431 U.S. 209 (1977)
In 1967 the Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified under Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act as the exclusive bargaining representative of all teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education.1
The Union and the Board thereafter concluded a collective-bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 1969, to July 1, 1971.2 Among the agreement's provisions was an agency shop clause. Every teacher who had not become a Union member within 60 days of hire or of the clause's effective date had to pay the Union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members.3 A teacher who failed to meet this obligation was subject to discharge.4
Christine Warczak and other named teachers filed a class action in a state court naming as defendants the Board, the Union, and several Union officials.5 Their complaint as amended alleged that they were unwilling or had refused to pay dues and that they opposed collective bargaining in the public sector.6
D. Louis Abood and other named teachers filed a separate action in the same state trial court with virtually identical allegations.7 This second action was held in abeyance pending disposition of the Warczak appeal. When that case was remanded the two cases were consolidated in the trial court for consideration of the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment.8
Following the 1973 legislative amendment that expressly authorized agency-shop clauses the trial court granted summary judgment and upheld the clause under state law and the Federal Constitution.9 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the retroactive application of the amendment but upheld the clause insofar as service fees financed collective bargaining while invalidating it to the extent fees financed political and ideological activities.10 The Michigan Supreme Court denied review and the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court.11
Whether Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act and the agency-shop clause it authorizes violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of public school teachers who object to the union as such?12
A state may authorize an agency-shop arrangement requiring public employees to pay a service fee equal to union dues to their exclusive bargaining representative for purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment without violating the employees' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of association.13
No. The established facts show that in 1967 the Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified under the Public Employment Relations Act as the exclusive representative of all teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education. The Union and the Board thereafter concluded a collective-bargaining agreement containing an agency-shop clause. The clause required every nonmember teacher to pay a service charge equal to regular membership dues. Failure to pay subjected the teacher to discharge.14
The clause was applied retroactively after the 1973 amendment expressly authorized such arrangements. The Court applied the holdings of Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson and Machinists v. Street. It concluded that the same governmental interests in labor peace and elimination of free riders that justified the arrangement in the private sector apply equally to public employment. Public employees possess no greater First Amendment interest in refusing financial support than private employees.15
The agency-shop clause is valid under the Constitution to the extent that the service charges are used for collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes.16
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Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.17 He observed that the positions taken by public-employee unions in collective bargaining inevitably touch upon political concerns if the word political is taken in its normal meaning.18 Success in pursuit of a particular collective-bargaining goal will cause a public program or a public agency to be administered in one way. Failure will result in its being administered in another way.19
He saw no constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat or Republican or else lose his job and a similar requirement that a public employee contribute to the collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union.20 He therefore joined the opinion and judgment of the Court while maintaining his view that both requirements implicate the same First Amendment concerns.21
Whether objecting public employees may be compelled to pay service fees that the union uses to finance political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining?22
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a state from compelling public employees to contribute to the support of political and ideological activities unrelated to the union's duties as exclusive bargaining representative.23
No. The established facts show that the complaints alleged the Union engaged in a number and variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, scientific, and religious in nature of which the plaintiffs did not approve and which were not collective-bargaining activities.24 The Michigan Court of Appeals held the agency-shop clause invalid to the extent service fees financed such political and ideological activities.25 The Court agreed that the constitutional line must be drawn on the basis of whether the activities are germane to collective bargaining. Objecting employees cannot be compelled to support nongermane ideological causes.26
The Court further held that the complaints' general allegations of opposition to any such expenditures if proved establish a cause of action.27
Objecting public employees may not be compelled to pay service fees used to finance political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.28
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Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall joined dissented.29 He argued that the agency-shop clause does not violate the First Amendment because the Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit. It is required to represent the interests of all the employees whether or not they are members of the Union.30
The agency-shop clause is a reasonable means of ensuring that all employees bear their fair share of the costs of collective bargaining.31 He contended that the Court's distinction between germane and nongermane activities is unworkable. The Union's political and ideological activities are an integral part of its collective-bargaining activities.32
The Union cannot effectively represent the interests of the employees without engaging in political activities. He would have reversed the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals.33
Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion of the Court.34 He wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not preclude the Union from engaging in political and ideological activities. The Union remains free to use the dues of its members for such purposes.35
He noted that the only limitation is that the Union cannot compel nonmembers to contribute to those activities.36 His separate writing underscored that the majority opinion leaves unions free to pursue political goals with voluntary member funds while protecting objecting nonmembers from compulsory support of ideological causes.
Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly drew the constitutional line between permissible and impermissible uses of service fees on the basis of whether the union's activities are germane to collective bargaining?37
The constitutional requirements for an agency-shop clause are satisfied if objecting employees are charged only for those expenditures that are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.38
Yes. The established facts show that the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the agency-shop clause to the extent service fees financed collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment but invalidated it to the extent fees financed political and ideological activities.39 The Court affirmed that holding. It stated that the line is to be drawn on the basis of whether the activities are germane to collective bargaining.40
The Court explained that the process of establishing a collective-bargaining agreement may require subsequent approval by other public authorities. Related budgetary decisions might be seen as integral to bargaining.41 It left the precise dividing line for development on remand because the case arrived on the pleadings without an evidentiary record.42
The Michigan Court of Appeals correctly drew the constitutional line between permissible and impermissible uses of service fees on the basis of whether the union's activities are germane to collective bargaining.43
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Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment.44 He agreed that the agency-shop clause is invalid to the extent service charges finance political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.45 He wrote separately to express the view that the Court's decision is consistent with First Amendment principles protecting the right to refrain from speaking as well as the right to speak.46
The government cannot compel individuals to support causes with which they disagree.47 His concurrence stressed that any withholding of financial support for a public-sector union is within the protection of the First Amendment.48 The State should bear the burden of proving that any required union dues or fees are needed to serve paramount governmental interests.49
Whether objecting employees must notify the union of their specific objections before obtaining any remedy for the union's use of their fees for political and ideological purposes?50
Objecting employees need only manifest opposition to any political or ideological expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining and they are not required to identify specific expenditures or causes before obtaining relief.51
No. The established facts show that the complaints alleged opposition to the use of service fees for any activities unrelated to collective bargaining and that the plaintiffs had not notified the Union of specific objections prior to filing suit.52 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they had not made known to the Union the specific causes to which they objected.53 The Court reversed that holding. It relied on Railway Clerks v. Allen to conclude that a general allegation of opposition to any such expenditures satisfies the requirement that dissent be affirmatively indicated.54
The Court further noted that requiring identification of specific expenditures would confront employees with the dilemma of either relinquishing their right to withhold support or disclosing their beliefs publicly.55
Objecting employees need not notify the union of their specific objections before obtaining a remedy; a general manifestation of opposition to ideological expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining is sufficient.56
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Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion of the Court including its discussion of possible remedies.57 He wrote separately to note that he did not imply that the remedies described in Machinists v. Street and Railway Clerks v. Allen would necessarily be adequate in this case or in any other case.58
More specifically the Court's opinion does not foreclose the argument that the Union should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure that will avoid the risk that their funds will be used even temporarily to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.59 He stated that any final decision on the appropriate remedy must await the full development of the facts at trial.60