Concept
Sources of the Standard
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
Statutes as the Standard of Care
Sources of the Standard
The reasonable person formula tells a jury what kind of care to look for but not what that care requires against a particular hazard, and courts cannot fill the gap. The circumstances that injure people vary too widely for judges to formulate a specific rule in advance for every careless act, so the jury is usually instructed under the general formula and left to its common sense, its experience, and any expert testimony.1 Legislatures, by contrast, routinely enact standards of care for common situations. This chapter asks what role those enactments play in proving breach, the second element of negligence.2
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 names four sources from which the standard of conduct may come. It may be established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation that so provides3; adopted by the court from an enactment or regulation that does not4; established by judicial decision5; or, when none of these exists, applied to the facts by the trial judge or the jury.6
Because most statutes provide no civil remedy and carry only penalties payable to the state, the second source does most of the work in practice.7 A court borrowing from such an enactment must exercise judgment, and § 286 supplies the test. The court may adopt the requirements of an enactment whose purpose is found, exclusively or in part, to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff, to protect the particular interest invaded, and to protect that interest against the kind of harm that resulted and the particular hazard that caused it.8 Later sections take that test apart. This section follows the four sources in order, beginning with the one that leaves the court nothing to decide.
Legislation That Supplies the Standard
The first source, in § 285(a), is an enactment or regulation “which so provides.”9 That phrase refers to an enactment that itself provides for civil liability. When a statute does so, it creates a statutory tort cause of action, and the court has no standard to borrow: the only questions are whether the statute is valid and whether the facts fall within its terms.10 The Federal Employers Liability Act, the Jones Act, and state employee safety and dram shop acts are familiar examples, and in a proper case a court may find that a legislature gave a civil remedy by necessary implication even though it never said so.11
When the legislature has spoken, the court’s work is nearly done. If the legislature either provides a civil remedy or clearly indicates that its other provisions for enforcement are complete and exclusive, there is nothing left for a court to decide.12 The legislature has settled the question of civil effect, in one direction or the other.
Most legislation does not settle it. Occasionally a statute provides a cause of action, but far more often it provides only penalties payable to the state.13 A plaintiff who relies on such a statute has no statutory tort. The suit is an ordinary negligence action in which the statute, if the court adopts it, does one thing: it fixes the measure of the defendant’s duty.14
A statute can impose a duty without supplying a standard of care, and a court that notices the difference may refuse to treat the statute as a standard. In Scovill v. City of Astoria, the court found that the statute was intended to protect intoxicated persons who endanger themselves, yet it rejected the negligence per se argument because the statute created and imposed a duty to act without creating a standard of care.15 Marquay v. Eno and Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc. take up a related question, how a legislature’s intent to create an individual right of action bears on negligence per se. Whenever a statute is invoked, ask two questions in order. Did the legislature provide a civil remedy? If not, does the statute supply a standard of care that a court should adopt?
Court Adoption of Silent Statutes
Section 285(b) describes a standard “adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so provide.”17 Most statutes fit that description, because they stop at a fine or other penalty payable to the state.18 The operative word is adopted, and it makes the court the actor. Under § 285(a) the court follows a choice the legislature has already made. Under § 285(b) the court makes the choice itself, taking a rule written for criminal or regulatory ends and using it to measure care in a negligence suit.
Osborne v. McMasters is the classic illustration. A statute required poison to be labeled, a druggist sold it unlabeled, and a customer who took it died. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the seller liable on a general principle: where a statute imposes a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, one who neglects that duty is liable to those the statute protects for injuries of the kind it was meant to prevent and that the neglect proximately caused.19 The statute fit the claim because its sole object was to protect the public against the dangerous qualities of poison, and the death was the very harm it addressed.20
That reasoning keeps the claim in negligence. The plaintiff sued at common law, and the statute did one thing: it established “a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be determined.”21 The gist of the action stayed negligence, and the only difference from an ordinary case was who measured the duty. In one case common-law principles measure it, and in the other the statute does, so that a violation is conclusive evidence of negligence, or negligence per se.22 How firmly an unexcused violation binds the jury is a separate question. In the ordinary case the jury is not permitted to decide whether the violation was negligent, because an unexcused violation is negligence.23
Adoption does not require that the enactment create a private cause of action. In {{ }}McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.{{ }}, 631 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. 2006), Judy McLain alleged that a nursing home’s violations of health and safety regulations caused her father’s death. Reversing the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court observed that even without a private cause of action under the federal statute, she could assert negligence per se for the violation of the regulations.24
The court adopts because the legislature has said nothing about civil effect. Comment d to § 286, quoted in Zeni v. Anderson, makes the point directly: since the legislation has not so provided, “the court is under no compulsion to accept it as defining any standard of conduct for purposes of a tort action.”25 Justice Traynor said the same in Clinkscales v. Carver. A statute that provides only a criminal proceeding creates no civil liability, and the absence of a civil remedy means the legislature did not contemplate one.26 The statute matters in a damages suit only through the standard of conduct it formulates, and the decision whether that standard governs “still rests with the court.”27 A standard in a criminal statute or police regulation becomes the civil standard only because the court accepts it.28
The same comment shows the discretion in use. It imagines an automobile speed limit of six miles an hour, enacted in 1908 and never repealed. A criminal court has no choice but to apply the law as written, but a civil court, under no such compulsion, may treat the provision as inapplicable in defining negligence, because the legislature provided nothing beyond a criminal penalty.29
Courts nonetheless borrow silent statutes often, and the first reason is deference. Statutes express public policy, and where the legislature has expressed its ideas the courts naturally give them great weight.30 It would be awkward for a tort court to call reasonable conduct that the legislature has already condemned as unlawful, and the legislature’s judgment, as the authoritative representative of the community, takes precedence over the views of any one jury.31 The legislature also knows that courts have applied negligence per se for about 150 years, so it may have intended a criminal enactment to set the standard of care even without saying so.32
Legislative silence cannot fairly be read the other way. One might speculate that a legislature that knows how to create a cause of action and does not must have intended none, but that inference is probably wrong. It is more accurate to see negligence per se as a common law creation resting on the idea that a reasonable person does not violate statutes.33 On that view the statute embodies a legislative judgment that certain conduct is required or unreasonable, and negligence is the breach of a duty imposed by law, whether the law is of judicial or legislative origin.34
A borrowed standard also gives the jury a narrower job. Without one, the jury must decide not only what the facts are but what the unformulated standard of reasonable conduct is, whereas a standard that a legislature has generalized from the community’s experience lets the court apply it directly.35 The borrowed standard also reduces the chance that a jury will decide on grounds unrelated to the merits. A jury sympathetic to a plaintiff who rode without a required helmet might be tempted to ignore his negligence, and that is harder once it is instructed that it must find him negligent if he wore no helmet.36
Courts do not treat every violation as negligence, because a reasonable person does not always obey the law. A driver who swerves across the center line to avoid a child, or who stops in a no-stopping zone to attend to a seriously ill passenger, acts reasonably despite the violation. Sometimes obedience is impossible, as when blizzard conditions overwhelm efforts to keep a street clear. Imposing liability on the bare fact of violation in such cases would look more like strict liability than liability for fault.37
Purpose limits adoption as well. A speed limit enacted solely to conserve gasoline is irrelevant in deciding whether a driver was negligent, and a statute prohibiting certain activities on Sunday, written to protect public peace and morals, is irrelevant to whether an activity was conducted negligently.38 A court borrows a standard only as far as the purpose behind it reaches, and § 286 turns that idea into a test.39 Because legislative purpose is, in practice, whatever the courts say it is, similar statutes can come out differently. Courts have split on whether a statute requiring a driver who leaves a car to remove the key and lock it protects people struck by a thief driving the car, though in general courts take a reasonably broad view of safety statutes.40
Judicial Decisions as Standards
The third source in § 285 is a standard “established by judicial decision.”42 No legislature is involved. Appellate courts reviewing jury verdicts must say whether particular conduct was or was not negligent as a matter of law, and under stare decisis those statements become precedent. As similar facts recur, courts generalize from them, and some kinds of conduct harden into standards fixed by rules of law.43
Courts want this control because a jury trial of a clear case consumes time and resources, and a jury may reach an improper result out of prejudice, sympathy, or error. Judicial control over what counts as negligence gives the concept stability, certainty, and meaning, because similar facts begin to produce similar outcomes.44
Such standards seldom announce themselves. They usually appear as rulings that the evidence was too thin to reach a jury, and the ruling does more than judge the proof. In Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway Co., a passenger who slipped on a worn staircase won a jury verdict, but the court set it aside and ordered a nonsuit. In practical effect the ruling said that the railway had done all it was bound to do in maintaining a staircase like the one proved. A later court facing a similar staircase starts from that ruling and not from the bare reasonable person formula.45
The same power can overreach. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, Justice Holmes tried to settle once and for all what care a driver owes at a railroad crossing: stop, look, and listen, and if necessary get out of the vehicle and walk to the tracks to see whether a train is coming.46 The rule proved harsh and unworkable, since compliance would often delay traffic, could itself be dangerous, and in some situations would not even achieve its purpose.47 In Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. the Court overruled Goodman, and Justice Cardozo explained that “[e]xtraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal.”48
Both decisions fixed conduct as a matter of law, and breadth separates them. Crafter says what one proved staircase required of its owner and leaves every other stairway to its own facts. Goodman prescribed one course for every driver at every crossing, whatever the view, the traffic, or the surrounding danger, and a rule that wide meets facts its author never imagined. Courts may still take a case from the jury when everyone would agree the conduct was clearly negligent or clearly was not, but because injuries arise in endless variety, virtually every rule of conduct must admit exceptions and excuses.49 A precedent therefore fixes the standard best when it stays tied to the facts decided. When no decision, enactment, or regulation applies, § 285(d) leaves the question to the judge or jury, the subject of the next subsection.
Application by Judge or Jury
The fourth source in § 285 applies when no enactment, regulation, or decision supplies a standard. The standard of conduct is then “applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge or the jury.”51 This is the default, and without a more specific rule the jury receives the general reasonable person formula and relies on its common sense, its experience, and, where appropriate, expert testimony.52 In the absence of a standard from the other sources, the case goes to the jury.53
Leaving the question to the jury does not leave it unsupervised. Each jury ordinarily makes its own ad hoc judgment about what a reasonable person would have done, subject to the court’s power to direct a verdict when it feels strongly one way or the other.54 Where reasonable minds could differ, the case goes to the jury, which then carries a double burden. As Justice Traynor put it in Clinkscales v. Carver, the jury must decide “not only what the facts are but what the unformulated standard is of reasonable conduct.”55 Each of the other three sources removes the second half of that burden.
A borrowed statutory standard changes the jury’s task. Suppose a statute requires adequate lighting in the common areas of apartment buildings, and a tenant is hurt in a dark hallway owned by a landlord, Cheever. If the court adopts the statute as the standard, the jury no longer asks what care a prudent landlord would use. It asks whether the light was out and, if so, whether Cheever has an excuse, because an unexcused violation is negligence.56 If the violation is undisputed and unexcused, the court may take the question from the jury and decide negligence as a matter of law.57 Without the statute, the same case goes to the jury under the general instruction that a landlord is negligent if he fails to use the care an ordinary prudent landlord would use in maintaining the common areas.58
Students often assume that no statute means no standard. It means only that the standard is the general one, and the plaintiff’s claim goes to the jury under it. The sections that follow explain when a court may replace that default with a legislature’s rule, beginning with the § 286 test.