82 Ohio St. 3d 563, 697 N.E.2d 198 (1998)
Earl Chambers was employed by the Dairymen’s Milk Company as a delivery person who delivered dairy products to St. Mary’s School.1 In the early morning hours of November 29, 1993, Chambers made a delivery to the school during a light snowfall. He brushed the snow off the steps but did not observe any ice before beginning his delivery.2 After taking milk into the school, Chambers proceeded out the service entrance with empty crates and slipped on a quarter-inch-thick layer of ice, sustaining back injuries.3
Chambers and his wife filed suit against St. Mary’s in the Court of Common Pleas. The complaint alleged that St. Mary’s had failed to maintain its premises in a safe manner under R.C. 4101.11 and asserted that the school should have constructed an awning, installed appropriate gutters, corrected an improperly sloped roof, and properly cleared and salted the area.4 Chambers presented expert testimony that St. Mary’s violated sections of the Ohio Basic Building Code, including those requiring exterior stairways to be kept free of ice and protected from accumulation of ice and snow.5
St. Mary’s filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.6 Chambers appealed to the Court of Appeals for Geauga County. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment and certified a conflict with decisions from the Summit County Court of Appeals.7 The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the case upon determining that a conflict existed.8
Whether a violation of the Ohio Basic Building Code may constitute negligence per se?9
To recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, and (3) that the breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.10 Typically, a duty may be established by common law, legislative enactment, or by the particular facts and circumstances of the case.11 Where a legislative enactment imposes a specific duty for the safety of others, failure to perform that duty is negligence per se.12 Application of negligence per se in a tort action means that the plaintiff has conclusively established that the defendant breached the duty that he or she owed to the plaintiff.13
Legislative authority is vested with the General Assembly.14 A legislative enactment, or statute, is initially introduced as a bill.15 The introduction of a bill is a manifestation of public policy, which is determined primarily by the General Assembly.16 A bill may originate in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.17 All bills are subject to debate, discussion, and amendment prior to being put to a vote.18 Once all amendments are made, the bill must still be passed by a concurrence of a majority of members from both the Senate and the House of Representatives. It must be signed by the Governor before it becomes law.19
In contrast, administrative rules do not dictate public policy, but rather expound upon public policy already established by the General Assembly in the Revised Code.20 The purpose of administrative rulemaking is to facilitate an administrative agency’s placing into effect a policy declared by the General Assembly in the statutes to be administered by the agency.21 Administrative agencies may make only subordinate rules.22 Directors of administrative agencies are appointed by the Governor.23 It is these directors and/or their employees who propose and adopt administrative rules.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Resnick And F.e. Sweeney, Jj.
Justice Douglas dissented from the judgment and opinion of the majority.29 He argued that the majority has determined that a violation of the Ohio Basic Building Code may never constitute negligence per se.30 The extension of the doctrine to violations of any administrative rules is never justified.31 The breadth of the majority opinion is alarming and simply wrong.32
Administrative rules issued pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law unless unreasonable or in clear conflict with a statute.33 This court has implicitly agreed that a tortfeasor may be negligent per se in violating a relevant administrative regulation.34 The majority has turned a blind eye to these and other important cases decided by this court.35