Concept
The Rule 803(3) Exception
Statements of mental, emotional, or physical condition
Statements of Then-Existing Condition
The Rule 803(3) Exception
Rule 803(3) lets a witness repeat a declarant's out-of-court description of what the declarant was thinking or feeling at the moment of speaking. The rule reaches a statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, such as motive, intent, or plan, and a statement of then-existing emotional, sensory, or physical condition, such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health.1 (The declarant is the person who made the out-of-court statement.) The rule then takes one thing back: a statement of memory or belief is excluded when offered to prove the fact remembered or believed, unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will.2 A broad grant and a narrow subtraction organize the rest of this chapter, and the words then-existing are the gate between them.
A statement can bear on someone's state of mind in two ways, and only one of them needs the exception. When words serve as circumstantial proof of what the speaker knew or felt, the hearsay rule is not implicated, because the words are not offered to prove the truth of what they assert. The children yelling "Barney, Barney, Barney!" in Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc. are one example, and the defendant in United States v. Parry who told his mother he was working with a narcotics agent is another. Sometimes, though, a statement explicitly describes the speaker's state of mind: "Hey, I think that's Barney!" or "I think she's an undercover cop" or "I hate him." Offered to prove what the declarant believed, knew, or felt, statements of that kind look like hearsay, and they come in under a longstanding exception for statements describing the declarant's state of mind.3 Rule 803(3) is that exception.
The exception reaches both mind and body. A declarant's statement "I plan to go to the restaurant tomorrow," offered to show that the declarant had that plan, is a statement of intent within it.4 A statement of pain or bodily health, offered to show the condition the declarant was in as the words were spoken, comes within the rule's text.5 Intent also carries a further use. Under Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, evidence of intention can tend to prove the doing of the act intended, and the Advisory Committee Note says that rule is "left undisturbed."6 Later sections develop that inference; this section concerns the basic grant.
The carve-out keeps the exception from swallowing the hearsay rule. A person who says the landlord pushed them down the stairs last week is, in a literal sense, expressing a present memory. If that present memory could prove the past event, any account of any past occurrence could be recast as a statement of current belief, and the exclusion of narratives about the past would mean nothing. So the exception stays on the present side of the line. "I think she's an undercover cop" can show what the declarant believed, but it cannot be used to prove that she was an undercover cop.7 The will provision is the one place the rule yields. One exception, grounded in necessity and expediency, allows a statement of opinion or belief to prove the facts remembered or believed if it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant's will.8
The exception applies whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.9 Rule 803 sits in the group of hearsay exceptions for which availability is immaterial; the other group is usable only if the declarant is unavailable.10 A declarant sitting in the courtroom, ready to testify, therefore changes nothing.
The question the exception asks is easy to replace with a general worry about reliability. In United States v. Harris, the trial judge excluded a defense proffer, and then similar proposed testimony from the defendant's Detroit lawyer, on the ground that it was "plainly blatantly hearsay, unreliable and self-serving."11 Those labels do not answer what Rule 803(3) asks. A statement describing the declarant's own state of mind, such as "I think she's an undercover cop," falls within the longstanding exception.12 The hearsay objection therefore fails when the statement is offered to show what the declarant believed. An objection that the speaker is self-interested or may have shaded the truth goes to the weight the jury gives the words. Under the exception, the inquiry is whether the statement fits the category, not how trustworthy this particular speaker seems.
The hearsay rule yields here because a person reporting a feeling or a plan is describing something that is happening as the words come out. The risks of faulty memory and faulty perception, which dominate statements about the past, are largely absent. The memory-or-belief clause confirms the point by withdrawing the exception from statements that look backward. The Advisory Committee Note describes Rule 803(3) as essentially a specialized application of Exception (1), the present sense impression exception, presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility.13 The neighboring spontaneous-statement exceptions rest on timing: spontaneity guarantees reliability because the brief gap between the event and the words leaves no time to lie.14 What remains is sincerity. A speaker can say they feel terrible and be lying, and the rule treats that risk as one for the jury.
Steps two and four decide most exam problems. A stem will hand you words that sound like a state of mind, and the job is to decide whether they speak about now or about then. An objection that the declarant had a motive to shade the truth appears nowhere in these steps, because it goes to weight once the statement fits the category.