Concept
Which Enactments Qualify
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
Which Enactments Qualify
Section 285 gives two routes by which a legislative enactment or administrative regulation becomes the standard of conduct: the enactment itself provides for civil liability, or a court adopts it when the enactment says nothing about civil liability.1 The instruments plaintiffs invoke are not always plain state statutes. They include a city ordinance, an agency rule, a federal act, a licensing requirement, a law no one has enforced in decades, and an enactment that disclaims civil effect in so many words. Each raises a threshold question that comes before the four requirements of § 286: should a court borrow a standard from this kind of instrument at all? An enactment that clears the threshold must still show that its purpose covers the plaintiff's class, interest, kind of harm, and hazard.2
The answer in each case turns on why courts borrow. Legislatures know that courts have applied negligence per se for 150 years, so a criminal enactment may be meant to set the civil standard even when it does not say so, and the doctrine also defers to the legislature's judgment about how a reasonable person acts.3 The most satisfactory justification, on one account, is that a statute embodies a legislative judgment that certain conduct is required or unreasonable, and courts apply that judgment in civil cases where the issue is directly analogous.4 Two consequences follow. The court, not the legislature, makes the choice: a standard formulated in a police regulation or criminal statute becomes the civil standard only because the court accepts it, and when no standard is accepted the jury must decide what reasonable care required.5 And the enactment fixes the standard without creating a statutory cause of action, because the gist of the claim remains negligence.6 Parties also cannot contract away liability for failing to comply with a duty that a safety statute imposes.7
Those premises supply a working test for each enactment below. The more clearly an enactment records a deliberate, specific judgment about how to conduct an activity, made by a body entitled to make it, the stronger the case for borrowing. An enactment that works as an administrative tool, a purely local rule, a statement of aspiration, or a dead letter records less of that judgment, and a court may decline it more freely. The subsections begin with ordinances and agency regulations, which sit closest to a statute, and end with enactments that withdraw civil effect altogether.
Ordinances and Agency Regulations
Section 285 speaks of a “legislative enactment or administrative regulation” and never mentions city ordinances.8 Two questions follow. Can an ordinance passed by a city council supply the standard a court adopts under § 285(b)? Does an agency regulation carry the same weight as a statute? Most jurisdictions answer yes to both and give ordinances and regulations the effect of statutes in a negligence per se action, while some courts treat them as evidence of negligence only.9 The Third Restatement sides with the majority: it applies negligence per se to regulations adopted by state administrative bodies, to ordinances adopted by local councils, and to federal statutes and regulations.10
The majority view follows from the reason courts borrow. A court adopts a standard because a legislative body has generalized it from the community's experience and prohibited conduct likely to cause harm, and the court accepts that formulation instead of asking a jury to rebuild it.11 Nothing in that rationale depends on whether the lawmaking body sits in the state capital or in city hall. In Winger v. CM Holdings, LLC, the Iowa Supreme Court applied negligence per se to a violation of a municipal building code.12
The minority view rests on who wrote the rule. In Elliot v. City of New York, a spectator fell from a bleacher seat that lacked a guardrail required by the city's building code, and the trial court treated the violation as negligence per se. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, reasoning that breach of the rules of a subordinate rule-making body is not negligence per se because only the state can enact a statute.13 The court gave two reasons. Treating the vast multitude of New York City ordinances as state statutes would fragment the common law of the state and make its application uncertain, and because the city can amend or repeal its code without any state legislative action, the court declined to transform a local enactment into a state statute.14 On that view, a city able to edit its own code could change state tort law one municipality at a time.
Other courts reach similar results. Ohio holds that violating an administrative rule is not negligence per se, though the violation may be admitted as evidence of negligence, as Chambers v. St. Mary's School illustrates.15 Michigan, which treats a statutory violation as creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence, treats violations of ordinances and administrative regulations as only evidence of negligence.16 Some jurisdictions that give conclusive effect to a legislature's statutes likewise give mere-evidence effect to city ordinances and agency regulations, because both come from subordinate rule-making bodies.17
The split is narrower than it sounds. These courts do not call the ordinance irrelevant; they change what the violation does once the jury hears about it. Under a per se rule, the jury asks only whether the enactment was violated. Under an evidence rule, the jury weighs the violation with all the other evidence and may still find that the defendant acted reasonably.18
Qualifying as a source ends only the first inquiry, because the purpose requirements of § 286 still apply to every ordinance and regulation.19 In Matteo v. Livingstone, the regulation requiring protective rails came from a state agency, and the court still refused to apply it: the rule aimed at accidental falls, not at what the court called “bicycle acrobatics,” and so it was not aimed at the kind of harm the plaintiff suffered.20 An answer should therefore take two steps in order. It should identify the instrument and the weight the jurisdiction gives it, and then run the four § 286 requirements. Elliot does not hold that a building code is irrelevant to negligence; it denies only the conclusive effect that a state statute would carry.
Federal Statutes and Regulations
Section 285(b) does not say which legislature must have enacted the rule, so a court may borrow a federal statute or regulation as it borrows a state statute, once the enactment satisfies § 286.22 Federal enactments add a complication, because two similar-sounding questions arise whenever a plaintiff relies on one, and different law answers them. The first asks whether the federal statute itself gives the plaintiff a private right of action. The second asks whether a state court hearing a common-law negligence claim may use the federal rule as the measure of reasonable care. The first has become hard for plaintiffs to win, while the second usually favors them, so merging the two produces wrong answers.
Federal courts once implied causes of action from federal statutes freely, as in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, but Cort v. Ash adopted a more restrictive test.23 When a statute provides no express remedy, Cort asks whether the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, whether Congress signaled an intent to create or to deny a remedy, whether a remedy fits the legislative scheme, and whether the claim is one traditionally left to state law.24 The first factor resembles the class-of-persons requirement of § 286, but the others look to Congress's remedial intent and to the federal scheme, subjects § 286 never reaches.
The second question belongs to state law, which answers it far more generously. A plaintiff who sues in state court, or in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, pleads negligence under the state's common law, and the federal enactment enters only as a candidate for the standard of conduct. No federal remedy is implied, so Cort has nothing to decide. Negligence per se is an independent doctrine of state tort law that applies to violations of federal and state statutes and regulations alike, whether or not the implication doctrine would also allow a private claim.25 In Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering, the Supreme Court observed that “violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.”26 One might have expected state courts, protective of their own lawmaking prerogatives, to resist borrowing federal rules, but that resistance has not materialized.27
The decisions bear this out. Lowe v. General Motors Corp. held that a plaintiff stated a valid Alabama-law claim by alleging that the manufacturer's recall and notice practices violated the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, because Cort, which concerns implied federal actions, did not govern a state wrongful death action; the court added that violating a federal law or regulation can be evidence of negligence, and even evidence of negligence per se.28 Answering a certified question in Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a negligence per se action can rest on a violation of the federal Medical Device Amendments Act.29 An Idaho court held in Sanchez v. Galey that violating federal OSHA regulations is negligence per se under state law.30
McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc. and Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. put the two answers side by side. In McLain, the plaintiff alleged that a nursing home's violation of multiple health and safety regulations caused her father's wrongful death. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that, even without a private cause of action under the federal statute, she could assert negligence per se.31 A Mississippi federal court in Miller took the opposite view: since Congress did not intend to create a private right of action, an alleged violation of the statute cannot support a negligence per se claim.32 That reasoning lets the answer to the Cort question decide a state-law question Cort was never meant to answer, and it remains the minority position.
A few states refuse to borrow federal standards for a reason of their own. In St. Luke Hospital, Inc. v. Straub, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky's codified negligence per se doctrine does not extend to federal statutes and regulations.33 That holding rests on the wording of the state's own law and not on Cort, so it differs from Miller. An answer should identify which approach the governing jurisdiction follows before treating the federal rule as available.
Borrowing a federal rule also requires a rule worth borrowing. A court borrows because a legislature has turned the jury's open question about reasonable care into a more specific rule of conduct.34 A federal provision that demands only appropriate care, or announces an abstract goal, returns the jury to the same open question, and courts decline to adopt a standard that amounts to little more than the general common-law rule of reasonable care.35
Data-security litigation shows the problem. The “reasonable and appropriate security measures” standard is flexible by design. It accounts for an institution's resources, the kind of information it holds, and changing technology, and negligence concepts such as foreseeability and cost-benefit analysis can help apply it.36 Courts have used the FTC Act in different ways. One applying Georgia law allowed a negligence per se claim to rest on it in In re Marriott International Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, while another, in In re Brinker Data Incident Litigation, treated the Act as evidence of foreseeable risk bearing on duty.37 In the Equifax breach litigation, the district court distinguished a statute from the regulation implementing it: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act could not support a negligence per se claim, but the Safeguards Rule could.38
Students sometimes end the analysis when the federal statute turns out to create no private right of action. That ends only the federal route, and the state-law route remains open.
A plaintiff who fails at the third or fourth step loses only the statutory shortcut and keeps a general negligence claim, a point taken up in the section on when the test is not met.
Licensing and Approval Requirements
A licensing or approval requirement screens people and products before they enter an activity or a market, and it says little about how the activity is conducted once it begins. A statute requiring a license to practice medicine, fly an aircraft, or drive, or an agency approval before a device is sold, describes a status. Negligence asks whether the defendant acted carefully on the occasion that injured the plaintiff, and a missing status often says nothing about that. Courts therefore commonly hold that lack of a required license is not negligence per se, and some exclude it even as evidence of negligence.40
The hazard the statute addresses explains the rule. An examination and a license keep unskilled or careless practitioners away from the public, so the danger targeted is incompetent performance, and an unlicensed person may perform as skillfully as a licensed one. In Brown v. Shyne, an unlicensed chiropractor who held himself out as licensed operated on the plaintiff's spine and paralyzed her. The plaintiff asked for an instruction that he was liable whatever care he gave, since the injury would not have occurred had he not treated her. Judge Lehman rejected that position: the statute protected against injury by an unskilled or careless practitioner, and unless carelessness or lack of skill caused the injury, the missing license was not connected to it.41
The Fifth Circuit reached a parallel result in Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., where a plane flown by an unlicensed pilot crashed and killed all four people aboard. The court observed that violating licensing regulations is often an exception to the general rule that violating a safety regulation is negligence per se, because a license may lapse for reasons unrelated to the operator's skill.42 In Horstmeyer v. Golden Eagle Fireworks, a defendant tried to use the plaintiff's violation of a statute governing fireworks brought into the state to show contributory negligence. A North Dakota court refused, because by analogy to the licensing cases the violation did not cause the harm.43 The gravity of the injuries, paralysis in one case and four deaths in another, did not change the analysis. The question is what the credential screens for and whether that is what went wrong.
The majority rule has critics. They note that it seems to tolerate the very violation the statute forbids and leaves the public exposed to the lack of skill that licensing is meant to guard against. One proposed alternative is a presumption of negligence that shifts to the unlicensed defendant the burden of showing the required care and skill.44 Judge Crane's dissent in Brown would treat the violation as some evidence of the practitioner's incapacity.45 A New York statute takes a version of that approach for medicine. When a person not authorized to practice medicine performs acts constituting the practice of medicine that were a competent producing proximate or contributing cause of an injury or death, the lack of authorization is prima facie evidence of negligence.46 Because the statute keeps a causal link, it does not make the unlicensed practitioner an insurer, and it shows that a legislature may settle the question for a profession as a matter of policy.
The Third Restatement keeps the majority result and conditions it. Comment h observes that the immediate reason a person lacks a license is often unrelated to the state's safety purpose, and it concludes that the lack of a required license is neither negligence per se nor evidence of negligence unless the evidence shows that the person also violated the substantive safety standards the licensing requirement enforces.47 Relevance therefore depends on why the actor is unlicensed. A lapse through oversight says nothing about competence, while a failed qualification that serves a safety purpose engages the requirement's purpose.
Approval requirements follow the same reasoning. In Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc., a spinal fixation device failed, and the plaintiff argued that marketing it without FDA approval for general use established negligence per se. The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument. A requirement that a device be approved before marketing, as opposed to a specific substantive requirement that it be safe and effective, is only a tool for administering the regulatory scheme. Because it has no independent substantive content, it sets no standard of care, and its breach resembles the failure to have a driver's license.48 That line tells a student where to look. A rule that prescribes what a product or practice must be like can be borrowed as a standard, while a rule that only requires the actor to obtain clearance cannot.
The same sorting applies across regulated industries. A restaurant without a health department's operating license, a manufacturer without FDA approval of a new drug or device, and an aircraft maker without FAA certification may each face administrative penalties, yet none becomes an outlaw subject to absolute liability for the harm that follows.49 Credential and safety can come apart. Food from an unlicensed restaurant may be as pure as food from one with the top grade, a device may be reasonably safe without FDA approval, and an uncertified plane may be entirely airworthy. In such cases the plaintiff cannot rest on the missing approval and must prove negligence another way.50
Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School v. Perotti shows that a licensing setting can weaken even a substantive safety rule. A patient jumped through a glass window and died shortly after being committed to a private hospital, and the District of Columbia's regulations for private hospitals forbade keeping a delirious or maniacal patient in a room not properly barred or closed. The court held it error to instruct the jury that violating the regulation was negligence per se.51 Unlike a traffic ordinance addressed to motorists who are expected to know and obey it, regulations tied to a licensing process are written expecting the licensing authority to apply the general rule with judgment, and negligence per se would remove the flexibility the drafters presumably intended.52 The correct standard was to decide the hospital's negligence on all relevant evidence, including violation of any applicable safety regulation and facts tending to show due care.53 That is a middle course between per se effect and exclusion.
Other hospital cases sort enactments the same way. In Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur, a hospital failed to preserve an x-ray showing a patient's cause of death, and the state's X-Ray Retention Act could ground a negligence claim because it imposed a specific duty to preserve the film and the plaintiff met the class, type-of-harm, and causation elements.54 Courts have refused the same treatment to Medicare reimbursement rules on hospital-acquired conditions, as in Stuck v. Miami Valley Hospital, reasoning that Congress, in writing billing and payment standards, did not mean to set a medical standard of care.55 A hospital's own regulations are not legislative enactments and cannot support negligence per se.56 The x-ray statute prescribes conduct, while payment rules and internal policies carry no legislative judgment about the care patients are owed.
Students often treat the missing credential as the breach itself. It shows only that the actor lacked a status, and whether the plaintiff may use it at all depends on whether it reflects the incompetence the requirement screens for and whether that incompetence caused the injury.
Defective or Obsolete Enactments
Section 285(b) describes the second source of a standard as one “adopted by the court” from an enactment that does not itself provide for civil liability, and that wording frees the court's choice from the enactment's own enforceability.58 Comment d to § 286 draws the consequence in both directions. A court may adopt a criminal provision's standard even though the provision is entirely ineffective for its initial purposes, and a court that would have to apply an unreasonable provision in a criminal prosecution is under no such compulsion in a civil suit.59
The enactment's enforceability does not control because of what the court does with it. A criminal prosecution asks whether the enactment binds the defendant as law, and a void enactment cannot. A negligence suit asks whether the defendant acted as a reasonable person would, and the enactment enters only as a ready-made description of that conduct. The decision about what the civil standard should be still rests with the court.60 An enactment can therefore help a civil plaintiff after it has failed as law, and it can fail to help after it has survived as law.
A stop sign posted under a defectively adopted enactment illustrates the first half. In Clinkscales v. Carver, a stop sign stood on a through boulevard under an enactment that had not been properly adopted, so the stop requirement could not have been enforced criminally. Justice Traynor nonetheless held that a driver who entered from a side street without stopping was negligent as a matter of law.61 His reasoning turned on reliance. Anyone on the road should know that the public relies on stop signs the authorities have posted in the customary way, so a driver who ignores one is negligent whatever irregularity attended its authorization.62 The defect explains why the result follows: a driver on the side street sees a sign and cannot see the council's minutes. A number of other courts agree that a procedural defect does not bar adoption, among them Lewis v. Miami and Ponca City v. Reed.63
The opposite situation arises when an enactment is perfectly valid and the court still declines to use it. Comment d's own example is an automobile speed limit of six miles an hour, enacted in 1908 and never repealed. A criminal court would have to apply it as written, but a civil court may treat it as inapplicable in defining negligence, relying on the fact that the legislature expressed no intention that it be applied beyond the criminal penalty it prescribed.64 Behind that freedom lies the reason courts borrow statutes at all: an enactment embodies a legislative judgment that certain conduct is required or unreasonable, and the court applies that judgment when the same question arises in a damages suit.65 A rule that survives only because no one has repealed it records no present judgment about safe driving, and a court that measured care by it would call negligent a driver traveling at a pace every other driver on the road considers prudent.66
Obsolescence is one ground among several for declining a valid enactment. A court usually should decline to adopt a statutory standard that is obsolete, arcane, trivial, little more than a general common-law rule of reasonable care, or so vague that it gives little help in setting the standard for a particular situation, and it may decline if sufficient policy considerations militate against adoption.67 The last two grounds follow from the purpose of borrowing, which is to replace the jury's open question about reasonable care with a more specific rule. A provision that only repeats the reasonableness formula adds nothing, and one whose command is unclear does not say what conduct was required.
Neither the validity nor the continued existence of an enactment settles whether it becomes the standard of care. The stop sign was adopted despite a defect because road users relied on it, and the six-mile-an-hour limit was set aside because no one now regards it as a measure of prudence. An enactment adopted despite its defect must still satisfy § 286 like any other, so the stop sign had to be aimed at protecting drivers on the through street against intersection collisions, and the court decides that question.68 Two shortcuts miss the point on an exam: reasoning that an enactment unenforceable in a criminal case cannot establish negligence, and reasoning that an enactment still on the books must establish it. Both skip the court's own judgment about whether the enactment fairly measures reasonable care.
Enactments Disclaiming Civil Effect
Section 285(b) lets a court adopt a standard from an enactment “which does not so provide,” meaning one that leaves the question of civil liability open.70 Borrowing therefore depends on a gap: the legislature must have written a rule without deciding what a violation means in a damages suit. Some enactments close that gap against the plaintiff by stating outright that a violation creates no civil liability, and a legislature can reach the same result by making its other enforcement provisions complete and exclusive. When a legislature does either, there is nothing left for a court to decide.71
The reason follows from what courts rely on when they borrow a silent statute. Adoption rests on an inference drawn from silence: legislatures write against a long practice of using safety statutes to define reasonable care, so saying nothing about civil effect can fairly be read to leave that practice in place. A disclaimer replaces the silence with an answer. A court that adopted the standard anyway would impose through negligence law the very consequence the drafters said a violation does not carry. A court should accordingly decline to adopt an enactment as the standard of care when evidence shows that the legislature intended other penalties, such as criminal or administrative fines, to be exclusive, or intended that a violation by itself would not trigger liability for negligence.72 That limit works alongside § 286 and does not depend on it, since an enactment can satisfy all four purpose requirements and still be unavailable as the standard.
Lawyer regulation supplies the familiar example. State disciplinary rules typically contain a provision, similar to one in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, stating that a violation does not automatically give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer or create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. That language shows the drafters did not mean a violation to support negligence per se.73 The rules the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to impose duties on lawyers say expressly that they create no private right of action against a lawyer or law firm, which forecloses a negligence per se argument there as well.74 Jurisdictions differ on what remains of an ethical violation after that. Most admit it as evidence of malpractice, and some keep it from the jury altogether on the view that the rules are guidelines for ethical conduct and an unsuitable basis for civil liability. The Iowa Supreme Court collected these competing treatments in Stender v. Blessum.75
A foreclosed shortcut leaves the enactment available as evidence. The client may still argue negligence under the ordinary totality-of-the-circumstances test, with the lawyer's violation as one circumstance, and an expert may rest an opinion about the standard of care partly on what the enactments say about the lawyer's duties.76 The Restatement's treatment of rules and statutes that regulate lawyers sets the terms. Proof of a violation of such a rule or statute:77
- does not give rise to an implied cause of action for professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty;
- does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care or the fiduciary duty; and
- may be considered by the trier of fact as an aid in applying the standard, to the extent the rule was designed to protect persons in the claimant's position and proof of its content and construction is relevant to the claim.
The third item keeps a purpose check inside the evidentiary role, which echoes the class-of-persons requirement of § 286.
The line that matters runs between an enactment that disclaims civil effect and one that is merely silent, because silence leaves the borrowing power intact. A statute requiring lawyers, among others, to reveal confidential information to prevent child abuse, with nothing said about civil liability, disclaims nothing. A child harmed by a lawyer's unexcused failure to report can therefore argue for negligence per se, since the statute was meant to prevent that type of harm to children in the plaintiff's position.78 Data-breach notification laws that bind law firms divide the same way. Some expressly provide civil damages, which makes them statutory torts, while others are silent, and in those states a court might find negligence per se from an unexcused violation.79 What separates the reporting statute from the disciplinary rule is what the rule-makers said about civil effect, so an exam answer should look to the enactment's own text for that statement before running the four requirements of § 286.