22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943)
The plaintiffs, consisting of the widow and child of Richard Clinkscales, initiated this lawsuit seeking damages for his death resulting from an automobile collision on May 20, 1937.1 The collision took place at the intersection of Highline Road and Oat Canal Road in Imperial County.2 At the time, the defendant was operating his vehicle northward along Highline Road while Richard Clinkscales traveled westward on Oat Canal Road.3
A stop sign had been installed on Highline Road at this intersection in 1936 by a road foreman acting with the permission of the local district supervisor.4 The purpose of the sign was to grant the right of way to gravel trucks traveling on Oat Canal Road.5 This installation occurred after the Board of Supervisors of Imperial County adopted a resolution on January 4, 1927, calling for boulevard stops at intersections, which in turn referenced Ordinance No. 82 from July 10, 1926, an ordinance that failed to take effect due to publication defects.6
The defendant, who was familiar with the stop sign, proceeded into the intersection without stopping.7 Although he checked both directions, he failed to observe the approaching vehicle.8 The impact from the collision proved fatal to Richard Clinkscales.9
Following a jury trial that resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, the defendant appealed the judgment entered against him.10
Whether irregularities in the authorization and placement of a stop sign at an intersection preclude a trial court from instructing the jury that failure to stop constitutes negligence as a matter of law in a civil action for wrongful death damages?11
The significance of the statute in a civil suit for negligence lies in its formulation of a standard of conduct that the court adopts in the determination of such liability.12 When a legislative body has generalized a standard from the experience of the community and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them, except where they would serve to impose liability without fault.13 Even if the conduct cannot be punished criminally because of irregularities in the adoption of the prohibitory provisions, the legislative standard may nevertheless apply if it is an appropriate measure for the defendant's conduct.14
No. The trial court rightly instructed the jury that, measured by the standard set up by the resolution of the board of supervisors and the Vehicle Code, it was negligence as a matter of law to disregard the stop-sign.15 The stop sign was placed on Highline Road at the intersection with Oat Canal Road in 1936 pursuant to the 1927 resolution referencing the defective ordinance.16 The defendant was familiar with the sign but did not stop before entering the intersection.17 Failure to observe a stop-sign is unreasonably dangerous conduct whether or not the driver is immune from criminal prosecution because of some irregularity in the erection of the stop-sign.18
Any reasonable man should know that the public naturally relies upon observance of posted signs.19
Irregularities in the authorization and placement of the stop sign do not preclude the trial court from instructing the jury that failure to stop constitutes negligence as a matter of law in this civil wrongful death action.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Edmonds, J.
Justice Shenk dissented on the ground that the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law if he failed to stop.21 The basis for the instruction was the false assumption that Highline Road was signposted with a stop-sign as then provided by section 577 of the Vehicle Code.22 He maintained that some stop signal was installed at the intersection but without any legal authorization therefor.23
The question of the defendant’s negligence under the circumstances was a question of fact for the jury.24 At the time of the impact the Clinkscales car was traveling on the left or wrong side of the road and must have been going at an excessive rate of speed.25 Freed from the erroneous instruction the jury might well have found that the negligence of the deceased was the sole proximate cause of the collision.26