Concept
Public Policy Limits
General rule and express assumption of risk
Public Policy Limits
A clear, conspicuous release that covers the plaintiff's claim can still fail. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B bars recovery by a plaintiff who expressly agrees to accept the risk of the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.1 The earlier sections asked whether the parties made an agreement and whether it reaches the claim in suit. This section asks whether a court will enforce the agreement at all. A court that answers no is refusing a bargain the parties did make, so the limit works as a judicial check on freedom of contract.
Two assumptions support enforcement, and the limits track them. The first is that the signer could meaningfully decline: a person who must sign to obtain a service available nowhere else has not freely chosen to give up the right to sue. The second is that the clause does not undercut a protection the law supplies for reasons beyond the two contracting parties. A release removes the pressure that liability puts on a provider to take care, and when the duty exists to protect the public or a protected class, letting the provider contract out of it turns a private allocation of risk into a way of avoiding public responsibilities.
State courts strike down pre-injury releases on several distinct public policy grounds, and they often hold that a party cannot waive its duty of reasonable care despite the agreement.2 Five grounds follow, and each is tested on its own, because a release can survive one and fail another: a transaction the public relies on, where the signer had little real choice; conduct as extreme as gross negligence or recklessness; a safety statute that fixes the duty; a defective product; and a parent's attempt to sign away a child's claim. A release that clears all five must still cover the risk that actually caused the injury. A form that lists the natural hazards of skiing, for example, does not reach negligent maintenance of the equipment.3 When a court does find the release contrary to public policy, the clause is unenforceable and the negligence claim proceeds as if no release had been signed.
Public Interest and Bargaining Power
The broadest ground looks at the transaction that produced the release rather than at the release's wording. The leading statement is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, in which a hospital would admit patients only if they signed a release of all liability. The California Supreme Court held the release void, reasoning partly that patients did not truly acquiesce voluntarily and partly that medical services were themselves so important.4 Courts in many states begin their public-policy analysis with Tunkl, and California names it as the limit on an express agreement that would otherwise relieve a defendant of its duty.5 The rule that emerges is that an exculpatory agreement is unenforceable when it adversely affects the public interest.6
Two ideas sit inside that rule. Enforcement rests on consent, since a signer trades away a future claim, usually to gain something valuable. When the thing sought is an essential service offered to everyone on the same terms, the signature records need rather than choice, because a customer who refuses to sign goes without. Courts therefore will not honor consent extracted from a party with little bargaining power; it is inconsistent with the free-choice principle behind the doctrine. They have rejected contractual consent to unsanitary conditions in public housing and to negligent treatment in local hospitals, and they have refused to let rail or electric providers condition service on the customer's acceptance of injury risk.7 The second idea concerns what a release does to the provider. A provider that controls the customer's body or property is the party best placed to prevent harm, and a clause excusing its carelessness removes the pressure of liability exactly where the public most depends on careful performance.
The six factors guide a judgment; they are not a formula. Not all must be present, and an exculpatory agreement may adversely affect the public interest even when some are missing.9 Maryland's court in Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc. treated the ultimate question as one for the totality of the circumstances, measured against current societal expectations. The public interest, it said, reaches public-service obligations such as those of utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and public warehousemen, and also transactions so important to the public good that an exculpatory clause would be “patently offensive.”10 Sorting the factors by the two ideas above helps in applying them. Factors two through five describe a signer with no real alternative: an important service, open to everyone, sold by a provider with a decisive bargaining advantage on a take-it-or-leave-it form. Factors one and six describe a provider whose care the public relies on the law to secure.
The hospital in Tunkl shows every factor at once, which is why it is the paradigm of a release that fails. Medical care is a regulated business and a practical necessity, the hospital serves anyone who applies, and it presents a standard form to a patient whose body is in its hands. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject releases for medical treatment.11 Courts reason the same way about other providers that take charge of a customer's welfare. Caregivers such as child care centers and nursing homes cannot undercut the care they have undertaken with a clause releasing them from the duty of care, and public schools may not condition a student's participation on a general release of liability for negligence. Releases in medical research on human beings may be void, and carriers, public utilities, and some professional bailees historically could not contract away liability for their own negligence.12 Employers stand in the same position for a related reason: the inequality of bargaining power inherent in employment bars express assumption of risk by employees, so a release demanded as a condition of the job is unenforceable.13 Two of the commonly stated exceptions to enforcement are at work in these cases: a gross disparity of bargaining power, and a transaction that involves a matter of public interest, as with common carriers, innkeepers, and employers who require disclaimers as a condition of employment.14
Recreation presents the opposite picture, and the contrast shows where the line falls. In Seigneur the member argued that the club's participation agreement was a contract of adhesion and that the exculpatory clause was void as against public policy.15 The Maryland court enforced the clause: a health club does not provide an essential public service, its services are not of great importance or practical necessity to the public as a whole, and it is nowhere near as socially important as an innkeeper, a public utility, a common carrier, or a school.16 A road-race organizer fared the same way in Williams v. Cox Enterprises, Inc. A law student who suffered heat prostration in a race argued that its popularity put him and other runners under enormous pressure to enter on whatever terms were offered. The court found no disparity in bargaining position and called the argument ludicrous; it also noted that the waiver described the conditions in specific terms and that the plaintiff had read it and knew the danger.17 A standardized form open to any paying customer may be present in such cases, so factors three and five may be met. What is missing are the factors that make signing a matter of necessity, an important service and a decisive bargaining advantage, because a person who dislikes the terms can choose another club, another race, or no exercise at all. Equal bargaining strength explains the commercial setting too. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., a release written into a contract of sale between two large corporations was enforced under California law, because parties with equal bargaining power can allocate the risk of loss as they choose.18
A release's wording can be identical across two providers while the result differs, because the factors look at the provider and the transaction rather than at the text of the form.
Courts are not uniform even within recreation. Many refuse to extend public-interest reasoning to nonessential recreational activity, but a few hold that a release in advance will not absolve a recreation provider of liability for its own negligence.19 Connecticut's court in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., for example, treated releases for recreational activity as void.20 An answer about a recreational release therefore starts from the majority rule of enforcement, ties it to the missing necessity and bargaining-advantage factors, and notes the minority position.
Residential leases sit on the dividing line, and courts split. Most uphold exculpatory clauses on the theory that the landlord-tenant relationship is not a matter of public interest but relates exclusively to the parties' private affairs, with the parties standing on equal terms and free to contract as they please. Other courts refuse to enforce them.21 A lease problem is best answered by naming both positions and the reason the majority gives; no single outcome is safe.
Gross Negligence and Recklessness
Read literally, § 496B lets a clear release excuse even a defendant who ignored a grave danger, because the section reaches harm from “negligent or reckless conduct.”23 Recklessness is a conscious choice to run a serious risk of harm to others, a worse state of mind than carelessness. Most courts decline to follow the text. They treat the public-policy clause as a limit on what any release can cover: even a clear, conspicuous release given in an ordinary commercial setting does not reach grossly negligent, reckless, willful, or intentional conduct.24
The reason follows from what a release can do. A release works on a risk the signer can price. Ordinary negligence is such a risk: a slip in routine supervision or a lapse in maintenance is a hazard a participant can accept in return for access to the activity, often at a lower price. Extreme misconduct falls outside the bargain for two reasons. No one who signs a release can reasonably be taken to have given up protection against egregious behavior, so the voluntary choice that justifies the defense is missing as to that risk. And a release that covered recklessness would remove the last reason for the provider to take even minimal care, because the provider would face no liability whatever it did. The law therefore lets the signer trade away claims for ordinary carelessness and keeps liability at the extreme end, where its deterrent force is most needed.
The California Supreme Court applied the majority view in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, holding a release invalid to the extent it purported to cover the future gross negligence of the operators of a city-sponsored recreational program for developmentally disabled children, and joining the vast majority of jurisdictions.25 Pennsylvania's court reached the same result for reckless conduct in Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., and it later held in Feleccia v. Lackawanna College that a release covering gross negligence is unenforceable.26 The holding is partial. The release keeps its force against ordinary negligence claims and loses it only against the conduct the law will not let a signer give up, so a plaintiff who can prove nothing worse than a lapse in care recovers nothing. Willful and wanton misconduct and intentional torts fall on the same side of the line as recklessness, because the parties cannot disclaim liability for them in advance.27
An exam stem that pairs a clear release with an injury is really asking where the defendant's conduct falls on a scale from carelessness to indifference. Two accidents on identical paperwork show how much turns on that placement.
The majority rule departs from the text of § 496B, and an exam answer should say so. Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability takes the contrary position,28 as do a minority of states, which enforce releases against reckless or grossly negligent behavior where the release clearly expressed the parties' intention and was not the product of overreaching or grossly unequal bargaining power. West Virginia's decision in Murphy v. North American River Runners, Inc. is the usual example.29 Those two screens, clear expression and no overreaching, echo the voluntariness concern behind the public-interest factors in the previous subsection, and they are the minority's substitute for a flat ban.
The line between ordinary and gross negligence matters early in a case, at the pleading stage. A defendant who moves to dismiss on the strength of a release asks the court to decide at once that nothing worse than ordinary negligence is alleged. Whether conduct was simple negligence or something worse is often a question of fact for a jury, and a plaintiff who pleads facts that would support gross negligence or recklessness, such as a known defect, an ignored warning, or a deliberate decision to skip a safety step, can defeat the motion, because the release does not cover the conduct alleged.30 Many plaintiffs have survived dismissal this way. A bare label adds nothing; facts do the work. The defendant can still prevail on summary judgment if the record shows only an ordinary lapse.
Statutory Safety Duties
A release cannot excuse a failure to meet a duty that a safety statute imposes. A safety statute sets minimum standards of care to protect the public or a protected class, and when a clause purports to release an industry member from liability for violating those standards, the clause will not be enforced.32 Two reasons support the rule. A statutory standard reflects the legislature's judgment that a precaution must be taken whatever a regulated business and any one customer would prefer, so the two of them lack authority to bargain it away. And a business that could collect a signature from everyone the statute protects would never have to comply with the statute, while the protected group is often the one least able to refuse to sign.
Kentucky's court stated the rule in Hargis v. Baize: a party cannot contract away liability for damages caused by its failure to comply with a duty imposed by a safety statute.33 The Sixth Circuit applied the same idea to liability resting on a mine-safety statute in Martin County Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., and West Virginia's court applied it to a home-inspection statute in Finch v. Inspectech, LLC.34 The home-inspection setting shows the logic well. An inspector who could have every client sign away claims for failing to meet the statute's standards would be free of those standards in every transaction, and the statute would protect no one.
A statute need not set affirmative standards to have this effect. Even a statute that immunizes an industry from a certain range of claims may lead a court to conclude that a release cannot go further without violating public policy.35 In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., the Utah court held unenforceable a release purporting to waive all claims against a ski resort, in light of a statute that immunizes ski operators from liability for the inherent risks of skiing.36 The logic is that the legislature drew a line between the risks a skier bears and the risks an operator must answer for, and a release of all claims would redraw that line by contract. Utah's later decision in Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. is cited as contrary authority, so an answer should treat this extension of the rule as contested.37
Residential leases supply a further application. Because it is against public policy to let a person waive statutory rights, an express assumption of the risk of harm from a landlord's violation of a statutory duty to repair is invalid.38 That is a narrower question than the general split over lease exculpatory clauses taken up in the previous subsection. The general split concerns clauses that excuse common-law negligence, while this clause targets a duty the legislature imposed.39 The invalidity attaches to the agreement and leaves the tenant's own conduct open to scrutiny. A landlord sued for violating a statutory repair duty can usually still raise implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence, because the law expects a tenant to look out for the tenant's own safety, with an exception for statutes meant to protect people who cannot protect themselves, a category housing codes are usually not construed to occupy.40 The landlord therefore cannot buy exemption by lease clause, but a tenant who knowingly walks on a broken stair still faces arguments about the tenant's own conduct, and the last section of this chapter returns to those arguments under comparative fault.
Applying the rule takes one question: does the clause purport to excuse noncompliance with a statutory standard? Whether the clause is otherwise valid does not answer it. A release can be clear, conspicuous, within its scope, and signed by a fully informed adult, and it still fails to the extent it would excuse a statutory violation, because the defect lies in what the clause tries to waive, which no drafting cure can fix.
Whether a given activity falls under a safety statute depends on the governing jurisdiction's law. On an exam, look for a statute, code, or licensing requirement that sets the standard the defendant is accused of missing.
Defective Products
Sellers of new products cannot use a disclaimer, waiver, or release to defeat a claim for physical injury caused by a defect. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 18 states the rule: disclaimers, limitations of remedies, buyer waivers, and similar contractual exculpations, whether oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products-liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.42 This section asks only what such a clause does to the plaintiff's claim and leaves the elements of a defect claim to products liability itself. The answer depends on whether the claim sounds in strict liability or negligence, whether the product was new or used, and who invokes the clause.
The refusal to honor these clauses grew out of products law itself. Warranty law traditionally let sellers disclaim, and sellers' use of disclaimers against people hurt by dangerously defective consumer goods was a principal reason strict liability in tort developed in the 1960s.43 From Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. onward, courts have refused to enforce contractual limits that conflict with the implied representation that a new product is not defective.44 Two ideas explain why. Strict liability places the cost of a defect on the seller who put the product into commerce, so a waiver that moved the cost back to the injured buyer would undo the rule, and every seller would have a reason to print one. A waiver is also justified only by informed choice, and a latent defect is by nature a risk the buyer cannot see. The comment to § 18 accordingly presumes that the ordinary consumer lacks the information and bargaining power to agree to a fair limit on the right to recover.45 The information half concerns the hidden risk; the bargaining half concerns the take-it-or-leave-it form, which resembles the standardized adhesion contracts that weighed against enforcement in the public-interest factors above. The clause's wording therefore cannot save it. An automobile manufacturer would gain no protection from a new-car sales clause by which the purchaser accepts that one car in 10,000 will be a dangerous lemon.46 For strict liability, a seller's attempt to disclaim responsibility for physical injury from a new product is void and of no effect.47
In Diedrich v. Wright a parachutist was severely injured when her parachute failed to open fully because its lines were crossed. She sued the parachute center for supplying an unsafe parachute, and the center pointed to a release she had signed that generally exculpated it from liability for parachuting injuries. The court held that the release could not bar the strict liability action, and that it did not bar the negligence action either, because it failed to state clearly that she was relieving the center of liability for negligence.48 The case shows two separate gates. The strict liability claim never reached the drafting question, because the clause is void as to that claim whatever it says. The negligence claim did reach it, and the clause failed on clarity. Had the release named negligence in terms, it would at most have cleared the second gate, and the strict liability claim would still have gone forward.
When the claim is negligence, products cases follow the general rule developed earlier in the chapter: a disclaimer works only if it clearly and unequivocally relieves the defendant of responsibility for its own negligence.49 Courts differ on how explicit the language must be. Some insist that the word negligence appear, while others accept any clear and unequivocal wording, such as a release of all claims.50 The negligence-disclaimer cases have mostly involved commercial parties suffering commercial losses, and the few consumer injury cases apply the same limits.51 Timing matters as well, because a buyer cannot consent to a term the buyer never saw.
A buyer must know of a negligence disclaimer when the sale occurs, and a provision buried in fine print in a manual delivered afterward fails for that reason.52 Even a disclaimer that works against the signing user does not bar a negligence claim by an injured third party against the manufacturer or other seller.53 Nor does a waiver signed at a rental agency's request help a different seller in the chain. In Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. the court held that a waiver signed at the rental agency's request could not benefit the distributor of the skier's bindings and rebuffed the distributor's claim that the skier's express assumption of risk was good “against the world.”54 A separate route stays open to defendants. A user who actually comprehended a specific defect and chose to encounter it can still face the implied form of the defense, even in strict liability, because that defense rests on the user's own comprehension and choice, which the treatment of implied assumption of risk develops.55
Used goods and rentals are where the clean rule gives out. Section 18 applies by its own terms only to sellers and distributors of new products.56 The rental-agency half of Westlye shows one side of the split: the court refused to enforce the skier's waiver against the agency, treating a product supplier's attempt to contract away strict liability in tort as void against the public interest.57 In Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., decided under Colorado law on virtually identical facts with only the rental agency sued, the waiver was held fully enforceable and the suit was dismissed.58 The two results come from two courts rather than from two different releases, which is why a rental problem has no single safe answer.
Each side has a reason. The case for enforcement starts from the buyer's position: a person who rents or buys a used item can often inspect it and price the risk, and both sides may gain from letting the consumer take on a defect in exchange for access or a lower price.59 Courts commonly enforce as-is disclaimers on used goods, which reaches the same result as the majority rule that a seller of used goods owes no tort duty.60 The case against enforcement is that a bare as-is clause does not shield a professional seller from a latent defect that makes the product unreasonably dangerous, because the buyer who accepts the item as is has not been told what is wrong with it.61 The hardest version adds a specific disclosure. If the last used hang-glider at a rental shop has a small tear, the seller points it out, and the customer rents it anyway, the argument for enforcing a waiver of that defect is that otherwise there may be no price at which a solvent business would rent the glider at all.62 Section 18 also leaves open consumers with full information and sufficient bargaining power, such as those represented by informed and economically powerful groups or intermediaries, who may trade curtailed liability for concomitant benefits, especially where an alternative nontort remedy serves as an adequate quid pro quo.63
Parental Waivers for Children
A release signed by a parent for a child strains the wording of § 496B, which speaks of the plaintiff's own agreement. The injured plaintiff is the child, and the signature on the form belongs to someone else. Most courts hold a parent's pre-injury release of a child's rights invalid.65 The vast majority of states that have decided the issue apply that rule to commercial activity, and they also hold void any accompanying indemnity agreement, meaning the parent's promise to reimburse the provider, that would shift liability onto the parent.66
Two features of these releases explain the majority rule. The first is whose claim is being surrendered. A child's tort claim belongs to the child, and a minor cannot consent to give it up, so the informed, voluntary choice that justifies express assumption of risk is missing on the child's side of the bargain. The parent who signs usually does so at the counter of a facility, on a form the provider drafted, as the price of letting the child take part, and in that setting the parent is poorly placed to weigh the child's interests against the convenience of getting inside. The second feature is who can best bear the risk. A commercial provider controls the premises and the equipment, can prevent injuries, and can spread their cost through ticket prices and insurance, while the child can do none of those things. A rule that let the provider shift the whole cost back to the child by collecting one adult signature would remove the pressure of liability from the party best able to respond to it, which is the concern behind the public-interest limits above.
The indemnity clause deserves its own attention because providers often add it to the same form. If the parent promises to reimburse the provider for whatever the child recovers, a successful suit by the child becomes a bill sent to the parent, and the parent acquires a personal financial reason to keep the child from suing. That conflict would restore the invalid release through the parent's pocketbook, which is why courts void the indemnity promise together with the release in commercial settings.67
A stem that pairs a parent's signature with an injured child asks first where the injury happened. In Miller v. House of Boom Kentucky, LLC the Kentucky court, answering a certified question, held that a pre-injury release signed by a parent was not enforceable against a minor injured at a for-profit trampoline park. The court noted that decisions elsewhere enforcing releases that covered minors usually involved noncommercial entities such as school or community-sponsored programs.68 The contrasting pole is Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., where the Ohio court treated a mother's release for her child's recreational soccer as waiving her own rights, the child's rights, and the father's rights.69 The setting accounts for the difference in pull. A trampoline park sells admission, controls its equipment, and can price injury risk into its tickets and insurance, so both reasons for refusing the waiver apply in full. A community soccer club depends on volunteers and community participation and has far fewer resources to insure against claims, and courts are more receptive to waivers when enforcing them keeps such a program running.
The line between commercial and noncommercial settings is a tendency in the cases and does not bind every court. Maryland's court in BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Rosen upheld a release signed by a father for a child playing in a store's children's play area and rejected the commercial versus noncommercial distinction, and Massachusetts's court in Sharon v. City of Newton held a father's waiver effective as to a teenage cheerleader's injury.70 Florida has gone both ways. In Kirton v. Fields its court held a release signed by a parent unenforceable against the minor or the minor's estate in a tort action arising from a commercial activity, and the legislature then limited that holding by permitting parents to release commercial providers for injuries resulting from the inherent risk of the activity, under Fla. Stat. § 744.301(3).71 A statute can therefore move the line, so an answer should apply the rule of the jurisdiction the stem names. In school and community settings, some waivers have been invalidated and others upheld, and the results seem to track, to some extent, how unreasonable the defendant's conduct was. The decision in Galloway, for example, invalidated releases for a community-sponsored program in which young children were told to cross a highway without supervision.72 That pattern resembles the gross-negligence limit taught in the previous subsection, so the defendant's own conduct matters even in a setting that favors enforcement.
The parent's signature is not wasted. Washington's court in Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort and New Jersey's court in Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park drew the line this way: parents can waive their own rights but not their minor child's.73 The reason is that the parent is an adult who may accept a risk of loss to the parent's own interests, while the child's claim is a separate right that the parent never held and so cannot give away. Zivich reaches the opposite result on the same kind of form, with one signature covering the child's claim and the other parent's as well. A complete answer therefore separates the claims, asking who is suing and whose right the release purports to give up.