386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)
Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were convicted in a California state court upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender.1
Chapman was sentenced to life imprisonment and Teale to death.2 At trial both petitioners chose not to testify.3
The prosecutor took full advantage of a provision in the California Constitution allowing comment on a defendant's failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of guilt.4 The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify.5
The trial took place before this Court decided Griffin v. California.6 On appeal the California Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence but affirmed applying the State's harmless-error provision.7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to these questions: where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, can the error be held to be harmless, and if so, was the error harmless in this case.
Whether state or federal law governs the determination of whether a federal constitutional error is harmless?8
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.9
Yes. The error from which these petitioners suffered was a denial of rights guaranteed against invasion by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rights rooted in the Bill of Rights.10 The Court has the responsibility to protect that federal right by fashioning the necessary rule rather than leaving formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies to the States.11 The application of a state harmless-error rule is a state question only where it involves errors of state procedure or state law, but here the error was a denial of federal constitutional rights.12
Federal law governs the determination of whether a federal constitutional error is harmless.13
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that a state appellate court's reasonable application of a constitutionally proper state harmless-error rule to sustain a state conviction constitutes an independent and adequate state ground of judgment.14 He viewed the Court's assumption of supervisory power over state courts as a startling constitutional development out of keeping with the federal system and unsupported by the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Harlan would have dismissed the writ because the California harmless-error rule was consistent with fundamental fairness and its application here was reasonable.16
He stressed that the posture of the case minimized the possible impact of the comment on the jury since the evidence itself cried for an explanation and the jurors were certain to take notice of petitioners' silence whether or not there was comment.17
Whether a violation of Griffin v. California can ever be considered harmless error?
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.18
Yes. All fifty States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States through Congress established that judgments shall not be reversed for errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.19 The Court declined to adopt a rule of automatic reversal for all federal constitutional errors.20 While some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless, the Court held that there may be some constitutional errors that are unimportant and insignificant.21
A violation of Griffin v. California can be considered harmless error in some circumstances.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the reversal but argued that a rule of automatic reversal would be best calculated to prevent clear violations of Griffin v. California.23 He rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be disregarded on the ground that they were harmless, citing a long line of cases involving involuntary confessions, denial of counsel, and other fundamental rights where reversal was required regardless of other evidence of guilt.24 Stewart viewed the adoption of a harmless-error rule as committing the Court to burdensome case-by-case examinations for which it is hardly qualified.25
Whether the prosecutor's extensive comments on the petitioners' failure to testify were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case?
Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning the beneficiary of the error must prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.
No. The comments on the petitioners' failure to testify were extensive.26 The prosecutor repeatedly invited the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their silence.27 The trial judge reinforced this with instructions.28 The California Supreme Court applied an incorrect standard by focusing on whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming rather than whether the constitutional error contributed to the verdict.29
It is impossible to say that these comments and instructions did not contribute to the verdict.30 Such a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights can no more be considered harmless than the introduction of a coerced confession.31
The prosecutor's extensive comments on the petitioners' failure to testify were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the reversal because he believed a rule of automatic reversal best prevents clear violations of Griffin v. California.33 He rejected any harmless-error inquiry for such violations, citing precedent requiring reversal for involuntary confessions and denial of counsel regardless of other evidence of guilt.34 Stewart viewed case-by-case harmlessness assessments as burdensome and inappropriate for this constitutional violation.35
Justice Harlan dissented and would have affirmed because the introduction of the Griffin error was not prejudicial.36 The petitioners received a fair trial, and the verdict was amply supported by the evidence.37 He viewed the California harmless-error rule as properly applied and the state court's resolution as a reasonable and therefore constitutional application of that rule.38
Harlan stressed that the posture of the case minimized the possible impact of the comment on the jury and that the evidence against the petitioners was convincing and unchallenged.39