Concept
Utility of the Conduct
Risk-utility factors in judging unreasonable conduct
Utility of the Conduct
Courts do not order compensation every time a defendant causes harm; fault remains the most common basis of tort liability.1 In negligence, fault means an unreasonable risk, and whether a risk is reasonable depends partly on what the risky conduct accomplished. That accomplishment is the conduct's utility, the credit side of the balance. Utility cannot be read off the label on an activity: driving and surgery are both useful in general, yet a particular driver or surgeon may earn a large credit or almost none, depending on what the conduct was for and how well it served that purpose.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292 breaks the credit into three factors: the social value the law attaches to the interest the conduct advances or protects; the extent of the chance that this course of conduct will advance or protect that interest; and the extent of the chance that another, less dangerous course would have advanced or protected it adequately.2
The three factors are not separate boxes to tick, because each limits what the others can contribute. A very valuable goal earns little credit when the conduct has almost no chance of reaching it, and little credit for the added danger of a route when a safer route would have served just as well. The credit for a course of conduct is therefore the value of the goal, reduced by the chance that the conduct will miss it and reduced again to the extent a safer way was available.
Each factor closes off a different defense of dangerous conduct. The first stops an actor from justifying a risk merely by wanting the result badly, because the law's valuation of the interest sets the credit. The second stops an actor from claiming credit for a goal the conduct was unlikely ever to reach. The third stops an actor from claiming the full value of a worthy goal when the goal did not require the danger.
Social Value of the Interest
The first utility question asks what the conduct was for. Under § 292(a), the credit depends on the social value the law attaches to the interest the conduct is meant to advance or protect.3 A weighty interest earns a large credit and can justify substantial risk to others; a slight one earns little and justifies little. Because the factor measures purpose, the cleanest way to see it is to hold the physical risk constant and vary only what the risk was taken for.
Purpose can decide a case even when the chance of harm is small. Where conduct has no social utility, an actor may be reckless though the chance of harm is under one percent,4 and no mathematical rule of percentages separates reasonable risks from unreasonable ones: a very large risk may be reasonable in some circumstances, and a small risk unreasonable in others.5
The phrase “social value the law attaches” guards against two opposite errors. If purposes earned no credit, a risky effort to save a life would be weighed as though it accomplished nothing, and rescue would be discouraged along with reckless conduct. If any goal the actor happened to hold counted, anyone could justify endangering others by pointing to an aim that mattered only to them. The actor's own reason for taking the risk counts only to the extent its value or importance is properly recognized,6 so enthusiasm for a trivial goal adds nothing to the scale.
Eckert v. Long Island R.R. shows a heavy credit at work. The plaintiff's decedent saw a child on the track in front of a rapidly approaching train and went onto the track to save the child. He saved the child, and the train killed him. The jury was allowed to find that he had not been contributorily negligent, and the question was whether he had exposed himself to an unreasonably great risk.7 The decedent was the plaintiff, so the issue was his own negligence, but the balance is the same one that judges a defendant's conduct. The danger to his life was grave, so the issue was whether his purpose could answer for it, and a child's life is among the most weighty interests the law recognizes. Change the child to a kitten and the same dash earns far less credit.
Even Chen's large credit is only one entry in the balance. Sections 292(b) and 292(c) add two further utility questions, and the magnitude of the danger to others must still be weighed against the total. A worthy purpose is therefore a weight that can be outweighed, never a complete defense.
Chance of Advancing the Interest
The second utility question asks whether the conduct will work. Under § 292(b), the credit depends on the extent of the chance that the interest will be advanced or protected by the particular course of conduct.9 Section 292(a) measures the goal, and § 292(b) measures the odds of reaching it. The word particular ties the inquiry to the course the actor actually chose, so a worthy goal in the abstract settles nothing until the court asks how well this conduct serves it.
A separate factor is needed because an actor accepts a risk in exchange for an expected benefit, and the expected benefit is the goal's value discounted by the likelihood of reaching it. Conduct with little prospect of working imposes real danger on others for a gain that will probably never arrive. If the law credited the goal at full value whatever the odds, any actor could dress up dangerous conduct with an admirable aim. The factor also protects genuine ventures, since a rescue with a fair chance of working earns substantial credit even though it may fail.
Eckert shows the factor at work. Its analysis lists the chance of saving the child as an element of reasonableness and observes that, had there been no fair chance of saving the child, the conduct would have been unreasonable and negligent.10 The question is the chance the rescuer faced when he stepped onto the track, so a rescuer who tries and fails with the same fair chance earns the same credit. A rescue also makes the calculus plain common sense: the probability and magnitude of harm to the rescuer are weighed against the interest that must be sacrificed to avoid that harm, here the chance that the child will be hit by the train.11
The goal is identical in the two scenes, so § 292(a) cannot account for the different results; only the chance of success differs. The converse also holds. A near-certain chance of success cannot make a slight interest valuable: a driver who speeds to reach a casual get-together and will almost surely arrive earns little credit, because the goal itself weighs little. The credit is high only when both inputs are favorable, a goal the law values and conduct with a realistic prospect of reaching it.
The Restatement asks for the extent of the chance and sets no percentage threshold. A genuine but uncertain chance earns a meaningful credit, a remote chance earns little, and the court or jury weighs the difference as part of the whole balance. What remains is whether a safer course would have served the same goal as well, which § 292(c) takes up next.
Safer Alternatives Available
The third utility question asks whether the goal required the danger at all. Under § 292(c), the credit shrinks to the extent that the interest could have been “adequately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.”13 Sections 292(a) and 292(b) measure the goal and the odds; § 292(c) tests necessity. When a safer route would have reached the same end, the extra danger of the route taken bought nothing, and the goal cannot justify a risk it did not demand.
The reason lies in what the credit measures. An actor accepts a risk in exchange for a benefit, and the benefit that belongs to the risky course is only the part of the goal that would have been lost without it. If a safer path led to the same result, the risky course added danger without adding benefit. The reduction comes in degrees, since § 292(c) speaks of the extent of the chance that a safer course would have served: an alternative that would very probably have worked trims the credit sharply, and a long shot trims it slightly. The factor presses actors who have a cheap safer option to use it, and it spares those who have none.
Eckert's analysis lists necessity as an element of its own: the probability that the child would not have saved himself by getting off the track in time.14 The rescuer's dash earns credit only to the extent it was needed, so a child already stepping clear of the rails would have left the rescuer's risk nothing to buy.
The word adequately limits what counts as an alternative. A safer course reduces the credit only if it would have served the interest about as well as the dangerous one, so a course that is safer because it gives up part of the goal does not show the risk was unnecessary. Burden belongs to the inquiry too. Reasonableness is ordinarily determined by balancing the burdens of the precautions the defendant skipped against the safety benefits they would have achieved, and great risks call for great precautions while small risks call only for small ones.15 The products test asks the same question of design: whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm.16 A safer course that would cost far more than the risk justifies, or that would leave the product unable to do its job, is not that kind of alternative, and it leaves the credit intact.
A warning is often the cheapest precaution available, which is why the burden side of the balance so often favors requiring one. In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., a perfume maker sold a flammable product without warning of the fire danger. A warning costs only some additional printing on a label, so weighing the probability and seriousness of harm against that cost will almost always favor an obligation to warn of latent dangers when the manufacturer is otherwise required to warn.17
What happens when no safer course exists? A firefighter's case answers the question.
The tenant and the firefighter both endanger bystanders. They differ in whether the goal could have been reached without the danger, and that difference decides how much credit each keeps. Even the firefighter's full credit is one side of the scale, since the magnitude of the danger to others must still be weighed against it. The factor condemns a risk only when an adequate substitute was available at reasonable burden; it never condemns a risk merely because the risk is great. With the utility side now built from three questions, the next section turns to the other side of the scale and the factors that fix the magnitude of the risk.