Concept
Limits on Distress Recovery
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Limits on Distress Recovery
Sections 924(a) and 905 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts list emotional distress beside bodily harm among the items a plaintiff may recover, and § 905 lets a jury compensate both without proof of pecuniary loss.1 Both sections start from a tort that has already been established. They say what distress is worth once a claim exists, and they leave open whether a plaintiff whose only injury is distress has a claim at all.
The law pays freely for distress when something stands behind it: a physical injury, or a wrong the law recognizes on its own terms. That injury or wrong vouches for the suffering and gives a court more than the plaintiff's word to rely on. Where nothing stands behind the distress, the law restricts recovery, because a claim built on feelings alone invites fraud and trivial suits, and a rule that paid for every foreseeable upset would leave liability without a limit. Whether the harm a plaintiff claims is legally compensable is a question for the court, and the restrictions in this section are rulings of that kind.2
The limits cluster in four settings. In the first, the plaintiff has no physical injury. In the second, the plaintiff fears a harm that has not yet happened. In the third, the claim rests on a broken contract or an economic tort, and in the fourth, the defendant damaged property. The suffering may be equally real in each, so the question every time is whether the law counts distress as compensable harm in that setting. The first setting comes first because its rules frame the questions the other three vary.
Distress Without Physical Harm
Courts treat distress differently according to whether another tort carries it. Distress that is an item of damages in an independently actionable tort is called parasitic, because it draws its legitimacy from a wrong the law recognizes on its own, and a plaintiff who proves that wrong recovers for the distress without the special limits, such as proof of physical manifestations or of severe distress, that apply to stand-alone claims.3 A stand-alone claim, in which inflicting the distress is itself the alleged tort, usually faces substantial limitations.4 Those limitations are the subject of this subsection.
Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co. shows the parasitic route. A gas company's agent, who had a right to read the meter in the basement, walked through the plaintiff's apartment without authority, and the court found a valid ground of liability in trespass even though the plaintiff sought damages only for the consequences of the entry.5 The agent's insulting language to the plaintiff's nurse gave the plaintiff no assault claim of her own, so the trespass was the host that carried her distress into the case.6 The court explained that mental disturbance may not be a cause of action in the first instance, yet fright and mental anguish are competent elements of damage when they arise out of a trespass upon the plaintiff's person or possession.7 A plaintiff with a host tort therefore carries the full distress into the verdict. A plaintiff without one must build a claim around the distress itself, and there the law asks for something beyond her own account of a feeling.
That demand rests on the reasons the law gives for withholding a general duty to avoid causing emotional distress. In negligence no such duty generally exists, and the reasons stated when the rule took shape were the opportunity for fraud in claims that a plaintiff was frightened or upset and the fear that the floodgates of litigation would open.8 Each reason addresses a different problem. The fraud concern is about genuineness: a plaintiff with no injury has nothing physical to point to, and a feeling can be claimed at no cost and disproved only with difficulty. The floodgates concern is about number: distress is a foreseeable reaction in everyone who sees or hears of a harmful event, so a rule that paid for the feeling would put no natural boundary on who could sue. A workable gate must therefore do two jobs, vouching for the plaintiff's suffering and confining recovery to a manageable class, and each rule below can be read as an attempt to do both. The traditional exceptions are few and narrow: negligent mishandling of a loved one's corpse, and negligent transmission of a telegram that wrongly announces a loved one's death.9
The oldest gate was the impact rule. A negligence plaintiff recovered for distress only if the defendant's negligence caused direct physical injury, and the distress, being parasitic, could be added to the physical contact but could not support an action by itself.10 A driver who knocked a pedestrian down paid for the fright along with the injury; a driver who missed by inches paid nothing, even if the fear brought on a heart attack.11 Courts found that line hard to defend, because the same distress drew full payment when the defendant barely touched the plaintiff and none when the defendant came close. Some courts responded by applying the requirement literally. In Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. dust in the plaintiff's eyes satisfied it, and in Condor v. Wood a plaintiff who pounded on the side of a truck to warn the driver that her companion had fallen under the wheels was held to have suffered impact.12 The rule lasted as long as it did because it premised liability on an objective fact that could be proved or disproved, which eased fears of fraud, exaggerated testimony, and awards driven by sympathy, and a few courts still apply it.13
Most courts now use the zone-of-danger approach instead. A plaintiff within the zone, the area in which the defendant's negligence created a risk of physical impact to the plaintiff, may recover for the resulting distress without being touched, because a person in that area will fear the impact, and that fear is the harm the negligence threatened.14 The zone keeps both functions of the gate in a looser form: presence in the area of danger makes the fear plausible, and the group of people so placed is small. Its boundary draws criticism as artificial. In Dillon v. Legg the California Supreme Court observed that a sister in the zone could recover for her fright at a child's accident while a mother a few yards farther away could not, and it reasoned that once the impact rule is rejected the zone requirement loses its only justification.15 Recovery by people who suffer distress at harm to someone else raises a question of duty, treated with negligent infliction of emotional distress and bystander recovery. The damages-side result is simple. A plaintiff who clears the gate has the distress valued like any other intangible harm under the rules already covered, and a plaintiff who does not recovers nothing for it.
Both pedestrians saw the same crash, and both may be telling the truth about their symptoms. The zone requirement tests something else. The first pedestrian had cause to fear for her own body, so the negligence threatened exactly the fright she suffered, and few people stand in such a place. The second reacted to an event that posed no risk to him, and paying him would extend liability to everyone who sees a negligent event and is upset by it. His ulcer does not close the gap, because the gate looks to the plaintiff's position and not to the seriousness of the symptoms, just as the heart attack did not rescue the near-miss plaintiff under the impact rule.
A plaintiff with no physical injury and no place in a zone of danger may still sue for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and the gate on that route is severity. The defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous, and the plaintiff's emotional response must be severe: a plaintiff who becomes unhappy, humiliated, or mildly despondent for a short time and spends a sleepless night or two cannot recover.16 If the anguish is great, and especially if it is prolonged, most courts allow the action whether or not a physical manifestation or bodily harm follows, although a few jurisdictions still require bodily harm.17 These two requirements do the screening work that impact and the zone of danger do in negligence. Courts hesitated to protect emotional tranquility independently because they feared false claims and did not want to redress mere wounds to the ego. But conduct so extreme and outrageous that a normal person would likely react strongly assures that the harm is real and serves a strong public interest in deterring the conduct.18 The severity element then screens out the remaining claims, since brief and transient upset is part of ordinary life.
Exam questions often hold the suffering constant and vary only the host.
The battery is the host tort, so the jury may compensate the first customer's humiliation and lost sleep as items of damages, with no showing of severity. The second customer has no host tort and must sue for intentional infliction, and brief humiliation with a night or two of lost sleep falls short of the severe response that tort requires. The suffering is identical, and the presence of a host is what separates a recovery from a dismissal.
Students lose the most points at step one. Applying the severity requirement to a battery plaintiff imports a limit that parasitic distress does not carry, and awarding distress damages to a plaintiff with neither a host tort nor a satisfied gate overlooks that § 905 and § 924(a) presuppose a claim. A plaintiff who can plead a host tort has little reason to depend on a stand-alone claim, because the host carries the distress without those limits.
Fear of Future Harm
Section 924 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts entitles a person whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded to recover for past or prospective harm, and that language can look like an answer for someone exposed to a toxic substance who wants payment now for a disease that may come later.20 The answer turns on how prospective harm fits with the single-recovery principle. A tort plaintiff sues once, so the jury compensates the future, but the same principle means that no independent cause of action exists for a loss that has not yet occurred.21 Once actual loss has occurred, the plaintiff may recover future losses that more probably than not will result from it; a plaintiff with no actual loss ordinarily cannot sue merely because loss will probably arrive.22 An exposed plaintiff with no symptoms starts on the wrong side of that line, and the toxic-exposure cases sort plaintiffs into three tiers by how much present harm or exposure each can prove.
The gate sits at actual loss because a claim for fear would force a court to price a disease that may never arrive, for every person exposed, and the people able to claim would include anyone who learned of a chemical release and worried about it. The concerns courts voice about stand-alone emotional harm apply here with full force: the difficulty of separating valid claims from trivial ones, the threat of unlimited and unpredictable liability, and the prospect of a flood of minor claims.23 Courts also decline to recognize a general duty to avoid causing emotional distress, citing the opportunity for fraud and the fear that the floodgates of litigation would open.24 Present physical harm or proof of actual exposure answers those worries because it does the work that bodily injury does in an ordinary distress case. It vouches that the plaintiff's concern rests on something real, and it confines the class of plaintiffs to people who can show the same thing.
The asbestos cases show the rule at its strictest. Plaintiffs there are typically denied recovery for distress about getting cancer, and with only a few exceptions common-law courts have denied recovery to those who are disease and symptom free.25 A stand-alone distress claim against a product maker requires that the product have put the plaintiff in danger of immediate bodily harm, and exposure to carcinogens does not meet that condition, even though consumers are foreseeably distressed by the added likelihood of cancer someday.26 The condition echoes the zone of danger from the previous subsection: an exposure whose consequences lie years away does not place the plaintiff in immediate danger of bodily harm.
The strongest tier belongs to a plaintiff who can prove any demonstrable physical harm at present. That plaintiff recovers for the injury and also for the measurable risk of future harm, which ordinarily includes the cost of periodic medical checks aimed at catching the disease early.27 The reasoning follows the parasitic-distress logic from the previous subsection: a proven injury vouches for the fear, and because actual loss has occurred, the jury may compensate probable future consequences under the more-probable-than-not standard. Federal railroad and maritime law draws the line in the same place. In Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers, the Supreme Court held that a claimant who already has one disease, such as asbestosis, and fears a related one, such as cancer, recovers for that fear only on showing that it is “genuine and serious.”28
The middle tier, actual exposure without physical harm, is where courts divide, and an exam answer should say so. One body of authority is generous: many courts allow a plaintiff who proves actual exposure to recover for medical monitoring and for distress, although some require proof of a greater than fifty percent chance of contracting the feared disease.29 Actual exposure has a specific meaning. The plaintiff must show a channel of exposure, the toxic substance or virus must be shown to exist, and the plaintiff's fear must be objectively reasonable; a reasonable but mistaken belief that exposure occurred does not suffice.30 Another formulation of the rule makes claims resting purely on enhanced risk or mental distress noncompensable unless the plaintiff establishes a probability of future disease greater than fifty percent.31 The probability condition has a reason. A plaintiff with no loss yet asks to be paid for a risk, and a risk that is less likely than not to materialize is hard to treat as the kind of future consequence that the single-recovery principle compensates.
The stricter view treats the absence of physical harm as decisive. Most courts, on this account, refuse to let a plaintiff with no actual physical harm claim damages for increased risk of future disease, for emotional harm from fearing it, or for medical monitoring.32 In Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff exposed to a toxic substance has no recovery for fear of developing disease, and no damages, unless and until symptoms of disease manifest.33 That holding postpones the claim and does not extinguish it, since liability for future loss must await the occurrence of actual loss.34 Alabama takes the same position in Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., where the court said that its law has long required a manifest, present injury and that the plaintiff there had alleged none.35
Medical monitoring has a test of its own that is more forgiving than the test for fear damages. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation requires a monitoring claimant to show four things:
- The plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the defendant's negligent action.
- As a proximate result of the exposure, the plaintiff suffers an increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
- The increased risk makes medical examinations reasonably necessary.
- Monitoring and testing procedures exist that make early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.36
The last two elements explain why monitoring survives where fear damages do not. The cost of an examination that is reasonably necessary now, and that can find a disease while treatment still helps, is a present and concrete expense, so the claim does not ask a jury to price a feeling or a disease that may never come. The inroad is nonetheless narrow: occasional awards of monitoring costs are the one limited exception to the rule against recovery for future loss.37 Some courts and litigants also prefer periodic payment of surveillance expenses from a court-supervised fund to a lump-sum award.38
At the bottom tier, a plaintiff who can show only a possibility or fear of exposure, with no present physical harm, recovers neither distress damages nor monitoring costs in almost all courts.39 Nothing vouches for the claim there. The plaintiff has no injury and cannot show that the substance reached him, so the claim rests on his own worry, and the class who could assert it has no boundary beyond what anyone might suspect.
The worker and the homeowner may be equally anxious, and the homeowner's fear may be entirely sincere. What separates them is proof: the burn and the hygienist's confirmation show that the solvent actually reached the worker, while the homeowner has only a suspicion. A worker with confirmed contact but no burn would sit between them, in the middle tier, where the jurisdiction's approach decides the outcome. A student who reasons from the sincerity of the fear has skipped the question that comes first.
HIV exposure receives special treatment. A plaintiff who shows actual exposure to HIV can usually recover for emotional distress between the time of exposure and the time when testing establishes that the plaintiff will not be infected.40 Some courts go further and allow distress damages in HIV and AIDS cases even without proof of actual exposure and without physical harm, so long as a channel of exposure existed and the plaintiff's fear is reasonable.41 The test that settles whether infection occurred gives the award a built-in endpoint, which marks these cases as a limited exception to the rule at the bottom tier.
Step one does the most work, since physical harm moves the plaintiff out of the contested tiers altogether. The reasonableness of the fear matters only at step two, and the probability condition, where it applies, belongs to the claim for fear and not to the separate test for monitoring.
Contract and Economic Torts
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 sets the terms for distress damages in a contract case: apart from a breach that also causes bodily harm, recovery for emotional disturbance is available only where the contract or the breach is of a kind that makes serious emotional disturbance particularly likely.43 Behind that narrow exception stands a general rule that contract damages are geared to economic loss. They do not ordinarily account for mental distress, inconvenience, or humiliation caused by a breach, and courts apply the rule whether the injured party is a corporation or an individual who is truly traumatized.44 The earlier subsections showed distress carried into a verdict by a physical injury or a recognized tort. A broken promise supplies neither, so the question in a contract case is whether the contract, or the way it was broken, gives the distress a legitimate place in the recovery.
The rule exists first because remedies follow rights. A contract creates a right to a bargained-for performance, and a purely economic right, such as the right to be paid on a promissory note, carries no claim for the distress that late payment causes.45 Two practical concerns reinforce the point. Distress is often not foreseeable when the contract is formed, and even when it is foreseeable the resulting damages are hard to establish and to measure.46 Courts also worry that a distress exception would reach nearly every breach, since almost every breach upsets someone, and would pull contract law away from financial harm toward the intangible harms of tort.47 A rule that paid for upset in every case would price each contract by the sensitivity of the other party, a variable the promisor cannot see or control when setting terms.
Erlich v. Menezes shows the rule at its most demanding. Homeowners whose newly built house had construction defects received more than $400,000 in ordinary contract damages to correct the problems, and the California Supreme Court still refused to add damages for their distress, although it called that distress undoubtedly real and serious.48 The court gave three reasons: liability could become disproportionate to the builder's culpability, no principled limit on such claims could be formulated, and the added exposure would damage stability and predictability in commercial affairs.49 A rule that focuses on one party's reaction to inadequate performance, rather than on the risks the parties voluntarily assumed, has no stopping point. Two homeowners with identical defects would recover different sums according to how upset each became, and a builder pricing the job could not price that difference. Recovery for defective construction is therefore limited to the cost of repair, including lost use or relocation expenses, or the loss in value.50
Two routes lead around the rule. The first applies when the breach also causes bodily harm or is an independent tort. The tort supplies whatever noneconomic damages tort law would allow, which makes this less an exception than an application of the host-tort logic from the first subsection: the distress attaches to a wrong the law recognizes on its own terms.51 The tort must be independent of the contract, a breach of a duty that tort law imposes apart from the promise.52 Bodily harm is the clearest case, and it is the one limb of § 353 that makes the character of the contract irrelevant. In Sullivan v. O'Connor a surgeon promised to enhance the appearance of the plaintiff's nose, the operation disfigured it, and damages for emotional distress were recoverable in the contract action.53 Chrum v. Charles Heating & Cooling, Inc. shows why the route matters. After a defective furnace burned down the plaintiff's home, the Michigan court denied distress damages on the contract claim because the contract was a commercial transaction whose breach produced property loss, but it indicated that the plaintiff could sue in tort for distress if the installer had negligently breached its duty of care.54
The second route looks to the contract itself. Where the clear and principal purpose of the contract is to give the promisee an emotional, sentimental, or psychic benefit rather than to serve an economic or commercial goal, a breach can support distress damages, and it is the nature of the contract, and not of the breach, that counts.55 Courts apply this exception narrowly, to contracts that deeply involve matters of personal concern, where the noneconomic purpose is clear and the breacher should have realized that breach would likely inflict serious distress.56 The commentary to § 353 lists the recurring examples: contracts of carriers and innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the carriage or disposition of dead bodies, and contracts for delivering messages about a death.57 In Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle a funeral home failed to ensure a proper vigil over the body in accordance with orthodox Jewish ritual, and the deceased's son recovered distress damages. A funeral contract exists to bring comfort to the bereaved, so the chapel could foresee that breach would cause emotional distress.58
The contract's purpose controls because it determines what kind of loss the parties were allocating between them. When a contract exists to protect emotional interests, the direct and foreseeable injury from breach is itself emotional, so a distress award measures the expected loss. When the contract serves a commercial purpose, distress is a secondary effect of the lost performance. The California court made the point about car purchases: although the choice of a car may be personal, the central reason to buy one is transportation, so the aggravation and anxiety from a defective car flow from its decreased usefulness and are not ordinarily the foreseeable result of the contract.59 The difference between Erlich and Menorah Chapels lies in what the contract was for. A home is a family's largest investment, and a builder can foresee that defects will distress the buyer, yet the contract is aimed at shelter and value. The funeral contract is aimed at the comfort of the bereaved. Foreseeability therefore does not carry the claim by itself. In Valentine v. General American Credit the court recognized that wrongful discharge distresses an employee and still denied distress damages because the employment contract was commercial, and Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk reached the same result for a client whose lawyer let a limitations period run.60
Courts have kept the category small even where the stakes felt personal. Plaintiffs who lost retirement savings through the breach of an investment-management contract were denied distress damages in Brooks v. Hickman because they had only lost money, and a patient whose physician failed to return telephone calls for two days during a miscarriage was denied recovery in St. Charles v. Kender.61 One Alabama decision, B & M Homes v. Hogan, stands out as unusual: it allowed mental anguish for severe defects in a new home on the view that any reasonable builder could foresee extreme anguish, while a Louisiana court in Ostrowe v. Darensbourg took the traditional view.62 An exam answer should treat Erlich as the majority position and the Alabama decision as an outlier.
Insurance is the setting where courts have moved furthest from the general rule. Most jurisdictions treat an insurer's bad-faith failure to pay a first-party claim as an independent tort, which brings tort remedies with it. One court stated the standard in elements: an insurance contract and its breach, an intentional refusal to pay the claim, the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for the refusal, and the insurer's actual knowledge that no such reason exists.63 First-party insurance covers losses suffered directly by the policyholder, as with accident, life, health, disability, fire, theft, and uninsured motorist coverage, and these are the claims that have been the subjects of bad-faith actions.64 On distress, courts divide. Some that adopt the tort allow recovery without the severity and accompanying-harm showing that ordinarily applies. Others that treat the claim as contractual allow distress on the theory that peace of mind is part of what a policyholder purchases, and some permit it only where tort law would otherwise allow it.65 Courts justify tort liability for insurers by pointing to the special relationship between insurer and insured and the insured's expectation of coverage, and they have been reluctant to extend bad-faith liability beyond insurance.66 Insurance therefore fits the two routes already described: the first when the bad-faith tort supplies the distress, and the second when the policy's purpose includes peace of mind.
The economic torts follow the same pattern. Fraud, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation protect an economic interest and do not reach interests in personality, so the plaintiff must show pecuniary loss, damages are limited to that loss, and distress is not recoverable on those theories.67 The rule holds in ordinary commercial dealings, even though the victim of a misrepresentation may be thoroughly upset.68 What the rule bars is distress damages on a fraud theory, and recovery stays open through some other tort. Where misrepresentation is an operative fact in another cause of action, or where outrageous conduct amounts to intentional infliction of emotional distress, the distress is recoverable. A few cases allow recovery on an outright fraud theory, but a court may also insist that a plaintiff who seeks distress in a fraud action meet the requirements of the distress tort, so that fraud is not used to avoid them.69
Step three carries most of the weight on exams, because a stem will pile personal detail onto an ordinary commercial contract, such as a retirement fund or a dream home, to tempt an award of distress damages. The question the law asks is what the contract was for, and the plaintiff's feelings do not answer it.
Property Harm
A person whose property is damaged, converted, or destroyed generally cannot recover for emotional distress or sentimental attachment to the property.71 The rule is black-letter law, and it applies even to an owner deeply attached to a family heirloom that the defendant's negligence ruins.72 Property harm is the fourth setting this section examines, and it fits the pattern of the other three: distress travels into a verdict when a bodily injury or a recognized tort carries it there, and damage to a thing, standing alone, carries neither. The paragraphs below explain why the law refuses the item and then show the narrow routes by which an owner can still be paid for the feelings.
The first reason is that a remedy follows the right it protects. A remedy should reflect the right, or the policy behind it, as precisely as possible, so a purely economic right, such as the right to be paid on a promissory note, does not carry damages for the distress that late payment causes.73 An owner's right in a chattel is likewise a right to its value, and the law measures that right in dollars that can be checked. For conversion, the measure is the value of the property at the time and place of the taking, usually its market value, because an owner who can buy a replacement on the market is expected to do so.74 For harm short of conversion, the owner recovers either the loss in value or the reasonable cost of repair and restoration, plus any loss in value that remains afterward.75
The second reason is variability. Market value and replacement cost can be proved with sales records and invoices, so a defendant can estimate its exposure before it acts. Sentimental attachment cannot be estimated that way. The same ring or photograph may mean everything to one owner and little to the next, and the defendant who damages it cannot know which owner it faces. If distress were recoverable, liability for harm to a thing would no longer be set by the thing, and two owners of identical objects would recover different sums according to temperament. Two exceptions follow from that logic. Where the defendant's conduct is outrageous, or where the owner's own person is caught up in the event, the harm is to the person and the ordinary distress rules apply. A third, narrower accommodation covers personal items that have little or no market.
Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster applies the general rule on facts that tempt students to depart from it. An owner whose dog escaped from a store's care and was killed by a car sued for mental anguish, counseling expenses, loss of companionship, lost wages, and exemplary damages.76 The court classified the dog as personal property and denied the claims for anguish, counseling, and lost wages. It added that anguish damages might have been available had ill will or a special relationship existed, and that neither was present.77 It also confined an intrinsic-value measure to property with no fair market value and tied the figure to the property's usefulness and not to the owner's sentiment.78 Pets hold the legal status of property, so an owner whose animal is negligently killed recovers its fair market value or the loss in market value, with nothing for the owner's distress and nothing for the loss of companionship that would be appropriate for a human family member.79
The owner's strongest route to distress damages bypasses the property claim altogether. In La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. a trash collector killed a family's pet dachshund by throwing a garbage can at it, and the case is cited for the point that sentiment alone earns nothing but an owner may recover for the emotional harm of the loss when the defendant's conduct is outrageous.80 The distress damages in such a case belong to the owner's personal injury claim and not to the property claim, so they depend on proving intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, with conduct that is extreme and outrageous and distress that is severe.81 An intent to harm the property does not supply the intent this tort requires, because the defendant must intend to cause emotional distress or act in conscious disregard of a high probability of causing it.82 A defendant who maims a pet in the owner's presence meets that requirement, since the harm to the animal is the means of hurting the owner.83 The difference between Petco and La Porte therefore lies in the defendants' conduct. The store in Petco was careless, and the court found no ill will, while the collector in La Porte aimed an outrageous act at the animal, and neither the dogs' worth nor the owners' affection decided either result. Malicious harm to property can also support punitive damages, which serve many of the same purposes as distress damages.84
A second route depends on a shocking event and not on the damage to the thing. When a vehicle suddenly crashes into an occupied home, the occupant's distress may be compensated along with the property damage, provided the occupant was present or nearby and meets the state's prerequisites for distress claims.85 The distress rests on the shock to the occupant's own person, and the damaged wall is incidental. The same crash into the bedroom while the owner is away ordinarily leaves a claim for property damage and none for distress, because the owner's person was not involved in the event. This route borrows the gates covered under distress without physical harm, so a plaintiff who merely watches property destroyed stands differently from one whose own safety is at stake. The line between a personal claim based on shock and a property claim based on attachment is one of degree, but it marks the main guideline for decision.86
A third accommodation covers property with little or no market value, where the market measure would leave a real loss unpaid. When personal items are destroyed, courts depart from market value in favor of value to the owner, and they say at the same time that this value may not include sentimental value.87 The formula invites the jury to help while giving the court a tool to cut back an award that grows too generous. The practice is best understood as a modest recovery for relatively minor distress at the loss, added to the value of the destroyed item.88 Courts tend to allow that small amount when the property is personal and non-functional, as with a pet or family photographs.89
Some courts go a step further for invasions of property. A few permit damages for the mental distress caused by a trespass or a conversion, and the recovery for an invasion of land may include discomfort, inconvenience, and annoyance resulting from it.90 Legislatures have started to adjust the pet rule as well. Tennessee allows noneconomic damages, up to $5,000, for the negligent or intentional death or injury of a pet, with pets limited to domesticated cats and dogs, and some other states have authorized limited recoveries in specified cases such as pets killed by defective pet food.91 One court, in Hawaii, lets an owner recover for the owner's own mental anguish when a pet is negligently injured or killed.92 These developments are a trend at the margins, and the general rule that a pet is property still controls most answers.
Students skip step one, because they begin with how much the owner loved the animal. That fact matters only at step four, and only in a small amount. Evidence of grief, counseling costs, or lost companionship does not change a negligence answer unless a later step supplies a reason to treat the harm as a harm to the person.