Concept
Public Officials and Public Figures
Freedom of the press
Public Officials and Public Figures
Old decisions such as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire suggested that defamatory speech is not entitled to constitutional protection.1 Sullivan and the cases that followed moved the law away from that view, and they moved it plaintiff by plaintiff. A public official or public figure must prove actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,2 and must prove it with convincing clarity.3 A private plaintiff faces a lower bar: states may not impose liability without fault, and they may not permit presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability does not rest on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.4 An identical false sentence, printed with identical care, can therefore produce liability against one plaintiff and none against another. The question “Who is the plaintiff?” must come before the question “What did the publisher know?”
The Court gave two reasons for sorting plaintiffs by status. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication, and so a more realistic opportunity to counteract a false statement. The media are also entitled to assume that such plaintiffs have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.” A private individual has accepted no such risk and has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his good name. He is more vulnerable to injury and, in the Court’s words, more deserving of recovery.5
Classification matters because it fixes the fault the plaintiff must prove, and that fault concerns the publisher’s attitude toward the truth. Depending on status, the plaintiff must prove either knowing or reckless falsehood or something like negligence, and in neither case does motive decide the question.6 A defendant’s subjective motives are of no interest so long as he believed, or sometimes reasonably believed, that he was publishing the truth.7 Negligence alone will not carry a public plaintiff, because it falls short of the recklessness that actual malice requires.8 That was the Court’s verdict on the evidence in Sullivan itself, which showed at most negligence in failing to discover the misstatements.9 A thin investigation does not suffice either. It may support an inference that the publisher doubted its source and wanted no confirmation of those doubts, but standing alone that inference is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The plaintiff’s case becomes much stronger on proof that the publisher knew facts discrediting the source and ignored obvious leads.10
A plaintiff’s status sets the fault the plaintiff must prove. It does not excuse the plaintiff from showing a false statement of fact when the subject is a matter of public concern. Only false statements of fact can support defamation liability,11 and a statement on a matter of public concern “must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law.”12 An opinion that contains no provably false factual connotation receives full constitutional protection.13 A later section takes up those limits; this one asks who must clear the higher fault bar.
Public Officials
Sullivan said little about who counts as a public official; the Court had no occasion there to decide how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the designation extends.14 Rosenblatt v. Baer supplied the missing definition: “the ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”15
Two phrases in that definition do most of the work. “At the very least” makes the quoted language a floor and not a ceiling. “Or appear to the public to have” makes the public’s perception of the job part of the test, alongside the position’s formal powers.
Applied to actual jobs, the definition reaches well past elected officeholders. One commentary reads it to exclude public employees such as custodians, filing clerks, and typists, yet “just as clearly” to include public school teachers, police officers, playground supervisors, and social workers.16 Another suggests that anyone in a supervisory or decision-making position will be classified as a public official when the defamation connects to the plaintiff’s role in that position.17
The middle of the hierarchy remains contested, and teachers show why. A teacher holds considerable discretion and power over students’ lives, and the public scrutinizes teachers’ conduct. But teachers do not administer the laws and directives with which individuals and businesses must comply, and in modern school systems their freedom to decide what and how to teach is limited by control from above. Courts are likewise divided on whether a person or business performing services under government contracts is an official, a question that depends more on the facts of each case.18 The sources thus disagree about where the line falls, and a strong answer says so.
The category also reaches former officials. Under Rosenblatt, the actual malice requirement applies to defamatory statements about a former official’s conduct in office, unless the person is “so far removed from a former position of authority that comment on the manner in which he performed his responsibilities no longer has the interest necessary to justify the New York Times rule.”19
The category stops at actual governmental position. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher argued that a lawyer who appeared at a coroner’s inquest had become a “de facto public official.” The lawyer had served briefly on housing committees appointed by the mayor, but at the time of publication he had never held a remunerative governmental position. The Court answered that its cases “recognize no such concept,” because the argument “would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning of the ‘public official’ category beyond recognition.”20
Once the plaintiff is an official, the subject of the statement rarely takes the case outside the rule. In Garrison v. Louisiana the Court reasoned that the public’s interest extends to “anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office,” because few personal attributes bear more on fitness than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though those traits also affect the official’s private character.21 The privilege therefore covers charges of criminal conduct, such as the bootlegging charge in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy and the perjury charge in Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron.22
Official status also has a limit running the other way. New York Times made clear that the First Amendment forbids making “an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations” into a libel of an official.23 In Sullivan itself, the advertisement did not refer to the commissioner by name or official position, and the plaintiff relied solely on the bare fact of his office. The Court held that showing constitutionally defective, citing its “disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct.”24
All-Purpose Public Figures
The Sullivan rule spread beyond officials in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its companion, Associated Press v. Walker. In Butts, the Saturday Evening Post charged Coach Wally Butts of the University of Georgia with conspiring with Coach “Bear” Bryant of the University of Alabama to fix a football game between their schools. In Walker, the Associated Press gave an erroneous account of former Major General Edwin Walker’s part in a riot on the University of Mississippi campus. Neither plaintiff was a public official under Sullivan: a private alumni association paid Butts, and Walker had resigned from the Army.26
Justice Harlan announced the result in both cases, but a majority agreed with Chief Justice Warren that the New York Times test applies to “public figures” as well as public officials. The Court extended the privilege to criticism of nonpublic persons who “are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”27 Harlan, writing for a plurality, would have let a public figure recover on proof of “highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable publishers.” Warren concurred in the result but joined four dissenters in concluding that the actual malice standard applied. Had Harlan’s gross-negligence standard carried the day, the public law of libel might look markedly different today.28
Gertz later sorted public figures into two kinds. An individual may achieve “such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” More commonly, an individual “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.”29 The limited-purpose kind has its own subsection below. The all-purpose label is the broader of the two because it attaches to the person and not to a controversy, so every false statement about the plaintiff, on any subject, falls under actual malice.
The reasons for heightened protection explain why only the most prominent plaintiffs qualify for the broad label. Those who attain public-figure status have mostly assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society, and some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.30 Media access and assumed risk hold on every topic only for someone whose prominence is pervasive.
Courts therefore read the category narrowly. They require that a person’s name almost be a household word before exposing him to media attention on every subject, on the theory that such a person has access to the media to rebut defamatory attacks and has voluntarily thrust himself into the public spotlight.31 Gertz’s own plaintiff shows how demanding the test is. The Chicago lawyer had long been active in community and professional affairs, had served as an officer of local civic groups and professional organizations, and had published several books and articles on legal subjects. He was well known in some circles, yet he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community, and none of the prospective jurors had heard of him before the litigation. The Court would not “lightly assume” that such participation made him a public figure for all purposes, and it required “clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.”32
Local celebrity falls well short of that line. The facts of Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., in which a high-school athlete who excelled in football and basketball and whose father had played professional football sued a newspaper, make a useful test case. A student like that may be famous in his town and unknown elsewhere, and neither his talent nor his lineage makes his name a household word. The household-name test therefore does not reach him, and the analysis moves to the limited-purpose question below.
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
Gertz made the limited-purpose public figure the more common kind: an individual who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.”34 The category is a third classification, after officials and all-purpose public figures, and it covers private persons who are public figures only for a particular incident or event.35 One definition puts the same point in other words: a person who, having become involved in a particular public issue, has achieved fame or notoriety only in relation to that issue.36 The Court preferred this narrower frame to a general inquiry into fame, saying the public-figure question becomes more meaningful when a court looks to “the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”37
The Court’s wording gives the test its content. Those in this group “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”38 Gertz’s own plaintiff failed that description. He played a minimal role at the coroner’s inquest, his participation related solely to his representation of a private client, he took no part in the criminal prosecution, and he never discussed the litigation with the press. He “plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”39 Read together, these formulations ask three questions: Is there a genuine public controversy? Did the plaintiff step into it by choice? Was the plaintiff trying to influence how it came out?
The reasons for treating public figures differently explain why the status turns on the plaintiff’s own choice. Public figures usually have greater access to channels of effective communication, and the media may assume that they have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.40 A person who campaigns on an issue has gained a platform on that issue and invited comment on the campaign. A person swept into the news by events has done neither. Otherwise-private persons must therefore “really go out of their way to bring attention and notoriety to themselves” before they are designated even a limited public figure.41
Time, Inc. v. Firestone shows how heavily the voluntariness requirement weighs. Mary Alice Firestone was prominent in social circles, appeared often in the newspapers, and hired a clipping service to track her publicity. Time magazine wrongly reported that her divorce was granted on grounds of adultery. The Court nonetheless held her a private figure, because she “did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it.”42 The Court thus rejected the effort to label this Palm Beach socialite, caught up in a racy divorce scandal, a public figure.43 Filing for divorce did not transform her either. She was compelled to seek judicial relief from the state to end the marriage, and she did not freely choose to publicize the propriety of her married life.44
Woy v. Turner lies on the other side of the line. Bucky Woy, a sports agent, used press conferences to make his point during a contract dispute with one of his athletes, and he was held a public figure because he thrust himself into the forefront of a public controversy.45 Woy and Mrs. Firestone were both caught in private quarrels that drew press coverage, so the difference lies in what each did with the audience. Mrs. Firestone went to court because the law gave her no other way to end her marriage. Woy took his side of the dispute to the public. Athletes themselves are usually deemed limited public figures, and the cases recognize that many personal factors in an athlete’s life may affect a career without being the proper subject of unlimited publication.46
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, a senator ridiculed a researcher’s federally funded study of aggressive monkey behavior with his “Golden Fleece Award.” The Court held the researcher a private figure because he “at no time assumed any role of public prominence.” Neither his grant applications nor his publications in professional journals “invited that degree of public attention and comment on his receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level.”47
No later Supreme Court case has formulated a precise definition of a public figure. Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n point the same way, however: a person must voluntarily and affirmatively thrust himself or herself into the limelight, which makes it difficult for anyone to be found an involuntary public figure.48 Gertz itself allowed that someone might become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own but called such instances exceedingly rare.49 Lower courts nonetheless find the voluntary element satisfied when a plaintiff engages in activity that predictably could embroil him or her in a public controversy.50
A limited-purpose figure is a public figure only for a limited range of issues, so the status reaches statements about the controversy and stops there.51 Almost anything bearing on an official’s honesty touches fitness for office, but a limited-purpose figure’s exposure ends where the controversy ends.
A fact pattern that calls the plaintiff newsworthy, socially prominent, or the subject of heavy coverage invites a quick conclusion that the plaintiff is a public figure. The better question is who moved first. If the plaintiff stepped forward and used a public platform to shape a dispute, the plaintiff is a public figure for that dispute. If events or a court proceeding put the plaintiff in the news, the plaintiff remains private. The stakes differ: a limited-purpose figure must prove actual malice for statements about the controversy, while a private plaintiff need prove only something like negligence and may recover presumed or punitive damages only by showing actual malice.52