68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968)
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon.1 Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter.2 Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister.3
The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries.4 In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering.5 The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident.6 The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses.7
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant.8 Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California.9
In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim.10 The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.11
Whether a mother who witnesses the negligent death of her child but suffers no physical impact may recover damages for emotional trauma and resulting physical injuries?12
A defendant is liable for all injuries that are the proximate result of negligence; duty is measured by the foreseeability of the risk to the plaintiff, taking into account whether the plaintiff was located near the scene, whether the shock resulted from direct sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related.13
Yes. On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant David Legg drove his automobile in a southerly direction on Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane in Sacramento County, and his negligent operation caused it to collide with and kill two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon.14 Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother, was in close proximity to the collision and personally witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. The risk of emotional trauma to a mother who observes the death of her child is reasonably foreseeable under the factors of proximity, contemporaneous observance, and close relationship, establishing the defendant's duty and breach.15
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover for the resulting emotional trauma and physical injuries.16
The mother may recover damages for emotional trauma and resulting physical injuries.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mccomb, J.
Justice Burke dissented on the ground that the majority overruled Amaya without justification.18 He maintained that every argument advanced by the majority had already been considered and rejected in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.19 Burke argued that the zone of danger rule serves as a reasonable limitation preventing a flood of litigation and fraudulent claims while remaining consistent with established principles of tort liability.20 He would have affirmed the judgment of dismissal.21
Whether a sibling who witnesses the negligent death of a sister but suffers no physical impact may recover damages for emotional trauma and resulting physical injuries?22
Recovery for emotional trauma turns on the foreseeability of the risk to the plaintiff under the factors of proximity to the scene, contemporaneous observance of the accident, and close relationship to the victim; the zone of danger rule is an artificial barrier that should not limit recovery when these factors are present.23
Yes. Plaintiff Robert Dillon was a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident at the intersection and actually witnessed the impact and death of his sister Erin Lee Dillon. The same foreseeability analysis that applies to the mother extends to a sibling who meets the guidelines of nearness, direct observation, and close familial relationship, rendering the artificial distinction based on the zone of danger untenable.24 The defendant's breach of duty is established, and the sibling is entitled to recover for emotional trauma and physical injuries.25
The sibling may recover damages for emotional trauma and resulting physical injuries.26
Whether the zone of danger rule should limit recovery for emotional trauma caused by witnessing injury to a third person?27
The zone of danger rule is an artificial and unrealistically restrictive barrier inconsistent with the general principles of tort liability that impose duty based on the foreseeability of the risk; it should not limit recovery when the plaintiff is near the scene, contemporaneously observes the accident, and is closely related to the victim.28
No. The zone of danger rule was applied by the trial court to grant judgment on the pleadings against the mother's claim while denying it as to the sister's claim.29 The rule creates an incongruous distinction that depends on happenstance of physical location rather than the reasonable foreseeability of emotional trauma to close relatives who witness the death of a loved one.30 The court therefore overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. and held that the general rules of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability govern instead.31
The zone of danger rule should not limit recovery for emotional trauma caused by witnessing injury to a third person.32
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Traynor dissented for the reasons set forth in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.33 He stated that the case was correctly decided and should not be overruled.34 Traynor believed the prior decision properly balanced the relevant policy considerations in denying recovery for emotional trauma induced solely by apprehension of danger to a third person.35
Joined by Mccomb, J.
Justice Burke dissented on the ground that the majority overruled Amaya without justification. He maintained that every argument advanced by the majority had already been considered and rejected in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. Burke argued that the zone of danger rule serves as a reasonable limitation preventing a flood of litigation and fraudulent claims while remaining consistent with established principles of tort liability. He would have affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Whether the trial court's sustaining of demurrers to bystander emotional distress claims should be affirmed?36
A complaint that alleges the defendant negligently caused the death of the child, that the plaintiff was in close proximity and witnessed the impact, and that the plaintiff suffered emotional trauma and physical injury as a proximate result states a sufficient cause of action under the foreseeability test for duty.37
No. The complaint alleged that Cheryl Dillon and Robert Dillon were in close proximity to the accident, actually witnessed the impact and death of the child, and suffered fright, shock, mental anguish, and physical injuries as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence.38 Because these allegations establish a foreseeable risk under the governing factors, the demurrers should have been overruled and the judgment of dismissal reversed.39
The trial court's sustaining of demurrers to bystander emotional distress claims should not be affirmed.40