Concept
Reach of the Intent Requirement
Battery
Reach of the Intent Requirement
The preceding subsections defined intent as purpose or substantial certainty and applied that definition to children and to mentally ill defendants. They left open what the purpose or the knowledge must be about, and three questions follow. Must the defendant intend only the touching, or must the defendant also intend that it hurt or offend? When the defendant wanted only an offensive touch, or only to frighten, how much of the resulting injury does the defendant answer for? And when the contact lands on someone other than the person the defendant had in mind, does the intent carry over? One subsection takes up each question.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the starting point. An actor is subject to liability for battery if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact.1 Section 16 then answers the second and third questions. Under §16(1), if an act is done with the intention of inflicting an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact, or of putting another in apprehension of either a harmful or offensive bodily contact, and the act causes a bodily contact to the other, the actor is liable for battery although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about the resulting bodily harm.2 Under §16(2), if an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in the manner stated in subsection (1), but causes a harmful bodily contact to another, the actor is liable to that other as fully as though he had intended so to affect him.3
One distinction organizes all three answers: intent attaches to the contact, or the apprehension of contact, that the defendant sets out to produce. It attaches neither to the movement that precedes the contact nor to the injury that follows it. The court in Wagner v. State, drawing on the Restatement’s comments, marked the first boundary with a pistol and a fist. When an actor points a pistol and pulls the trigger, the act is the pulling of the trigger, and the consequence is the impingement of the bullet on the other’s person. When an actor strikes with a fist, the act is only the movement of the actor’s hand, not the contact with the other’s body that the movement immediately establishes. So, presuming the movement was voluntary rather than spastic, whether the actor committed an intentional contact or a negligent one depends not on whether the actor meant to move the hand but on whether the actor meant to make contact by moving it.4 The second boundary, between the contact and the injury that follows it, is the subject of §16(1) and of the unintended-injury subsection below.
Single Versus Dual Intent
The intent clause asks whether the actor meant “a harmful or offensive contact,” and the phrase can be read two ways. If “harmful or offensive” describes the contact as the law later classifies it, the defendant need only have meant the touching. If it describes what the defendant had in mind, the defendant must have meant the touching to hurt or offend. Courts have adopted both readings, and the two standards are called single intent and dual intent.5
Under the single-intent view, the plaintiff proves that the defendant intended to make the contact and that the contact was in fact harmful or offensive, and the defendant’s attitude toward harm or offense does not matter. Even this view keeps the harmful-or-offensive character of the contact as an element: there is no liability unless the contact actually turns out to be harmful or offensive, whether or not the defendant meant it to be.6 Under the dual-intent view, the plaintiff must prove two intents, one directed at the contact and a second directed at its harmful or offensive character. Each is satisfied the way intent always is, by purpose or by knowledge that the result is substantially certain.7
Wagner v. State is the leading statement of the single-intent view. The court identified two elements of a civil battery: the contact must have been deliberate, and it must have been harmful or offensive at law. It then held that the actor need not intend the contact to be harmful or offensive, so long as the actor deliberately made the contact and the contact meets the legal test.8 The court reached that result through the Restatement’s definition of intent, under which the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act or believes them substantially certain to result, and it applied the definition to the consequence that battery concerns, which is the contact.9
The case arose on hard facts. Retained immunity barred the caretakers of a handicapped person from taking responsibility for the person’s conduct, and the court called that result unfortunate. It still refused to narrow battery to repair the problem, because the legislature, not the judiciary, controls immunity, and because narrowing the tort would burden every other plaintiff injured by a deliberate contact. Nor would the court distort the Restatement’s language so as to “elevate an actor’s ‘right’ to deliberately touch others at will over an individual’s right to the preservation of her bodily integrity.”10
Franklin applies the same rule, as in Horton v. Suzuki: it is enough that the defendant intended to cause a contact that turned out to be harmful or offensive, and the defendant need not have intended the contact to result in harm or offense.11 Applied to Trapp, who grabbed Miller’s phone on purpose and with such force that he dislocated her shoulder, the rule ends the intent inquiry. The contact was both offensive and harmful, and Trapp’s intent to make it was sufficient, whatever he meant the contact to accomplish.12
The dual-intent view is the older one, and White v. Muniz illustrates it. The court explained that battery historically required a subjective desire on the part of the tortfeasor to inflict a harmful or offensive contact on another, so a deliberate contact that merely turned out to be harmful or offensive was not enough.13 The older rule never demanded intent to cause the harm that actually followed. If a slight punch produced traumatic injuries, the actor was liable for all the damages even if he meant only to knock the wind out of the victim.14 Nor does the rule leave plaintiffs helpless on proof, because a factfinder may infer intent from what a person of reasonable intelligence would know. Such a person knows with substantial certainty that a stone thrown into a crowd will strike someone, so a jury can find the required intent even though the thrower denies having had such thoughts.15
The Restatement states the consequence for an actor who lacks the specified intent. Under §18(2), an act not done with the intention stated in §18(1)(a) does not make the actor liable for a mere offensive contact, even though the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.16
The choice between the rules matters most for defendants who cannot be assumed to grasp what a contact will do. The White court observed that when the defendant is a mentally alert adult, blending the two definitions prejudices neither side, but for the very young and the mentally disabled the intent a jurisdiction requires becomes critical.17 Under Wagner’s rule, a defendant’s inability to appreciate harm gives no help, because only the contact must be intended. Under the dual-intent rule, the same inability is evidence that the defendant neither desired nor knew the contact would harm or offend.
The single-intent view does not turn every deliberate touch into a battery. The contact must still be harmful or offensive at law, and consent shields much ordinary contact. In a crowded society some unpermitted contact is inevitable, customary, and reasonably necessary, and consent may be assumed where reasonable and customary given the time, place, circumstances, and relationship of the parties, unless and until the plaintiff gives notice to the contrary.18 The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Intentional Torts to Persons § 2, takes the single-intent position that the only intent required is the intent to cause a contact with the person of another.19
In practice the two rules rarely produce different results. Even in a single-intent jurisdiction, a plaintiff gains by proving that the defendant intended not only contact but harmful or offensive contact, because that proof shows greater blameworthiness and may draw more sympathy from the jury, so the difference between the standards often does not surface in battery cases.20 A defendant who wanted to hurt or insult the plaintiff is liable under both rules, and a defendant who intended no contact at all is liable under neither. Only the indifferent or oblivious defendant, who meant a touch and gave no thought to its effect, separates them.
A fire-drill case shows where the choice bites. Rosen told Wallace to get moving because this was a fire drill. Wallace testified that Rosen pushed her and she slipped and fell down the stairs, and Rosen denied pushing but admitted touching her back. The jury found for the defendants on negligence, and the trial court had refused the civil-battery instruction that Wallace requested.21 Whether Wallace had to prove anything beyond a deliberate touch is exactly what the two views dispute.
Unintended Injury
Section 16(1) settles how much of the plaintiff’s injury the defendant’s state of mind must cover, and the answer is none of the resulting bodily harm. An actor who intends an offensive contact, or an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive one, and who causes a bodily contact is liable for battery although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about that harm.26 The provision corrects an inference that the basic intent clause invites. Because the clause asks about intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, a student may conclude that the defendant must also have intended whatever harm turned up. The defendant need only have intended a contact of the kind the tort covers, or the apprehension of one.
A standard teaching illustration shows the two layers. Brutus acted with the purpose to trip Cassius, which is surely an offensive contact, and the battery was complete when Cassius tripped. From that point the law holds Brutus liable for all the consequences of the battery. Cassius may suffer no injury at all, or more than Brutus expected, or less, but if the contact is a battery, Brutus answers for the resulting harm, whatever its extent.27
Lambertson applies the same reasoning to horseplay. A worker stumbled forward, struck his face on some meat hooks, and sustained serious injuries. The inspector evidently acted in the spirit of horseplay, and there was no suggestion that he intended the worker to hit the hooks or suffer serious injuries.28 Because the inspector’s contact with the worker was a battery, he answered for the injuries it caused. The justification is that, when the actor fails to avoid the invasion, it seems appropriate to place all the resulting damages, even unintended ones, on the actor rather than on the innocent victim.29
Other decisions state the rule in general terms. The White court put it this way: if a slight punch resulted in traumatic injuries, the actor would be liable for all the damages resulting from the battery even if he meant only to knock the wind out of the victim.30 The rule reaches children as well. In Baldinger v. Banks, a young child’s shove injured another child, and the shover answered for the injury.
Vosburg v. Putney gave the rule its classic form. Putney touched, or kicked, Vosburg with his foot at school. Vosburg’s leg already carried an injury just above the knee, nearly healed, from coasting earlier in the winter. One medical witness theorized that the limb was diseased when the touch came, that microbes entering through the earlier wound were revived by the touch, and that the touch was the exciting or remote cause of the destruction of the bone.31 The jury found that Putney, in touching Vosburg with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm, and it assessed damages at $2,500. The judgment was reversed, but because of an error in a ruling on an objection to certain testimony and not because Putney meant no harm, and the case went back for a new trial.32
The court also drew a line that shows when the rule applies. Had the parties been on the playground, engaged in the usual boyish sports, with the defendant free from malice, wantonness, or negligence and intending no harm, the court would hesitate to hold the act unlawful, because some consideration is due to the implied license of the playground. But the injury was inflicted in school, after the teacher had called the class to order and the regular exercises had begun.33 The jury’s finding that Putney meant no harm therefore did not end the case. Putney meant the touch, the touch was the contact, and the destruction of the bone was a consequence of that contact. Had the kick been part of ordinary play, it might not have been a battery at all, and the injury would then have followed from a contact that was not a battery. The rule on consequences operates only after the contact itself is a battery.
An actor who did not intend a harmful or offensive contact commits no battery and is not liable for battery even though the contact turned out to have harmful consequences.34 Two contrasting facts mark the boundary.
The rule on unintended injury must also be kept apart from unintended contact. A driver who looks away from the road and collides with a pedestrian acts voluntarily but without purpose or substantial certainty of a harmful or offensive contact, and so does a joker who throws a snowball at a tree when a pedestrian unexpectedly steps into its path. Acts of that kind may be negligent if the actor failed to exercise due care, but they lack the state of mind an intentional tort requires.35
The second branch of §16(1), intent to cause only an apprehension of contact, extends liability in the same way.
Negligence supplies the contrast, because it ordinarily confines liability to the foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s conduct. A battery defendant is held to all the resulting harm even when it exceeds what the defendant reasonably would have anticipated.36 Courts that require only intent to contact and courts that also require intent to harm or offend agree on this point: the defendant is liable even if the resulting injury is greater than the defendant intended or could have foreseen.37 The rule is not peculiar to battery. In Baker v. Shymkiv, a trespass to land led to an argument with the owner, who suffered a fatal heart attack, and the trespasser was held liable for the death as a consequence of the intentional tort.38
These authorities state the rule without a foreseeability ceiling, and an answer should apply it that way. An examinee who meets a truly bizarre chain of consequences may add a sentence noting that a court could be asked to draw an outer line, but that sentence belongs after the main analysis, which holds the defendant to the injury. Put the intent question to the contact, and treat the injury as damages.
Transferred Intent
Section 16(2) answers what happens when the person the defendant meant to affect is not the person who is touched: the actor is liable to the person actually contacted as fully as though the actor had intended to affect that person.40 The basic intent clause already points the same way, since it describes the intended contact as one with the person of the other or a third person.41 The Restatement’s formulation of intent has the same shape. The act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension to a particular person, either the other or a third person, or with knowledge that the contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.42 Without the doctrine, a defendant who swung at one person and hit another would escape liability to the person actually hurt, because the defendant had no purpose to touch that person and may not have known the person was there.
Courts avoid that result with a legal fiction: the intent aimed at the intended target is treated as aimed at the person actually contacted. Two reasons support it. The first concerns blame. The tortfeasor’s act is just as culpable when her aim is bad as when it is good, and it would be unconscionable to exonerate her because she hit the wrong person.43 The second concerns proof. A plaintiff can sometimes show easily that the defendant intended harm to someone, or knew harm to someone was substantially certain, and still be unable to show who. A defendant who secretly dumps hazardous waste into a community’s water supply has no particular victim in mind, and a rule demanding intent toward the particular plaintiff would leave every person poisoned without a battery claim. Transferred intent solves the problem by making the identity of the target irrelevant.44 The doctrine does not manufacture intent from nothing, however. The plaintiff must still show purpose or substantial certainty toward someone, because only an intent that exists can be moved.
The classic application is Talmage v. Smith. The defendant ordered boys off the roof of a shed on his property and threw a stick at one of them. The stick missed its target and struck another boy in the eye, destroying the sight of that eye. The court held that the defendant’s intent to hit the boy he aimed at, using unwarranted force, supported the injured boy’s recovery. The right to recover rested on an intention to hit somebody and to inflict an unwarranted injury upon someone, so the fact that the injury fell on a boy other than the one intended did not relieve the defendant. The defendant’s ignorance of the second boy’s presence did no work, because the intent that mattered was the intent toward the first. And because §16(2) makes the actor liable as fully as if he had intended the plaintiff, the defendant answered for the loss of an eye, not only for the part he intended.
The intent that transfers is ordinary intent, and purpose alone can supply it. Suppose Romeo, hoping that Thibault would slip and fall, puts soap in the shower for that purpose. He could hardly be substantially certain of causing a fall, since he did not know Thibault would use that shower or slip on the soap, but the intent requirement is satisfied either by an act done with substantial certainty that the contact will result or by an act done with the purpose to cause the contact.45 Now suppose Thibault’s roommate steps into the shower and falls. Romeo’s purpose toward Thibault is the intent that moves to the roommate.
Transfer also bridges one tort to another. If Chu tries to hit Smith with a hammer but misses, placing Smith in fear of a harmful contact but not actually causing one, her intent to commit a battery suffices to hold her liable for assault. Conversely, if she tries to frighten Lopez by shooting near her but the bullet hits her instead, Chu is liable for battery even though she intended only an assault.46 The second direction produces many exam problems, because it rescues a battery claim when direct intent to touch looks doubtful. Suppose Jessica, annoyed by a serenader below her window, throws a soft slipper meaning only to scare him off, and the slipper hits and hurts him. Whether she desired the contact or knew it was substantially certain is arguable at best. But she plainly meant to frighten him, so she had the requisite intent to commit an assault, and that intent can be transferred to satisfy the intent for the battery.47 An answer that stopped at the doubtful direct-intent analysis would leave the stronger route unused.
The doctrine has limits, and the first concerns which torts can exchange intent. Intent transfers among the five progeny of the parent trespass action, battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels, so long as the harm is direct and immediate. A’s intent to commit only an assault on B, such as by shooting in his direction to frighten him, may support liability for a battery to C, who is unexpectedly struck by the bullet.48 In Corn v. Sheppard, a defendant shot at a dog and hit a boy scout, and the intent directed at the animal supported a battery. The members of the family share a feature that explains the confinement: each is a direct invasion of a person or of property, so moving intent among them charges the defendant with no wrong of a different order.
When either the tort intended or the harm that resulted falls outside that family, the doctrine does not apply. In McGee v. Vanover, a bystander sued for the mental distress caused by a defendant’s beating of another person. The bystander’s harm was not a trespassory invasion, so no intent to commit a trespassory tort had a place to land.
The second limit concerns the act that supplies the intent. Transfer moves a wrongful intent from one person to another, so the defendant’s act toward the intended target must itself have been wrongful. The Talmage jury was told that if the defendant threw the stick at one of the boys but the force was reasonable under the circumstances, the injured boy could not recover, and liability followed only because the force was found unwarranted.
The privilege defenses have their own requirements, taken up with the other defenses, but their consequence for transfer is already clear. A defendant who struck the wrong person while pursuing a lawful act has no wrongful intent for the law to relocate. A defendant who aimed an unprivileged blow, as the Talmage defendant did when he used unreasonable force, carries that wrongful intent to whoever it hits.