section 828(b), on the utility side, compares the defendant's conduct with the character of the locality, and a good fit adds weight to the utility of the conduct.20
Because the two factors sit on opposite sides of the scale, a court weighs them together, and they can reinforce each other or pull apart.
When the two factors point in opposite directions, neither controls. In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., a developer built Sun City near an existing feedlot and so came to the nuisance. If the developer's own interests had been the only ones at stake, it would have received no injunction. The court nonetheless enjoined the feedlot because the rights of innocent Sun City inhabitants were also involved, and it required the developer to indemnify the feedlot for the cost of moving.21 The feedlot's prior presence in the area added weight to its side of the scale, but the other factors still had to be weighed.
Zoning matters under this factor because a classification is the most visible public statement of what a district is for. A defendant who operates within the classification can point to that judgment as support for the fit, but the support has limits. A zoning classification helps ascertain the suitability of the location for both the defendant's use and the plaintiff's, yet it is only one factor and not a determinative one.22 In Prah v. Maretti, the circuit court concluded that because the defendant's proposed house conformed to zoning regulations, building codes, and deed restrictions, the use was reasonable. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that step, holding that compliance with zoning laws does not automatically bar a nuisance claim and that compliance “is not the controlling factor, though it is, of course, entitled to some weight.”23 The reason is that a zoning designation is fixed in advance for a whole district. It records what kind of use the community approved, and it says nothing about how much smoke or noise a particular operation sends onto a particular neighbor's land, which is the question the balance exists to answer. Some courts, however, give almost complete deference to a municipality's decision to zone for a use, and where a fact pattern shows that deference, zoning comes close to deciding the factor.24 Without that signal, treat zoning as evidence of suitability that carries some weight.
The law of nuisance also recognizes a sharper form of locality rule. A nuisance per se is a use treated as a nuisance wherever it appears, while a nuisance per accidens depends on the circumstances, and the difference is observable in zoning law itself.25 Zoning laws let uses already in place continue as legal nonconforming uses, yet they require junkyards, unsightly billboards, and particularly noxious activities to end immediately or within a relatively short period.26 In Powell v. Taylor, an Arkansas court found a neighborhood so residential in character that converting a home into a funeral parlor would be a nuisance. An older rule of that kind treats the mismatch as settling the question, while the Restatement treats it as a factor that goes on the scale and can be outweighed by the rest of the balance. On an exam, run the factor and weigh it unless the problem says that the jurisdiction treats a use as a nuisance whenever it sits in the wrong district.
Impracticability of Prevention
The third utility factor in Section 828 asks how impracticable it is to prevent or avoid the invasion.28 The first two factors asked what the defendant's activity is for and whether it belongs where it is. This one asks whether the defendant could have stopped the interference and what stopping it would take. It is the defendant's counterpart to the burden-of-avoidance factor on the harm side, which asked what the plaintiff could do to protect against the same invasion. The harder prevention is, the more weight the factor adds to the utility side, and prevention is hardest when the only way to end the harm is to end the activity.
The factor has two ends, and each has its own logic. At one end is the defendant who cannot stop the harm without closing down. A requirement of prevention would then amount to a requirement to stop, and the goods, jobs, and other benefits of the activity would disappear along with the interference. The whole utility side of the scale is at stake, which gives that defendant a strong claim to be tolerated. At the other end is the defendant who could remove most of the harm with a modest change. The activity can go on and the neighbor can be protected at the same time, so asking nothing of the defendant would leave the neighbor to absorb a cost the defendant could have removed cheaply. Pushing the burden toward whoever can avoid the harm at the lowest cost also gives defendants a reason to adopt reasonable precautions early, because an operator who knows that an available fix weakens its position has an incentive to install the fix before a dispute arises.
The cement factory in the standard illustration sits at the first end. It operates in a rural, uninhabited area and cannot prevent its emissions without closing the factory.29 A buyer who later builds next door and finds that the dust stunts one variety of flower in the garden does not prevail under the Restatement balance, because the utility of the conduct is high. Cement production is crucial to construction, the area suits it, and prevention is impossible short of closure.30 The impracticability of prevention is one of three utility factors in that result, and the very low gravity of the buyer's harm does equal work on the other side of the scale, so the factor supports the outcome without producing it alone.
The closure end also explains why the factor cannot mean impossibility. Every invasion can be prevented by stopping the activity that causes it, so a factor that asked only whether prevention is conceivable would never favor a plaintiff. The working question is whether the invasion can be prevented or reduced while the activity continues in a recognizable form. The remedy in Dobbs v. Wiggins shows that question in operation. The circuit court found the defendant's land well suited to a kennel, yet it ordered the owner to decrease the number of dogs to no more than six, to kennel them in the southern region of the property, and to take all steps necessary to suppress the barking.31 Reduction, relocation, and suppression are the kinds of measures the factor invites a court to consider, so a kennel owner who claims that prevention is impracticable has to show that measures of that kind would fail or would cost too much.
The cases that divide courts fall between those ends, and Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz is one of them. The apartment complex's air-conditioning system produced noise that the defendant tried, unsuccessfully, to abate.32 The original owner testified that the system cost about $80,000 to construct, that separate units for the eight buildings would have cost $40,000 more, that changing to that arrangement now would cost $150,000 to $200,000, and that the apartments could not be rented without air conditioning.33
Those figures point in two directions, and a careful answer states both before reaching a conclusion. Because the apartments could not be rented without cooling, removing the equipment would mean giving up the use, and on that side the facts resemble the cement factory. Yet a quieter design was available when the complex was built for a modest addition to the price, and a court can treat that design-stage figure as showing that prevention was practicable when the choice was made, even though the cost of a cure rose to several times as much once the buildings stood. The later figure shows how much more expensive the defendant's own choice made the fix. The cost figures are facts that this factor makes relevant. Whether they show that the utility of the apartments outweighed the gravity of the noise is a further judgment that also depends on the harm factors discussed earlier.
Two neighboring provisions use similar ideas, and keeping them apart prevents misapplying this factor. Section 830 makes avoidability its own route to unreasonableness: an intentional invasion is unreasonable if the harm is significant and it would be practicable for the actor to avoid the harm in whole or in part without undue hardship.34 Under that route no full balance is needed. Under Section 828(c), avoidability is one input among eight, so a cheap precaution lightens the defendant's side without ending the analysis, and the absence of any technological fix helps the defendant without winning the case. Section 826(b) asks a different question again, which is whether the financial burden of compensating for serious harm would make continuing the conduct infeasible.35 The cost of stopping an invasion and the cost of paying for it are separate quantities, and a later section takes up the second.