Concept
Basis of the Bargain
Express warranties
Basis of the Bargain
Each of the three routes in § 2-313(1) ends on the same condition. An affirmation of fact or promise, a description of the goods, and a sample or model create an express warranty only if each becomes, or is made, part of the basis of the bargain.1 A statement can therefore be specific, checkable, and about the goods themselves, and still produce no warranty because it never entered the deal. The condition is the third hurdle in the creation sequence, after the statement’s form and its separation from mere opinion.
The condition belongs to the buyer’s prima facie case. A plaintiff suing on an express warranty must allege a contract, an express warranty about a material fact, a warranty that was part of the basis of the bargain, and breach.2 Proving that the seller made a warranty and so incurred an obligation under § 2-313 comes first. Nonconformity, causation, damages, and defenses such as disclaimer and lack of notice matter only if that step succeeds.3
The statute leaves the key question open. Neither clause mentions reliance, and each requires only that the statement be part of the basis of the bargain.4 The Code does not define the phrase, and courts have divided over it.5 One reading requires the buyer to show some awareness of the statement and some influence on the purchase. A second holds that a qualifying statement is part of the bargain because the seller offered the goods on those terms, whether or not the buyer noticed. A third splits the burden between the two.
The choice matters because each reading puts a different question at the center of the case. A reliance rule makes the buyer’s state of mind the issue: the buyer must prove what was heard and how it affected the decision to buy. A rule that looks only at what the seller offered makes the seller’s presentation the issue, and the buyer’s attention drops out. The intermediate rule shares the burden. This section follows that order. It first traces the phrase to the statute it replaced and reads the Official Comments, then presents the three approaches in turn. It closes with two recurring tests of every approach: assurances that arrive after the price is paid, and advertisements and packaging the buyer may not have seen before buying.
Replacing the Reliance Requirement
The phrase takes its meaning from the statute it replaced. Under § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, an affirmation or promise relating to the goods was an express warranty if its natural tendency was to induce the buyer to purchase and if the buyer purchased “relying thereon.”6 The buyer therefore had to prove that the statement, and not some other consideration, moved the purchase. Hellman v. Kirschner shows the old rule at work. A memorandum of sale described a used car as a Cadillac sedan, model 57-V. The car was a model 57-J, and the buyer had inspected it before buying. The appellate court reversed a judgment for the buyer because the trial court’s instruction implied that the buyer was entitled to a 57-V whether or not the buyer had relied on the model number.7
The Code dropped those words. “Induce” and “reliance” appear nowhere in § 2-313, although the fitness warranty in § 2-315 still refers to buyer reliance, so the drafters had the vocabulary and chose not to use it for express warranties. The Virginia Supreme Court drew the inference in Daughtrey v. Ashe: the drafters meant to modify the traditional requirement of buyer reliance.8 The Code also stopped asking whether the seller meant to warrant anything. A seller need not use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee,” or have a specific intention to make a warranty, a substantial change from the common-law approach.9
Fault plays no part in an express warranty claim, which helps explain the change. A seller who spoke only the truth as it understood it, and did everything humanly possible to honor its statement, can still be liable, because recovery rests on what the seller promised and not on blame.10 Reliance is the language of misrepresentation, where the plaintiff’s own reliance ties a false statement to the harm. Abandoning it holds a seller to the deal it thought it was making, and that deal can fairly be read to include whatever promises the seller made to merchandise its product.11 A seller can fairly be expected to price the goods with the cost of honoring those claims in mind.12
The Official Comments describe what replaced reliance. Comment 3 observes that affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded in practice as part of the description of those goods, so that “no particular reliance” on them “need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.” Any fact offered to take such an affirmation “out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof,” and the issue “normally is one of fact.”13 Courts apply the idea most readily to misdescriptions, which they treat as breaches of an express warranty that the goods conform to the description.14 The burden falls where the information sits. The seller made the statement and knows whether it was withdrawn before closing or understood by both sides to be untrue, while a buyer asked to prove reliance would have to reconstruct a state of mind. Comment 3 therefore treats the statement as part of the agreement and requires the party who disputes that to produce proof of a specific reason.
Comment 4 supplies the principle. The whole purpose of the law of warranty, it says, is to determine what the seller has in essence agreed to sell, so the policy adopted is that of the cases that refuse, except in unusual circumstances, to recognize a material deletion of the seller’s obligation.15 The inquiry moves from what the buyer was thinking to what the seller undertook. Daughtrey applied that move. The jeweler classified a bracelet’s diamonds as v.v.s., one of the highest grades, but described them to the buyer in conversation only as “nice.”16 The court held that the basis-of-the-bargain language “does not establish a buyer’s reliance requirement” and instead makes a seller’s description that is not mere opinion a representation that defines the seller’s obligation.17 The jeweler offered no evidence of any factor that would take his affirmation of quality out of the agreement, so it was part of the basis of the bargain.18
Comment 8 states the same default for every statement the seller makes. The basic question is which statements “in the circumstances and in objective judgment” have become part of the basis of the bargain, and the answer is that all of them have “unless good reason is shown to the contrary.”19 The comment adds that subsection (2) is included because common experience shows that some statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering the bargain.20 Comments 3 and 8 thus describe one presumption from two directions: what the seller said while bargaining is in the deal, and the exceptions must be proved.
Good reason does exist in some sales. A seller who says cloth is 100 percent wool has made the kind of statement that ordinarily enters the bargain. If the buyer knows the cloth is half cotton and buys for reasons unrelated to the claim, the statement is not part of the basis of the bargain.21 Keith v. Buchanan places the burden: a buyer’s actual knowledge of the goods’ true condition before contracting may show that the statement was not an inducement, but the seller must demonstrate that knowledge.22 The inspecting buyer in Hellman stands in this position. Under the old Act, the buyer’s lack of reliance defeated the claim. Under the Code, the inspection is evidence the seller must offer, and whether it suffices depends on how the phrase is read. The jeweler in Daughtrey had no such evidence to offer.
What the phrase itself requires remains uncertain. The comments push against a reliance requirement, but the text still demands that the statement become part of the basis of the bargain, and the Code defines neither the phrase nor its key word. In Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that the Code replaced the Sales Act’s express reliance requirement with the “part of the basis of the bargain” language and that how far the law changed is unclear. The court then rejected both extremes. Requiring reliance in every case contradicts the plain language of Comment 3, and eliminating it nullifies the phrase, since a buyer could recover on a statement the buyer never knew about while the bargain was being made.23
Courts have answered in three ways. A majority of jurisdictions, Kelleher reports, continues to treat reliance as essential. A minority eliminates it. A few adopt an intermediate rule under which a statement the buyer knew of during the bargaining is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain unless the seller proves otherwise.24 The next three subsections take the approaches in that order. On an exam, a statement that fits one of the three routes and clears the puffery screen still needs an answer to this condition, and the answer depends on the approach the governing jurisdiction follows.
Reliance Required
Courts that require reliance read the phrase to mean that the buyer knew of the seller’s statement and was influenced by it in deciding to buy. The position descends from the Sales Act, whose express reliance requirement the Code did not repeat. Kelleher reports that a majority of jurisdictions continues to treat reliance as an essential element of an express warranty claim, though the court declined to adopt that view for reasons that appear below.26
Decisions applying Ohio and Texas law state the rule in terms. A federal court applying Ohio law held that “reliance upon the representations is necessary in order for them to become part of the basis for the bargain,” and a federal court applying Texas law granted summary judgment to a seller because the buyer had adduced no evidence of reliance.27 The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell is the usual authority for the Texas rule. The count of jurisdictions is contested, however. A federal court that canvassed the cases nationwide found “considerable divergence” over whether reliance is an element at all.28 Reliance is best presented as one of the main readings, and not as a settled rule.
Two reasons keep the requirement alive. The first is textual. If a statement counts whenever the seller made it, the phrase does no independent work, because the buyer’s state of mind drops out and a buyer could recover on a statement first learned of in a lawyer’s office. The Third Circuit pressed this point in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: a purely objective test would permit suit on advertisements made in another state or country, and it strains the language to call a statement part of the basis of a buyer’s bargain when the buyer did not know it existed.29 The second reason is fairness. A buyer who never relied on a statement has suffered harm that did not flow from it, and that buyer keeps the baseline protection of the implied warranty of merchantability.30 A reliance requirement keeps express warranty from becoming a guarantee of every public claim a seller ever made.
The position sits uneasily with the Official Comments. Kelleher called the majority view clearly contrary to the language of Comment 3, and Comment 8 points the same way.31 Reliance courts have two ways of living with the comments. One softens what reliance means. Sessa v. Riegle called basis of the bargain “essentially a reliance requirement” and, in the same breath, said the drafters meant not to require a strong showing of it, since all of the seller’s statements become part of the basis unless clear affirmative proof shows otherwise.32 The other reads the last sentence of Comment 3 as qualifying the one before it. On the Third Circuit’s reading, the seller may take an affirmation out of the agreement by proving that the buyer did not rely, and a New Jersey statement that particular reliance need not be shown means only that the plaintiff need not prove reliance, not that reliance is irrelevant.33 On both readings the buyer’s awareness and inducement stay relevant, and the readings differ over who must prove them. The second reading, which puts the burden on the seller, is the one the rebuttable-presumption approach develops.
The cases show these steps failing at different points. Morgan v. Cabela’s Inc. fails at the second. The plaintiff’s affidavit said she relied on the retailer’s good name, but it did not say whether she read any of its advertisements or letters before buying a tree stand, and it did not say whether an ad or letter, as opposed to the catalog and the retailer’s reputation, induced the sale. The court held that a vague familiarity with “the catalogs” and reliance on Cabela’s as the “world’s greatest outfitter” did not show that any statement became part of the basis of the bargain.34 Sessa fails at the third. The buyer of a horse testified that the seller’s telephone guarantee was the quintessence of the sale, but the court found that another person’s opinion was the principal, if not the only, factor that motivated the purchase and that the seller’s conversation played a negligible role.35 The conversation also seemed largely collateral to the sale, and the seller’s remarks that the horse was “a good one” and that the buyer would “like him” were bland commendation that colored the accompanying statement that the horse was sound.36
Reliance courts do not ask the buyer to show that the statement was the only thing that moved the purchase. The usual formulation is that the statement should at least be one of the factors that led the buyer to buy. What is crucial is whether the statement was made as an affirmation of fact, the goods did not live up to it, and the defect was not so apparent that the buyer must be held to have discovered it.37 The last step in the checklist is where buyers most often lose, because trusting a seller and relying on a statement are different things. A buyer who purchased from a catalog company because it has a good name has relied on the seller, and that trust ties no sentence the seller wrote to the bargain. The proof that closes the gap is testimony naming a statement the buyer read, heard, or took into account before buying.
The requirement has costs, and they explain why Kelleher declined to adopt it in pure form. Buyers act from mixed motives and may not recall which claim shaped a choice made amid a flood of advertising. A seller who made claims to the public in order to sell the product probably priced the goods with the risk of those claims in mind.38 The costs fall most lightly where reliance courts are most comfortable. Advertisements and brochures a buyer may never have seen are far from the actual contract, and many courts therefore hold that unread and unheard statements cannot form the basis of an express warranty.39 A later subsection returns to advertising and packaging.
On an exam, present the reliance position as a judicial gloss that many courts apply and that Comment 3 sits uneasily with, and not as a requirement written into § 2-313. State what the buyer must show, then apply it: what did the buyer see, read, or hear before buying, and was it one of the reasons for the purchase?
Reliance Not Required
The contract-oriented position reads the phrase to ask what the seller put into the deal. On that reading a qualifying statement is part of the bargain whether or not the buyer relied on it, and even if the buyer never learned of it before paying, because the buyer purchased the seller’s commitment along with the goods. Daughtrey v. Ashe is the leading example. The jeweler there had classified the bracelet’s stones as v.v.s., one of the highest grades, yet described them to the buyer only as “nice.”41 The court held that the “part of the basis of the bargain” language “does not establish a buyer’s reliance requirement” and instead makes a seller’s description that is not mere opinion a representation that defines the seller’s obligation.42
The first reason is that a warranty is a term of the contract, and a party is held to the terms of a deal whatever the other party believed about them. In Ainger v. Michigan General Corp., a $4 million transaction governed by a negotiated six-page letter agreement, the court observed that problems of reliance “do not appear when the action is grounded in warranty.” The warranty is as much part of the contract as any other term, and the right to damages depends on nothing more than breach.43 The parties had reviewed the agreement line by line, and the disputed warranty sat in one of its paragraphs.44 The case shows the premise on which the position rests: a promise that was bargained for binds the promisor without any further showing about the promisee’s state of mind.
The second reason is the purpose the Official Comments assign to warranty law, which is to determine what the seller has in essence agreed to sell.45 The Third Circuit in Cipollone, which ultimately took a middle course, conceded the force of this argument. Reliance is irrelevant to what a seller agrees to sell, and a reliance requirement fits poorly with the rule that a promise made after closing can create a warranty even though the buyer could not have relied on it in deciding to buy.46 If a post-closing promise can bind the seller, it is hard to see why a pre-closing promise binds only when the buyer relied on it.
The third reason concerns price. A seller makes a claim in order to sell the goods, so the price presumably reflects its willingness to stand behind the claim. A buyer who pays that price has bought the commitment, and a seller who keeps the price while disowning the claim because this buyer never read it collects for a promise it declines to honor. Courts reasoning this way treat the seller as estopped from denying that the total package sold included its promises about the product, even when the injured buyer did not know of them.47 The commitment also supplies what the implied warranty of merchantability, which is vague for goods that are not utterly non-merchantable, does not: a definite standard.48 One majority opinion makes the point in a footnote. A seller who agrees to sell a certain quality of product cannot avoid liability for delivering lower-grade goods, and cannot find solace in the fact that the injured consumer never saw his warranty.49
The reach of the position shows most clearly on concrete facts. In Koch v. Kaz USA, Inc., a husband bought an oil-filled heater, and his wife, who never saw the box before the purchase, sued on representations printed there. The sellers argued that she could not recover on the warranty because she had not relied on those representations. The federal district court, after quoting Comment 3, held that the sellers were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that ground.50 Those facts fail at the second step of the reliance checklist, because the injured user never saw the statement. Here the statement was printed on the packaging of the goods the seller sold, so it was part of what the seller undertook to deliver, and the contract view asks for nothing more.
Keith v. Buchanan, the sailboat case, states a rule that works as a presumption. A warranty statement is presumptively part of the basis of the bargain, and the seller bears the burden of proving that the resulting bargain does not rest at all on the representation.51 Keith therefore sits at the border between this position and the intermediate approach the next subsection develops. Even on the contract view, a seller keeps a chance to show that the statement never became part of the deal. Keith says that a buyer’s actual knowledge of the goods’ true condition before contracting may show that the statement was not an inducement, with the burden on the seller.52 Decisions collected in Cipollone go further and find no warranty where buyer and seller both knew that a statement in a bill of sale was false, since neither side could then have been bargaining over its truth.53
Two cases decided outside the ordinary consumer sale sharpen the principle. CBS, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co. arose under New York contract law from the purchase of businesses and not from a sale of goods under Article 2, so it is an analogy and no more. The buyer had misgivings about the seller’s financial information before closing, and the seller argued that the buyer therefore could not have relied on the warranties. The court held that the buyer had bargained for the seller’s promise that the warranted facts were true, so the doubts did not release the seller. The opposite rule would have produced an irony: the seller would have pressed the buyer to close despite its misgivings and then defeated the warranty claim because the buyer harbored those same misgivings.54 Rogath v. Siebenmann turns that principle into a “disclosure” rule. A seller who tells the buyer the facts that make the warranty untrue cannot be said to have sold the promise. The rule may not always place the risk on the party best positioned to avoid it, but it is relatively verifiable. It also spares courts the uncertainty of inquiring into what a buyer privately suspected, and it arguably allocates the risk correctly often enough that case-by-case inquiry would not improve its overall effect.55
The central objection comes from the other side. If the buyer’s state of mind never matters, the phrase “basis of the bargain” does no work, because a buyer could sue on a statement first learned of in a lawyer’s office. Cipollone made that argument against the purely objective test, and the Third Circuit found the extreme version untenable and settled on a presumption of its own.56 Courts on the contract side answer that the phrase still screens statements, because a statement must be part of the deal the seller offered, whether made in the negotiation, printed in the contract, or carried on the goods. Comments 3 and 8 also let the seller take a statement out of the agreement with clear affirmative proof or good reason to the contrary.57 Daughtrey itself rested on the seller’s failure to offer any evidence that would take the description out of the agreement.58
The position is strongest where the statement is truly a term of the deal: written contract terms, the oral terms of a negotiated sale, and writings tied closely to the goods, such as labels, manuals, and literature delivered with them. It is weakest for advertisements and brochures a buyer may never have seen before the bargain was complete, and for statements made after the sale, where many courts that otherwise sympathize with the contract view hold that unread and unheard statements cannot form the basis of a warranty.59 The last two subsections take up those settings.
On an exam, the typical fact pattern is a buyer who never saw or read the statement. Start with the split, because the answer depends on the jurisdiction. If it follows the contract view, the buyer’s lack of awareness is no defense, and the seller escapes only by showing that the statement was taken out of the agreement, as by the seller’s own disclosure of the contrary facts before the sale. If it requires reliance, the same buyer loses for want of awareness. Either way, note where the statement sat, since the closer it was to a contract term or to the goods themselves, the stronger the buyer’s claim.
Rebuttable Presumption
The rebuttable-presumption approach answers the question by dividing the proof between buyer and seller. The buyer need show only awareness of the seller’s statement during the bargaining. From that awareness the statement is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain, and the seller can escape only by clear affirmative proof that the resulting bargain did not rest at all on the statement.61 Kelleher called this an intermediate third approach, noted that only a few jurisdictions had adopted it, and chose it because the reliance position and the no-reliance position each conflict with the Official Comments.62
The comments explain why this approach tracks them most closely. Comment 3 says that no particular reliance on a seller’s affirmations made during a bargain need be shown, and that any fact taking them out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. Comment 8 adds that all of the seller’s statements become part of the basis of the bargain unless good reason is shown to the contrary.63 Those two comments describe a presumption. The statement is in the deal when the buyer begins with nothing but the statement, and whoever says it is out of the deal must produce the proof. The reliance position reverses that allocation by making the buyer prove inducement. The no-reliance position leaves no way for a statement to fall outside the deal, though both comments contemplate one. Cipollone made the second point directly: both comments envision a mechanism for overcoming the presumption that a seller’s statements are a basis of the bargain, even when the actual buyer heard them.64
The buyer’s initial burden is awareness, and Cipollone defines it. The plaintiff satisfies the basis-of-the-bargain requirement by proving that she read, heard, saw, or knew of the statement, and that proof suffices to weave the statement into the agreement.65 The requirement exists because a statement the buyer never encountered cannot have been something the buyer bargained over.66 When the statement was spoken to the buyer in the negotiation or written into the contract, the transaction itself supplies the awareness. An answer that denies recovery merely because the buyer did not prove reliance therefore misapplies this approach: the buyer’s burden ends with awareness, and the seller’s burden begins there.
Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. applied the same logic. The complaint alleged that express warranties became part of the basis of the bargain, and because the affirmations were made during the bargain, the court treated them as presumed to be part of it unless and until the seller presented clear, affirmative proof indicating otherwise.67 Keith v. Buchanan shows the presumption working for a buyer. At a boat show the buyer collected sales brochures describing a sailboat as “a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness,” and he told a sales representative that he wanted an ocean-going boat for long-distance cruising.68 The California Court of Appeal held that a warranty statement is presumptively part of the basis of the bargain and that the seller must prove the bargain does not rest at all on the representation. The seller proved nothing of the kind, because the buyer’s experts had looked at the boat but no one had tested it in the water, so nothing showed that the buyer knew its true condition.69
The presumption gives way when the buyer’s own knowledge shows that the statement did not move the purchase. A seller who says cloth is 100 percent wool has made the kind of statement that ordinarily enters the bargain, but if the buyer knows the cloth is half cotton and buys for other reasons, the statement is not part of the basis of the bargain.70 The same result followed in Chinn v. Fecht. A tractor seller called the machine in “excellent condition” and “field ready,” and the statements did not become part of the basis of the bargain because the buyer, who knew tractors, inspected it and determined that it needed repairs.71 The decisions collected in Cipollone follow the pattern. A bill of sale describing goods as new did not warrant newness when buyer and seller both knew the description was false, and a buyer who had operated trucks and knew they needed repairs could not sue on the seller’s statement that they were in good condition.72 Keith adds the allocation of proof: the seller must demonstrate the buyer’s knowledge.73
Knowledge defeats the presumption because of what a warranty protects. A seller’s statement earns enforcement by inviting the buyer to stop investigating, and a buyer who already knows the statement is untrue has not been invited to stop. The Third Circuit rooted the idea in contract principles. These cases depart from strictly objective construction, yet they follow the principle of reading terms in light of the parties’ intentions and the surrounding circumstances, and the relevant intent is that the statement be part of the basis of the bargain.74 The knowledge must be actual. The Cipollone court insisted that the jury be asked whether the buyer actually disbelieved the advertisements, an inquiry distinct from whether she should have disbelieved them.75 If constructive knowledge were enough, the presumption would turn into a duty to investigate, and a seller could escape any warranty by pointing out that the truth was discoverable.
Cipollone adds a final step that other courts do not describe. If the seller proves that the buyer disbelieved the statement, the buyer may still try to prove reliance directly, because it is possible to doubt a warranty and yet rely on it.76 The court saw its framework as a chain of shifting presumptions: proof that the plaintiff saw the statement raises a presumption of belief, the seller rebuts by proving disbelief, and the buyer answers with direct proof of reliance. It added that calling the result a belief requirement or a reliance requirement is probably a matter of semantics and not substance.77 An exam answer should present that last step as the Third Circuit’s refinement, since Keith and Kelleher describe the seller’s burden without adding it.
Rebuttal also reaches facts about the transaction. A seller’s statement is not presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain when the buyer knew it to be false or was not influenced by it, or when it was not made until after the sale.78 A seller who withdrew a statement before closing is proving exactly that kind of fact. The burden sits comfortably on the seller for that reason: the seller made the statement and knows whether it was withdrawn, whereas a buyer who had to disprove a retraction would be proving a negative about a conversation the buyer may not have had.
A seller who points to the buyer’s pre-purchase inspection is offering evidence on the knowledge question, and the presumption approach asks what the inspection actually revealed. A buyer who inspects before purchase may be deemed to have waived the seller’s express warranties, but an inspection does not necessarily discharge the seller if the defect was not actually discovered and waived.79 The buyer’s experts in Keith examined the boat but never tested it in the water. Seaworthiness appears only when a vessel is put to sea, so the inspection could not have exposed the defect and did not rebut the presumption.80 The tractor buyer in Chinn also inspected, but his inspection told him the machine needed repairs, and his experience with tractors made that knowledge credible, so the seller’s statements dropped out of the bargain.81 An inspection that finds nothing leaves the buyer where the warranty protects the buyer: having looked, seen nothing wrong, and taken the seller’s word on what looking could not reach.
Because rebuttal depends on evidence about what a particular buyer knew and what happened in a particular negotiation, the issue is normally one of fact, as Comment 3 says. Kelleher treats whether the seller has proved by clear affirmative proof that its statements were not at all part of the basis of the bargain as a question for the factfinder.82 A seller therefore rarely wins on the pleadings and must come to trial with specific proof of knowledge, disbelief, or withdrawal.
The fourth step does the work, because the presumption either holds or yields there, and the proof it demands concerns the particular buyer and the particular negotiation. A buyer who cannot be shown to have known the truth keeps the warranty.
Statements After the Sale
None of the three clauses in § 2-313(1) says when the seller must have spoken.84 Comment 7 answers the timing question directly: the precise time when words of description or affirmation are made “is not material,” and the sole question is whether the language is “fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.” If language is used after the closing of the deal, as when a buyer taking delivery asks for and receives an additional assurance, the warranty becomes a modification, which “need not be supported by consideration” if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.85 A statement made after the price is paid sharpens the reliance question, because the buyer by definition cannot have relied on it in deciding to buy. The Third Circuit counted that fact against a strict reliance rule in Cipollone: if a post-closing promise can create a warranty, it is hard to see why a pre-closing promise can do so only if relied upon.86
Timing gives way to a test of fair connection because of how sales actually close. A buyer standing at the counter, or just taking delivery, usually has the practical power to get the seller to take the goods back, and a seller who offers reassurance at that point is still working to keep the sale in place.87 A rule that treated the bargain as closed the instant money changed hands would let a seller pass over a reassurance with the goods, benefit from the buyer’s resulting confidence, and then disown the words. The modification route supplies the doctrinal vehicle for holding the seller to them. An agreement modifying an Article 2 contract needs no consideration to be binding, so the fact that a buyer who has already paid gives nothing new in exchange does not defeat the assurance.88
The treatment below moves outward from the counter: assurances given as the deal closes, warranties that arrive with the goods, and statements made long afterward. The standard illustration of the first is a sales clerk who hands over just-purchased eye shadow and says it is absolutely harmless to the eyes. The words follow the sale by seconds, yet they operate as a modification that needs no consideration.89 A camper who buys a sleeping bag advertised for winter use and, right after paying, hears the seller say it can be used below zero makes the reason plain. The camper relies on the statement and sleeps out when the temperature reaches two below. A seller who had said in the store that the bag could not be used in sub-zero weather would probably have taken it back, but once the bag has acquired holes and mud the seller is less willing to rescind, so treating the statement as an express warranty is reasonable.90
Sellers resist these claims by pointing out that the sale was already complete. Sears made that argument in Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., contending that its salesman’s later statements, including some made at the buyers’ residence, could not be part of express warranties. The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, nonetheless found ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Sears made and breached express and implied warranties. In Stang v. Hertz Corp., a court upheld a directed verdict on a warranty claim built on a rental agent’s remark about the car’s tires, partly because the remark came after the car had been rented. Comment 7 makes timing immaterial, so Stang looks like an early decision running against the comment’s language.91
Warranties delivered with the goods pose a related problem, because many reach the buyer only after payment, packed in the carton or left in the glove compartment. Representations in an owner’s manual in a glove compartment, or in a brochure inside a product’s packaging, are properly treated as part of the basis of the bargain.92 Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray is the leading illustration. A pharmacy handed a buyer the prescription drug doxycycline together with its information pamphlet, which said what to do if stomach upset occurred, and the buyer claimed that the instruction was a warranty. Rite Aid argued that an affirmation becomes part of the basis of the bargain only if it is a negotiated term or the consumer at least knew of it before the sale was consummated. Maryland’s highest court disagreed. Based on the circumstances surrounding most purchases in modern commercial dealing, it held that the argument does not fit how sales work.93 Comment 7 implies that express warranties may form before the sale is completed or even after it has been consummated. The paramount question is the relationship between the sale of the goods and the affirmations the seller made.94
The majority borrowed its practical reasoning from other decisions. A federal court in the Bridgestone/Firestone litigation observed that a buyer cannot prove reliance on an affirmation made after closing, yet the Code contemplates enforcing such affirmations when they are “fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.” The opposite rule would render almost all consumer warranties a nullity, since warranty booklets are commonly sealed in a product’s box or left in a new car’s glove box.95 Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co. likewise treated a warranty handed over at delivery of a motor home as part of the basis of the bargain. The mechanism turns on who controls the timing. A seller decides whether to hand the warranty across the counter or seal it in the carton, and a rule that made prepurchase reading a condition would let the seller defeat its own warranty by choosing the second option.
The dissent in Rite Aid shows what the majority’s reading costs. It would have held that the pamphlet instruction was not part of the basis of the bargain, because the instruction was neither a dickered term nor part of the contract and because the buyer purchased the drug on her doctor’s advice, so an instruction read after the purchase would not have been a factor in the decision to buy even had she read it beforehand.96 On the dissent’s account, the majority disposed of the statutory requirement altogether. The dissent cited Shreve v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., which held that an owner’s-manual instruction for switching off a snow thrower was not an express warranty because it was not an affirmation about the goods that became a basis of the bargain.97 The two opinions agree that timing alone does not decide the case and disagree about what replaces it. The majority asks whether the statement came with the goods at the sale and so is fairly part of what the seller delivered. The dissent asks whether the buyer bargained for the statement or would have been moved by it, a question that keeps “basis of the bargain” from collapsing into any statement the seller ever made.
Statements made well after the sale, tied to nothing in the transaction, bind only through the modification route, and that route has limits. A post-agreement representation can be an express warranty that modifies the warranties arising under the original agreement.98 Bigelow v. Agway, Inc. shows the route working. Two months after a farmer bought and used a chemical to treat hay before baling, the seller’s salesman guaranteed that treated hay was safe to bale at moisture levels of thirty-two to thirty-four percent, although most farmers would not bale hay above twenty to twenty-five percent. The farmer baled the hay, and the moisture contributed to a fire that destroyed his entire crop. The Second Circuit observed that the salesman’s visit was meant to promote the sale of the product, so his guarantee might constitute an actionable modification of the warranty.99 The purpose of the visit carried the weight, because a statement made to keep or build the seller’s business with the buyer looks like part of a continuing deal.
The modification route requires an agreement, and agreements for goods carry formalities. A seller’s words spoken during delivery are not self-evidently an agreement of that kind. An advertisement published after the sale can hardly be given a bilateral character at all, so the route works best for face-to-face dealing while the deal is still warm.100 An oral modification of a contract for goods priced above $500 must also satisfy the statute of frauds under § 2-209(3) or operate as a waiver of it under § 2-209(4), and those provisions are ambiguous enough to be read to prohibit oral modification of such contracts altogether.101 A salesperson’s telephone call three weeks after delivery faces a hurdle that a clerk’s remark at the register does not. The parties’ own contract can also close the route. In McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, the Fifth Circuit held that a post-sale warranty by modification could not be established because the contract’s integration clause required the signature of both parties to create an effective modification.102 A post-closing assurance can be made at the right time, to the right buyer, about the right goods, and still fail because it was not made in the form the contract and the statute require for a change.
Statements far removed from the deal draw more caution still. A seller’s post-sale statements about a product, generally unsupported by consideration, are hard to view as part of the bargain or as something the buyer relied on in making a deal, and a respectable position therefore requires reliance where the representation is distanced from the sale.103 That position accepts warranties delivered with the goods even when delivery comes well after the deal. It treats other post-deal representations as warranties only if they can be proved as modifications under § 2-209.104
Advertising and Packaging
Neither clause of § 2-313(1) limits the form a seller’s communication must take, so courts treat advertisements, catalogs, brochures, and labels as capable of creating express warranties.106 In Cipollone the Third Circuit explained that a seller may be liable when its representation about the goods takes the form of a newspaper, magazine, radio, or television advertisement.107 Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. likewise recognized that documents, brochures, and advertisements may constitute express warranties, and Keith v. Buchanan found one in sales brochures that called a sailboat a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness.108 The advertisements in Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp. stated that a liquid drain cleaner was “safe” while showing a hand swishing water around a kitchen sink, and the court held that they warranted the product was safe for human contact.109 Those decisions answer only the first of two questions an advertising claim raises: whether the words are the kind of statement the clauses cover. The second, whether the words entered this buyer’s bargain, is where advertising cases are contested.
The second question is harder for advertising than for a statement made across the counter. Mass advertising is addressed to the public at large, so a given purchaser may have chosen the product for unrelated reasons without ever reading the magazine page or watching the broadcast. These are the difficult cases: advertisements, catalogs, owners’ manuals, and other documents delivered with the goods, where a seller who shows that the buyer ignored or did not rely on the statement may show that it was not part of the basis of the bargain.110 Comment 3’s presumption speaks of affirmations made “during a bargain,” language that fits a negotiation better than a magazine page.111 Courts also resist reading the phrase so loosely that it does no work. If every published claim counted for every buyer whether or not the buyer knew of it, a buyer could recover on a warranty first discovered in a lawyer’s office, and the Third Circuit rejected a purely objective reading because it cannot explain how an advertisement the buyer never saw becomes part of that buyer’s bargain.112
What a buyer must show about an advertisement is therefore contact with it. Cipollone holds that the buyer satisfies the basis-of-the-bargain requirement by proving that she read, heard, saw, or knew of the advertisement containing the affirmation or promise. Once awareness is shown, the statement is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain unless the seller proves by clear affirmative evidence that the buyer knew it was untrue.113 Where a brochure is said to have been part of a negotiation, the trial court must decide whether and when the buyer received it. A brochure given during the sales negotiation is examined closely for affirmations of fact or promises, and the analysis then resembles the one for a spoken statement.114 Under the reliance approach, a buyer who cannot connect the seller’s own advertising to the purchase loses, as the plaintiff did in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell. In Morgan, discussed earlier, the plaintiff’s trust in the retailer’s reputation supplied a reason to trust the seller and no sentence to which the seller could be held.115
The content of what the buyer saw matters as much as whether the buyer saw it. The retailer’s statements in Morgan related to all of its goods and not to the tree stand, so they could be read generally as “We are a good company. We sell good products.” The court called that puffing.116 Express warranties are most often found when a seller makes a specific statement about a specific product.117 A statement that praises the seller’s entire line gives the buyer no trait of a particular product against which the delivered goods can be measured, and it falls within the exclusion for a seller’s opinion or commendation.118 Verifiability and the discouragement of independent inquiry point the other way: a statement that can be checked, and that invites the buyer not to check, reads as an affirmation of fact.119 A generalized statement is a weak foundation for a warranty, and it grows stronger as it carries a concrete claim about what the seller did to the goods.
Images raise a related limit, because a picture can suggest a quality without asserting it. In Maneely v. General Motors Corp., plaintiffs hurt riding in a pickup’s cargo bed relied on advertising that showed people in truck beds. The Ninth Circuit held that no reasonable jury could find that the manufacturer promised that riding in the back of a moving truck was safe simply by depicting people there. Unlike the all-capitals “completely safe ball will not hit player” in Hauter v. Zogarts or the seaworthiness statements in Keith, the advertisements presented visual images of the product in certain surroundings and made “no explicit guarantees.”120 The Drayton advertisements also contained a picture, a hand in a sink, but they paired it with the word “safe,” so the words supplied the explicit assurance that the picture illustrated.121 If a depiction of ordinary use counted as a promise of safety, every photograph in a catalog would insure the product against every hazard of the use it shows.
Labels and packaging differ from mass advertising in a way that bears directly on the basis of the bargain, because they are part of the goods as sold. The statement is printed on the carton the buyer picks up, so it reaches the buyer at the moment of choosing, and a seller who chose the words and put them on the goods has little ground to say the statement stood outside the sale. One organizing approach sorts statements by their distance from the deal. Terms in a written contract and oral terms of a negotiated sale are the deal itself, and writings closely connected to it, such as labels, owner’s manuals, and literature delivered with the product, travel with the goods, so reliance need not be proved for any of them. Representations far removed from the deal, such as most advertisements, call for proof that the buyer met them, because they sit at a distance in time and place from the actual contract.122 Jurisdictions differ on whether they apply that sorting, so an answer on a packaging claim should present it as the strongest available argument and then check the governing rule.
The pull in the other direction deserves a fair statement. A seller runs an advertisement to induce purchases and presumably prices the goods to reflect the risk in its claim, so a buyer who missed the particular advertisement still paid for the commitment. Buyers exposed to a barrage of advertising may be unable to say which phrase influenced a choice, and a rule requiring proof that the buyer saw and acted on a specific claim from a mass campaign comes close to restoring the reliance requirement the Official Comments set aside.123 Many courts nonetheless hold, for advertisements and brochures a buyer may never have seen before the bargain was complete, that unread and unheard statements cannot form the basis of an express warranty.124 The usual result for a mass-advertising claim is accordingly a requirement that the buyer have been exposed to the statement, and the contested questions that remain are who must prove what afterward.
The second and fourth steps do most of the work in practice, because they decide whether the words promise anything about the product and whether this buyer can be tied to them.