447 U.S. 404 (1980)
Respondent Glenn Charles was arrested in Grand Rapids, Michigan, while driving a stolen car belonging to Theodore Ziefle, who had been strangled to death in his Ann Arbor home less than a week earlier.1 Charles faced charges of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court of Washtenaw County, Michigan.2 The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence at trial linking Charles to the crime, including his possession of Ziefle's car and other personal property, ownership of clothing similar to that worn by the man last seen with the victim, and statements to witnesses boasting that he had killed a man and stolen his car.3
Detective Robert LeVanseler testified that after providing Miranda warnings, he interviewed Charles about the stolen automobile, during which Charles stated he stole the car from the vicinity of Washtenaw and Hill Streets in Ann Arbor.4 Charles took the stand in his own defense and testified that he took the unattended automobile from the parking lot of Kelly's Tire Co. in Ann Arbor.5
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Charles about the proximity of Kelly's Tire Company to the bus station and the Washtenaw County Jail.6 The prosecutor also inquired about Charles's time spent in jail and his opportunity to observe cars parked there.7 The prosecutor inquired whether Charles had come up with the story about taking the car from that location based on his observations from jail.8 He questioned why Charles had not told anyone at the time of his arrest where he got the car.9 Charles responded that he had not come forward because he was charged with murder rather than auto theft.10 He added that his attorney had advised him to keep quiet.11 The prosecutor then asked if Charles's account was a recent fabrication.12 The prosecutor referenced Charles's earlier statement to Detective LeVanseler that he stole the car from Washtenaw and Hill Street.13 Charles replied that he never spoke with LeVanseler.14
The jury convicted Charles of first-degree murder. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in People v. Charles, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.15 Charles subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which denied the writ. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision.16
The prison warden petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted along with leave for the respondent to proceed in forma pauperis.17
Whether the prosecutor's cross-examination of the respondent about prior inconsistent statements made after Miranda warnings violated due process by inquiring into post-arrest silence under Doyle v. Ohio?18
Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances. But Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.19
No. The cross-examination in this case inquired into the inconsistency between Charles's statement to Detective LeVanseler and his trial testimony. Charles told the detective that he stole the car from Washtenaw and Hill Streets. He testified at trial that he took the car from the Kelly's Tire Co. parking lot. The questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence.
Instead, they sought to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement. Any ambiguity was resolved by explicit reference to LeVanseler's testimony, which the jury had heard only a few hours before.20
Doyle does not apply to the facts of this case. Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said to involve silence insofar as it omits facts included in the other version. Yet Doyle does not require any such formalistic understanding of silence.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in its opinion. The dissenting justices thereby indicate their agreement with the lower court's finding that the prosecutor's questions about the respondent's failure to tell arresting officers the same story he told the jury were unconstitutional. This view diverges from the per curiam opinion by concluding that Doyle v. Ohio bars such impeachment even when the defendant has made some post-arrest statements.22