Concept
Other Rules and Impeachment
Inconsistent statements and conduct
Other Rules and Impeachment
Rule 607 lets any party attack a witness's credibility, including the party that called the witness, and Rule 613 supplies the mechanics when the attack uses an earlier statement.1 The examiner may question the witness about the statement without showing it, though on request the examiner must show it or disclose its contents to the opposing attorney. Unless the court orders otherwise, extrinsic proof of the statement waits until the witness has had a chance to explain or deny it.2 Those rules settle who may impeach and in what order. They assume that the earlier statement may be used at all.
Another rule of exclusion may keep that statement out of a party's main proof, and neither Rule 607 nor Rule 613 says what follows. Rule 607 sharpens the question. Because the calling party may impeach its own witness, a party can call a witness for the sole purpose of proving what the witness said earlier, under the guise of impeachment, when the real aim is to get the jury to treat the earlier statement as substantive evidence.3 Any rule that excludes a statement from the main proof must therefore decide whether the exclusion also reaches impeachment.
The answer turns on what the excluding rule is for. Impeachment asks the jury to see that a witness has contradicted himself; it does not ask the jury to accept the earlier version as true. If keeping the statement out of the proponent's main proof already secures the rule's purpose, impeachment use costs the rule little. If the purpose is to keep the statement from being used against its speaker at all, impeachment use would empty the rule.
Two settings show the method, and they come out in opposite directions. A statement taken from an accused without full Miranda warnings may impeach him when he testifies inconsistently. A statement made during settlement negotiations may not be used to impeach the witness who made it. In each setting, the purpose of the excluding rule decides the case.
Miranda-Defective Statements
A statement that police take from a suspect without full Miranda warnings cannot come into the prosecution's case in chief, the stage at which the government presents its own proof of guilt. Harris v. New York holds that the prosecution may nonetheless use the statement to impeach a defendant who takes the stand and testifies inconsistently with it, provided the statement is trustworthy.4 Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with an accused's custodial statements taken before he had or effectively waived counsel. It does not follow, the Court said, that evidence inadmissible in the case in chief is barred for every purpose.5 Rule 607 already lets the prosecution attack the credibility of any witness, and Harris decides that Miranda does not remove that power when the witness is the accused.
The prosecution in Harris made no effort to use his statements in its case in chief and conceded that Miranda made them inadmissible there. The interrogation transcript showed that the police gave no warning of a right to appointed counsel before questioning him in custody, though Harris did not claim that the statements were coerced or involuntary. He took the stand, and his testimony about the events at issue contrasted sharply with what he had told police shortly after his arrest. The prosecution used the earlier statements to impeach him; the transcript itself never went to the jury.6 In a federal trial, Rule 613(a) would let the prosecutor question the defendant about such a statement without showing it to him, while opposing counsel could ask to see it.7
The Court gave two reasons, and each answers a different objection. The first answers the objection that impeachment use will encourage police to skip the warnings. Even assuming that the exclusionary rule deters police misconduct, the Court reasoned, sufficient deterrence flows when the statement is unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.8 An officer who skips the warnings loses the statement as proof of guilt and keeps only a use that depends on the defendant's choosing to testify and then contradicting it. The Court called the added deterrence from also barring impeachment a speculative possibility, one that should not cost the jury valuable aid in assessing credibility.9 The balance held in a later case in which the officer kept interrogating after the suspect asked for a lawyer, because the speculative possibility that police would use the technique purposely to gain impeachment evidence did not change it.10
The second reason answers the objection that the defendant pays a price for testifying. A defendant may decline to take the stand out of fear of cross-examination, but that is a choice of litigation tactics. Once he chooses to testify, “[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.”11 A rule that barred impeachment would let a defendant who knew that one contradicting statement was unavailable testify falsely at no risk, which is what the Court meant by “a license to use perjury.”12 The Court also found no difference in principle between Harris and Walder v. United States, even though Walder was impeached on collateral matters raised in his direct examination and Harris on testimony bearing more directly on the crimes charged.13
Two features limit the exception. The defendant must testify inconsistently, and the use is for credibility alone. Courts treat Harris as one instance of the established distinction between impeachment evidence and substantive guilt evidence. The Supreme Court has emphasized that distinction in several constitutional contexts, and it likewise allows evidence obtained after a defendant invoked his Sixth Amendment rights to impeach inconsistent trial testimony while excluding it from the case in chief (Michigan v. Harvey).14 A student who concludes that Miranda bars the statement for every purpose overstates the exclusion. A student who lets the jury treat the statement as proof of guilt overstates Harris.
The trustworthiness condition marks where the exception ends, and two cases show it. Harris itself noted that its facts presented no coerced confession and that trustworthiness must satisfy legal standards.15 Mincey v. Arizona turned that remark into a holding that involuntary statements cannot be used for impeachment.16 The Court distinguished the two settings by what each rule protects. A coerced confession involves the Fifth Amendment privilege “in its most pristine form,” while Miranda is a rule designed to deter unlawful police conduct, and its prophylactic function is why some balancing was permissible in Harris and none in Mincey.17 Reliability alone does not decide the matter. Grand jury testimony given under a grant of immunity was treated like an involuntary confession and could not impeach, even though it was at least as reliable as the statements used in Harris.18 A voluntary statement taken without full warnings is the Harris case, and a coerced one is the Mincey case.
Harris concerns words that the defendant actually spoke. A defendant's silence after warnings raises a separate problem, which Anderson v. Charles and the Doyle line of cases address.
Settlement Statements Under Rule 408
Rule 408 meets the impeachment rules from the opposite direction, because it closes the door that the Miranda cases leave open. Rule 408(a) makes inadmissible, on behalf of any party, evidence that someone furnished, promised, or offered a valuable consideration to compromise a disputed claim, or accepted or agreed to accept one, together with conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim. The bar applies whether the evidence is offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of the claim or “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”20 Those last words name two familiar impeachment techniques and remove settlement material from both. Rule 607 still lets any party attack a witness's credibility, but Rule 408(a) takes this material out of the cross-examiner's hands.
The rule serves the policy of encouraging compromise.21 A parallel rule makes the logic explicit: parties negotiate more seriously when they know that what they say will not be admissible against them at a later time.22 An exclusion that let the same remarks return as impeachment would defeat that assurance. It would also invite the jury misuse that the voucher-rule discussion above describes, since a jury told that a witness once said the opposite may treat the earlier version as substantive evidence.23
The express reference to impeachment exists because of a drafting gap. As originally enacted, Rule 408 declared evidence of compromise conduct and statements “likewise not admissible” only to prove liability for, or invalidity of, the claim, and it said that exclusion was not required when the evidence was offered for another purpose. A majority of decisions read that text to permit impeachment use. Rule 408(a) was therefore amended effective December 1, 2006 to list impeachment “by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction” among the prohibited uses.24
Giving W the chance to explain or deny does not rescue the proof. Rule 613(b) postpones extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement until the witness has had that chance,25 so it controls the order in which usable proof arrives and says nothing about whether a statement from settlement talks is usable at all. Whether a given statement falls within Rule 408 is a question for the judge alone under Rule 104(a).26 The rule keeps one narrow exception, for conduct or statements offered in a criminal case when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office exercising regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.27
Proof that a settlement happened remains available when the proponent offers it for a purpose unrelated to the claim. Rule 408(b) provides that the court may admit compromise evidence “for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice.”28 Payments to witnesses create a real conflict between the principle that bias may be shown and the policy of encouraging compromise, and cases such as Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railway illustrate the bias use, in which the proponent shows that a witness received settlement money from the opposing party.29 The inference runs through the relationship and the money: a witness who took payment from a party may lean toward that party. That inference does not ask anyone to believe or disbelieve what was said in negotiation about the merits, so the policy of encouraging compromise is far less threatened. The policy still counts, which is why the court weighs probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 and considers the likely effect of a limiting instruction under Rule 105.30
A single settlement can therefore yield two proffers about one witness. Proof that the railroad paid W to settle his claim, offered to show that W feels beholden to the railroad, is a bias showing that the court may admit. W's own words in the negotiation, offered to show that he once said the opposite of his testimony, are barred. The first question on an exam stem is what the settlement evidence is being used to show.
Plea discussions rest on a similar bargain, with an important limit on audience. Rule 410(a)(4) excludes a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority when the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or resulted in a later-withdrawn plea, and its purpose is to promote plea bargaining. The protection is not absolute: statements made to the police are not protected, so a suspect who offers information to police in exchange for leniency finds that her statements can be used against her later.31 Whether a defendant may waive the protection in advance was the question in United States v. Mezzanatto.
Set side by side, Harris and Rule 408 show the method. Harris permits impeachment because the Miranda exclusion is a prophylactic rule whose deterrent purpose is satisfied by keeping the statement out of the case in chief, and because a testifying defendant has no right to commit perjury. Rule 408 bars impeachment because its text now says so and because its purpose, encouraging compromise, would be defeated if the remarks of negotiators could resurface to impeach them.