Concept
Consequential Damages Exclusions
Limitation of Remedies
Consequential Damages Exclusions
Section 2-719(3) lets the parties write out the losses a seller fears most. Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable, and the subsection’s second sentence marks the two ends of the range: a limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, while a limitation where the loss is commercial is not.1
The test differs from the one in subsection (2). Subsection (2) responds to circumstances that cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, and courts generally reserve it for “lemons,” not for ordinary personal injury claims.2 Subsection (3) asks whether the exclusion itself is unconscionable, a question the UCC directs courts to answer as of the time the parties contracted.3
This unit builds the rule in four steps. It first establishes that exclusions are valid and identifies what they remove, then covers the presumption that protects injured consumers and the showing a business buyer must make. It closes with a common error, the use of § 2-719(3) against a warranty disclaimer. A later unit asks what becomes of an exclusion when a repair remedy fails.
Validity of Exclusions
The first sentence of § 2-719(3) makes validity the rule. A seller that writes an exclusion into the contract need not defend it, and the buyer who attacks it must establish unconscionability, the only ground the subsection names.4 Official Comment 1 explains why: parties are left free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements, and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect.5 Two typical clauses show that freedom in use. One makes repair or replacement the buyer’s sole and exclusive remedy and denies liability for injuries to persons or property; the other limits the buyer to the price of the allegedly defective goods and bars incidental and consequential damages under any circumstances.6
Applying an exclusion requires sorting the buyer’s claims into two piles. Consequential damages are those claimed to result as a secondary consequence of the defendant’s non-performance, while general damages rest on the value of the performance itself.7 A seller who fails to supply cattle feed owes general damages measured by the feed’s value, and harm that follows from the missing feed is secondary.8 For breach of warranty, the general measure is the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.9 Acme’s lost profits on an order it could not fill, in this chapter’s machine illustration, fall outside that formula.
Even without a clause, the law already trims consequential recovery. Hadley v. Baxendale denied recovery for a loss that could not fairly and reasonably have been contemplated by both parties when they contracted, because the loss would not have flowed naturally from the breach in the great multitude of cases and no special circumstances had been communicated to the defendants.10 An express exclusion removes the question: whatever the parties might have foreseen, the buyer gave up the claim.
Sellers want exclusions because consequential loss turns on what the buyer does with the goods. A tractor dealer may gladly repair a defective tractor yet refuse to answer for a farmer’s lost crop, and the dealer can avoid that exposure either by disclaiming warranties under § 2-316 or by excluding consequential damages as a remedy.11
Sellers reach the result by two routes. Limitations on remedy usually either preclude an element of damages, such as consequential damages, or substitute a different remedy, such as repair or replacement, and a substitute remedy implicitly precludes consequential damages when the buyer may recover only the cost of repair.12 Acme’s repair-or-replace clause works that way. Even if its agreement had contained no disclaimer of consequential damages, limiting Acme to repair or replacement would effectively eliminate its right to recover them.13 Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc. offers a second example. A contract for an executive aircraft limited the buyer’s remedy for non-delivery to cancellation and refund of the deposit, the buyer’s action for consequential damages failed, and the court held that § 2-719(1)(a) authorized the clause, a result § 2-719(3) also supports.14
The implication from a substitute remedy is only as strong as the remedy that produces it. A seller may limit the buyer to repair or replacement only if the contract makes clear that the limited remedy is the sole and exclusive one, and an ambiguous clause supplements the Code’s remedies instead of displacing them.15 In Lowe, a Tennessee appellate court applied that rule: the contract specified a remedy, but nothing in it said the remedy was the sole one, so other UCC remedies remained available.16 And where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, “remedy may be had as provided in this Act.”17 Whether a separate exclusion of consequential damages survives that failure is the question of a later unit.
A commercial buyer who attacks an exclusion must prove unconscionability. In one decision the plaintiff lost because it showed no abuse of the right to contract freely and no contract that was “one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising.”18 The commercial-loss section below shows what a successful showing requires.
The dairy facts show how narrowly a bare exclusion works. It sorts the buyer’s claims into those the direct-damages formula covers and those that grow out of the buyer’s business, and it removes only the second group. A stem that pairs a commercial buyer’s lost profits with a printed exclusion therefore calls for the same sequence each time: classify the loss as direct or consequential, confirm that the clause is part of the agreement, and assign the burden of proving unconscionability to the buyer unless consumer goods and personal injury are involved. For commercial losses the Code starts from the opposite of the sympathy a student may feel for the weaker party, and it expressly authorizes the exclusion.
Consumer Goods and Personal Injury
The second sentence of § 2-719(3) reverses the usual burden for one kind of loss. A limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.22 The clause therefore starts out invalid, and the seller must produce something that negates the presumption. What that something might be is unclear: the dissent in Collins, discussed below, complained that the Code, the legislature, the cases, and the commentators are all silent on the question.23
Two triggers must both be present. The goods must be consumer goods, meaning goods used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and the loss must be injury to the person. A commercial loss draws no presumption, and neither does a consumer’s property damage.24
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. reached the same result on public-policy grounds under the Uniform Sales Act. A clause limiting the car buyer to repair or replacement of defective parts and excluding responsibility for personal injury damages would consign an injured buyer to negligence law’s formidable challenge of proving the seller’s fault in making or selling a defective car. The New Jersey legislature had declared that sales of all goods, including automobiles, carry an implied warranty of merchantability as economic protection against the risk of injury from defective products, and Chrysler’s disclaimer and remedy limitation revealed “a studied effort to frustrate that protection.” The court held both attempts unconscionable, violative of public policy, and void.25
In Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., a blowout killed a tire buyer, and the case went to the jury on strict liability in tort and on breach of a “Road Hazard” guarantee. The jury rejected strict liability and rested a $125,000 verdict on the warranty alone.26 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the seller had not overcome the presumption. The seller had advertised, “If it only saves your life once, it’s a bargain,” and a buyer drawn by that promise is far more likely to be buying protection against death or injury in a blowout than assurance of a refund. Because that was the purchaser’s natural reliance and reasonable expectation, the court found it patently unconscionable for the maker to limit damages for a death resulting from breach of the warranty to a refund or replacement of the tire.27
The dissent pressed the other side. None of the three experts could identify the defect in the tire, and a presumption that is only prima facie must be capable of being negated by something.28 The majority nonetheless held the presumption unrebutted.29
Subsection (2) does little for the injured consumer. Courts generally apply failure of essential purpose to lemons, not to ordinary personal injury claims.30 The paradigm case is a car with many recurring defects that the seller cannot or will not repair within a reasonable time. A limit to repair or replacement then fails its essential purpose of guaranteeing a cure within a reasonable time, and the buyer may revoke acceptance under § 2-608 if the defects substantially impair the car’s value.31 Protection against bodily harm comes instead from the presumption in subsection (3), from tort law, or from both.
The presumption stops at consumer goods. In Reibold v. Simon Aerials, Inc., a mechanic for an equipment lessor was hurt by an unshielded engine fan on an aerial lift and sued on a warranty that excluded consequential damages, including injury to person. The court enforced the exclusion against the warranty claim for three reasons: commercial parties may apportion the risk of loss from commercial products, unconscionability is measured between the original parties to the bargain, and workers’ compensation already covered the injury. Placed beside Collins, the case shows which fact moves the answer. Both involved physical injury and seller paper excluding personal injury damages, but an individual bought the tire for protection under a guarantee marketed to the public, and a business bought the lift for commercial use. The injury was the same; the transaction behind the clause was not.
The second sentence names only injury to the person. A consumer whose property is destroyed by a defective product therefore gets no presumption and must prove unconscionability under the first sentence.32 Courts divide on how readily they strike such exclusions: a few do, particularly when the clause also bars personal injury recovery, and many enforce them unless the particular facts show unfairness.
Contractual limits also generally leave tort claims alone when a person is physically harmed. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 18 provides that disclaimers, limitations of remedies, waivers by purchasers, and similar contractual exculpations do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers of new products for harm to persons.33 The § 2-719(3) presumption therefore matters most when warranty is the plaintiff’s only viable theory, as in Collins, where the jury had rejected strict liability and the verdict rested on the express guarantee alone.34
Official Comment 1 supplies the principle behind the presumption: a sales contract must carry at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach, and a clause that limits the Code’s remedies in an unconscionable manner is deleted, leaving the Code’s remedies in force as if the clause had never existed.35 Orlett v. Suburban Propane applied Ohio’s counterpart to § 2-719(3) to a propane supplier’s clause insulating itself from its own negligence in servicing customers and held the clause void as unconscionable.
Step two decides who carries the burden, so it deserves attention before any discussion of fairness. When the injured person is a mechanic, a driver, or a household member, ask who bought the goods and for what use before asking who was hurt, because the presumption follows the character of the goods and the sale.
Commercial Losses and Unconscionability
The second sentence of § 2-719(3) withholds the presumption where the loss is commercial, so a business buyer who wants an exclusion set aside must prove it unconscionable under the first sentence.38 Phillips Machinery Company v. LeBlond, Inc. shows how that burden operates. A distributor claiming lost profits argued that any exclusion of them is unconscionable because profit is the very reason for entering a commercial contract. The court called the argument unsound: the contract limited no damages other than lost profits, the Code specifically provides for such exclusions, and the argument would leave § 2-719(3) without effect by invalidating every such limitation between businessmen.39
The court then held that the plaintiff had not carried its burden. It found no evidence that the manufacturer abused its right to contract freely and no evidence that the contract was “one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising.” Paragraph 7(g) did not prevent the plaintiff from asserting a breach or from recovering any actual damages except lost profits, so enforcing it could not deprive the plaintiff of its reasonable expectations. The court also separated unconscionability in formation from a later breach of the good-faith obligation: the test is whether the clause is unconscionable at the time of contracting, and subsequent events will not make a valid provision unconscionable.40
Courts break unconscionability into procedural and substantive elements and, for the most part, require both. Procedural unconscionability is a flaw in the formation of the contract, though a term can be so outlandish that a court refuses to enforce it even after a fair process, and a process can be so devoid of consent that even a fair term fails.41 For a term, the usual formulation is unfair surprise plus oppression, meaning terms unreasonably favorable to the party who proposed them. Oppression requires an advantage that lacks a commercial justification. Showing that a term favors one side proves nothing, because every term favors one side or the other, so courts require some showing of oppression beyond a lack of reasonable choice.42
The formation date is not arbitrary. Some courts define oppression by a term’s harsh effects on the plaintiff, but that approach conflicts with the UCC requirement that unconscionability be determined at formation, when the effects are unknown and the commercial justification makes the term look reasonable and not overreaching.43
Courts hesitate to find unconscionability between businesses. Many stress that concepts developed to protect consumers should not be borrowed to favor one commercial party over another, although gross disparity in bargaining power can arise between merchants, as when a giant corporation deals with a much smaller enterprise.44 Ordinary commercial evidence usually favors the seller. The comments to § 2-207 list clauses that limit a remedy in a reasonable manner among the terms that tend not to surprise the other party unreasonably, and they point to §§ 2-718 and 2-719.45 Where the seller proved standard trade practice, dealings on the same terms throughout, and no evidence that the clauses were inconspicuous, one court held that its damage-limitation clauses did not materially alter the agreement and became part of it. The same opinion cites a decision holding that a party could not be bound by language it never received or saw.46
The seller’s best substantive answer is that the exclusion tracks a risk it cannot control. In Bruce v. ICI Americas, Inc., a pesticide producer reasonably limited consequential damages because so much of what determines a pesticide’s effectiveness depends on factors outside its control, and the limitation was not unconscionable.47 AMF Incorporated v. Computer Automation, Inc. likewise enforced a limitation between sophisticated commercial parties.
Enforcement is the usual result between experienced businesses, but two decisions show where it breaks down. In Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co. the buyer was not a dealer or manufacturer of heavy equipment and had never negotiated the purchase of such equipment. He had no reason to expect a clause, buried in fine print on the reverse side of the form, that shifted to him the risk of economic loss from a machine incapable of doing the job it was designed to do. The court refused to let the clause stand and added that an integration clause cannot validate an unconscionable or otherwise invalid provision.48
Phillips Machinery and Moscatiello differ on the two elements. The Phillips plaintiff showed neither unfair surprise nor oppression. The Moscatiello buyer’s inexperience and the buried clause supplied the surprise, and a clause that shifted the whole risk of a machine that could not work supplied the oppression.
Trinkle v. Schumacher Co. fails a clause on the substantive side alone. The court held the provision unconscionable because it gave the buyer neither a minimum nor an adequate remedy. Applied to the case, it denied any remedy whatsoever although a specific warranty of fitness for the intended purpose had been breached, and it denied even recovery of direct damages.49 Comment 1 states the principle: a sales contract must carry at least minimum adequate remedies, and a clause that limits remedies in an unconscionable manner is deleted so that the Code’s remedies apply as if it had never existed.50 The line between Trinkle and Phillips Machinery lies in what each clause left behind. The Phillips exclusion removed lost profits and left every other claim for actual damages, while the Trinkle clause removed everything.
Step three carries the most weight against a business buyer, because procedural complaints from a firm that had time to read a short contract rarely succeed, while a term that leaves no adequate remedy can succeed without them, as the Trinkle buyer found. Step two carries the most weight for a buyer new to the market whose clause was buried, as the Moscatiello buyer found. A tempting answer treats a seller-drafted form as enough, but sellers draft the forms that courts enforce.
Disclaimers and the Unconscionability Rule
A seriously injured consumer who faces a conspicuous warranty disclaimer may argue that it is prima facie unconscionable under § 2-719(3) because it leaves the consumer without personal injury damages. A couple of courts have accepted that reasoning, but it contradicts the structure and wording of Article 2.53 The error lies in classifying the clause. A disclaimer under § 2-316 decides whether a warranty exists, and § 2-719(3) governs the personal injury damages recoverable for breach of a warranty that survived the disclaimer.54
Comment 2 to § 2-316 makes the separation explicit. The Code treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the creation of liability under a warranty, and where no warranty exists there is no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty.55 The steps form a short syllogism: consequential damages are a remedy for breach, a warranty never made cannot be breached, and an effective disclaimer means the warranty was never made. When a disclaimer succeeds, subsection (3) has nothing to test, because the claim ends before any question of remedy arises. Section 2-316 carries its own protection. It denies effect to disclaimer language inconsistent with an express warranty and permits the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise.56
A seller that wants to avoid liability therefore has two routes: disclaim the warranty under § 2-316, or make the warranty and exclude consequential damages as a remedy.57 Buyers value warranties, and sellers are often perfectly willing to provide some remedy, so the second route is common.58 Which route a clause took depends on its wording. A contract that purports to limit the seller’s “warranties,” “obligations,” or “liability,” instead of the buyer’s “remedies,” may be read as an invalid disclaimer and not as a valid limitation of remedies.59 In Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, almost identical language failed § 2-719(1)(b) because it dealt only with warranties and obligations, and nothing in it expressly made repair or replacement the exclusive remedy.60
The minority approach treats the disclaimer itself as open to attack for unconscionability. In Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, where the defect was one a reasonable inspection would not have disclosed, the court held that the unconscionability of the exclusion of the implied warranty between the dealer and Ford was a fact issue.61 The structural approach appears in Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton. The Tennessee court tested a one-year or twelve-thousand-mile limit on Ford’s express warranty under § 2-719(3) and held that disclaimers valid under § 2-316 operate independently and do not violate it.62
The minority’s motive is easy to see. If neither § 2-302 nor § 2-719(3) restrains a disclaimer that satisfies § 2-316, a seller may shift the entire risk of personal injury to a consumer, and some courts seem determined to apply § 2-302 to warranty disclaimers whether or not those disclaimers comply with § 2-316.63 Commentators divide on whether that is right. Proponents of a two-hoop view note that § 2-302 applies to “any clause of the contract” and that seven of the ten illustrative cases in its comment 1 involve disclaimers denied full effect, while others believe the drafters never intended § 2-302 to overlay § 2-316.64 The practical advice is to expect judicial hostility to warranty disclaimers, particularly in contracts made with consumers.65
Rejecting § 2-719(3) as a tool against disclaimers does not strand an injured buyer. Disclaimers and similar exculpations do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers of new products for harm to persons, and a court that faces an oppressive disclaimer may also turn to § 2-302 in a jurisdiction that allows it.66 The structural point tells a student which provision tests which clause. It does not guarantee that a disclaimer will stand, because a disclaimer protects the seller only if it satisfies § 2-316 itself.67 A defective disclaimer leaves the warranty in place, and the surviving warranty then faces whatever remedy limit the contract contains, tested for exclusivity, failure of essential purpose, and unconscionability under § 2-719.
Step one does the real work. The labels in a fact pattern can mislead, and the clause’s language decides which provision applies: language about what the seller warrants or owes raises a disclaimer question, while language about what the buyer may recover once the seller is in breach raises a remedy question. A student who skips that sorting and applies the personal injury presumption to a conspicuous disclaimer has used a remedy rule on a warranty-creation problem.