87 F.2d 410, 411
A special federal grand jury was convened at Philadelphia on September 14, 1950, to investigate frauds upon the Federal Government, including violations of the customs, narcotics and internal revenue liquor laws, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and conspiracy to commit such offenses.1 In response to subpoena petitioner Hoffman appeared to testify on the day the grand jury was empaneled and was examined on October 3.2 The pertinent interrogation included questions about what Hoffman does now, whether he had been doing the same thing since the first of the year, how long he had known William Weisberg, when he last saw him, whether he had seen him that week, whether he had talked with him on the telephone that week, and where Weisberg was now.3
Hoffman refused to answer most of those questions.4 He answered that he knew Weisberg for about twenty years and had heard about a subpoena for him in court. It was stipulated that Hoffman declined to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense.5
Petitioner's claim of privilege was challenged by the Government in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which ordered him to return to the grand jury and answer.6 Hoffman stated in open court that he would not obey the order, and on October 5 was adjudged in criminal contempt and sentenced to five months imprisonment.7
Hoffman appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.8 After denial by the District Court of his request for bail pending appeal, Hoffman on October 20 filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Allowance of Bail Pending Appeal with an accompanying affidavit asserting that he had a twenty-year police record, had been publicly charged as an underworld character and racketeer, had been photographed with the head of the Philadelphia office of the United States Bureau of Narcotics while waiting to testify, and had been questioned concerning the whereabouts of a witness for whom a bench warrant was sought.9 The affidavit was supported by clippings from local newspapers.10
On October 23 the District Court allowed bail.11 On the following day the petition, affidavit, and appendices were filed in the Court of Appeals as a supplemental record on appeal.12 The Government moved to strike this matter.13 The Court of Appeals granted the motion to strike and affirmed the conviction.14 Hoffman unsuccessfully sought rehearing in the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination justified Hoffman's refusal to answer questions before the grand jury?16
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute. It likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.17
Yes. The special federal grand jury was convened to investigate frauds upon the Federal Government, including violations of the customs, narcotics and internal revenue liquor laws, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and conspiracy.18 Hoffman appeared pursuant to subpoena.19 He refused to answer questions about his current activities since the first of the year and his recent contacts with William Weisberg, whom he had known for twenty years and who was evading service of a subpoena.20 In this setting, truthful answers to the business questions could have disclosed that Hoffman was engaged in proscribed activity.21
Answers to the Weisberg questions could have established contacts during the period when Weisberg was eluding the grand jury.22 They could have revealed that Weisberg was hiding with Hoffman's assistance, thereby forging links in a chain imperiling Hoffman with conviction of federal crimes ranging from obstruction to conspiracy.23
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination justified Hoffman's refusal to answer the questions before the grand jury.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Reed dissents from the Court's reversal of the contempt conviction. He agrees with the conclusions reached by Judges Goodrich and Kalodner as expressed in the opinion below.25
Whether the Court of Appeals should have considered the supplemental record containing Hoffman's affidavit and newspaper clippings when reviewing the contempt conviction?26
When facts appear sufficient to sustain the claim of privilege, the ends of justice require discharge of the contemnor. Courts should be solicitous to invoke their power to discharge the contemnor for good cause whenever important constitutional objections are renewed. The petition, though captioned a request for reconsideration of bail, was by its terms an application to the District Court to vacate the contempt order on constitutional grounds.27
Yes. The supplemental record was filed in the Court of Appeals only two weeks after the contempt order. It included Hoffman's affidavit asserting his twenty-year police record, his public labeling as an underworld character and racketeer, his photograph with the head of the Philadelphia office of the United States Bureau of Narcotics, and his questioning about the whereabouts of a witness for whom a bench warrant was sought, all supported by current local newspaper clippings. This information was directed to the power of the committing court to discharge the contemnor.28
It was adequate to establish circumstantially the likelihood that Hoffman's assertion of fear of incrimination was genuine rather than mere contumacy.29
The Court of Appeals should have considered the supplemental record when reviewing the contempt conviction.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Reed dissents from the Court's reversal of the contempt conviction. He agrees with the conclusions reached by Judges Goodrich and Kalodner as expressed in the opinion below.