401 U.S. 222 (1971)
The State of New York charged petitioner Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to an undercover police officer on January 4 and January 6, 1966.1 At the jury trial, the undercover officer testified as to the details of the two sales, a second officer verified collateral details, and a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin.2
Petitioner Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on January 4.3 He admitted making a sale of the contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser.4
On cross-examination, petitioner was asked whether he had made specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January 7 that partially contradicted his direct testimony.5 In response, petitioner testified that he could not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the prosecutor.6 At the request of petitioner’s counsel, the written statement was placed in the record for possible use on appeal but was not shown to the jury.7
The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to petitioner could be considered only in passing on his credibility and not as evidence of guilt.8 The jury found petitioner guilty on the second count of the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a per curiam opinion.9
The prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the statements.10 The prosecution conceded they were inadmissible under Miranda because no warning of a right to appointed counsel was given before questions were put to petitioner when taken into custody.11 Petitioner made no claim that the statements were coerced or involuntary.12 The Supreme Court granted the writ to consider whether such a statement may be used to impeach the petitioner’s credibility.13
Whether a statement made by the petitioner to police under circumstances rendering it inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona to establish the prosecution’s case in chief may be used to impeach his credibility?14
Yes. The prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the statements. Petitioner took the stand in his own defense.17 He admitted knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on January 4. He admitted making a sale of contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser.18 The trial judge properly limited the jury's consideration of the statements to the issue of credibility alone.19
This application aligns with the principle that a defendant has no constitutional right to commit perjury.20 The adversary process benefits from traditional truth-testing mechanisms even when the evidence could not be used affirmatively by the prosecution.21
The statement may be used to impeach the petitioner's credibility.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the Constitution denied the State the use of the statement on cross-examination to impeach the credibility of petitioner’s testimony given in his own defense.23 The decision in Walder v. United States is not dispositive to the contrary.24 Rather, that case supports his conclusion that the evidence was used to impeach on matters directly related to the crimes charged.25
Brennan viewed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as requiring an unfettered choice to testify.26 The prosecution’s use of the tainted statement cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.27 Miranda identified that statements used to impeach may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.28