219 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2000)
In February 1995, a collision occurred in Lebanon, New Hampshire between a Jeep driven by Kay Parry and owned by Maureen Boulanger and a vehicle operated by Mitchell Leonard.1 Leonard and his minor daughter Jade suffered injuries in the accident.2 Leonard's attorney thereafter contacted the insurance carrier for Raymond Boulanger, Maureen's husband, to pursue settlement of the claims.3
The parties reached a settlement for Jade's injuries. The settlement documents and related state court petition, prepared by the insurer's lawyer, named Raymond Boulanger as the sole defendant and incorrectly identified him as the Jeep's operator.4 A New Hampshire state court judge approved the settlement on February 18, 1998.5
Mindful of the three-year limitations period, Mitchell Leonard commenced a federal diversity action on January 27, 1998, in the District of New Hampshire against Raymond Boulanger, again naming him as the driver.6 Following service of process, defense counsel contacted Leonard's attorney on February 13, 1998, to clarify that Kay Parry had been operating the Jeep.7
The statute of limitations expired on February 28, 1998.8 Boulanger then moved to dismiss the federal suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Leonard responded by moving to amend the complaint to substitute Parry as the defendant.9 The district court permitted the amendment without prejudice to Boulanger and dismissed the claims against him.10
Leonard effected service on Parry on May 25, 1998.11 Parry moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. On July 22, 1999, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case.12 Leonard appealed the dismissal to the First Circuit.13
Whether an amendment adding a party after the expiration of the statute of limitations relates back to the date on which the plaintiff commenced the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3)?14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) provides that an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original complaint.15 This occurs if the claim arose out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading.16 Within the period provided by Rule 4(m), the party to be brought in must have received notice of the action so that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits.17 That party also must have known or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party the action would have been brought against it.18
Yes. The same transaction requirement is satisfied because both the original and amended complaints derive from the collision in Lebanon, New Hampshire between the Jeep operated by Kay Parry and Mitchell Leonard's vehicle.19 The timely notice requirement is also met because Leonard served Parry within the 120-day period prescribed by Rule 4(m) after the district court allowed the amendment substituting her for Boulanger.20 The knowledge of mistake requirement is fulfilled since the original complaint erroneously named Raymond Boulanger as the driver, a mistake that Parry, who knew she had been operating the Jeep, would have recognized as the reason she was not initially sued when served with the amended complaint following the February 13 contacts and the expiration of the limitations period on February 28, 1998.21
The district court's dismissal of the action as time-barred must be reversed because the amendment adding Kay Parry as defendant relates back to the filing of the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(3).22