13 Tex.App. 289
There is but a single question which we think is involved in and requires discussion on this appeal.
Appellant and one P. F. Dillman were jointly indicted in the District Court of Travis county for the forgery of a transfer of a land certificate for a league and labor of land in the State of Texas. It is alleged in the indictment that the acts constituting the forgery were all committed in Caddo parish, in the State of Louisiana. No act or thing connected with the execution of the forgery is charged to have been done in Texas; but the crime and injury, so far as this State is concerned, are averred to consist in the fact that the said forgery in Louisiana "did then and there relate to and affect an interest in land in the State of Texas, and would, if the same were true and genuine, have transferred and affected certain property, to-wit, a certain land certificate, number 222, for one league and labor of land in the State of Texas," etc.
This indictment was brought under Article 451 of the Penal Code. By Article 454 of the Code it is declared that "persons out of the State may commit and be liable to indictment and conviction for committing any of the offenses enumerated in this chapter which do not in their commission necessarily require a personal presence in this State, the object of this chapter being to reach and punish all persons offending against its provisions, whether within or without this State," etc.
It was made a ground both in the motion to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment, and is again urged in counsel's brief, that the facts alleged, if true, would constitute an offense against the sovereign State of Louisiana alone, and one of which the courts of this State would have no jurisdiction. If that position be correct, then the Legislature had no authority to pass Article 454, and the same would be a nullity. Can this proposition be maintained? We think not. There is no constitutional inhibition, State or Federal, depriving the Legislature of the authority, and unless there is some legal authority superior to the State's constitutional power that controls the action of the Legislature within its proper scope, we cannot hold such reasonable enactments inoperative.
Two authorities are chiefly relied upon for the contrary view. The leading one is State v. Knight (2 Haywood, reported in Taylor's N.C. Reports, 44), and the other is People v. Merrill (2 Park Crim. R. 590). In Knight a statute attempted to subject persons resident in neighboring States who counterfeited the bills of the State to trial as if the offense had been committed within that State, and the court there entertained doubt as to jurisdiction and discharged the prisoner.
But textwriters and decided authorities point out limitations to the rule that locus delicti alone confers jurisdiction. Mr. Wharton notes that the originator of misconduct outside the territory which reaches and injures interests within the territory may be held responsible there. He gives examples: a forger operating across a boundary to defraud another sovereignty; the author of a libel who originates it in one country but publishes in another; one who employs an agent on the other side of a boundary to obtain goods by false pretenses; and the seller who through agents sells lottery tickets in another jurisdiction. English authorities are cited to the same effect: a person may, by employment of conscious or unconscious agents, render himself amenable to the law of England when he comes within its jurisdiction.
Mr. Cooley, after stating the general principle that a State's legislative authority ordinarily cannot punish acts committed beyond its boundaries, immediately adds that if the consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State reach and do injury within it, the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against that State. Story likewise states that although penal laws are local, an offense committed in one sovereignty in violation of the laws of another may be punished by the latter if the offender is found there, and allegiance to another sovereignty is no bar to the indictment.
The offense charged here plainly falls within the terms of Article 454 of the Penal Code. Had the acts been committed by a citizen within this State there would be no question of liability. The contention of the defendant is in effect that the State may try and convict its own citizens for the same act but may not try and punish one who committed the same offense outside the State. We see no valid reason why the Legislature could not assert jurisdiction, as it has done, over wrongs and crimes affecting land titles of the State, whether the perpetrator was within or without its territorial limits at the time. Such acts are offenses against the State of Texas and her citizens, and properly triable in her courts. It may be that the act would not be a crime in the State where it was perpetrated, and if so, that State would have little interest or ability to punish it. When this forgery was committed in Louisiana, at that instant a crime was committed against, and injury done to, the State of Texas, because it affected title to lands within her sovereignty.
Our conclusion is that the Legislature had authority to adopt Article 454; that the statute violates no superior law; and that the jurisdiction thereby conferred can be rightly exercised by the courts of this State. The defendant comes within the scope of that jurisdiction. He has been fairly and impartially tried under the law, and legally convicted according to the evidence in the record. We have found no error requiring reversal, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Hurt, J., dissents upon the ground that the Legislature had no authority to pass Article 454, Penal Code.