Concept
The Defendant's Right to Testify
Competency of witnesses
The Defendant's Right to Testify
Every competency rule in this chapter works inside Rule 601, which presumes that every person is competent to be a witness unless the rules provide otherwise.1 The exceptions all come from the rules themselves: the personal knowledge and oath requirements, the bar on judges and jurors, and the state law borrowed in civil cases. Rules can be amended, though, and one limit on them cannot, because it comes from the Constitution. In Rock v. Arkansas the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in her own defense, and that a State may not restrict the right arbitrarily or disproportionately.
The accused needs that protection more than any other witness does. The common law disqualified parties because of their interest in the outcome,2 and no party has more at stake than a defendant who may lose her liberty. She is also often the witness best placed to meet the prosecution’s case: in many criminal cases the most important defense witness is the defendant herself.3 A rule that silences the accused therefore costs the defense more than a rule that silences anyone else. Rule 601’s second sentence hands competency to state law only in a civil case, so it does not operate in a prosecution,4 and the constitutional right adds a second layer that holds even against a rule applied exactly as written.
This section traces how the accused went from disqualified party to competent witness, identifies the three constitutional sources of the right, applies the right to the hypnosis rule struck down in Rock, and marks the limits that survive. One question controls throughout: does the rule restrict the defendant’s own testimony, and if so, is the restriction arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose it serves?5
Why the Right Exists
Rock starts from a premise the Court treated as settled: at this point in the development of the adversary system, a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and testify in his or her own defense. The Court called the premise a change from the historic common-law view, under which all parties to litigation, criminal defendants included, were disqualified from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the trial.6 The right to testify is what remains when that disqualification is lifted from the party with the most at stake.
The principal rationale for the bar was the possible untrustworthiness of a party’s testimony.7 A person who wins or loses by the verdict has a motive to shade the account, and in a criminal case the stake is liberty. The rule that a defendant was incompetent to testify took hold in eighteenth-century England on exactly that fear, that a person so directly interested would testify falsely.8 American courts inherited the rule as part of the common law and later rejected it.9
A middle stage softened the bar without ending it. Courts came to let criminal defendants tell their side of the story, but only through an unsworn statement that counsel could not elicit by direct examination and that was not subject to cross-examination.10 Both limits followed from the fear of falsehood: the defendant took no oath, and nothing tested what the defendant said. The jury heard an account that it had no tool to measure.
The rejection came in steps. On the federal level, the Supreme Court first abrogated the general rule of incompetency based on interest and then specifically acknowledged the right of a federal defendant to testify.11 Similar developments followed in the states, and by the end of the nineteenth century all but one state (which later changed its practice) granted criminal defendants a right to testify.12 Because local law protected the right, the Supreme Court did not squarely rule on a constitutional right to testify until the mid-1980s.13 Ferguson v. Georgia had already summed up the consensus: “there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution’s case.”14
The fear of lying did not disappear; it moved to a place where it could be tested. As Rock put it, there is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to offer his own testimony, because, like the truthfulness of other witnesses, the defendant’s veracity, the concern behind the original common-law rule, can be tested adequately by cross-examination.15 Interest or bias may also still be proved to impeach credibility, and in most jurisdictions the trial judge instructs the jury to weigh a party’s testimony in light of self-interest and stake in the outcome.16
The repeal runs in one direction only. Although the disqualification of parties has been almost entirely repealed, the old bar survives in that the prosecution cannot call the defendant.17 In that form the bar is a privilege, one aspect of the broader Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.18 The two rules rest on different reasons. The old disqualification rested on distrust of what the defendant would say; the surviving bar rests on refusal to compel the accused to supply proof against herself.
Students err in two directions here. Seeing a defendant with an obvious stake in the outcome, some reach for the old disqualification, which mistakes a ground for impeachment for a ground for exclusion. Seeing that the defendant is competent, others assume that the prosecution may call her, which mistakes competence for compulsion. Competency asks whether the person may speak; the privilege asks whether the government may make her.
Three Constitutional Sources
No clause says in so many words that an accused may testify. Rock found the right in three provisions that together protect the accused’s part in a fair trial: the Due Process Clause, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled testimony.20
Due process supplies the first source. The right to testify is one of the rights that Faretta v. California described as “essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process,” and the necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee include a right to be heard and to offer testimony.21 Rock draws on In re Oliver for the point that a person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge and to an opportunity to be heard in his defense, a right to his day in court, includes as a minimum the right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.22 A hearing at which the accused may listen, confront the government’s witnesses, and have a lawyer, yet may not tell the jury what happened, omits the one part of the day in court that only the accused can fill.
The Compulsory Process Clause supplies the second source, by logic. The clause grants the accused the right to call “witnesses in his favor,” a right that Washington v. Texas held binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Logically included in the right to call witnesses whose testimony is “material and favorable to his defense” is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his favor to do so.24 The point carries weight because in many criminal cases the most important defense witness is the defendant himself.25
The Fifth Amendment supplies the third source, which looks odd at first because the privilege is usually described as a right to stay silent. Rock treats the opportunity to testify as a necessary corollary of the guarantee against compelled testimony. It quotes Harris v. New York for the statement that every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.26 Three Justices who dissented in Harris agreed that the privilege “is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’”27 If the government could forbid the testimony, the decision to stay silent would no longer be the accused’s own.
Washington v. Texas shows how these sources defeat a state competency rule. A Texas statute made persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime incompetent to testify for one another. The Court struck it down under the Compulsory Process Clause, stressing the statute’s absurdity and arbitrary character and the fact that it blindly blocked a whole category of defense witnesses.28 By preventing the defendant from having the benefit of his accomplice’s testimony, the State “arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.”29
Chambers v. Mississippi reaches a similar result from the due process side. Mississippi’s rule against impeaching one’s own witness, combined with its rejection of hearsay declarations against penal interest, kept a third party’s confession from the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial, although later decisions have read Chambers narrowly, to require defense evidence only if it is extremely trustworthy.30
The edge of the Washington holding lies in its wording. The excluded witness could testify to events he had observed, and the statute shut him out because of a category he belonged to, not because of anything about his ability to perceive or report.31 The target was the blindness of the category, and a rule that blocks a whole class of defense witnesses without regard to the individual is what the clause forbids.
Rock itself accepts rules of that kind: nonarbitrary rules disqualifying those incapable of observing events because of mental infirmity or infancy do not offend the defendant’s right to testify.32 A rule that excludes a witness who could not have observed the events, or that applies a recognized privilege, answers to a real interest in the trial, while a rule that silences a capable witness because of a status alone does not. The next section applies that distinction to a rule that restricted the defendant’s own testimony.
The Hypnosis Ban Struck Down
Rock v. Arkansas tested the right to testify against a state rule that barred hypnotically refreshed testimony. The petitioner, Rock, was prosecuted for shooting her husband. According to an investigating officer, she told him that she stood up to leave the room, that her husband grabbed her by the throat, choked her, and threw her against the wall, and that when he hit her again she picked up the weapon, pointed it toward the floor, and shot him.34
Rock underwent hypnosis to help her recall the shooting, and the details she then remembered led her counsel to arrange for a gun expert to examine the weapon. The inspection showed that the gun was defective and prone to fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger being pulled.35
Arkansas applied a per se rule: no hypnotically refreshed testimony of any defendant could be admitted, on the ground that such testimony is always unreliable. A per se rule is a blanket prohibition applied in every case without asking about its particulars. Under it, an accused could testify only to matters she could prove she remembered before hypnosis.36 The Arkansas Supreme Court followed a number of States that exclude hypnotically enhanced testimony as tending to be unreliable.37 Although it acknowledged that a defendant’s right to testify is fundamental, it ruled that excluding Rock’s testimony did not violate her constitutional rights, and it said that any prejudice she suffered was minimal and resulted from her own actions.38
The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded, holding that Arkansas’s per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on her own behalf.39 Washington barred a State from using an arbitrary rule to keep a capable defense witness off the stand; Rock bars a State from using an arbitrary rule to confine what the defendant says once she is there. The test is the one that governs any restriction on the defendant’s testimony. The right may bow to other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process, but a restriction may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it is designed to serve, and the State must evaluate whether the interests behind its rule justify the limit placed on the defendant’s constitutional right.40
The Court’s reasoning starts with what the rule did. It gave the trial court no chance to ask whether posthypnosis testimony might be admissible in a particular case, and it operated against every defendant who had undergone hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it took place, or any independent verification of what it produced.41 In Rock’s trial the effect was significant. The rule virtually prevented her from describing any of the events of the day of the shooting, despite corroboration of many of those events by other witnesses, and she could describe the shooting itself only in the words of Doctor Back’s notes.42 The expert’s description of the gun’s tendency to misfire would have taken on greater significance if the jury had heard Rock say that she did not have her finger on the trigger and that the gun went off when her husband hit her arm.43 Only the defendant could connect the physical evidence to the defense theory, so silencing her on that connection removed the link the jury needed.
The Court did not pretend that hypnosis is trustworthy. The popular belief that hypnosis guarantees the accuracy of recall has no established foundation, and hypnosis often has no effect at all on memory.44 Responses vary greatly, but the most common one is an increase in both correct and incorrect recollections.45 Three characteristics can produce inaccurate memories. The subject becomes suggestible and may try to please the hypnotist; the subject may confabulate, filling in details from the imagination to make an answer more coherent and complete; and the subject may experience “memory hardening,” which gives great confidence in true and false memories alike and makes effective cross-examination more difficult.46
That variation is why the per se rule overreaches. If hypnosis yields accurate recollections along with inaccurate ones, a rule that excludes everything it yields discards the reliable material with the unreliable. A State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions of testimony that may be reliable in an individual case, and wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant’s testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify absent clear evidence from the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections.47 Arkansas had not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial.48 The exclusion was excessive because it ignored the procedural safeguards used in the hypnosis to reduce inaccuracies, the availability of corroborating evidence, and the other traditional means of assessing the accuracy of the particular testimony.49
The Court did not order Rock’s testimony admitted. It vacated and remanded, and it declined to endorse hypnosis as an investigative tool without qualification, because scientific understanding of the phenomenon and of the means to control its effects was still in its infancy.50 The dissent saw no meaningful constitutional difference between the privilege and incapacity rules the majority accepts and the Arkansas hypnosis rule,51 and would have treated a per se rule as a permissible state response to unsettled science.52 The disagreement concerns who bears the burden of scientific uncertainty. The majority required the State to justify a blanket rule with clear evidence that all posthypnosis recollections are invalid; the dissent would have allowed the blanket rule.
What the majority left to the States matters as much as what it took away. A State would be well within its powers to establish guidelines to aid trial courts in evaluating posthypnosis testimony, and it may be able to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is justified.53 An essay question will often ask whether Rock forbids a State from excluding a defendant’s posthypnosis testimony at all, and the answer turns on how the exclusion is reached: by a blanket rule, or by findings about the particular testimony.
The holding is also confined to the defendant’s own testimony. The far more prevalent view is that testimony about posthypnotic memories is inadmissible,54 and other States that exclude it have done so for the testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant. The Arkansas Supreme Court erred by failing to perform the constitutional analysis that applies when a defendant’s right to testify is at stake.55 A blanket exclusion of a prosecution eyewitness’s hypnotically refreshed testimony does not engage the defendant’s right to testify, so the reasoning above does not reach it.
Limits on the Right
Rock announced the right to testify and marked where it stops in the same passage. The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process,” but restrictions on it may not be “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”57 The standard has two parts. The first asks whether the State pursues a legitimate interest in the trial process, such as keeping unreliable evidence from the jury. The second asks whether the burden on the defendant is in proportion to that interest, which depends on how closely the rule fits the problem it addresses. In applying its evidentiary rules, a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limit placed on the defendant’s right to testify.58
A proportionality test fits because the right arrives inside a trial that runs on rules. A defendant who takes the stand is a witness, and the State’s interest in preventing unreliable evidence justifies requiring her to conform her testimony to the rules of evidence.59 If every limit on the testimony were a violation, the rules of relevance, hearsay, and privilege would bind every witness except the accused. The Constitution steps in only when a restriction is arbitrary or excessive in relation to its purpose.60 Rock’s account of Chambers names the mark of that failure: a rule of evidence may “not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.”61 A mechanical rule applies in every case whatever the facts, so it cannot notice the case in which its own purpose is absent.
Some restrictions never reach the balance. Rock itself recognized that rules governing testimonial privileges, and nonarbitrary rules disqualifying those incapable of observing events because of mental infirmity or infancy, do not offend the defendant’s right to testify.62 The competency screens taught earlier in this chapter fit that description, because each turns on a finding about whether this witness could perceive and report. The dissent saw no meaningful constitutional difference between such rules and the Arkansas hypnosis rule,63 and would have treated a per se rule as a permissible state response to the unsettled scientific understanding of hypnosis.64
Other decisions show restrictions that survive because they put a price on the defendant’s choice and leave the choice open. In Luce v. United States the trial court ruled before trial that the government could impeach the defendant’s testimony with his prior convictions, and the defendant argued that a rule requiring him to testify in order to challenge that ruling on appeal burdened his right to testify. The Court rejected the claim.65 The Court later called the choice between testifying and keeping impeachment evidence of past bad acts from the jury a “hard” one, but observed that “difficult strategic choices like these are ‘not the same as no choice.’”66 The rule forbids nothing and silences no one, so the defendant remains free to testify and bears only the cost that any witness bears when credibility can be attacked. Students often treat every cost attached to testifying as a violation, when the question is whether the burden is arbitrary or disproportionate to a legitimate purpose.
The Court has also let States treat a testifying defendant like any other witness. In Perry v. Leeke it allowed a bar on consultation with counsel during a short recess before cross-examination began, and it distinguished Geders v. United States, where the defendant was barred from consulting counsel during an overnight recess, when general matters of defense strategy and not simply the defendant’s testimony would have been discussed.67 In Portuondo v. Agard the Court likewise refused to treat a prosecutor’s argument that the defendant, having sat through the trial, could tailor his testimony as a burden on his rights to be present and to testify.68 The same reasoning lets a court increase a sentence for false testimony, because the right to testify is not a license to lie.69 In each setting the accused who takes the stand takes the witness’s role, and the trial’s interest in testing a witness’s truthfulness applies to the accused as it applies to everyone else.
Taylor v. Illinois tests the same standard against a sanction instead of a rule. The trial judge found the defense’s discovery violation “blatant and willful” and precluded the evidence the defense had offered, and the Supreme Court held that the preclusion did not abridge the defendant’s constitutional rights.70 The Court acknowledged that in most cases alternative sanctions would be adequate and appropriate, and that a discovery sanction entirely excluding defense evidence may violate the right to present evidence in some circumstances. It reasoned, however, that alternatives are less effective against willful misconduct, and that declining to preclude would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process.71 Taylor concerns the defense’s right to present evidence rather than the defendant’s own testimony, but the analysis is the one Rock prescribes: a real interest, a sanction that answers the defense’s own deliberate conduct, and a judge’s finding on the particular facts.
The first prosecution sits in the zone the Court described when it said that alternative sanctions usually suffice and that total exclusion of defense evidence may sometimes violate the right.72 The second is Taylor. The facts differ only in the fault behind the late disclosure, and that one fact decides whether the burden on the defense is proportionate to the interest in a fair and orderly trial.
Rock supplies the invalid pole, and set beside Luce and Taylor it shows what the standard punishes. Arkansas’s rule prohibited the admission of any defendant’s hypnotically refreshed testimony on the ground that such testimony is always unreliable, and it gave the trial court no way to ask whether posthypnosis testimony might be admissible in a particular case.73 The State’s interest in reliable evidence was legitimate. The defect lay in fit, because the exclusion operated without regard to the safeguards used in the hypnosis or to corroborating evidence and the other traditional means of checking the particular testimony.74 In Luce the defendant makes the choice, and in Taylor a judge finds willful misconduct; Arkansas’s rule had neither. That difference is the majority’s answer to the dissent’s complaint: privilege and incapacity rules rest on a reason that applies to the witness in question, while Arkansas’s rule excluded testimony that might be reliable in the case at hand.
The right looks strongest when the evidence is the defendant’s own account. In United States v. Scheffer a defendant’s lie detector expert could constitutionally be excluded under a jurisdiction’s rule against lie detectors, and read beside Rock that result suggests the right may be stronger when the defendant herself wishes to testify to the material a rule would block.75 Rock’s facts show why. The gun expert could describe the weapon’s tendency to misfire, but the description would have taken on greater significance had the jury also heard the defendant say that her finger was off the trigger and that the gun went off when her husband hit her arm.76 Only the defendant could supply that link from her own memory. A categorical rule against a type of expert evidence leaves the defendant free to tell the jury what happened, so it is an error to read Rock as forbidding every categorical rule; it forbids a categorical rule that silences the defendant’s own account without regard to the case.