Concept
Who Is a Licensee
Duty owed to licensees
Duty to Licensees
Who Is a Licensee
A claim against a landowner opens with a question about the plaintiff: what was the injured person doing on the land, and by whose leave? Most courts still begin the analysis of a landowner’s duty by sorting the entrant into the traditional categories, although a substantial number now extend a duty of ordinary care to licensees or even trespassers.1 The sorting is a legacy of the land ethic. Until the late nineteenth century, real property dominated the economies of England and America, and individualism and the sanctity of private property ranked among the leading social values. The law weighed the rights of ownership, possession, and use heavily against competing interests, and special tort rules favoring landowners and occupiers followed. They proved durable: the special duty limitations were not restricted, if not entirely eliminated, until the last third of the twentieth century.2
The licensee’s class matters because the duty owed to it is narrow. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 makes a possessor liable for physical harm that a condition on the land causes licensees only if three things are true: the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to licensees, and should expect that they will not discover it; the possessor fails to use reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn of it and the risk; and the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk.3 Section 341 draws a parallel line for the possessor’s activities: reasonable care in conducting them is owed to licensees only if the possessor should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger and they do not know or have reason to know of the activities and the risk.4 Both sections speak of licensees as a class, so the content of the duty cannot be stated until the entrant has been placed in it.
A licensee, in the Restatement’s definition, is an entrant whose privilege to be on the land rests on the possessor’s consent.5 In practice the term is narrower still. A licensee has the possessor’s express or implied consent but no business purpose, does not enter as a member of the public on land held open to the public, and has no independent right to be there. An invitee, by contrast, is invited for a purpose that benefits the possessor economically, as a customer is, or enters as a member of the public on land held open to the public, as a visitor to a public park does.
Licensees occupy the middle rung of the ladder of entrants. Trespassers, who enter without consent or privilege, receive the least protection and invitees the most; the full comparison comes later in this chapter. The gradation tracks what each entrant can expect. A customer or park visitor arrives because the possessor has, in effect, held the premises out as ready for visitors, and that implied assurance supports a duty to make them safe. A licensee arrives because the possessor allows it, which carries no such assurance, so the licensee takes the land largely as found. The social guest illustrates the position best, and the point is most often misapplied there, so it comes first. Other consensual entrants follow, and the section closes with the public emergency workers who fit none of the categories comfortably.
Social Guests
Since Southcote v. Stanley, decided in England in 1856, the decisions have been essentially uniform in holding that a social guest, although invited and even urged to come, is not an invitee but merely a licensee.6 Courts apply the Restatement’s licensee provision to social guests without strain: the opinion in Parks v. Rogers quotes it with the words “social guests” bracketed beside “licensees.”7
The word “invitee” misleads, because as a term of art it names the purpose of the entry and not the warmth of the welcome. Invitee status rests on one of two things: an economic stake, as when a customer comes to a store, or public access, as when a visitor comes to a park or beach held open to everyone. Both rest on one mechanism. A possessor who profits from visits, or who opens land to everyone, is taken to represent that the premises are ready for those who come, and visitors enter in reliance on that representation.8 A dinner invitation supplies consent, which lifts the guest out of trespasser status, but it supplies neither the economic stake nor the public access. The host consents to the guest’s presence, yet the guest is not potentially engaged in any economic transaction with the host.9 The trap, then, is the word “invited”: it describes the host’s consent, not the purpose that decides the guest’s status.
A shopper who walks into a store during business hours to browse stands on the other side of the line. The shopper is typically an invitee, because the store is open in the hope of present or later sales, and status turns on the potential for an economic transaction, whether or not a sale closes.10
Affection and usefulness leave the classification where it was. A grandmother in Reicheneker v. Reicheneker who looked after her three-year-old grandson without pay, because she enjoyed spending time with him, was held not to be an invitee, since her care conferred no economic benefit on the household.11 The same reasoning governs a guest who does a small favor for the host: an incidental service to the occupier does not clothe a social guest with invitee status, as in Thompson v. Katzer.12 A person who comes to help a friend or relative with work around the house is likewise a licensee, as in Young v. Paxton.13 The limit makes sense, because if any helpful act sufficed, a guest who carried a dish to the kitchen would change status in the middle of the evening. A few courts treat the question less rigidly. In Pinnell v. Bates, a guest who helped a host unpack in a new home may have been an invitee, and the court left the question to the jury.14
Some states depart from the traditional rule by statute. Connecticut’s § 52-577a requires the standard of care owed to a social invitee to be the same as that owed to a business invitee, and in 2012 it superseded the majority opinion in Laube.15 Where a statute like that applies, the label “social guest” no longer limits the guest’s protection, so an answer should first ask whether the jurisdiction follows the traditional scheme. The broader retreat from the categories comes at the end of this chapter.
Other Consensual Entrants
Consent, not invitation, makes a person a licensee. The licensee has express or implied permission to be on the land, which removes trespasser status, and comes for the licensee’s own purposes, with no business dealing with the possessor and no entry as a member of the public on land held open to the public, which rules out invitee status.17 Nothing in that definition requires that anyone asked the entrant to come, so the class reaches well beyond social guests.
Many everyday entrants fit it. Hunters and fishermen on land with the owner’s tacit or implied permission, people who permissibly enter to look for a lost pet or to take a shortcut, salespersons and people who distribute advertising or religious literature or solicit contributions, and people who come to help friends or relatives with work around the house are all licensees.18 In Singleton v. Jackson, a Jehovah’s Witness who came to make a religious solicitation was implicitly permitted to approach the front door but was not an invitee.19 A fisherman in Douglas v. Bergland and a hunter in Waller v. Smith were likewise treated as licensees.20 What these entrants share is the absence of both invitee purposes. The solicitor at the door may walk up the path, but the visit serves the solicitor’s own aim, so the householder gains no economic benefit and has not opened the house to the public. The possessor has made no implied assurance that the premises are ready for such visitors, and a licensee therefore takes them largely as found.
Consent also marks the point at which an invitee stops being one. Invitee status reaches only harm within the scope of the invitation, and the scope has two dimensions. In time, an invitee ceases to be an invitee once a reasonable time to accomplish the purpose of the visit has passed. In space, the status extends only to the part of the land where the possessor gives reason to believe the visitor’s presence is wanted for that purpose. Beyond either limit, the visitor is a licensee if the possessor consents to the visitor’s presence and a trespasser if the possessor does not.21 The Restatement’s illustration is a shop that occupies part of a building whose remainder is the shopkeeper’s home. A customer who walks into the residential part without the shopkeeper’s consent is a trespasser there, but one whom the shopkeeper permits to use the bathroom, or invites in for a social call, is a licensee.22 The customer and the building are the same in both scenes, and only the possessor’s consent differs.
Consent can also be implied from conduct. In Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp., the court recounts that the tendency in this country is to hold that the possessor’s continued toleration of an intrusion amounts to permission to use the land, so that the entrant is a licensee and not a trespasser.23 The rule does not convert a single unnoticed crossing into licensed use, because an owner who never knew of the entry has tolerated nothing. It does reach the owner who sees habitual use, says nothing, and does nothing to stop it.
The licensee label may not be the true ground of liability to such entrants. Dean Prosser, quoted in the same opinion, thought the real basis of liability to “tolerated intruders” would seem to be only the ordinary duty to protect another, where the harm to be anticipated from a risk for which the defendant is responsible outweighs the inconvenience of guarding against it.24
A few states add one more layer by dividing licensees into two groups, and in those states the “bare” licensee is owed even less than the ordinary licensee. In other states, “bare” is simply an uncomplimentary epithet applied to all licensees and creates no separate class.25 An answer should check whether the jurisdiction actually uses the subdivision before applying it.
Police and Firefighters
Public emergency workers sit awkwardly in the classification because a licensee’s privilege rests on the possessor’s consent and theirs does not. Those privileged to be on the land for reasons other than the occupier’s consent, notably firefighters and police officers, do not fit the Restatement’s licensee definition.27 Nor are they trespassers, since their privilege to enter is independent of any permission from the occupier. A firefighter could insist on entering over the owner’s active objection.28
The invitee class fits them no better. Officers normally do not come for any purpose for which the premises are held open to the public, they frequently confer no benefit on the occupier, and nothing in the circumstances gives the occupier reason to expect that the place has been prepared to receive them.29 Some public employees clear that bar. Inspectors whose approval a business needs enter for a purpose connected with it, and garbage collectors, water-meter readers, and mail carriers can be said to confer an economic advantage, so they are commonly treated as invitees.30 A firefighter answering an alarm or an officer responding to a call serves no comparable function for the possessor.
With trespasser and invitee both ruled out, courts place such officers in the middle category. Fire and police officers have generally been held to enter under a bare license conferred by the law, and so to be no more than licensees.31 In many cases the courts therefore treat them more or less like licensees, though the theory behind that treatment has grown more complicated than the short statement suggests.32
Once an officer is classed as a licensee, § 342 supplies the content of the duty. Because the section turns on what the possessor knows or has reason to know, a possessor is not liable for failing to find a hazard the possessor had no information about. When the possessor does know the officer is present, however, the possessor must warn of known dangers the officer is unlikely to discover, as decisions such as James v. Cities Service Oil Co. and Rogers v. Cato Oil & Grease Co. hold.33 The knowledge requirement has its own logic, since a possessor cannot warn someone the possessor does not know is there. Section 342 also asks only for reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn, so a possessor who had no chance to speak before the officer went in has not fallen short.34
Liability in the first house and none in the second turn entirely on what the owner actually knew. The step, the injury, and the entrant are the same, and the licensee rule makes the owner’s knowledge the trigger. A failure to inspect that might be negligence in another setting does not count here.
Whether a court ever reaches that analysis is a separate question, because most jurisdictions that limit a possessor’s liability to rescuers do so on grounds other than the rescuer’s status on the land.35 One rationale holds that professional rescuers are paid and their workers’ compensation is funded by taxpayers, so allowing suit would charge the public twice, as in Roberts v. Vaughn. Other courts rest the limit on assumption of risk and public policy, as in Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Commission, while some, as in Levandoski v. Cone, continue to base liability on land-possessor duties.36 The competing rationales explain why the answer varies by state, and an essay should flag the split. Some courts have abandoned the categories for public officers altogether and apply ordinary reasonable care, as in Mounsey v. Ellard and Armstrong v. Mailand, and Oregon abolished the fireman’s rule in Christensen v. Murphy.37 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 51 reaches a similar result by providing a unified duty owed to entrants, which removes any need to classify firefighters, police officers, and other professional rescuers separately.38