951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997)
Wiley Grinnell began smoking Lucky Strikes cigarettes manufactured by the American Tobacco Company in 1952 when he was nineteen years old.1
Almost a year later, he switched to Pall Malls, also manufactured by American.2 After smoking for approximately thirty-three years, Grinnell was diagnosed with lung cancer in July 1985.3 He filed this lawsuit shortly thereafter and died less than a year later.4 His family continued the suit after his death, adding wrongful death and survival claims against American Tobacco Company.5
The Grinnells alleged that American failed to warn of, and actively concealed, facts that it knew or should have known, including that Grinnell could quickly become addicted to cigarettes and that his smoking could result in injury or death from the cancer-causing ingredients if used as intended.6 They also alleged that American represented to consumers that cigarettes were not harmful, dangerous, or capable of causing injury.7 The asserted claims included strict liability for design, marketing, and manufacturing defects; negligence in testing, failure to warn, misrepresentation, and design; affirmative fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment; Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations; breach of express and implied warranties; and civil conspiracy.8
In several motions for summary judgment, American asserted that it conclusively defeated at least one element of each of the Grinnells' claims and that many of the claims were preempted by federal law.9 The trial court granted all three motions and dismissed the Grinnells' suit.10 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the entire case.11 The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.
Grinnell testified in his deposition taken one month before his death that he began smoking because his friends smoked and later changed brands based on taste rather than advertisements.12 He specifically remembered seeing only R.J. Reynolds's advertisements but might have seen American's.13 The summary judgment record included internal documents showing that American fumigated its Turkish tobacco with chemicals containing acrylonitrile and that pesticide residue remained in the tobacco after fumigation.14 Historical publications and expert testimony addressed the public's awareness of smoking risks by the 1950s.15
Whether the general health risks of cigarette smoking were common knowledge in the community when Grinnell began smoking in 1952?16
Yes. The court applied the common knowledge standard from Seagram to the facts that historical publications from the early 1900s, the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, and expert testimony from Drs. Ravenholt and Greenberg established that the general health risks were widely known by 1952 when Grinnell began smoking.19 The court further noted that early judicial decisions from 1898 onward and numerous magazine articles and books confirmed societal awareness of smoking's deleterious effects.20
Because the dangers were common knowledge, the defendants had no duty to warn before 1969 and were entitled to summary judgment on all claims based on failure to warn of those general risks.21
The general health risks of cigarette smoking were common knowledge in the community when Grinnell began smoking in 1952 so summary judgment was proper on claims based on failure to warn of those risks.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Enoch
Justice Hecht argued that the risk of addiction is subsumed in the risk of cancer and that the difficulty of quitting was common knowledge long before 1988 because ordinary smokers and their families knew it was very difficult to quit.23 He concluded that the court's distinction between general health risks and addiction was untenable and that all claims should fail under comment i to section 402A.24 He emphasized that nicotine is not a foreign substance like marijuana and that labeling the risk addiction adds nothing practical to an ordinary smoker's knowledge already present in 1952.25
Justice Hecht would have affirmed the district court's summary judgment on all plaintiffs' claims.26
Joined by Justice Hecht
Justice Enoch argued that the court retreated from McGuire by limiting the common knowledge doctrine and that the general health risks include the risk that cigarettes can kill when used as intended.27 He would have held that all failure-to-warn claims were barred by common knowledge and affirmed summary judgment on every claim. He noted that the court gave no guidance on which other smoking-related risks fall within the general category and that the particularized-risk approach undermines the common knowledge doctrine because the specific always trumps the general.28
Whether the addictive quality of cigarettes was common knowledge in the community when Grinnell began smoking in 1952?29
No. The court applied the Seagram standard to the facts that the 1988 Surgeon General's report was the first comprehensive official recognition of nicotine addiction. The FDA's 1996 assertion of jurisdiction came decades later. No major public health organization had determined nicotine was addictive before 1980.32 Expert testimony and the absence of widespread pre-1952 publications on addiction confirmed that the specific danger of addiction was not common knowledge in 1952.33
Because American did not conclusively establish common knowledge of addiction, the marketing defect and related claims based on addiction survived to the extent not preempted.34
The addictive quality of cigarettes was not common knowledge in the community when Grinnell began smoking in 1952 so summary judgment was improper on claims based on failure to warn of addiction.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Enoch
Justice Hecht argued that the distinction between addiction and habituation is unimportant for comment i purposes because the ordinary smoker knows it is hard to quit and that labeling the risk addiction adds nothing practical to community knowledge already present in 1952.36 He stressed that the risk of addiction is subsumed in the risk of cancer and that a product is not unreasonably dangerous unless it is dangerous beyond what the ordinary consumer contemplates with common knowledge of its characteristics.37
Joined by Justice Hecht
Justice Enoch argued that the court's particularized-risk approach undermines the common knowledge doctrine because the specific always trumps the general and that the court gave no guidance on which other smoking-related risks fall within the general category.38 He would have held that summary judgment was proper on all of the Grinnells' claims including those predicated on the presence of pesticides.39 The distinction drawn by the majority between general risks and addiction lacks support in precedent and creates an unworkable framework for future cases.40
Whether the federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts the plaintiffs' post-1969 failure-to-warn claims?41
Under Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc. the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims that would impose a duty to include warnings other than those required by the federal statute.42 It does not preempt claims based on fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation not predicated on a failure to warn.43
Yes. The court applied Cipollone to the facts that the Labeling Act requires specific warnings and contains an express preemption provision in 15 U.S.C. section 1334(b).44 The court held that post-1969 failure-to-warn claims sounding in negligence and strict liability are preempted because they seek additional or different warnings.45
The court therefore dismissed those claims while preserving non-preempted claims such as those based on pre-1969 conduct or independent fraud theories.46
The federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts the plaintiffs' post-1969 failure-to-warn claims so those claims were properly dismissed.47
Whether the plaintiffs' fraud, misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims are preempted by federal law?48
No. The court applied Cipollone to the facts that the fraud, misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims rest on affirmative misrepresentations and concealment rather than on a duty to warn.51 The court held these claims are not preempted but then examined them under state law.52
Because the conspiracy claim depends on an underlying tort that failed, the conspiracy claim also failed.53
The plaintiffs' fraud, misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims are not preempted by federal law but the claims failed for lack of evidence under state law.54
Whether the plaintiffs presented evidence that Grinnell relied on specific misrepresentations by the defendant?55
No. The court applied the reliance requirement to the facts that Grinnell testified he began smoking because his friends smoked and changed brands based on taste not advertisements.58 He specifically remembered seeing only R.J. Reynolds advertisements and the 1950s and 1960s materials on which the claims were based were never shown to have been seen or relied upon by Grinnell.59
The summary judgment record therefore established a complete absence of reliance and the claims failed as a matter of law.60
The plaintiffs presented no evidence that Grinnell relied on specific misrepresentations by the defendant so summary judgment was proper on the fraud, misrepresentation, and express warranty claims.61
Whether the presence of pesticide residue in cigarettes constitutes a manufacturing defect claim?62
Yes. The court applied the manufacturing defect definition to the facts that internal documents showed American fumigated its Turkish tobacco with Acritet 34 containing acrylonitrile and that pesticide residue remained after fumigation.65 The court held that the presence of residue is not an intended ingredient and therefore could constitute a manufacturing defect even if common throughout the industry.66
Because American did not conclusively negate causation or the existence of a defect the manufacturing defect claim survived in its entirety.67
The presence of pesticide residue in cigarettes constitutes a manufacturing defect claim that survives summary judgment.68
Whether the absence of a safer alternative design defeats the design defect claims?69
A product is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law if there are no safer alternatives. The jury must balance utility against risk considering factors including the availability of a substitute product that meets the same need without being unsafe or unreasonably expensive.70
Yes. The court applied the safer-alternative requirement from Turner and Caterpillar to the facts that the Grinnells' own experts testified no safe cigarette exists with respect to lung cancer and that Grinnell would have developed cancer regardless of filters, lower tar, or less tobacco.71 Because American conclusively proved that no reasonably safer alternative design exists, the design defect claims including those based on addiction were defeated as a matter of law.72
The absence of a safer alternative design defeats the design defect claims so summary judgment was proper on those claims.73