Concept
Holder and Waiver
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Holder and Waiver
A privilege belongs to someone, so two questions come before any dispute over a particular communication: who owns the right, and what may the owner do with it? Jaffee answered the second in a footnote, observing that, like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection.1 Waiver is the voluntary surrender of a right the holder could have kept. A communication that meets every element of the privilege can therefore still be compelled once the person it protects has given up that protection.
Waiver differs from the exceptions covered in the preceding subsections. An exception removes protection from a category of situation, such as a serious threat of harm or a future crime or fraud, whatever the patient wants. Waiver ends protection because of something the patient chose to do. The distinction also reconciles waiver with the rule against balancing. Jaffee rooted the privilege in a public good that overrides the quest for relevant evidence, and it refused to make the promise of confidentiality contingent on a trial judge’s later weighing of the patient’s privacy against the need for disclosure.2 A judge may not strip a communication of protection because a litigant needs it badly. A patient who releases the communication, by contrast, has made the choice the privilege leaves to the patient.
The patient’s choice can end the protection because the privilege withholds evidence in exchange for an assurance of secrecy, and a patient who freely gives up the secret has shown that the assurance is unnecessary for that communication. As one secondary source puts it, the law has no reason to conceal in court what has been freely divulged on the public street.3
Three subsections follow, and each rests on different conduct. The first identifies the holder, who decides whether the privilege is asserted or released. The second covers waiver by disclosure, which gives up the secrecy of what was said. The third covers the patient-litigant exception, in which a lawsuit places the subject of the treatment before the court. A privilege analysis in this field should end by asking whether the holder has given up the protection.
Who Holds the Privilege
The federal psychotherapist-patient privilege belongs to the patient, and that ownership carries three powers: to refuse to disclose confidential communications, to prevent others from disclosing them, and to waive the protection. Proposed Rule 504 states the first two. It gives the patient a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications made for diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition among the patient, the psychotherapist, and persons participating in the treatment under the therapist’s direction, including members of the patient’s family.4 The third power appears in decisions applying Jaffee, which describe the privilege as owned by, and fully waivable by, the patient.5
The power to prevent others from disclosing does the practical work. A patient called as a witness can refuse to speak, but the witness an opponent usually wants is the therapist, who heard the communications and can repeat them. A privilege that silenced only the patient would protect nothing. The right to claim a privilege belongs exclusively to the holder, and when the holder is not a party, none of the parties has standing in its own right to object to the privileged evidence.6 The holder need not be a party, and a party need not be the holder, so a privilege analysis should name the holder before asking who may object.
Others may assert the privilege, but only as the holder’s representatives. A guardian or conservator may claim it for the patient, and a personal representative may claim it after the patient’s death.7 The therapist who treated the patient may also claim it, but only on the patient’s behalf.8 A representative’s authority may be given expressly or fairly implied, as it is when a lawyer invokes the attorney-client privilege for a client, and a court may invoke a privilege for an absent holder.9 The treating professional’s ethical duty, and in some states legal duty, to assert the privilege for the patient points the same way.10 The therapist is a guardian of someone else’s right. The therapist may not invoke it for the therapist’s own benefit and has no power to give it up.
Decisions applying these rules show the limit from the other side. In a dispute governed by Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) and the federal privilege, the court explained that the MHPA privilege is held by the patient, who may waive it and allow the protected information to be released, and it cited Sprague v. Walter, which found the privilege waived by a former patient who had allowed records to become publicly available.11 The federal privilege is likewise owned by, and fully waivable by, the patient. Because Mr. Miller had released the information, any privilege covering it would have been waived, and no privilege could support the protection sought.
For the same reason, a therapist’s own disclosure does not waive the patient’s privilege. Waiver is the holder’s act, and the therapist acts only as the holder’s representative. California decisions state the principle this way: in Menendez v. Superior Court, the court, drawing on Roberts v. Superior Court, treated the power to waive any part of the privilege as the patient’s alone.12 A therapist’s warning to a patient’s intended victim raises a different question. Under Wharton, the warning falls outside the privilege even if it relates an otherwise protected communication, provided the psychotherapist had reasonable cause to believe that the patient is dangerous and that disclosure is necessary to prevent harm.13 That result comes from the dangerous-patient exception, not from waiver. These are California decisions, so they bind a federal court only where Rule 501 points to state law, but they state the holder principle the federal rule shares.
Children complicate the picture, because a young patient cannot exercise the privilege alone. When the patient is a child too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege, the child’s parent typically assumes the role of holder.14 A parent cannot hold it, however, when the parent’s interests as a party to a proceeding involving the child might give the parent an incentive to assert or waive the privilege strategically, against the child’s interest in confidential therapy, and other courts have likewise held that a conflict between parent and child may bar the parent from waiving the child’s privilege.15 In L.A.N. v. L.M.B., a Colorado dependency and neglect case, the state supreme court held that the guardian ad litem, the person appointed to protect the child’s interests, holds the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege when neither the child nor the child’s parents have that authority and no statute abrogates the privilege.16 The reasoning reaches any representative. A substitute can be trusted to decide for the patient only if no stake of its own pulls the other way, and a parent whose conduct is on trial might waive the child’s privilege to obtain helpful records or assert it to conceal harmful ones.
Waiver by Disclosure
Waiver by disclosure turns on a short test that statutes and courts state in similar words: the holder, without coercion, must have disclosed a significant part of the communication or consented to its disclosure by someone else. California’s Evidence Code section 912(a) waives the right to claim the privilege as to a communication “if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone.”20 Wisconsin’s courts ask whether the patient made a voluntary disclosure of “any significant part of the matter or communication,” as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did in Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital.21 A disclosure made or acquiesced in by the holder waives the privilege before trial, and the only real questions are the voluntariness of the revelation and the scope of the waiver.22
The cases in this subsection apply state statutes, so they govern a federal court only where the second sentence of Rule 501 sends the privilege question to state law. They still supply the right questions for a federal problem, because the federal psychotherapist privilege rests on the same premise of patient ownership. A court applying the federal privilege reasoned that any privilege covering information a patient had released would be waived by the release.23
Johnson shows how much a patient can reveal about a course of therapy without surrendering the privilege for what was said in it. Charlotte’s parents, who alleged that negligent therapy had implanted false memories of abuse, argued that she had waived the privilege through a series of disclosures, and the court rejected each one. A hospital had released records mentioning her earlier psychiatric care, but one note recorded that she was guarded and did not want the information shared with her parents, so she had given no informed consent, and the hospital’s inadvertence could not stand in for the holder’s choice. The records in any event showed only that she believed she had been abused and had undergone therapy at the hospital, with nothing about what she or her therapist said or what kind of therapy she received. The medical bills she gave her parents identified only who performed therapy, on what date, and for how long, and a bill that lists no substance discloses no significant part of the communication.24
Her other acts failed for related reasons. She invited her parents to a therapy session to confront them, but the Wisconsin statute protects communications made to persons participating in the treatment, including family members, and the parents conceded that the confrontations were part of her treatment. A supporter who sat in the room waived nothing, because Charlotte’s deposition showed that the person was there to support her, and a third person present to further the patient’s interest does not destroy confidentiality. A friend’s affidavit reported only that she said she was “seeing a therapist” and “being hypnotized,” general statements that cannot reasonably be read as disclosing a significant part of any communication.25 Each disclosure revealed that therapy took place, and none revealed what was said. An exam fact pattern in which a patient told people about therapy invites the conclusion that the privilege is gone, and the answer turns on what the patient actually revealed.
The parents also treated a statement by Charlotte’s attorney as a waiver, and the court’s answer shows who must make the disclosure. The statement suggested that Charlotte had discussed her therapy with her lawyer, and that communication was itself privileged. Wisconsin provides that no waiver results when a later communication is itself privileged, and because Charlotte held the attorney-client privilege, her attorney could not waive it without her consent.26 The hospital’s inadvertent release and the lawyer’s statement fail for one shared reason: waiver is the holder’s act or the holder’s consent, and an act by someone else carries neither.
Waiver does occur when the patient lets a third person into the circle of the communication. In Manela v. Superior Court, a dispute between spouses, the mother was present during the father’s intake examination with Dr. Cohen, and he did not dispute that he had consented to disclosure of at least a significant part of what was said.27 California treats a communication as confidential only if, so far as the patient is aware, it reaches no third persons beyond those present to further the patient’s interest or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the consultation (section 992). Her presence therefore made his statements nonconfidential unless it was reasonably necessary to his diagnosis and treatment, and he offered no evidence that it was.28 The difference from the supporter in Johnson lies in the record. Charlotte’s deposition established that the person in the room was there to help her, and the father produced nothing showing that his wife’s presence served his treatment.
The waiver in Manela stopped where the disclosure stopped. The mother argued that the father’s waiver as to Dr. Cohen, together with his filing of a declaration from Dr. Gross, also opened the records of Dr. Morrison, a physician he had consulted years earlier as a teenager. The court refused. A waiver may not extend beyond the express limits of section 912, and its scope is construed narrowly in light of the policies behind privileges.29 Measured by purpose, the father’s voluntary disclosures about Cohen and Gross belied any humiliation interest in that material, but they did not relate back to his conversations with Morrison, when he reasonably believed he could speak freely, and opening those records would undermine the candor with a treating physician that the privilege protects.30 Each consultation was held in reliance on its own assurance of secrecy, so giving up one does not retract another.
A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver, as Johnson applied to the lawyer’s statement and as California’s section 912(c) provides.31 A marital example shows the reasoning. A wife who told her lawyer what she had earlier told her husband in confidence enlarged the circle of people who knew by one, but the lawyer was bound to keep the information confidential, so the disclosure posed no risk of further communication and did not waive the marital confidentiality.32 The same reasoning protects a patient who repeats a therapist’s words to a lawyer. The rule helps only when the second privilege applies. In Manela the father argued that his statements in his wife’s presence were protected by the marital-communications privilege, but that privilege cannot be invoked in a proceeding brought by one spouse against the other, so his statements stayed unprotected.33
A patient can also arrange waiver in advance by contract. A stipulation waiving the privilege, of the kind often included in applications for life or health insurance or in the policies themselves, is generally valid and effective.34 Because the patient consented to disclosure before any dispute arose, the stipulation fits the consent route of the waiver test, and the patient cannot later claim a confidence that the bargain for coverage required him to surrender.
Waiver by a representative follows the same logic. In L.A.N. v. L.M.B., a Colorado dependency and neglect case, the child’s therapist, Newland, wrote a letter, and the child’s guardian ad litem distributed it. The guardian ad litem held the child’s privilege in that proceeding, so her act counted as the holder’s act.35 The disclosure was also a choice. She could have conveyed Newland’s opinions to the juvenile court in several ways without distributing the entire letter, and by opting to disseminate it she waived the child’s privilege as to its contents. The scope of that waiver remained at issue.36
Colorado then supplied a procedure for fixing the reach of the waiver. The juvenile court first asks whether the scope is readily apparent from the words or conduct that waived the privilege, and if it is, the court may exercise its discretion and order disclosure of what the waiver covers. If it is not, the court instructs the guardian ad litem to compile, with the therapist’s help, a privilege log identifying the documents she believes should remain privileged despite the waiver.37 The breadth of Newland’s letter left its scope unclear, so the supreme court remanded for a log submitted to the juvenile court and to all of the parties.38 The court may then inspect the documents in camera and weigh the patient’s privacy and the trust that therapy depends on, which is especially strong for children, against the interests supporting disclosure.39 This weighing differs from the balancing Jaffee forbids. Jaffee rejected weighing a litigant’s need against the patient’s privacy to decide whether a protected communication may be compelled, while the Colorado court weighs only after a waiver is established, to decide how far the waiver extends.
Steps three and six decide most disputes, because opponents tend to argue that any mention of treatment opens everything, and the cases read waiver narrowly for that reason.
Mental Condition in Issue
The patient-litigant exception strips a medical privilege from a patient who puts her own physical or mental condition in issue in the lawsuit. For the psychotherapist privilege, Proposed Rule 504(d) listed it as one of three situations in which the privilege would not apply, alongside hospitalization or commitment proceedings and court-ordered mental examinations: litigation in which the patient asserts her mental condition as an element of a claim or defense.43 It is the most significant exception to the physician-patient privilege as well.44 It differs from waiver by disclosure because the patient need not reveal anything about any conversation. The lawsuit itself surrenders the protection, since the claim or defense makes the condition a subject the factfinder must decide.
A plaintiff who sues for damages arising from an ailment has chosen to display that ailment to the court, so the secrecy the privilege promises is no longer something she wants for that condition. Recovering for the condition while shielding the doctor’s knowledge of it would let her use the privilege as both sword and shield, and courts guard against that.45 It would also frustrate discovery on a central issue of the case, because the defendant could not learn the history of the condition from those best placed to know it.46 The patient keeps a real choice, since a plaintiff who values privacy can preserve it by declining to sue.47
The physician-patient setting shows the exception at its simplest. A plaintiff who sues for a broken leg puts the leg in issue, and the defendant may obtain the doctor’s account of her condition before and after the injury, because denying the defendant that information would place too heavy a burden on the defense.48 A claim for damages for personal injuries is the paradigm case and waives the privilege in every jurisdiction that recognizes waiver by filing a claim at all.49 Most states have a physician-patient privilege, and the Supreme Court has not approved one for federal criminal trials, so the state statute governs the details and a federal court reaches it only where Rule 501 sends the question to state law.50
The waiver is only as wide as the condition the patient has put before the court, and it depends on her own pleading. It reaches information relevant to the condition on which the claim or defense relies. A party who alleges a physical or mental condition of her own as part of a defense waives the privilege, while a party who merely denies a condition the adversary asserts does not, because the denial leaves her own condition outside the case.51
The psychotherapist privilege applies the same principle with more friction, because nearly every litigant’s mental state touches a claim somewhere, and the privilege would disappear if every such connection counted. Jaffee’s footnote says only that the patient may waive the protection.52 Jaffee also likened the privilege to the attorney-client and spousal privileges, which are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust, and the D.C. Circuit took that comparison as its guide in Koch v. Cox.53 Koch acknowledged a history of depression but claimed no damages for emotional distress, and the SEC argued that his mental state was nonetheless in issue.54 The court refused to accept that position, and the reason is practical: if an opponent could put the plaintiff’s mental state in issue by theory alone, the privilege would give way in nearly every case, and Jaffee would reach little beyond its own facts.55
The standard the court supplied looks to the patient’s own conduct. A plaintiff does not put his mental state in issue merely by acknowledging that he suffers from depression for which he seeks no recompense, and a defendant cannot overcome the privilege by putting the plaintiff’s mental state in issue.56 That second point fits Jaffee’s rejection of balancing: the opponent’s theory or need never opens the privilege, and only the patient’s choices can. A plaintiff who claims no recovery for mental or emotional injury puts that state in issue, and so waives, when he does what would waive the attorney-client privilege, such as basing his claim on the therapist’s communications with him, or when he selectively discloses part of a privileged communication to gain an advantage in litigation.57 By analogy to a client who sues a lawyer for malpractice or relies on the lawyer’s advice, a patient waives by suing the therapist for malpractice or by relying on the therapist’s diagnoses or treatment in making or defending a case.58
Koch’s own release of records shows where the selective-disclosure limit sits. The SEC called it cherry-picking that he waived the privilege as to Dr. Polakoff but not as to Ms. Aron. The court answered that Koch claimed no damages for emotional distress and that his release as to Polakoff was unrelated to his mental condition. He tied his heart problems to a lipid disorder, so the release served that theory and was no tactical maneuver to gain an advantage.59
An exam fact pattern that describes a plaintiff with a treatment history invites the conclusion that the lawsuit has waived the privilege. The test asks instead whether the plaintiff, by claim or by conduct, has made the condition or the therapist’s communications part of the case. Koch’s acknowledgment of depression fails that test because nothing in his case depended on what the therapist said, while the plaintiff in the disability suit above built her proof on it.
The question that arises most often remains open. Koch did not decide whether a claim for emotional distress itself waives the privilege, because the plaintiff there made no such claim.60 The court found two appellate decisions on waiver, both Title VII cases. In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, the Seventh Circuit said that a plaintiff who seeks damages for emotional distress places his psychological state in issue, and in Schoffstall v. Henderson, the Eighth Circuit found persuasive district court decisions reaching the same result.61 The D.C. Circuit added that the attorney-client analogy does not compel that answer, since a client waives by putting the attorney-client relationship itself in issue.62
The parties in Koch sorted the district court decisions into “narrow,” “broad,” and “middle ground” approaches. On the narrow approach, patients waive only by affirmatively placing the substance of the advice or communication directly in issue.63 The broad approach treats a claim for emotional distress damages as itself opening the records. The middle approach holds that a plaintiff who claims only garden-variety mental damage, unaccompanied by specific psychiatric evidence or a major specific mental illness, has not waived.64
The middle approach rests on a concern about forced choices. A plaintiff with a physical injury ordinarily claims some pain and mental distress, and treating that routine claim as a waiver would force her to choose between her privacy and her right to redress for the injury.65 The broad view answers that a plaintiff who asks to be paid for mental harm has made her mind a subject of the case. Because cases applying Jaffee have not agreed on whether and when a distress claim waives the privilege, an exam answer should present the question as unsettled: state the Seventh and Eighth Circuit position and the garden-variety limit, and say that the D.C. Circuit reserved the question.66
Custody litigation shows the line from another side. A parent who seeks custody invites inquiry into psychological functioning, and a treating professional’s records may be the best evidence of it, which is the argument that contesting custody places the parent’s mental condition in issue. Most decisions reject that argument and hold that contesting custody does not, by itself, trigger the patient-litigant exception, though courts are not always consistent.67 The usual concern is that the contrary rule would deter parents from seeking therapy that would make them better caregivers, the same worry that drives the garden-variety limit. The majority position keeps the exception tied to the patient’s own assertion of a condition as a claim or defense. A legislature can draw the line elsewhere, and the Alabama Evidence Code withdraws the privilege for relevant communications offered in a custody case in which a party’s mental state is clearly an issue and a proper resolution of the custody question requires disclosure.68