Concept
Compelled Financial Support
Freedom of association
Compelled Financial Support
The freedom to associate includes a freedom not to, and that freedom extends from compelled words to compelled money. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette laid the foundation. The Court held there that local authorities could not compel public school students to salute the flag and recite a pledge, because the compulsion invades the sphere of intellect and spirit that the First Amendment reserves from all official control.1 A state that could force a citizen to say the words could make the citizen appear to hold a belief the citizen rejects.
Wooley v. Maynard carried the principle from spoken words to property. New Hampshire required license plates to bear the state motto “Live Free or Die.” A Jehovah’s Witness covered the motto and was prosecuted, and the Court set aside the conviction because the state’s interests in pride, history, and distinguishing its plates were not compelling enough to override his First Amendment interest.2 The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking, the Court said, are “complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”3 Freedom from compelled association rests on the same idea: the individual, not the state, chooses associations and defines the persona held out to the world.4 The freedom is not absolute. An infringement may be justified by a regulation that serves a compelling state interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.5
Compelled payment raises the same concern because money is how groups speak. A person made to pay for a message supports it whether or not the person agrees with it, so the principles that bar compelled affirmation also govern laws that compel financial support for another’s speech.6 The speaker’s identity sets the boundary. The government may tax citizens and spend the proceeds on messages they dislike, and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association found no violation of the compelled-subsidy doctrine where the funded speech was the government’s own; a private message with which a person disagrees is another matter.7
Compelled payment also differs from the compelled disclosure of membership lists discussed earlier in this chapter. In the disclosure cases, the Court required the state’s interest to survive exacting scrutiny and to bear a substantial relation to the information demanded,8 and a challenger needed to show only a reasonable probability that disclosure would expose contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals from officials or private parties.9 In the payment cases the injury is the subsidy itself, and the question is whether the state’s justification can overcome it.
Two mandatory fees show where the principle wins and where it yields. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education allowed the agency fee that public-sector unions charged nonmembers for collective bargaining and forbade it for ideological causes, until Janus v. AFSCME struck down the arrangement.10 Board of Regents v. Southworth upheld the mandatory student activity fee at a public university so long as the program that distributes the money is viewpoint neutral.11 The two differ in who speaks and in what the payer is made to support.
Agency Fees and Janus
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 holds that a state may not compel a public employee who has chosen not to join a union to subsidize it. Illinois required such employees to pay an agency fee, a percentage of full union dues that went to the union’s collective bargaining,12 and the Court held that the requirement violates nonmembers’ free speech rights by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.13 By a vote of five to four, the Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which had countenanced such fees for forty-one years.14
Abood had divided a union’s spending into two categories. Nonmembers could be required to pay for collective bargaining but not for the union’s political and ideological positions, and the agency fee was limited accordingly. Janus struck that distinction down.15 The Court had already worn the compromise down. In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, a case about a special assessment for political purposes, it observed that its precedents had already impinged on nonmembers’ rights by allowing any fees at all. In Harris v. Quinn, it declined to extend Abood to home-care assistants who were public employees only for purposes of unionization, and it questioned Abood’s reasoning. Janus completed the retreat by overruling Abood outright.
Illinois law let a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit choose a union, which became the exclusive representative of every employee in the unit. Nonmembers were not obligated to join, yet the union remained their sole permitted representative.16 If the collective bargaining agreement contained an agency-fee provision and the union certified the amount, the state deducted the fee from the nonmember’s wages, and the employee’s consent was not required.17
Janus rested on the ordinary rules of compelled speech. Forcing a person to subsidize private speech burdens that person’s freedom of speech and association, and the public-sector setting made the burden heavier, because a union bargains with the government over matters of substantial public concern.18 Bargaining and political advocacy therefore overlap, which is why Abood’s line between chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures proved “impossible to draw with precision.”19
The Court left the standard of review partly open. Janus argued for strict scrutiny, and the dissent would have asked only whether an employer could reasonably believe the fees served its interests. The majority rejected minimal scrutiny as foreign to free speech law but found it unnecessary to choose, because the Illinois scheme could not survive even the more forgiving standard of the earlier compelled-subsidy cases.20 The state’s two justifications therefore had to do real work, and neither did.
Labor peace was Abood’s principal defense of agency fees. The state’s interest lay in avoiding the conflict that would follow if rival unions represented employees in one unit and made conflicting demands on the employer.21 Janus assumed that interest to be compelling and still found it insufficient. Abood had cited no evidence that disorder would follow without agency fees, and experience since then showed the fear to be unfounded. More basic, exclusive representation and agency fees can be separated: a state can designate one union to bargain for everyone and still spare nonmembers any fee, so labor peace can be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.22 An interest that a gentler rule also serves cannot justify the harsher rule’s burden.
The second justification, avoiding free riders, failed for a different reason. Respondents argued that nonmembers enjoy the benefits of union representation without sharing its costs. The Court saw no reason to treat the free-rider interest differently in the agency-fee context than in any other First Amendment context, and it held that agency fees cannot be upheld on free-rider grounds.23 The reason lies in how far the argument reaches. A group that lobbies for senior citizens or physicians benefits many people who never asked it to speak, and if that benefit were enough, the government could make every one of them pay. Private speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, but that fact does not alone empower the state to compel payment for it. The cost of representing nonmembers in grievance and disciplinary matters did not change the answer, because that burden can be met by charging nonmembers for the service or denying them representation, both significantly less restrictive than an agency fee.24
The remaining defense came from the public-employment cases. Respondents and the dissent relied on Pickering v. Board of Education, under which a public employee’s speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern is protected unless the state’s interest as an employer in the efficiency of public services outweighs the employee’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern. The Court answered that Abood was not based on Pickering, which the Abood majority cited exactly once, in a footnote, and that it saw no good reason at this late date to shoehorn Abood into the Pickering framework.25 Respondents’ fallback was that union speech at the bargaining table is part of union officers’ official duties and so resembles the employee speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos. That argument fared no better. A union negotiating with the employer speaks for the employees, and if its words were really the employer’s, the employer would be negotiating with itself.26
The decision left exclusive representation intact. The Court did not question a state’s power to require that a union serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit, though it described that power as a significant impingement on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts. It drew its line at letting government go further and require every employee to support the union whether or not the employee shares its views.27
Overruling a forty-one-year-old decision required reasons beyond disagreement, and the majority gave several. Abood was poorly reasoned, had led to practical problems and abuse, was inconsistent with other First Amendment cases, and had been undermined by more recent decisions.28 The majority found no reliance interest on the part of public-sector unions strong enough to justify perpetuating the free speech violations that Abood had countenanced.29 Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented, contending that the majority ignored the factors that ordinarily call for adhering to precedent, such as reliance interests.30
The remedy matters as much as the holding. Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages unless the employee affirmatively consents.31 Agreeing to pay waives First Amendment rights, and a waiver cannot be presumed; it must be freely given and shown by clear and compelling evidence, which requires that employees clearly and affirmatively consent before any money is taken.32 The default rule does the work. Under an opt-out system the employee who stays silent pays, so inattention becomes a subsidy and the burden of protecting the right falls on the person who holds it. Requiring consent in advance puts that burden on the union, the party that wants the money.
The fourth question usually decides the facts in an essay. An answer that asks only whether the fee covers chargeable bargaining expenses applies the question Abood asked, and that question no longer rescues a deduction from a nonconsenting employee. The opposite error is to read Janus as ending exclusive representation, which a state may still require.33
Student Fees and Southworth
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth asks the question that Janus answered, whether government may make a person pay for speech the person dislikes, and reaches the opposite result for a mandatory student activity fee. Justice Kennedy’s opinion held that a public university may charge its students an activity fee to fund a program that facilitates extracurricular speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.36 The two cases show that the rule against compelled subsidy has no single remedy: the protection an objecting payer receives depends on who speaks and on what the money supports.
Students at the University of Wisconsin sued, claiming that the mandatory activity fee violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise unless the university let them decline to fund groups such as the International Socialist Organization, the College Democrats, and the College Republicans, whose political and ideological expression they found offensive.37 A registered student organization (RSO) could obtain fee money in three ways: from the Student Government Activity Fund (SGAF), from the General Student Services Fund (GSSF), or through a student referendum in which the student body voted to approve or disapprove an assessment for a particular RSO. One referendum produced $45,000 for WISPIRG in a single academic year.38 The parties stipulated that the SGAF and GSSF funding was viewpoint neutral, and the stipulation did not extend to the referendum.39
The Court began from the premise that drives the union cases. The complaining students were being required to pay fees that subsidized speech they found objectionable, even offensive, so Abood and Keller supplied the beginning point for the analysis.40 Keller had held that a state bar, although state law creates it and requires lawyers to join it, is not part of the general government and may use compulsory dues to regulate the legal profession and improve legal services but not to promote political or ideological activities such as endorsing gun control or a nuclear freeze.41 The objecting students therefore had a real interest.
The means that Abood and Keller used to protect objectors, however, did not fit this setting. Those decisions limited compelled subsidies to speech germane to the purposes of the union or the bar, and the Court held that approach neither applicable nor workable for extracurricular student speech at a university, where the speech a university seeks to encourage has vast, unexplored bounds.42 A germaneness test works when an organization has a defined function against which each expenditure can be measured, such as bargaining with an employer or regulating lawyers. A forum for open-ended campus debate has no such function, so a court applying the test would have to decide which ideas belong in a university education, a judgment that is not the judiciary’s to make.43 Germaneness is therefore the wrong question for a student-fee problem.
The Court also refused to require that objecting students be allowed to opt out of funding particular groups. A university free to adopt an optional or refund system may do so, but the First Amendment does not require it, because such a system could be so disruptive and expensive that the program supporting extracurricular speech would be ineffective.44 The reasoning follows from what the fee is for. A fund meant to sustain many groups with conflicting messages depends on broad participation, and each student who withdraws support from every group the student dislikes shrinks the pool that makes the open exchange possible.
What the Court required instead was neutrality in how the money is distributed. It looked to the public forum cases by close analogy, even though the activity fund is not a public forum in the traditional sense and those cases usually involve demands for access, not claims to be exempt from supporting speech, and it concluded that the standard of viewpoint neutrality is controlling.45 Viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funds is the proper measure and the principal protection for objecting students.46 A program that funds groups without regard to their messages gives no side an advantage, so each student’s money supports an open exchange of ideas and not one viewpoint over another. In the Court’s words, “The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views.”47
The Court separated this case from one in which the government itself speaks. The case did not raise the university’s right to use its own funds to advance a particular message, because the university’s whole justification for the fee was that the expression springs from student initiative.48 When government speaks, it answers to the electorate and the political process for its message. Here the university is not responsible for the content of the speech; it distributes money to facilitate the students’ exchange of ideas.49 The government-speech rule, under which no compelled-subsidy violation arises when the funded speech is the government’s own, therefore does not carry this case. The money funds private student speech through a university-run forum, which is why the Court drew its standard from the public forum cases.50
The Wisconsin program contained one feature that resembled the second committee’s approach. By majority vote, the student body could fund or defund a given RSO, and the Court found it unclear what protection for viewpoint neutrality existed in that part of the process.51 To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality, it undermines the protection the program requires, because a vote asks whether most students approve of a group’s message, and the groups likeliest to lose are the unpopular ones that neutrality exists to protect. Access to a public forum does not depend on majoritarian consent. The referendum therefore appeared inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement.52 But the record on it was sparse and the stipulation covered only the other two channels, so the Court remanded for further consideration and did not decide whether the referendum was invalid.53
Janus and Southworth begin from the same idea, that making a person pay for another’s speech implicates the First Amendment, and they diverge in remedy. The Janus fee supported a single private organization’s own bargaining and advocacy directed at the government, and the Court barred the payment unless the employee consented. The Southworth fee entered a fund on which many independent groups drew under neutral rules, with the university advancing none of their messages, and the Court held that neutral distribution is the safeguard. The rules developed in Abood and Keller, the Court explained, did not translate well into a public university setting where the fees subsidize the speech of student organizations and not the speech of the university itself.54
A problem that describes a mandatory fee calls for sorting the facts before choosing a test. If the payer is a nonmember who must fund a union’s own bargaining and advocacy, the Janus line governs. If the payer is a student whose fee goes into a pool distributed among student groups, the question is whether the distribution is viewpoint neutral. The answer does not depend on whether each funded activity is germane to the university’s mission, and it does not depend on whether the student may obtain a refund.