64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974)
In 1966 the plaintiff's decedent purchased U.S. Royal Master tires from defendant Uniroyal, Inc.1
The tires were accompanied by a written guarantee containing a Road Hazard provision that warranted the tires against blowouts, cuts, bruises, and similar injury rendering the tire unserviceable when used in normal passenger car service.2 The same document included a clause, printed in italicized type and accompanied by a reimbursement chart, that limited the manufacturer's liability to repair or replacement of the tire and expressly excluded consequential damages.3
The plaintiff, as representative of the decedent's estate, filed a complaint against Uniroyal that asserted two counts: one for strict liability in tort and one for breach of the express warranty set forth in the Road Hazard guarantee.4 None of the three expert witnesses who testified at trial identified a specific defect in the tire or even suggested a possible defect that might have caused the blowout.5
At trial the court admitted the guarantee into evidence but, before summation, excised the limitation-of-damages clause and instructed the jury to disregard all testimonial references to it.6 The trial judge overruled the defendant's objection to the excision of the limitation clause.7 The jury returned a verdict of $125,000 for the plaintiff on the breach-of-express-warranty count alone and found against the plaintiff on the strict liability count.8
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.9 The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment.10
Whether a manufacturer may enforce a contractual limitation of consequential damages for personal injury arising from breach of an express warranty on consumer goods when the jury has found the product free from defect?11
Under N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(3) a limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.12 A cause of action for breach of express warranty does not depend upon a defect in the goods, and the affirmative establishment by the defendant of freedom from defect would be irrelevant in such an action.13
No. The established facts show that in 1966 the plaintiff's decedent purchased the tires accompanied by the written guarantee containing the Road Hazard provision and the italicized limitation clause.14
The plaintiff filed a two-count complaint.15 None of the three experts identified any defect.16 The jury returned its $125,000 verdict solely on the express-warranty count.17
The rule applies directly because the legislative declaration of prima facie unconscionability in the instance of contractual limitation of damages for personal injury was not intended to be negated in a case of breach of express warranty merely because a defect in the product could not be established.18 It should be immaterial that the plaintiff joined a strict-liability count and that the jury found against her on that count.19
The plaintiff should not stand in a worse posture for having joined the claim than if she had sued only on the express warranty.20
The tire manufacturer warrants against blowouts to increase sales.21 Its advertising stated that if the tire only saves your life once it is a bargain.22 That being the natural reliance and reasonable expectation of the purchaser, it is patently unconscionable for the manufacturer to limit damages for a breach proximately resulting in death to a price refund or replacement.23
The manufacturer may not enforce the contractual limitation of consequential damages.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clifford dissented from the judgment.25 He concluded that the jury's rejection of the strict liability count established the tire was free from defect because none of the experts identified any defect and the verdict rested solely on the express warranty.26
In his view the prima facie unconscionability contemplated by the Code has been overcome where the express warranty goes beyond what the law requires and the product is found free from defect.27 This approach would permit manufacturers to offer extra guarantees without opening the floodgates of claims.28 He would have given effect to the limitation clause and entered judgment for the defendant.29
Whether a plaintiff who joins a strict liability count with a breach of express warranty claim stands in a worse position than if she had sued solely on the express warranty when the jury rejects the strict liability theory?30
If the question of defect is irrelevant on the issue of damages as well as that of liability in an action solely for breach of express warranty, it should be immaterial that the plaintiff joined a count on strict tort liability.31
No. The facts establish that the jury rejected the strict-liability count yet found for the plaintiff on the express-warranty count alone.32
Because freedom from defect is irrelevant to liability or damages in a pure express-warranty action, the joinder of the strict-liability count cannot place the plaintiff in a worse position than if she had sued only on the warranty.33
The plaintiff does not stand in a worse position.34
Whether the prima facie unconscionability of a damages limitation under N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(3) is overcome in an express warranty case where the warranty extends beyond freedom from defect and the product is found free from defect?35
The statutory presumption of unconscionability is not overcome merely because the express warranty extends beyond freedom from defect and the jury has found the product free from defect.36
No. The facts demonstrate that the Road Hazard guarantee promised protection against blowouts even without defect, yet the limitation clause sought to restrict recovery to repair or replacement.37
The commercial reality that purchasers buy such tires to protect life and limb, not merely to obtain a refund, prevents the presumption from being overcome.38
The prima facie unconscionability is not overcome.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clifford dissented. He concluded that the jury's rejection of the strict liability count established the tire was free from defect because none of the experts identified any defect and the verdict rested solely on the express warranty.
He argued that where the express warranty goes beyond legal requirements and the product is defect-free, the prima facie unconscionability is overcome.40 This principle would encourage manufacturers to offer guarantees above the minimum without exposing them to unlimited consequential damages.41 He would have reversed the judgment and entered judgment for the defendant.42