Concept
Privity Beyond Products
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
Privity Beyond Products
MacPherson cleared privity out of negligence law: a manufacturer owes due care to any foreseeable plaintiff, so the want of a contract with the maker is no defense.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281(b) states the premise underneath that rule: the actor's conduct must be negligent “with respect to the other, or a class of persons within which he is included.”2 Courts have been slower to carry the rule from wheels to words. When the defendant's product is a certificate, a report, or an opinion, the plaintiff has lost money and not blood, and the question becomes whether the defendant aimed its work at the plaintiff or at a group whose edges it could see.
The caution comes from how the two kinds of harm spread. A defective wheel hurts the few people who ride in the car, and its maker can weigh a risk of that size. A careless statement can be copied, passed along, and shown to anyone, and each new reader may act on it for a purpose its author never imagined. The author's fee covered one engagement, and because the loss is financial, it grows with every reader who acts. Foreseeability alone, applied to opinions as it was to wheels, would expose the author to an open-ended audience for an open-ended time.
Cardozo wrote MacPherson and also the leading opinions on both sides of this problem, so the difference between the two lines of cases reflects a judgment about reach and not a change of heart. A defendant who knows its work will reach an identified person can take the care that person's reliance deserves, and the reasoning that supported a duty to the unnamed driver supports a duty to the known recipient. The reasoning gives out when the possible readers have no edge. The first subsection takes up the cases that impose a duty to a known third party; the second takes up the cases that refuse one to an indeterminate class.
Intended Reliance
Buyers with no contract with the weighers recovered from them in Glanzer v. Shepard, the leading case on a professional's duty to a known third party. The weighers certified the weight of a shipment of beans that had been sold, and they sent the buyers a copy of the certificate for the very purpose of inducing action. The buyers accepted the beans and paid on the faith of it. When they tried to resell, they found the true weight 11,854 pounds below the certified weight, and they sued in the City Court of New York for the $1,261.26 they had overpaid.3 The Court of Appeals sustained the claim.
Cardozo's opinion turns on what the weighers knew and meant to accomplish. The buyers' use of the certificate was, to the weighers' knowledge, “the end and aim of the transaction.” The weighers held themselves out to the public as skilled and careful in their calling, knew the beans had been sold, and knew payment would follow on the faith of their certificate. In Cardozo's compressed phrase, “Bech, Van Siclen & Co. ordered, but Glanzer Brothers were to use.” From those facts he drew the duty: taking on the task of weighing meant assuming “a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to be governed.” The court did not need to state that duty “in terms of contract or of privity,” because a duty that grew out of a contract had “none the less an origin not exclusively contractual.”4
The rule has two working parts. Knowledge of the person who will act fixes the reach of the duty before the work is done: the weighers knew the buyers and the shipment their certificate would govern, so they could set their care and their fee against a risk of known size, and “all whose conduct was to be governed” meant those buyers and not the world. The purpose of inducing action explains why the duty runs to the buyers at all. A certificate exists to steer what its recipient pays, and a duty owed only to the seller who ordered it would leave unprotected the very person the certificate was built to steer. Cardozo also described the wrong as the careless performance of a service, the act of weighing, which happened to find its summary in the words of a certificate, and not as carelessly chosen words alone.5
Savings Bank v. Ward marks the opposite pole. There a lawyer made certificates of title at a loan applicant's request, without knowing what use would be made of them or to whom they would be shown, and a lawyer who supplies a certificate to a client is not answerable to a third person the lawyer did not mean to serve. A searcher who prepares an abstract at a client's order and then delivers it to another person to induce action on its faith has no such protection.6 The document is the same on both sides of that line; what separates them is whether the preparer aimed the work at the person who relied.
California reached the same place for wills in Biakanja v. Irving. A notary who prepared a will was sued by the beneficiary, who had no contract with the notary, and the lower appellate court in Michel v. Murphy had rejected such a claim for want of privity. The California Supreme Court sorted the authorities. Recovery outside privity for injury to intangible interests had been allowed, with Glanzer a leading example, but it had been refused where the plaintiff's advantage from the contract was only a collateral consideration of the transaction or where injury to the particular plaintiff was not foreseeable, as in Ultramares.7 A will falls on the allowed side. Its whole object is to pass property to the named beneficiary, so that benefit is the end and aim of the work, and the notary was held answerable to the beneficiary.
Modern malpractice law preserves the same two exceptions. A lawyer owes care to clients, and a non-client can ordinarily sue only where the lawyer invited the non-client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or services, or where the non-client is an intended beneficiary of the services rendered to the client. A lawyer who certifies to a lender that the borrower's collateral carries no liens has invited reliance, which is Glanzer's situation with a lender in the buyer's place, and Greycas, Inc. v. Proud is the usual illustration. A lawyer who drafts a will meaning to pass property to particular beneficiaries owes them care, and Lucas v. Hamm was an early decision to say so. Allowing the beneficiaries to sue reinforces the duty the lawyer owed to the testator, and the exception is needed because the person who lost the gift has no contract with the lawyer and the testator can no longer complain.8 In the title-certificate case the lawyer neither invited reliance nor meant to benefit the plaintiff, so neither exception applies.
Intended reliance carries MacPherson's reasoning from products to services. A manufacturer owes due care to any foreseeable plaintiff because it knows others will use what it sells.9 A weigher, notary, or lawyer owes care to the particular person it knows will rely, because it aimed the work at that person, and its conduct is negligent “with respect to” that person in the sense the Restatement requires.10 The edge of the class differs. A class of drivers the maker could not name was enough for a wheel, while in the reliance cases the plaintiff is the identified recipient or a person the preparer knew would use the work. Two wrong answers follow from forgetting that edge. One rejects the claim only because no contract existed, overlooking that the duty is imposed by law. The other accepts it only because reliance was foreseeable, skipping the question whether the preparer knew of the plaintiff's use and meant to serve it. What happens when the readers form a group with no such edge is the subject of the next subsection.
The Indeterminate Class
How well defined must a class of plaintiffs be when the harm is financial and the instrument of harm is a document? MacPherson accepted drivers the maker could not name.12 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, decided in 1931, gave a narrower answer for accountants: the New York court refused to hold them liable in negligence to a lender who relied on a certified balance sheet, and Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. later restated that limit.13
The accountants in Ultramares had been employed by their client, Fred Stern & Co., to prepare and certify a balance sheet showing its business as of December 31, 1923. The action in tort had two counts, one for merely negligent misrepresentation and one for fraud.14 The counts drew different answers. Accountants might be held liable in fraud to nonprivy parties they intended to rely on their misrepresentations, but negligence raised a “different question”: whether the accountants owed those parties a duty “to make [their reports] without negligence.”15 Cardozo, disputing the wisdom of extending the duty of care to anyone who might foreseeably rely, answered no, and his reason was the size of the exposure. A thoughtless slip, such as failing to detect a theft or forgery beneath deceptive entries, “may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”16
Each open-ended term has its own source. The amount is open because the loss is financial: it grows with every dollar a reader lends on the strength of the report, and the fee for one audit was never set against those dollars. The time is open because a certificate does not expire when the client puts it away and can be shown to a new lender years later. The class is open because the client controls the copies, and the accountants cannot tell in advance who will read the report or what decision it will drive. A liability the accountants could neither price nor insure was the result Cardozo declined to impose.
Ultramares distinguished Glanzer by the intimacy of the relationship. The weighers' bond with the buyers “was so close as to approach that of privity, if not completely one with it.” No one, Cardozo said, would be likely to urge a contractual relation, “or even one approaching it,” as the root of any duty owed by the accountants to “the indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the [accountants' client] in reliance on the audit.” The weighers' service was “primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee.”17 In Glanzer the buyer's reliance was the end and aim of the work; in Ultramares a lender's reliance was one use among many that the client might make of the certificate. The weighers' known buyers and known shipment fixed the size of the risk, so the weighers could price it. The auditors faced every possible lender as a possibility and none as a target.
Credit Alliance reexamined both decisions and kept the standard: a relationship “so close as to approach that of privity” remains the predicate for imposing liability on accountants to noncontractual parties for the negligent preparation of financial reports.18 The standard examines the relationship between the accountants and the plaintiff, so the plaintiff's reliance alone does not satisfy it.
Courts elsewhere have disagreed about how far beyond that standard to go, and one summary sorts the results into four approaches:
- The Ultramares rule: privity or a relationship approaching it.
- New York's slight modification of that rule in Credit Alliance.
- Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552: a person or limited class of persons whom the auditor can foresee will rely on the statements, and who do rely, may recover.
- Reasonable foreseeability: any reasonably foreseeable recipient of the statements may recover if the recipient relied on them for business purposes. This approach is associated with H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.19
California rejected the fourth approach in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. because it could impose “a potential liability far out of proportion to its fault,” and because sophisticated investors could have bought protection from the auditor by contract. Following § 552, Bily limited recovery to “specifically intended beneficiaries of the audit report who are known to the auditor and for whose benefit it renders the audit report.”20 The choice among the four is a policy judgment about how much exposure to accept in exchange for compensating injured readers, so the answer varies by state. An exam problem that names no jurisdiction calls for identifying the competing tests and applying each.
The same difficulty arises whenever carelessness causes economic loss without physical injury, and People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. shows another court's way of drawing the line. The New Jersey Supreme Court extracted from decisions allowing and denying recovery a rule that a defendant owes a duty to avoid the risk of economic damages, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or an identifiable class whom it knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer them. In the cases that allowed recovery, the defendants knew or should have foreseen both that particular plaintiffs or an identifiable class were at risk and that ascertainable economic damage would follow.21
The opinion then separated two ideas that students often merge. An identifiable class is not simply a foreseeable class. Travelers delayed near a negligently caused accident, members of the general public, and invitees at a plaintiff's business are all “certainly a foreseeable class,” but their presence would be fortuitous and their economic injuries “hopelessly unpredictable.” Tenants of a building harmed by a utility blackout, by contrast, form a defined, limited, known class, as the court noted in citing Strauss v. Belle Realty Co. The court measured identifiability along four dimensions, and a class qualifies when it is particularly foreseeable in terms of:
- The type of persons or entities that make up the class.
- The certainty or predictability of their presence.
- The approximate number of people or entities in the class.
- The type of economic expectations their loss disrupts.22
People Express and Ultramares demand different things but rest on one idea: foresight that someone may be hurt is not enough, and the plaintiffs must form a group whose edges the defendant could see when it acted. People Express is looser in one respect, because a class the defendant knew of as a class can qualify with no member named, while near-privity looks to a party the accountants knew and meant to serve. Both are consistent with MacPherson, since the people who will ride in a car can be read from the product itself, whereas the people touched economically by a closed highway or a circulating report depend on chance and on other people's choices. The usual exam error is to recite that any foreseeable plaintiff may sue and conclude that any lender who read the audit recovers. That rule governs physical injury from careless manufacture. For words and for pure economic loss, the first question is whether the defendant's work was aimed at the plaintiff or at an identifiable class that includes the plaintiff.