Concept
Recurring Fact Patterns
Impracticability
Recurring Fact Patterns
Every impracticability claim runs the same test. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, a party’s duty is discharged when, after the contract is made, an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption makes performance impracticable without that party’s fault, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 The comment to § 261 states this as a general principle. It applies the principle to three traditional categories (death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance, destruction of a specific thing, and governmental prohibition or prevention) and insists that the principle reaches every type of impracticability.2
Four fact patterns recur in the cases: cost and market shifts, crop and supply failures, governmental regulation, and death, incapacity, or destruction. Two variables sort their outcomes. The first is allocation. Discharge fills a gap in the contract, so a court that finds the risk already placed on the claimant, by an express term, a fixed price, trade usage, or the claimant’s role in the deal, has no gap left to fill. The Code builds the same limit into the seller’s excuse, which yields to any greater obligation the seller assumed.3 The second variable is severity. An event that changes the job itself, so that the promised performance cannot be rendered in anything like the contemplated way, stands differently from an event that leaves performance intact and merely dearer.4
Each pattern therefore carries a starting expectation, and only that. Cost claims seldom succeed because the price term itself allocates the risk. Supply claims turn on whether the contract contemplated the source that failed. Regulatory claims succeed most often, because the law treats compelled compliance as a basic-assumption event. Death and destruction claims turn on whether the person or thing was necessary to the performance. In every pattern, one changed fact can reverse the expectation: a clause that names the event, or a contract that identifies the source of supply.
Increased Cost and Market Shifts
A seller whose costs have climbed will say that the Code’s excuse fits: delay or non-delivery is no breach when performance as agreed has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.5 The comment to § 261 gives the usual answer. Fluctuations in market conditions, including increases or decreases in prices or costs, are typically risks that parties assume when they contract, so such changes without more do not satisfy the basic-assumption requirement and do not discharge the duty to perform.6 Cost claims therefore fail far more often than they succeed, and the few that succeed show the kind of disruption a court requires.
The official comment to § 2-615 builds the rule in three sentences. The first sets the baseline: “Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.” The second closes the obvious loophole. A rise or a collapse in the market is not in itself a justification, because that is exactly the business risk that fixed-price contracts are meant to cover. The third gives the seller an opening: a severe shortage of raw materials or supplies, caused by a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, or unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply, falls within the section when it either causes a marked increase in cost or prevents the seller from securing the supplies performance requires.7 That sentence shifts the inquiry from how much costs rose to why. A price that moved because a market bid it up is a market shift. A price that moved because the seller’s means of performing were cut off is a disruption, and only a disruption can alter what the contract demands.
The baseline is firm because that is what a fixed price is for. The seller is paid to carry the risk of rising costs and keeps the benefit when costs fall. Excusing the seller on the way up while enforcing the price on the way down would give it every favorable swing and none of the unfavorable ones. Courts also defer to the bargain because parties can allocate the risk of changed circumstances at the time of negotiation better than a court can after the risk has materialized.8 A promisor on a fixed-price contract can legitimately be presumed to have accepted some degree of abnormal risk.9
What does it mean for a cost rise to alter the essential nature of the performance? The Restatement requires extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss, and a mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense, from higher wages, raw-material prices, or construction costs, does not qualify unless it falls well beyond the normal range.10 Economics gives the phrase content. The limiting case for excuse is the one in which performing costs the seller more than the buyer gains from receiving the goods, so that enforcement destroys more value than it creates.11 Courts cannot measure those gains and losses precisely, so they demand a large gap before treating the condition as met, and in an ordinary market shift the seller’s loss is largely the buyer’s gain anyway.12 “Extreme and unreasonable” thus describes a performance that has become a different and far costlier undertaking than the one the parties priced. A seller whose margin has merely vanished has not shown that.
The excusing cases show what “extreme” looks like. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, the contractor’s remaining gravel lay below water level and could be reached only by a method costing ten to twelve times what both sides had expected. The court excused the contractor even though performance was not literally impossible.13 Sellers were also excused in Iannuccillo v. Material Sand & Stone Corp., where unanticipated rock in the designated excavation area would have raised the cost of the job from about $5,000 to about $65,000, and in Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, where a government notice meant that drilling a required test well could expose the seller to unquantifiable cleanup costs.14 In each case the cost multiplied because the work itself changed, and the multiple was large. Even so, courts excuse performance on this ground only very occasionally.15
The denials are far more numerous, and they mark the line from the other side. In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, a carrier agreed to haul wheat to Iran for $305,842.92. When the Suez Canal closed, it sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, a detour of about 3,000 miles on a 10,000-mile voyage, at an added cost of roughly $43,972. The extra expense was less than 15 percent of the contract price, and the court held that it did not make performance impracticable, in part because the carrier was better placed than its customer to insure against war and to price the alternative route.16 Charter-party law follows the same logic: a much costlier voyage does not suffice unless the increase is extreme and unreasonable.17
Sellers hurt by the oil shocks of the 1970s fared no better. In Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp. the seller had promised uranium at about $9 a pound, its own cost rose to about $14, and the court held it to the contract.18 In Publicker Industries v. Union Carbide, the seller blamed Arab price increases for the rising cost of ethylene, and the court said it knew of no case in which an increase of less than 100 percent had made a seller’s performance impracticable.19 In Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co. the court explained that a mere showing of unprofitability does not excuse performance.20 Courts have regularly held sellers bound at increases of 100 percent or more.21
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. shows how hard it is to prove the loss that excuse presupposes. Gulf had agreed to supply jet fuel from 1972 through January 1977 at a price tied to a trade journal’s posted price for a specified domestic crude. When the price of imported oil soared and government price controls scrambled the posted prices, Gulf pleaded impracticability, and the court required it to perform.22 Gulf’s cost figures included built-in intra-company profits, so the court could not tell whether Gulf had lost money on the contract at any point, and the defense failed for want of proof of the loss itself.23 The court also noted that Gulf enjoyed historically high net profits during the period it called a hardship. The reasoning generalizes. A fuel seller holds a portfolio of contracts, some at fixed prices and some with adjustments, and at any moment some will be profitable and others will not, so letting the seller keep its winners and shed its losers would be peculiar.24 The contract language mattered as well, because the court read the price-indicator term as clear and as showing that the parties intended to be bound by the journal’s postings.25
Market collapses get the same treatment from the other side. By its terms, § 2-615 applies only to sellers, so a buyer whose market falls after it agrees to a fixed price has no parallel claim under the literal language.26 Whoever invokes the doctrine, a drastic downturn does not defeat a basic assumption. In Karl Wendt Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co. the manufacturer faced a dramatic downturn in the farm equipment market, decided to go out of business, and terminated a dealership agreement. The court rejected its impracticability defense even though it was losing over two million dollars a day, because the market shift did not alter the parties’ basic assumptions.27 In Flathead-Michigan I, a court reasoned that the state of the market is one of the things on which parties gamble when they contract, so the 2008 collapse and the recession that followed, though unusually disastrous, did not excuse the defendant.28
The cause of the price change does not matter if the market price is what changed. The Hemlock litigation applied that reasoning to a defendant that blamed a foreign government’s conduct instead of the market; the court held that the change in market price was the pertinent factor, whatever caused it.29 Other courts have refused relief to a buyer of fracking sand facing a 50 percent drop in demand and a 40 percent drop in price, and to a party hurt by a depression in the hog market.30 A market change that flows from a calamity such as a sudden war, embargo, or natural disaster stands on different footing, because the assumption defeated is that the calamity would not occur. Courts have decided the cases arising from the Suez crisis, the Vietnam War, and the OPEC oil embargo both ways. Some found performance impracticable, and others denied relief because the parties had foreseen the disruption or because another element, such as extreme hardship or risk allocation, was missing.31
Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc. is the outlier in which relief was granted. In 1967 Alcoa agreed to convert Essex’s alumina into molten aluminum under a contract that could run to 1988, at a price set by a formula whose non-labor portion tracked the Wholesale Price Index for industrial commodities.32 The oil shock of the mid-1970s and new pollution-control requirements pushed Alcoa’s costs far past what the index produced, and Alcoa projected out-of-pocket losses of more than $75 million over the remaining term.33 The court granted relief on theories of mistake and impracticability, rewrote the price term, and kept the contract in force.34 It distinguished the Suez and fuel cases on the absolute extent of the loss and its proportion, observing that Alcoa’s loss was more than a thousand times the carrier’s in Transatlantic, and it found that the parties had deliberately sought to avoid abnormal risks.35
Critics have attacked the decision for a reason the structure of the doctrine makes plain. The parties had foreseen long-term cost swings. With the help of an eminent economist they built a price escalator with separate labor and non-labor components and a cap, which shows that they saw the need to adjust the price and chose a mechanism for doing it.36 They also passed over other devices, such as a cost-plus price, a shorter renewable term, or a joint venture sharing costs and profits, so critics read the escalator as an explicit allocation of cost risk, including the risk that the formula would track Alcoa’s costs poorly.37 On that reading the court filled a gap that did not exist. Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, a mistake case, shows the more usual result. A pricing formula keyed to a crude oil price became unrealistically low when a glut hit that market, and the court treated the choice of formula as a judgment that proved wrong; the facts suggest the seller would have foreseen that the market could change and so assumed that risk.38 Because Alcoa sold a conversion service rather than goods, its analysis rested on the common-law standard and not on the Code.39 Alcoa is best learned as an extreme result confined to its facts.
No percentage marks the boundary, and the cases supply none. Sellers have been held to their contracts at increases up to 100 percent or more,40 and relief has come where costs multiplied ten or twelve times.41 The range between those poles remains largely untested, so the figures describe past cases and predict little about the next. The measures that explain the results are proportion and absolute size, the two on which the Alcoa court drew its distinctions.42
Foreseeability tightens the rule with each disruption. Each embargo, war, or price shock makes the next one more foreseeable, and a seller in the petroleum or uranium markets can hardly call another radical swing an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, because periodic radical changes are what participants in those markets should expect.43 Foreseeability is evidence of allocation and not proof of it, since recognizing a risk does not necessarily mean the parties allocated it.44 But where the parties contracted understanding that supply might fail, a fixed-quantity, fixed-price promise puts the risk of shortage on the seller.45
Crop Failure and Supply Failure
The Code excuses a seller’s delay or non-delivery when performance “as agreed” has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.47 In crop and supply cases the words “as agreed” do most of the work, because what the parties agreed includes, expressly or by plain implication, where the goods were to come from. The first task is to read the contract for the source the parties contemplated. If both sides had a particular field or supplier in mind, the loss of that source defeats an assumption on which the deal rested. If the seller could have gone anywhere for the goods, one place’s failure is the seller’s problem. Almost every decision in this group turns on that distinction.
The official comment to § 2-615 applies the idea to farmers. A farmer who contracts to sell crops to be grown on designated land may be excused when those crops are destroyed through no fault of the farmer, because a basic assumption of the contract has failed.48 Section 2-613 reaches the same facts by another route. It relieves a seller when goods identified at the time of contracting suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, and a crop tied to designated land fits that description.49 Both routes ask whether the contract tied the goods to a particular source. A contract that names only the kind and amount of a fungible good does not, because otherwise sellers could use § 2-613 to escape ordinary contracts for goods they could replace on the open market.50
The Restatement’s potato illustration draws both lines at once. A contracts in the spring to raise potatoes on a specific tract and to sell B 200 tons at a stated price; the land would ordinarily produce 1,000 tons. A’s duty is discharged if the tract is taken by eminent domain, or if blight or a malicious neighbor leaves no crop despite proper planting and cultivation. If the land habitually produced only 250 tons, though, and unfavorable weather yields 175, A’s duty is neither discharged nor modified, because the risk was obvious and a shortage should have been anticipated.51
Dunavant Enterprises, Inc. v. Ford shows the excusing side. High water kept the farmer from planting his full acreage of cotton, and the court freed him from his obligation to deliver after considering what the parties contemplated and relying on the official comment.52 Courts have routinely excused farmers in that position where both sides contemplated that the crop would be grown on the farmer’s own land and neither expected the farmer to buy replacements.53 The result follows from what the farmer promised: the yield of particular land, and not goods from anywhere.
A seller who is not tied to a field gets no such relief from the same disaster. In Bliss Produce Co. v. A.E. Albert & Sons, Inc. a middleman argued that a general failure of the Arizona potato crop freed it from its contract, and the court rejected the argument because the official comment speaks only of farmers who contract to sell crops from specific land.54 A middleman, or a farmer who sells crops other than or in addition to his own, has assumed a greater obligation than an attempt to grow a crop on one parcel, since the promise runs to goods of a kind and not to the yield of a particular place.55 Trade practice points the same way: a middleman is expected to lock up a source of supply before committing to a resale.56 A failure to shift the risk by contract language also counts for more against a middleman, who has many sources of supply and can spread the risk across many customers by adjusting prices, than against a producer with a limited source and few outlets.57
A farmer selling his own crop still loses when the contract does not tie the crop to land. In Clark v. Wallace County Cooperative Equity Exchange, Clark agreed to sell 4,000 bushels of corn to a cooperative, a fall freeze damaged his crop, and he delivered only 2,207 bushels.58 He argued that the freeze excused the shortfall as a casualty to identified goods. The Kansas court disagreed: the goods were not identified when the contract was made, because the contract did not call for corn from any particular land or grower.59 It rejected his § 2-615 argument as well.60 Clark and the cotton farmer both lost crops to weather, so the decisions turn on the promise each had made. The cotton farmer had promised cotton from his own land; Clark had promised corn, which the market could supply. Statements of agricultural law put it the same way: a farmer whose crop falls short from drought, hail, or other weather is generally not excused unless the contract called for the crop to be grown on a specified area, such as a 160-acre tract.61
Failure of a supplier follows the logic of failure of a field. The official comment says that when production by an agreed source fails for causes beyond the seller’s control, the seller should, if possible, be excused, because production by an agreed source is without more a basic assumption of the contract.62 The pre-Code carbolic acid case, Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-La Roche Chemical Works, supplies the model. A seller who had agreed to sell 1,120 pounds of carbolic acid cancelled when European governments embargoed exports of the acid after war broke out, and the Code’s drafters cited the case as an example of how the failure of a particular source of supply may excuse performance.63 A bus-body seller in Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King fits the same mold. The contract named the manufacturer that would build the bodies, so there was a single mutually contemplated source. The manufacturer collapsed financially, which the seller had no reason to anticipate, and the seller, who gave notice as soon as it learned of the problem, was excused.64
Each condition answers a different allocation question. The sole-source requirement separates a seller who promised goods from one place from a seller who promised goods and happened to buy them from one place, which is the line the farm cases draw. Unforeseeability matters because the rationale of the excuse is assumption of risk: in ordinary circumstances the risk that supply will fail rests on the seller, who promises a product knowing the conditions of its market.65 A seller who saw the failure coming and wrote no protection into the contract looks like one who accepted the risk, although foreseeability is evidence of allocation and not proof of it.66
The third condition takes its content from Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co. Dunbar, a middleman, had promised molasses from a named refinery without ever contracting with the refinery. Cardozo assumed that Dunbar would have been discharged had the refinery been destroyed, the sugar crop failed, war ravaged the refinery, or the refinery itself breached a supply contract. None of those events occurred. Dunbar had put its faith in the mere chance that the refinery’s output would match earlier years, and it had to take the consequences.67 The official comment states the resulting rule: there is no excuse unless the seller has employed all due measures to assure itself that its source will not fail.68 A seller that skipped the obvious step of contracting with the source has put its own omission into the causal chain, which is the fault problem treated earlier in this chapter. A seller that did contract with its sole source is excused when that source fails to deliver, absent its own assumption of the risk or its own fault.69
The first seller in that scene must still satisfy the Code’s allocation and notice requirements, taken up later in this chapter, because the excuse covers only a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 2-615.70
Strikes get the least favorable treatment in this group. In the modern business world a strike is hard to call a wholly unforeseen contingency, and many contracts allocate the risk of strikes in force majeure clauses.71 A strike can usually be resolved by spending more money, which turns the problem into one of cost, and a seller that failed to take steps to avoid the strike may be at fault as well.72 Foreseeability, cost, and fault all cut against the seller, so a strike seldom satisfies the basic-assumption requirement.
Some decisions nonetheless leave the question open. In Glassner v. Northwest Lustre Craft Co., a suit against a seller of china dishes who failed to perform because of a labor dispute, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment for the buyer and held that a strike could have made performance impracticable, so the question had to go to a trier of fact. In Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a jury could take labor difficulties into account in deciding whether a concrete supplier’s performance was excused, although the strike there was directed at the job site and not at the supplier.73 Those decisions say who answers the question; they do not hold that strikes excuse. A seller that cannot show a stoppage beyond its power to avoid or settle should expect to remain bound.
Governmental action is also foreseeable, and the Code nevertheless gives it its own clause in § 2-615(a), which the next pattern takes up.74
Governmental Regulation
Supervening governmental action is the most receptive of the four patterns, and the text of the two governing provisions shows why. Restatement § 264 provides that if the performance of a duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, the regulation or order is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.76 UCC § 2-615(a) reaches the same result for sellers through a separate limb: delay or non-delivery is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order, whether or not it later proves invalid.77 The Restatement declares the regulatory event to satisfy the basic-assumption requirement, and the Code covers it apart from its contingency clause, so a seller who relies on a regulation need not show what the parties assumed about the future.78 The text settles the second element of discharge, and the contest moves to the other four.
That result can seem odd beside the foreseeability discussion earlier in this chapter. A new regulation is among the most foreseeable events a contracting party faces, and a foreseen event usually counts as evidence that the risk was allocated. The Restatement’s approach suggests that foreseeability counts for little here.79 The reason is that a contract that allocates one risk allocates only that risk, and not every consequence the government may attach to it. When a state police order took a potato supplier’s truck off the road in bad weather, the tribunal reasoned that the weather risk may have been foreseeable and may have been allocated to the supplier, but that the risk of the resulting governmental interference had never been allocated, so the Code’s excuse applied.80
The excuse is not limited to formal enactments. The Code’s commentary directs courts to disregard technical distinctions between a law, a regulation, an order, and the like, and it makes the test the seller’s good-faith belief in the validity of the requirement, with general commercial acceptance of the regulation as the best evidence of good faith.81 Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp. (trial decision) shows how far the instruction reaches. Harris contracted to sell radio parts that the buyer intended to deliver to Iran. The U.S. Customs Service seized a shipment at the request of the Department of Defense, although Harris held a valid license to export all but a small fraction of the parts, and Harris then compromised with the government by agreeing to withdraw from the Iranian market. No formal rule barred the sale, yet the court excused Harris because Harris was not free to disregard the government’s informal prohibition.82 On appeal in the same dispute, Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., 3 F.3d 576 (2d Cir. 1993), found shelter for the seller under the contract’s force majeure clause for “governmental interference,” without requiring the seller to have resisted governmental influence to a degree the court regarded as “unusually foolhardy.”83
The Fifth Circuit pressed the same principle in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., excusing delayed delivery of aircraft where the manufacturer gave military orders priority over commercial ones at the federal government’s mere request, and not its order.84 The practical reason for treating pressure like command is that officials sometimes forestall performance by urging a supplier and not by issuing a rule. A requirement that a formal order issue first would oblige the supplier to defy a government that can penalize it just to learn whether the demand was serious. The clause’s indifference to later invalidity works the same way, because the seller must decide when the demand arrives and cannot wait for a court to rule on its validity.
The category is receptive, but the remaining elements still apply, and they supply its limits. The regulation must forestall performance, meaning prevent it. A regulation that merely inhibits performance does not qualify.85 A measure that makes performance somewhat harder or dearer inhibits it. To excuse, the measure must put performance out of reach or, under the extreme-burden element, push its cost far outside the range the parties priced.
The cost cases mark the gradation. In M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation, revised OSHA regulations governing the refurbishing of bridges painted with lead-based paint would have produced a substantial and unanticipated increase in the cost of the work, and the court excused the contractor.86 A regulation that only trims a margin leaves the loss where the contract put it. In Mel Frank Tool Supply, Inc. v. Di-Chem Co., a lessee that stored hazardous chemicals in a leased warehouse left after a new city ordinance barred that use, and the court held that the governmental action did not discharge the lessee’s rent obligation.87 Mel Frank is chiefly a frustration case, the doctrine of Krell v. Henry. There Krell rented Henry a suite of rooms for watching the coronation of Edward VII, the coronation was postponed when Edward came down with appendicitis, and Henry was excused from paying the balance of the rent because his purpose in renting had been frustrated.88 Frustration asks whether the purpose of the contract was destroyed, while the impracticability cases in this unit ask whether performance itself became extremely burdensome. Mel Frank shows only that a governmental act touching a contract does not discharge a duty by itself.
The second limit is that the obligor cannot have induced the regulation it now invokes. The excuse rests on a government acting on the obligor from outside, and an obligor that lobbied for the rule has used the government to build its own defense. This is the fault element at work: if one link in the causal chain that renders performance impracticable is the seller’s fault, the seller cannot claim the protection of § 2-615, and a seller that could have escaped the effect of a regulation is likewise not freed by it.89 One seller claimed excuse because it complied with a federal regulation without mentioning that its own representatives had lobbied for that regulation. Another failed where its agreement required it to stay apprised of new regulations, and it knew of them but told its buyers nothing.90
Inducement means procuring the measure, and ordinary cooperation with a regulator is not inducement. In International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., the Tenth Circuit excused a potash miner from its obligation to buy natural gas when new state emission standards meant the miner could no longer burn gas in the quantities anticipated, even though the miner had cooperated readily with the state and complied early.91 The seller argued that the buyer could have forestalled the new standards and kept burning gas. The court answered that doing so would increase pollution, which would be unacceptable as a matter of public policy, and the added pollution is a social cost to count beside the buyer’s own in deciding whether performance was worth its price.92 The contract was a take-or-pay contract, one in which the buyer must pay for a minimum quantity whether or not it takes the goods. That makes the result notable, because other courts ordinarily deny excuse when taking and paying under such a contract becomes impracticable.93
Orders reached through negotiation pose the hardest problem. Some courts deny the defense where the obligor’s fault contributed to the order’s issuance. When the Commodity Futures Trading Commission entered a consent order barring certain petroleum futures contracts, the seller could not establish the defense as a matter of law because it had not vigorously resisted the agency.94 That result sits comfortably beside Harriscom, because each case asks whether the regulation or the seller’s own choices made performance impracticable. A seller that yields to a clear governmental determination stands differently from one that agrees to an order it never contested.
Death, Incapacity, and Destruction
Restatement §§ 262 and 263 apply the general rule to the two classic settings. Under § 262, if the existence of a particular person is necessary for performance of a duty, that person’s death, or an incapacity that makes performance impracticable, is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.96 Section 263 says the same of a specific thing necessary for performance: its failure to come into existence, its destruction, or deterioration that makes performance impracticable is such an event.97 Because each section declares the basic-assumption element satisfied, the claimant need not prove what the parties took for granted. The fight moves to an earlier question: was the person or thing necessary at all? A person is necessary only when the duty calls for that person’s own service and cannot be delegated. A thing is necessary only when the contract requires that very thing or source, so that no substitute would do.
Both tests separate a lost bargain from a lost resource. When only this person or this thing can perform the contract, the loss leaves no one able to perform. The comment to § 262 draws that conclusion for personal service: when the obligor is personally to perform, death or incapacity makes performance objectively impracticable, since it is no longer practicable for anyone to perform the duty.98 When a replacement worker or a replacement unit of goods can fill the order, the other party still receives what it bargained for, and the obligor’s difficulty is a shortage of its own resources, which the obligor ordinarily bears.
Whether a person is necessary is first a matter of agreement. The parties may provide that a particular person is or is not necessary, and an agreement requiring the obligor’s personal service makes the obligor necessary. Where the agreement is silent, a court examines all the circumstances, including usage and course of dealing, to decide whether the duty involves enough personal service or discretion to require performance by a particular person.99 That is the question a court asks when an obligor tries to delegate performance, and it has the same consequence here: if the obligor can discharge the duty through another’s performance, the obligor’s own disability discharges nothing.100 The necessary person need not even be the obligor, since the comment recognizes that the person may be the obligee or a third person.101
The illustrations put both sides of the line on concrete facts. When a confidential secretary hired for a year dies, the secretary’s duty to work is discharged and the estate owes no damages, and the same is true when the employer dies and the secretary takes other work.102 A contractor who agrees to cut a tract of standing timber and then dies stands on the other side of the line. Unless special circumstances show that the contractor’s own service or supervision was necessary, the duty is not discharged and the estate is liable for breach.103 A crew working under the estate’s direction can cut the timber, so the death changes who must hire the crew while the landowner still receives the work he contracted for.
Two firm illustrations show the test turning on what the parties understood each individual to owe, whatever the occupation. When two architects who form a firm contract to design a building, and both are understood to render the services, one architect’s death discharges the duties of both. When a firm of contractors doing extensive business in many localities contracts to fill a tract of low land and one partner dies, neither duty is discharged, and the deceased partner’s estate and the surviving partner both remain liable.104 The architects sold the judgment of two particular people, so losing one changed the performance being bought. The contractors sold work the survivor could still arrange.
Incapacity follows the same logic as death. A school teacher’s duty was discharged when his vision deteriorated in Oneal v. Colton Consolidated School District No. 306, and in Wasserman Theatrical Enterprise v. Harris the actor Walter Huston was excused from appearing on stage because of a minor throat ailment, which shows that apprehension of illness, and not only illness itself, may suffice.105 The Restatement reaches a similar result where a producer agrees to stage a play starring a famous actor. The star’s throat condition worsens, and although it does not prevent him from performing, his doctor advises him to cancel and have a minor operation. The producer’s duty to put on the play is discharged.106 In that illustration the necessary person is a third party, and the incapacity need not make performance literally impossible.
The loss of a necessary person does not end the analysis, because the other elements of § 261 continue to apply. A party seldom undertakes personal service in spite of death or incapacity, so an intention to do so must be clearly manifested before it defeats discharge. The obligor’s fault also prevents discharge, but because it is so hard to foresee the effect of conduct on health, the fault must be clear.107 The rule extends by analogy to the dissolution of a corporation, though it seldom applies in practice because the dissolution must not stem from the corporation’s own financial inability or fault. A corporation dissolved by a new statute is discharged, and one that dissolves voluntarily or through insolvency is not.108 Death and illness are foreseeable in every contract, so the contested question is often which party should carry the risk.109 A party’s death also discharges nothing when the estate can perform just as well. In Warner v. Kaplan, the death of a buyer before the close of escrow did not discharge the contract to purchase a cooperative apartment, because the buyer’s performance is to pay and take title, and an estate can do both.
The test for a thing is the same inquiry about the contract’s subject. The music hall in Taylor v. Caldwell is the model. Caldwell agreed to rent a hall to Taylor for several days of concerts, the hall burned down before the first performance, and the court excused Caldwell because the hall itself was essential to the contract and the parties had contracted on the basis of its continued existence.110 Courts have applied the same principle to sales of specific goods. The test is easy to apply to unique goods and harder with goods of a fungible type, because the party seeking excuse must convince the court that the contract required the particular goods that were destroyed.111
A seller who loses a shipment tends to say that goods that no longer exist cannot be delivered, and the cases show why that instinct fails when any goods of the description would have served. In Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., the court refused to excuse delivery of 11,000 combat boots destined for Ghana that were destroyed in a train derailment.112 The destroyed boots were one lot among many that would have satisfied the contract.113 The court added that the derailment was foreseeable and that the parties could have expressed a different allocation of risk in the contract.114
The Code’s counterpart for goods is UCC § 2-613. It applies where the contract requires for its performance goods identified when the contract is made, and those goods suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer.115 If the loss is total, the contract is avoided.116 If the loss is partial, or the goods have deteriorated so that they no longer conform, the buyer may demand inspection and either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due allowance from the price, without further right against the seller.117 Identification plays the role that necessity plays under § 263, and a description by kind and amount does not satisfy it. In Valley Forge Flag Co. v. New York Dowel & Moulding Import Co., a storm destroyed 130,000 Ramin dowels aboard ship while the seller still bore the risk of loss. The court refused to excuse the seller because the dowels were interchangeable, no particular wood was required, and the seller admitted it could have replaced them on the open market. The buyer covered and recovered the difference in price.118 Demanding more than kind and amount keeps a seller of ordinary goods from invoking the loss of its own stock to escape a contract it could still fill by buying elsewhere.119