145 U.S. 285 (1892)
In March 1879, John W. Hillmon, the insured under several life insurance policies, was reported to have died during a trip through southern Kansas.1 His widow brought three separate actions in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas against the Mutual Life Insurance Company and other insurers to recover the policy proceeds.2
The central dispute at trial was the identity of the body found at Crooked Creek on the night of March 18, 1879.3 The plaintiff introduced evidence that Hillmon and a companion named Brown had left Wichita, Kansas, on or about March 5, 1879, while traveling in search of a cattle ranch site, and that Hillmon had been accidentally killed at their camp on March 18.4
The defendants introduced evidence that a man named Walters had left his home and betrothed in Iowa in March 1878 and remained in Kansas until March 1879.5 During that period Walters corresponded regularly with his family and betrothed.6 The last letters received from him were one postmarked at Wichita on March 2 and received on March 3, and another received about March 4 or 5 and dated at Wichita a day or two earlier.7 He had not been heard from since.8
The Circuit Court consolidated the three actions for trial.9 The defendants offered two letters written by Walters on the first days of March 1879, which the court excluded.10 After verdicts for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.11
Whether the Circuit Court's consolidation of the three actions for trial improperly denied the defendants their statutory right to separate peremptory challenges?12
Section 921 of the Revised Statutes authorizes a court to consolidate causes of a like nature or relative to the same question when it appears reasonable to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.13 Yet section 819 separately guarantees each party three peremptory challenges and treats multiple defendants in a single action as one party only for that purpose.14 Defendants sued in distinct actions therefore retain their individual statutory challenges even when the court orders joint trial for efficiency.15
Yes. The Circuit Court consolidated the three separate actions brought by the widow against the several insurers because the claims appeared of like nature and relative to the same question.16 Although that consolidation fell within the discretionary authority conferred by section 921, the defendants remained entitled to the full complement of peremptory challenges secured to them by section 819.17 The established facts show that the causes of action stayed distinct, each requiring its own verdict and judgment, and that no defendant could be stripped without consent of any right material to its defense, including the statutory right to challenge jurors.18 By forcing the three cases to be tried together while denying the defendants their several challenges, the trial court violated the statute and thereby committed reversible error.19
The statutory scheme distinguishes between consolidation for convenience and the preservation of peremptory rights that attach to each separate action.20 When defendants in different suits are compelled to proceed as one for jury selection, the practical effect is to reduce the number of challenges below what Congress provided, undermining the balanced allocation of peremptory strikes that the statute guarantees.21 The denial of that right, standing alone, requires that the verdicts be set aside.22
The consolidation order improperly denied the defendants their statutory right to separate peremptory challenges, independently requiring reversal and a new trial.23
Whether letters written by Walters in early March 1879 were admissible as evidence of his intention to leave Wichita with Hillmon?24
When a person's intention at a particular time constitutes a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, contemporaneous oral or written declarations expressing that intention are competent evidence of the mental state.25 Such declarations are treated as verbal acts and are admissible on the same footing as other original evidence of mental condition whenever the state of mind itself is relevant to the issue being tried.26
Yes. The two letters written by Walters in the first days of March 1879 were offered to prove his intention, shortly before his disappearance, to leave Wichita in the company of Hillmon.27 At the moment the letters were proffered, the record already contained evidence that Walters had been in Wichita until March 5, that he had not been heard from thereafter, and that a body was discovered at Crooked Creek on March 18; the letters supplied direct proof of the very intention that made it more probable both that Walters departed and that he departed with Hillmon.28 Because the central factual dispute turned on whether the body was that of Hillmon or that of Walters, evidence of Walters's contemporaneous intention was relevant and should have been received.29
The rule recognizes that a person's state of mind can be proved only through outward manifestations, and that letters written at the time are often the most reliable manifestation available after death.30 The letters were not offered as narratives of external facts or as proof that Walters actually traveled, but solely as evidence of his then-existing intention, which the jury could weigh together with the other testimony on identity.31 Their exclusion therefore deprived the defendants of competent corroborative evidence on the decisive issue in the case.32
The letters were competent evidence of Walters's intention at the time of writing and should have been admitted, furnishing an independent ground for setting aside the verdicts and ordering a new trial.33