Concept
The Contributory Negligence Bar
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Comparative Negligence
The Contributory Negligence Bar
Under the traditional common law rule, a plaintiff whose own failure to use reasonable care contributed to an injury recovered nothing from a negligent defendant; the defendant was entirely excused.1 That failure is contributory negligence. The bar holds even when the defendant’s negligence consists of violating a statute, unless the statute’s effect is to place the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.2
The rule never asks how much fault each side bore. A plaintiff who was slightly careless lost the whole claim, and so did a plaintiff who was grossly careless, though in each case the defendant’s negligence had also helped cause the harm. The entire loss landed on one party, however the blame divided.
Three subsections follow: the bar’s elements and operation, the safety-statute exception, and the leniency juries showed in practice. Together they explain why courts built so many workarounds and why nearly every state replaced the bar with comparative negligence, the subject of the rest of the chapter.
The All-or-Nothing Rule
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the bar in one sentence: except where the defendant has the last clear chance, “the plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by him.”3 The bar is a defense, so it has elements of its own, and contributory negligence has three working parts:
- The plaintiff breached a duty to use reasonable care to protect against harm to himself or herself.4
- That breach was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s own harm.5
- The defendant pleads and proves both points, because contributory negligence is an affirmative defense.6
Because the defendant carries that burden, each side ordinarily tries to prove a tort claim against the other. The plaintiff proves that the defendant breached a duty and caused harm; the defendant proves that the plaintiff breached a duty to self and caused that same harm.7 A defendant who argues only that no one was negligent is contesting elements of the plaintiff’s own case and has not raised this defense at all.
Causation does real work in the second element, because the defendant must connect the plaintiff’s carelessness to the injury that actually occurred.8
The bar’s effect is starkest when the two parties’ fault is lopsided.
The gap between nothing and $90,000 on identical facts is the whole difference between the two regimes.9
Almost every state has abandoned the bar. Only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, together with the District of Columbia, still apply it; of the rest, 36 states replaced it by statute and 10 by judicial decision.10 Maryland shows the rule in operation in Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, where the jury found both the soccer association and the plaintiff negligent, the plaintiff’s own negligence barred recovery, and the court declined to abrogate the common law rule.11 Because the bar still governs in those jurisdictions, an exam fact pattern that does not name the governing rule calls for an answer under both the bar and the comparative rules.
The rule traces to Butterfield v. Forrester, decided in 1809, which involved an obstruction the defendant had left in a road. The court held that “[o]ne person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for himself,” and that two things must concur to support the action: “an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.”12
A rule that old needs a present-day justification, and the usual ones fail:
- The causation argument holds that the plaintiff’s negligence, not the defendant’s, produced the harm. Yet in these cases the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s negligence are both causes in fact and both proximate causes of the plaintiff’s harm, so causal reasoning does not explain the defense.13
- The deterrence argument holds that the bar makes plaintiffs careful. Few people take more care for their own safety than the fear of personal injury already inspires, and the uncertain outcome of a future lawsuit adds nothing. Meanwhile the bar relieves negligent defendants, such as corporations and manufacturers whose carelessness creates no comparable risk of injury to themselves, and so reduces the total incentive toward safety that negligence law creates.14
- The punishment and clean-hands argument holds that a plaintiff at fault should be penalized or denied the court’s help. But the defendant was also at fault, so one party bears the whole penalty for a wrong two committed, and courts regularly grant relief to plaintiffs who were partly at fault in other settings.15
What remains is a single intuition: it is unfair to impose liability on a defendant when the plaintiff negligently contributed to the injury. The opposite intuition is just as strong, because it is unfair to relieve the defendant of liability entirely merely because the plaintiff’s negligence was also a cause of the plaintiff’s own injury. The bar honors only the first.16
The court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. put the objection in terms of the fault principle itself. The doctrine is inequitable because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault, and the objection, grounded in the idea that in a system of liability based on fault “the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability,” remains “irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness.”17 A rule that gives a plaintiff at 2 percent fault and a plaintiff at 90 percent fault the same result, zero, cannot satisfy that principle. Nearly every state has since replaced the bar with comparative negligence.18
Safety Statute Exception
A defendant whose negligence consists of violating a statute does not escape the bar merely because a statute is involved. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence still bars recovery “unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.”20 Proving the violation establishes the defendant’s negligence, but the plaintiff’s own failure to use reasonable care is a separate question, and the defendant may still raise it. The exception asks what the statute was meant to do: did the legislature intend the defendant to bear the whole responsibility for this harm?
The usual answer is yes when the statute protects persons who cannot protect themselves against the danger it addresses. Before comparative fault, contributory negligence was usually not a defense to liability under statutes of that kind, among them school bus laws, child labor laws, laws prohibiting sexual relations with minors, laws prohibiting the sale of certain articles to minors, and factory acts and other statutes for the protection of workers.21
The reasoning follows from the statute’s purpose. A legislature that writes a statute for people who cannot protect themselves has already assumed that some of them will lapse, and it has placed the burden of preventing the harm on the defendant. If the lapse defeated the claim, the defendant could point to the very failing the statute anticipated, and the duty would disappear in the cases it was written for.
A violation alone does not trigger the exception, as a second hypothetical shows.
The two cases differ in what each statute assumes about the people it protects. The bus statute assumes carelessness and assigns the burden to the defendant anyway; the speed limit assumes no such thing. The contrast can be run as a short sequence of questions.
The exception also raises a question under comparative negligence: does the statute still prevent any reduction of the plaintiff’s damages? The answer depends on the particular statute and its context, but as a general rule the statutory policy should negate the defense entirely.22
Jury Leniency Under the Bar
The bar was absolute on paper, but juries did not always treat it that way. As the court in Li observed, every trial lawyer knew that juries often allowed recovery despite the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, and that the compromise in the jury room reduced damages because of the plaintiff’s fault. The process, the court said, was “at best a haphazard and most unsatisfactory one.”24 Commentators describe the practice as under-the-table comparative negligence. It probably operated in many jury deliberations for a long time, though unsystematically and without control or instruction by the courts.25
A hidden reduction has no standard to govern its size and no record for a court to review. Two juries hearing the same collision might split the damages according to their own sympathies, or one might apply the bar as instructed and award nothing. Li added that this state of affairs can only detract from public confidence in the ability of legal institutions to assign liability on a just and consistent basis.26 The court in Hoffman v. Jones described the bar as a rule that either places the burden of a loss two parties caused upon only one of them or “relegates to Lady Luck the determination of the damages for which each of two negligent parties will be liable.” When two people’s negligence contributes to an accident, it said, each should pay the proportion of the total damages he has caused the other party.27
Doctrine worked alongside practice. The weakness of the bar’s rationale led courts and legislatures to find ways around it, among them the doctrine of last clear chance, which the Restatement’s own statement of the bar carves out, and the rule that the bar could not be invoked by a defendant whose conduct was “willful and wanton.”28 The safety statute exception is another example.
Formal comparative negligence replaced the hidden compromise with an open one, and “an entire system of rules implementing the basic concept had to be developed.”29 Some statutes, for example, make each of several defendants liable for a share of the award in proportion to that defendant’s causal negligence.30 A party enters the allocation only if a valid theory of liability would allow recovery against it.31 How far comparative fault reaches beyond negligence is a separate question; one Ohio decision held that the state’s comparative negligence statute does not apply to a strict products liability action because the statute is limited to negligence actions.32 The sections that follow take up these rules in turn.