Concept
Elements of Negligence
Duty and negligent conduct framework
Duty and Negligent Conduct
Elements of Negligence
Section 281 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says when an actor is liable for invading another person’s interest, and its four conditions organize this section. The interest invaded must be one that the law protects against unintentional invasion. The actor’s conduct must be negligent with respect to the plaintiff or to a class of persons that includes the plaintiff. That conduct must be a legal cause of the invasion. And the plaintiff must not have conducted himself so as to disable himself from suing.1 The conditions are cumulative, so a plaintiff who fails any one of them loses even when the other three are met.
Two terms from the Restatement’s vocabulary recur throughout. “Actor” designates the person whose conduct is in question, whether the question is if that conduct makes the person liable to another or if it precludes the person from recovering against someone whose tortious conduct was a legal cause of the person’s injury.2 “Duty” denotes the requirement that the actor conduct himself in a particular manner, at the risk that failure to do so makes him liable to the person to whom the duty is owed for any injury his conduct legally causes.3 A duty runs to a person, so the inquiry asks whether this actor owed it to this plaintiff, a question distinct from how carefully the actor behaved.
The word “negligence” carries two meanings, and courts use both. In the broad sense, negligence is a tort, a cause of action whose four elements are a duty of reasonable care, breach of that duty, causation, and resulting damage. In the narrow sense, negligence is the failure to exercise the care a reasonably prudent person would have exercised, which is the second element alone.4 The two senses can come apart: a defendant can act negligently in the narrow sense and still escape liability for negligence in the broad one.
The gap also opens when a careless defendant owed the plaintiff no duty. That defendant “was negligent” yet is not liable, because duty and breach are separate elements and each must be established.5
The traditional formula divides the cause of action into four elements: a duty to use reasonable care, a failure to conform to the required standard (breach), causation, and actual damage.7 Courts often call the first two together “negligent behavior,” though the term frequently is applied to breach alone.8 The division also allocates the work. Whether a duty is owed is a question of law for the judge. Whether it was breached is usually a question for the jury, though the judge may determine that no reasonable jury could find breach.9 Duty begins the analysis without ending it, since an actor may owe a duty and still not breach it.10 The next subsection takes up duty and the interests it protects, and the plaintiff’s own conduct, the last of the four conditions, comes at the end.
Duty and Protected Interests
Section 281(a) sets the first gate: the interest invaded must be one the law protects against unintentional invasion.11 The law does not protect every interest equally against carelessness. Physical harm lies at the core, since a person who negligently creates a risk of physical harm owes a duty.12 Interests of a solely pecuniary nature, such as the right to have a contract performed, have received relatively little protection against negligent invasion, and American courts have been slow to allow recovery for illness resulting entirely from negligently caused psychic trauma.13 A claim built on an interest outside the protected set therefore fails however careless the defendant was.
The boundary moves, as injuries to unborn children show. The law once limited the duty owed to a child injured before birth. That limitation no longer exists, provided the child is born alive, and the child may recover for its personal injuries, though courts remain split on whether a wrongful death action lies when the child is killed while still in the womb.14 Modern courts, for reasons of policy, are simply more willing to impose a duty in such cases, and two likely reasons for the shift are the improved ability to trace the source of fetal injury and the wide availability of insurance for such claims.15 Protection against carelessness thus follows policy judgments about proof and insurance, and it shifts as those judgments change.
Once the interest passes that gate, the next question is whether the defendant owed this plaintiff a duty. That question belongs to the court: the scope of one’s legal duty is a question of law, although in some cases the jury must decide the facts underlying it.17 Breach, by contrast, is usually for the jury.18 The allocation fits what a duty ruling is. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the California Supreme Court observed that legal duties are not “discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.”19 A conclusion about a type of case is a rule for a court to announce, and not a fact for a jury to find. Duty therefore works as a screening device. As a threshold issue of law in every negligence case, it lets courts divide claims at the category level into those negligence law should embrace and those it should exclude, drawing on fairness, justice, social policy, and judicial practicability.20
The default is broad. An actor whose conduct creates a risk of physical injury to the plaintiff will ordinarily owe a duty of care, and a driver, for example, owes a general duty to others whom he reasonably foresees will be injured through his driving.21 The scope of the duty may still be contested, and courts often give reasons of social policy for limiting liability.22 The default has a long pedigree. In Heaven v. Pender, Brett, M.R., wrote that when circumstances place one person where anyone of ordinary sense would recognize that carelessness would endanger another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid the danger.23 No court accepts that statement without qualification, because liability for all foreseeable injury would impose too heavy a burden on defendants in some situations, and the burden sometimes leads courts to restrict liability for foreseeable harm by holding that the defendant “owed no duty.”24
Rowland v. Christian states both the default and the price of departing from it. The court noted that some exceptions have been made to the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care, but it held that, absent a statute declaring an exception to the principle enunciated in section 1714 of the California Civil Code, no exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.25 Applying the principle to land, the court held that the test is whether the possessor, in managing the property, acted as a reasonable person in view of the probability of injury to others. The plaintiff’s status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee may bear on liability but is not determinative.26 Tarasoff names the most important consideration in establishing duty as foreseeability, and it restates the principle this way: a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks that make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.27
One court carried the same logic into landlord-tenant law. It set aside the common-law questions of hidden danger, public use, control, and duty to repair, which had been prerequisites to considering the landlord’s negligence; those questions now matter only as they bear on elements of negligence such as foreseeability and the unreasonableness of the risk. The landlord owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care in light of all the circumstances, and a jury decides whether the duty was breached.28 Duty language can also be misused to name particular precautions. A bottler’s duty is to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its consumers; failure to inspect the bottles may breach that duty, but inspection is not itself a duty.29
A defendant can therefore act unreasonably and still escape liability because no duty ran to the plaintiff.30 Duty also shades into proximate cause, and courts do not consistently honor the line between the two.31 The causation subsection draws that line.
Duty also turns on who created the danger. In most states a bystander has no legal duty to act to protect another and is not liable for failing to do so; a sunbather who watches a child going under the waves need not dive in, throw a life ring, or even notify a nearby lifeguard.32 The same caution applies when avoiding foreseeable harm would require the defendant to control another person’s conduct or to warn of it. The common law has traditionally imposed liability then only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim.33
The sunbather and the driver differ in one fact, who created the danger, and that fact decides whether the default duty of reasonable care attaches. Questions about duty concentrate beyond the core of careless acts that cause physical harm.34 Failures to act, harms to purely financial interests, emotional injury, and injury before birth all raise the question whether any duty exists.35 In most negligence cases, duty language adds nothing, because the defendant plainly owes reasonable care. In these classes of cases, whether a duty exists is precisely the issue, and duty language is essential.36
Breach of Duty
Section 281(b) supplies the second condition: the actor’s conduct must be negligent with respect to the other, or to a class of persons within which the other is included.38 The clause carries two ideas. One is breach itself, and the other is a limit that ties breach to the plaintiff. Breach comes first.
Breach is a failure to conform to the standard of conduct the duty requires, and it is the second element of the traditional formula.39 Because the duty is one of reasonable care, the inquiry compares what the defendant did with what a reasonably prudent person would have done in a similar situation.40 The next major section develops that comparison. For now, notice that breach concerns conduct and not outcomes. Products cases make the point. Negligence is the classic products liability claim, and it kept a prominent place even after “strict” theories of manufacturer liability took center stage in the 1960s and 1970s.41 A negligence plaintiff must still show that the defendant failed to use reasonable care.
A plaintiff who cannot say exactly how the defendant was careless may still prove breach by circumstantial evidence. In Byrne v. Boadle, a pedestrian was hit on the head by a barrel of flour that rolled out of a second-story window over the defendant’s shop, and he sought recovery without affirmative proof of how and why the barrel fell. Chief Baron Pollock remarked, “res ipsa loquitur,” the thing speaks for itself, and allowed the verdict.42 The remark grew into a doctrine: a plaintiff may establish breach indirectly where an accident’s specific cause is unknown but the circumstances indicate that some negligent act or omission by the defendant probably was its cause.43 The doctrine changes how breach is proved, and breach remains a failure to meet the standard of care.
The jury ordinarily decides whether the duty was breached, but the judge keeps a gatekeeping power. The judge can always determine that no reasonable jury could find, on the evidence presented, that the duty was breached.44 A plaintiff whose evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, that the defendant was careful, therefore loses without a verdict.
The second idea in § 281(b) asks toward whom the conduct was negligent. Conduct that is negligent toward the plaintiff, or toward a class of persons that includes the plaintiff, satisfies the clause, and carelessness directed at someone else does not carry over to her. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. shows the clause at work. A railroad employee’s push of a passenger boarding a train led the passenger to drop a package of fireworks, and the resulting explosion injured Mrs. Palsgraf, who stood far down the platform. Judge Cardozo asked whether the employees’ negligence breached a duty to her and concluded that it did not, while Judge Andrews saw the issue as one of proximate cause.46 Whichever label is used, the basis for the majority’s result is the same: Mrs. Palsgraf was an unforeseeable plaintiff as a matter of law.47 The dispute over labels belongs to a later reading. The point here is that § 281(b) connects breach to the plaintiff, and a plaintiff outside the class the conduct endangered cannot rely on the carelessness it showed toward someone else.
The child stands within the class the speeding endangered, whereas Mrs. Palsgraf was an unforeseeable plaintiff, and that difference decides the two cases.
Causation and Damage
Duty and breach show that the defendant owed care and fell short of it, but neither shows that the shortfall produced the plaintiff’s injury. Section 281(c) therefore adds a third condition: the actor’s conduct must be a legal cause of the invasion.49 Tort liability is just only if the actor’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s loss or harm.50 The basic tort remedy is a money award that compensates the victim’s costs, and tort law means to place those costs on those who, in justice, ought to bear them. Without a causal link, nothing explains why this defendant should pay.51
Legal cause combines two inquiries, causation in fact and legal or “proximate” causation, which later readings treat separately.52 Cause in fact is the factual inquiry: was the defendant’s conduct a substantial factor in bringing about the harm?53 Proximate cause asks whether the law will hold the defendant liable for the consequences, and its classic function is to refuse liability for unforeseeable ones.54 Some count this limit on the scope of liability as a fifth element of negligence. Strictly it is a liability limitation that cuts off recovery, much as a duty limitation does, even when the four traditional elements are established.55
Keeping the proximate cause limit apart from the duty limit avoids a common confusion. A court that confines liability to the foreseeable consequences of the negligent act is applying proximate cause. A court that refuses, for policy reasons, to impose liability for consequences that are foreseeable is applying a duty limitation.57 The courts’ own usage is looser. Earlier cases held that a barkeeper who served liquor to an intoxicated patron was not “the proximate cause” of the patron’s drunk driving, though nothing could be more foreseeable than a drunk driver causing an accident.58 On an exam, ask what the court’s reason rests on. Unforeseeability of the harm points to proximate cause, and a policy reason for excluding foreseeable harm points to duty, whatever label the opinion uses.
Actual damage is the final piece, and the plaintiff must prove it even when duty, breach, and legal cause are all present. Negligence developed chiefly out of the old action on the case, which made pleading and proof of damage an essential part of the plaintiff’s case, and the tort kept that rule.60 Nominal damages to vindicate a technical right therefore cannot be recovered in a negligence action when no actual damage has occurred. In Right v. Breen, the court reiterated the common law rule that where the plaintiff’s right was negligently, rather than intentionally, invaded, recovery requires proof of causation and actual damages.61 The rule follows the compensatory function of the tort, which measures the victim’s costs in money.62
A defendant whose negligent conduct threatens harm that never arrives is not wholly beyond the law’s reach, since a threatened plaintiff may be able to obtain an injunction and stop the activity as a nuisance.63 What counts as damage is also less certain than it once was. Whether a plaintiff has suffered damage when the wrongful act causes fear of a future disease, or reduces the chance of surviving one, is a question for the damages reading.64 For now, the point is that duty and breach establish only part of a claim. A defendant who was careless toward the plaintiff escapes liability unless that carelessness caused actual loss.
Plaintiff’s Own Conduct
The fourth condition turns from the defendant to the plaintiff: the person whose interest was invaded must not have conducted himself so as to disable himself from bringing an action for the invasion.66 A plaintiff can satisfy the first three conditions and still lose, because the defendant’s carelessness is rarely the whole account of how an injury happened. This subsection previews the problem and the two rules that govern it, and later readings develop contributory negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of risk in full.
The classic disabling conduct is contributory negligence, a failure to exercise reasonable care to protect oneself from harm.67 The standard that measures the defendant’s conduct measures the plaintiff’s here. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, so the defendant raises and proves it, and the plaintiff need not disprove it as part of her own case.68 The defendant must prove not only that the plaintiff breached a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect himself from harm, but also that the breach was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of his harm.69 A plaintiff who was careless in some respect that played no part in the injury has therefore not disabled himself from suing.
What a plaintiff’s lapse costs depends on the jurisdiction, and a single collision shows the whole difference. Victoria is driving through an intersection and looks down for a moment to adjust her radio, so she does not see Mickey entering on the cross street after running a red light. Mickey is plainly negligent, and Victoria is contributorily negligent as well. Where the traditional rule survives, her lapse bars her claim entirely, and it makes no difference that Mickey’s fault is far worse than hers. Where comparative fault governs, the jury expresses each driver’s fault as a percentage, and Victoria recovers her total damages multiplied by Mickey’s share of the fault. On damages of $100,000, with Mickey found 90 percent at fault and Victoria 10 percent, she recovers $90,000 where the older rule would have given her nothing.70
Comparative fault is the majority rule today. Forty-six states have adopted some form of it, by judicial decision or by legislation.71 The total bar is much older. In Butterfield v. Forrester, the court seemed to think it self-evident that a negligent plaintiff had no right to recover from a negligent defendant, and from the doctrine’s inception until the 1970s most states made the plaintiff’s contributory negligence a complete bar, even for a slightly negligent plaintiff.72 The dividing line for an exam is whether the plaintiff’s carelessness defeats the claim or only reduces it, and an answer should name the jurisdiction’s rule before applying it.
The reasons offered for the total bar help explain why it lost ground. Its core notion is that it would be unfair to impose liability on the defendant when the plaintiff negligently contributed to his own injury. The opposite is also true, because it is unfair to relieve the defendant entirely merely because the plaintiff’s negligence was also a cause of the injury, and causal reasoning cannot explain the defense either.73 Most legal historians believe the most important reason for the bar was to reduce the liability exposure of emerging industries and railroads in the nineteenth century, so that liability would not thwart the Industrial Revolution.74 Comparative fault keeps the first intuition and answers the second by comparing the parties’ degrees of fault.
The shift reaches proof of breach as well. The traditional requirement for res ipsa loquitur, that the plaintiff’s own conduct not contribute to the harm, fits a total bar but conflicts with comparative fault. Newer formulations, including Restatement (Third) § 17, drop it, although the common law of many states still tracks the traditional requirements of the Second Restatement.75
Assumption of risk belongs on the same map. A plaintiff’s conscious taking of an unreasonable risk is a form of contributory negligence, often called “secondary” assumption of risk, and unlike the other forms of assumption of risk it is a true defense, available even when the defendant is proved negligent.76 Only the conscious taking of an unreasonable risk counts.
The driver’s argument fails because awareness of a danger does not make ordinary activity unreasonable.77 An exam answer therefore asks first whether the plaintiff’s own conduct fell short of reasonable care, since knowing about a risk is not enough. It asks second which rule the jurisdiction applies. Where the stem is silent, comparative fault is the majority rule, so a careless plaintiff usually recovers less rather than nothing. Neither question disturbs the defendant’s own negligence, which stands as established under the first three conditions.