139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272 (1995)
Three former students in the Mascoma Valley Regional School District filed separate complaints in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire alleging sexual abuse by school employees.1 Lisa Bums claimed she was sexually abused by high school teacher Brian Erskine beginning in her sophomore year and continuing beyond graduation.2 Jennifer Snyder alleged abuse by sports coach and teacher Michael Eno starting in seventh grade and continuing past graduation, and Yvonne Marquay asserted abuse by Eno from seventh grade and by teacher Brian Adams from high school.3
Each complaint also alleged that a host of school employees, including other teachers, coaches, superintendents, principals, and secretaries, either were aware or should have been aware of the sexual abuse, although none specified the location or timing of the incidents relative to school hours.4
The plaintiffs sought damages against the abusing employees, non-abusing employees, the school district, and school administrative units on negligence, assault and battery, constitutional violations, failure to report under RSA 169-C:29, and respondeat superior theories.5 After the defendants moved to dismiss various State law claims, the district court certified five questions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court under Supreme Court Rule 34.6
Whether RSA 169-C:29 creates a private right of action?7
No. The three former students who filed complaints in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire alleging sexual abuse by school employees Eno, Adams, and Erskine cannot recover damages from the non-abusing employees, school districts, or administrative units under RSA 169-C:29 because the statute contains no express or implied legislative intent to create a private right of action.10 The reporting requirement was originally limited to physicians in 1965, extended to all persons with a fine in 1971, and made a misdemeanor in 1973, yet the legislative history never mentions civil liability.11 Because the statute imposes an affirmative reporting duty that departs sharply from common-law nonliability for nonfeasance, the absence of any textual or historical indication of intent precludes implying a cause of action.12
RSA 169-C:29 does not create a private right of action for failure to report child abuse.13
Whether New Hampshire common law imposes a duty on school personnel to protect students from sexual abuse by other school employees?14
A special relationship exists between schools and students entrusted to their care.15 This relationship imposes a duty of reasonable supervision upon school employees who have supervisory responsibility over students.16 The duty arises when those employees acquire actual knowledge of abuse or learn of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude a student is being abused. A school district or school administrative unit has a duty not to hire or retain employees that it knows or should know have a propensity for sexually abusing students.17
Yes. The three former Mascoma Valley Regional School District students who allege that a host of school employees either were aware or should have been aware of the sexual abuse by Eno, Adams, and Erskine may pursue common-law negligence claims against those employees who possessed supervisory responsibility over students and against the school district for negligent hiring or retention.18 The compulsory character of school attendance and the resulting impairment of parental protection create a special relationship that requires supervisory employees to take reasonable protective measures once they know or should know of abuse.19 School districts likewise owe a direct duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and retaining employees who have contact with students.
This duty extends to officials who possess hiring and firing authority.20
School employees with supervisory authority and school districts themselves owe common-law duties of protection and reasonable hiring and retention.21
Whether common law duties to protect students extend to conduct occurring after graduation?22
The common-law duties based on special relationships to the plaintiffs are circumscribed by the scope of that relationship, which will not ordinarily extend beyond graduation.23 Duties based on a relationship to the abusing employees may give rise to liability for abuse that occurs after graduation where there is a causal connection between the fact of employment and the injury.24
No. The special-relationship duty of supervision owed by school employees to the three former students ends at graduation and therefore does not support liability for post-graduation abuse.25 The negligent-hiring-and-retention duty owed by the school district and by officials with hiring authority may extend beyond graduation if the plaintiff can establish that the employment relationship itself created the opportunity for continued contact between abuser and victim.26 Because none of the complaints alleges where or when the abuse occurred, the district court will have to determine on a case-by-case basis whether any post-graduation incidents satisfy the causal-connection requirement.27
Supervisory duties end at graduation while negligent-hiring-and-retention duties may extend beyond graduation when employment creates the continuing association.28
Whether the alleged facts give rise to a private cause of action under Part 1, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution for violation of the right to life and liberty?29
Once an infringement of a constitutional right has been established the court will avoid creating a new constitutional tort where established statutory, common-law, or administrative remedies are adequate to redress the denial.30
No. Even assuming that the alleged failure to report or the underlying sexual abuse by Eno, Adams, and Erskine violated the three former students’ rights under Part 1, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution, no private damages action is available because the established common-law remedies are adequate.31 The plaintiffs may recover in tort from the abusers themselves, from supervisory employees who knew or should have known of the abuse, and from the school district under respondeat superior for torts committed in the course of employment.32 These remedies, though perhaps not as complete as an additional constitutional cause of action, suffice to redress the harms alleged.33
No private constitutional tort action lies under Part 1, Article 2 for the alleged conduct.34
Whether the alleged facts give rise to a private cause of action under the equal protection guarantee of Part 1, Article 2?35
Once an infringement of a constitutional right has been established the court will avoid creating a new constitutional tort where established statutory, common-law, or administrative remedies are adequate to redress the denial.
No. Even assuming that the alleged failure of the non-abusing employees and school entities to report the sexual misconduct of Eno, Adams, and Erskine violated the three former students’ equal-protection rights under Part 1, Article 2, the same array of common-law tort remedies that precludes a constitutional tort for the liberty-interest claim also precludes a constitutional tort for the equal-protection claim.36 Because those remedies are adequate, the court declines to recognize a new damages action under the state constitution.37
No private constitutional tort action lies under the equal-protection guarantee of Part 1, Article 2.38