500 S.W.2d 217
Thad Schultz and his wife filed suit against Estancias Dallas Corporation seeking a permanent injunction to stop the operation of air conditioning equipment and tower on the property next to their residence.1 Trial was by jury and judgment was rendered upon the jury verdict.2 The apartment complex was completed about March or April of 1969 with about 155 rentable apartments in eight buildings.3 The air conditioning unit at issue served the entire complex and was located at the back side of defendant’s property, about five and one-half feet from plaintiffs’ property line, about fifty-five feet from plaintiffs’ back door, and about seventy feet from plaintiffs’ bedroom.4
The jury found that the noise emitted solely from defendant’s air conditioning equipment constitutes a nuisance that began May 1, 1969, is permanent, and has been continuous since it began.5 The jury awarded Mrs. Schultz $9000 and Thad Schultz $1000 in damages considering material personal discomfort, inconvenience, annoyance and impairment of health, but failed to find that the nuisance proximately caused such harm to either plaintiff.6 The jury also failed to find any unreasonable delay by plaintiffs in calling the nuisance to the attention of the defendant.7 Plaintiffs testified that the neighborhood was quiet before the apartments were constructed, that they can no longer entertain in their backyard, cannot carry on normal conversations inside with doors and windows closed, and that the noise interferes with their sleep.8 Neighbors gave similar testimony, and witnesses valued plaintiffs' land at $25,000 before the noise and $10,000 or $12,500 after.9
A witness who was the original owner testified that it cost about $80,000 to construct this air conditioning system and that separate units for the eight buildings would have cost $40,000 more, with it now costing $150,000 to $200,000 to change to that system.10 An expert metallurgical consultant testified as to sound factors in decibels before and after changes to reduce the noise.11 The trial court granted the permanent injunction, and defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.12
Whether plaintiffs were required to secure a jury finding that the nuisance proximately caused their discomfort in order for the trial court to grant a permanent injunction?13
Plaintiffs were not required to recover damages for a temporary nuisance to secure a permanent injunction.14 They were entitled to such injunction based upon the affirmative answers given by the jury that the noise constitutes a nuisance, that it is permanent, and that it has been continuous since it began.15 The failure on the part of the jury to give an affirmative answer to the proximate cause issues related to the damage issues or to a temporary nuisance and did not alter the situation.16
No. The jury found that the noise emitted solely from defendant’s air conditioning equipment constitutes a nuisance that began May 1, 1969, is permanent, and has been continuous since it began.17 The jury awarded damages to each plaintiff but failed to find that the nuisance proximately caused material personal discomfort, inconvenience, annoyance and impairment of health to either plaintiff.18 This failure pertained only to the damage claims and did not prevent injunctive relief.19 The plaintiffs were entitled to the permanent injunction based on the affirmative findings regarding the existence, permanence, and continuity of the nuisance.20
Plaintiffs were not required to secure a jury finding that the nuisance proximately caused their discomfort in order for the trial court to grant a permanent injunction.21
Whether the trial court properly balanced the equities when granting the injunction against the defendant?22
Even though a jury finds facts constituting a nuisance, there should be a balancing of equities to determine if an injunction should be granted.23 The court considers the injury which may result to the defendant and the public by granting the injunction as well as the injury to be sustained by the complainant if the writ be denied.24 If the court finds that the injury to the complainant is slight in comparison to the injury caused the defendant and the public by enjoining the nuisance, relief will ordinarily be refused.25 An injunction may issue where the injury to the opposing party and the public is slight or disproportionate to the injury suffered by the complainant.26
Yes. The trial court impliedly balanced the equities in favor of plaintiffs by entering the judgment granting the injunction after evidence was heard on the question.27 There is little or no testimony reflecting benefit to the public generally, and no evidence that there is a shortage of apartments in the City of Houston.28 The apartment complex was completed about March or April of 1969 with about 155 rentable apartments in eight buildings.
The air conditioning unit is located about five and one-half feet from plaintiffs’ property line, about fifty-five feet from plaintiffs’ back door, and about seventy feet from plaintiffs’ bedroom.29 According to much of the testimony, the unit sounds like a jet airplane or helicopter.30 Plaintiffs can no longer entertain in their backyard, cannot carry on normal conversations inside with doors and windows closed, and the noise interferes with their sleep.31 In contrast to cases involving essential businesses serving the public, the record here shows no such public necessity, and defendant’s election tactic prevented development of a full damages record.32
The trial court properly balanced the equities when granting the injunction against the defendant.33
Whether the trial court's special issue using the terms 'noise' and 'equipment' was proper?34
The use of the word 'noise' instead of 'sound' did not constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence.35 It was uncontroverted that noise came from the operation of this air conditioning unit.36 Every witness conceded this unit made a noise and the attorneys for all parties used that term in their interrogation of the witnesses.37 The use of the word 'equipment' is not too broad in connection with the special issue.38 The jury could not have been confused or misled as none of the witnesses were that specific in their testimony as to the source of the sound.39
Yes. The special issue asked whether the noise emitted solely from the Defendant’s air conditioning equipment constitutes a nuisance.40 The use of 'noise' was proper because it was uncontroverted that noise came from the unit and all parties used the term.41 The use of 'equipment' was proper because witnesses were not specific as to any particular part of the air conditioner.42 The jury could not have been confused or misled by these terms.43
The trial court's special issue using the terms 'noise' and 'equipment' was proper.44