410 U.S. 284 (1973)
The events that led to Leon Chambers' prosecution occurred on Saturday evening, June 14, 1969, in the small town of Woodville, Mississippi.1 Two Woodville policemen entered a local bar and pool hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of C. C. Jackson.2 Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd of some 50 or 60 persons gathered.3 During the commotion five or six pistol shots were fired.4 Officer Liberty was shot several times in the back.5 Liberty fired both barrels of his riot gun into an alley and hit Leon Chambers in the back of the head and neck.6
Chambers' friends James Williams, Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald transported the wounded Chambers to the hospital.7 Chambers was subsequently charged with Liberty's murder.8 He pleaded not guilty and has asserted his innocence throughout.9
In November 1969 Gable McDonald gave a sworn confession to Chambers' attorneys admitting that he shot Officer Liberty with his .22-caliber revolver.10 One month later at a preliminary hearing McDonald repudiated his prior sworn confession.11 He testified that Reverend Stokes had persuaded him to confess and had promised that he would not go to jail and would share in the proceeds of a lawsuit Chambers would bring against the town of Woodville.12
At trial in October of the following year after a change of venue to Amite County Chambers called McDonald as a witness and introduced the sworn confession into evidence.13 The trial court denied Chambers' request to examine McDonald as an adverse witness under the voucher rule.14 Chambers attempted to introduce the testimony of Sam Hardin, Berkley Turner, and Albert Carter regarding McDonald's additional confessions to them but the court excluded this evidence as hearsay.1516 The jury convicted Chambers of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.17 The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether petitioner's trial was conducted in accord with principles of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Whether the trial court's application of the voucher rule to prevent cross-examination of McDonald denied Chambers due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?20
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations.21 This includes the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf.22 These rights are essential to due process because they allow testing of a witness's recollection, probing into details of an alibi, and sifting of conscience so the jury may judge credibility.23 The voucher rule rests on the presumption that a party who calls a witness vouches for his credibility.24 It bears little relationship to the realities of the criminal process where defendants must take witnesses as they find them.25 When applied to prevent cross-examination of a witness whose repudiation is adverse, the rule interferes with the accused's right to defend against the State's charges.26
Yes. The voucher rule prevented Chambers from cross-examining McDonald after McDonald repudiated his confession on the stand.27 McDonald's testimony was adverse to Chambers because the State's proof excluded the theory that more than one person participated in the shooting.28 McDonald's repudiation inculpated Chambers to the same extent that it exculpated McDonald.29 The application of the voucher rule in this case therefore interfered with Chambers' constitutional right to confrontation and denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.30
The trial court's application of the voucher rule denied Chambers due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.31
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Justice Rehnquist would not reach the merits of the voucher rule claim.32 He concludes that Chambers failed to properly raise the constitutional issue in the state courts.33 The claim was not asserted until the motion for new trial.34
That timing came too late under Mississippi's contemporaneous objection requirement.35 The requirement serves a legitimate state interest in allowing the trial judge to address errors promptly.36 Petitioner denied the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its evidentiary ruling in light of the constitutional objection by delaying the contention until after the evidence was in and the jury had returned a verdict of guilty.37
Whether the trial court's exclusion of testimony from Hardin, Turner, and Carter about McDonald's confessions denied Chambers due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?38
The right of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense is fundamental to due process.39 Although the hearsay rule traditionally excludes out-of-court statements because they lack indicia of reliability such as oath and cross-examination, exceptions exist for declarations against interest made under circumstances that assure trustworthiness.40 Mississippi limits the declaration against interest exception to pecuniary interests and excludes declarations against penal interest.41 Where the excluded testimony bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the defense, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.42
Yes. Chambers attempted to introduce the testimony of Sam Hardin, Berkley Turner, and Albert Carter regarding McDonald's additional confessions to them but the court excluded this evidence as hearsay. Each confession was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder.43 Each one was corroborated by other evidence including the sworn confession and proof of McDonald's gun ownership.44
Each was self-incriminatory.45 Each was made by a declarant who was present and available for cross-examination at trial.46 The exclusion of this critical evidence when combined with the denial of cross-examination deprived Chambers of a fair trial in accord with due process.47
The trial court's exclusion of testimony from Hardin, Turner, and Carter denied Chambers due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurs in the judgment on the merits of the due process claims.49 He concludes that jurisdiction exists because the State does not contest that the federal question was properly raised.50 The question was necessarily decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court.51
Mississippi precedent allows consideration of fundamental rights claims even when not raised at trial in exceptional circumstances.52 The State Supreme Court has stated that errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.53 Where fundamental and constitutional rights are ignored, due process does not exist, and a fair trial in contemplation of law cannot be had.54