Concept
The Confrontation Right
Right to confront witnesses
The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Right
The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 The Fourteenth Amendment carries that guarantee into state courts, so a state trial judge must honor it just as a federal judge must.2 The right also includes the accused's presence in the courtroom at every stage of the trial.3
A plurality of the Court has divided the guarantee into two protections: the right physically to face those who testify against the accused, and the right to cross-examine them.4 The rest of this chapter develops both, along with the question of when the Clause bars the statements of witnesses who never appear at trial.
The physical-presence protection rests on a common intuition about fairness. "Look me in the eye and say that" remains a familiar challenge, and the Court has said that confrontation "contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails."5 A lie about a person is harder to tell "to his face" than "behind his back," and even when it is told, it will often be told less convincingly.6 The Clause does not compel the witness to fix his eyes on the defendant. He may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.7
That preference for face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. The Court has never held that the Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against him at trial, and it has recognized that the preference may be compromised in appropriate cases.8 The Face-to-Face Confrontation section below takes up when it yields.
Hearsay law and the Clause often meet over the same statement, but they have different sources. The hearsay rules are rules of evidence. The Clause is a constitutional command, and where a rule conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution wins.9 A statement can therefore satisfy a hearsay exception and still be unusable when the prosecution offers it against a criminal defendant. The question that has generated the most controversy is when the Constitution prohibits the prosecution from introducing, against a criminal defendant, hearsay from a declarant who does not testify.10
The constitutional label raises the stakes of getting that question right. Under Chapman v. California, a constitutional error generally requires reversal of a conviction unless the prosecution shows that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The criteria for ordinary evidentiary error are almost always easier to satisfy, and the Court has sharply restricted the use of limiting instructions to avoid Confrontation Clause violations.11
The first step in any hearsay problem with a constitutional angle is to ask who offers the statement, against whom, and in what kind of proceeding. Three large categories of hearsay fall outside the Clause altogether: hearsay in civil cases; hearsay the defendant introduces against the prosecution in a criminal case; and hearsay from a declarant who winds up testifying in open court, at the current or a prior trial, subject to cross-examination.12 Only hearsay offered against a criminal defendant from a declarant who does not testify leaves a live Confrontation Clause question.13
When the defendant is the proponent, any claim to admission must come from elsewhere. The constitutional regulation of evidence flows from three sources: the Confrontation Clause, the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process clause, and free-standing due process.14 Only the first shields the accused from the prosecution's witnesses, so a defendant who wants a third party's confession admitted must look to the other two. In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court held that mechanically applying the hearsay rules to exclude reliable, critical defense evidence can violate due process. The Chambers and Due Process section below returns to that holding.