388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)
Curtis Publishing Co. published an article in the Saturday Evening Post in 1962 accusing Wally Butts, athletic director of the University of Georgia and a former head football coach, of disclosing Georgia's offensive plays and defensive patterns to Alabama coach Paul Bryant one week before the teams played.1
Butts, who was employed by the private Georgia Athletic Association rather than the state, filed a diversity libel action in federal district court in Georgia seeking $5 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.2 The complaint was filed and the trial completed before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York Times, and the only defense raised by petitioner Curtis was one of substantial truth.3
The evidence showed that Burnett had indeed overheard a conversation between Butts and the Alabama coach, but the content of that conversation was hotly disputed.4 Expert witnesses supported Butts by analyzing Burnett's notes and the films of the game itself. The Saturday Evening Post's version of the game and of the players' remarks about the game was severely contradicted.5
The jury returned a verdict for $60,000 in general damages and for $3,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the total to $460,000 by remittitur.6 Soon thereafter the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York Times and Curtis immediately brought it to the attention of the trial court by a motion for new trial.7 The trial judge rejected Curtis' motion on two grounds. He first held that New York Times was inapplicable because Butts was not a public official. He also held that there was ample evidence from which a jury could have concluded that there was reckless disregard by defendant of whether the article was false or not.8
Curtis appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the judgment of the District Court by a two-to-one vote.9 The majority there did not reach the merits of petitioner's constitutional claim, holding that Curtis had clearly waived any right it may have had to challenge the verdict and judgment on any of the constitutional grounds asserted in Times, 351 F. 2d 702, 713, on the basis of Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91.10 Judge Rives dissented, arguing that the record did not support a finding of knowing waiver of constitutional defenses.11 Rehearing was denied, 351 F. 2d, at 733, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Separately, on September 30, 1962, the Associated Press distributed a news dispatch giving an eyewitness account of events on the campus of the University of Mississippi when a massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering the enrollment of James Meredith as a student.13 Walker was a private citizen at the time of the riot and publication. He had pursued a long and honorable career in the United States Army before resigning to engage in political activity.14 Walker initiated this libel action in the state courts of Texas, seeking a total of $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.15 A verdict of $500,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages was returned. The trial judge found no evidence to support the jury's answers that there was actual malice and refused to enter the punitive award.16 Both sides appealed and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed both the award of compensatory damages and the striking of punitive damages.17 The Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether Curtis Publishing waived its right to assert constitutional defenses in the libel action by failing to raise them before trial?19
No. The complaint was filed and the trial completed before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York Times, and the only defense raised by petitioner Curtis was one of substantial truth.22 Although some of Curtis's attorneys were involved in the New York Times litigation, even a lawyer fully cognizant of the record and briefs in the New York Times litigation might reasonably have expected the resolution of that case to have no impact on this litigation.23 The arguments advanced there depended so heavily on the analogy to seditious libel.24 Curtis presented the constitutional issue promptly after the New York Times decision, and the district court addressed the merits of the claim without prejudice to Butts.25
Curtis Publishing did not waive its right to assert constitutional defenses.26
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Warren agreed that Curtis did not waive its contentions under New York Times.27 He noted that the trial judge had substantially conformed to the essential principle in the punitive damages instructions.28 After the New York Times rule was brought to the trial judge's attention in a post-trial motion, he reviewed the record in light of that precise standard and held that the jury verdict should not be disturbed.29
Warren emphasized that the trial occurred before New York Times and that counsel's failure to raise the defense appeared deliberate given overlapping representation in related cases.
Whether the New York Times actual malice standard applies to libel actions brought by public figures who are not public officials?30
A public figure who is not a public official may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.31
No. The rigorous federal requirements of New York Times are not the only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake when the plaintiff is a public figure rather than a public official.32 Butts commanded substantial continuing public interest as athletic director of a state university and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument.33 Walker thrust himself into the vortex of an important public controversy through his publicized statements and actions.34 Both cases therefore require a standard that protects speech on matters of public concern without extending the full New York Times actual malice rule to every public figure libel action.35
The New York Times actual malice standard does not apply unchanged to libel actions brought by public figures who are not public officials.36
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Warren would have applied the New York Times actual malice standard to public figures as well as public officials.37 He reasoned that the distinctions between governmental and private sectors have blurred through a fusion of economic and political power.38 Public figures often play an influential role in ordering society and have ready access to mass media of communication.39
Because they are not amenable to the restraints of the political process, public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can attempt to influence their conduct.40 Warren concluded that the New York Times standard is a manageable rule that balances the legitimate interests protected by defamation law while safeguarding press freedoms.41
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Black would abandon the New York Times rule entirely.42 He viewed the differing outcomes in the two cases as an illustration that the rule is wholly inadequate to save the press from being destroyed by libel judgments.43 Black argued that the Court is reviewing factual questions in cases decided by juries, which violates the Seventh Amendment.44
He concluded that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments and that the Court should adopt a rule granting the press that broader freedom rather than continuing to experiment with various standards of liability.45
Whether the evidence in the Butts case satisfied the constitutional standard for imposing liability on the publisher?46
A public figure plaintiff may recover upon a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.47
Yes. The Saturday Evening Post story was not hot news, yet the magazine ignored elementary precautions by publishing on the basis of Burnett's affidavit without viewing his notes, without interviewing Carmichael, without screening game films, and without checking with football experts.48 The Post knew Burnett had been placed on probation for bad checks, assigned a non-expert writer, and proceeded under pressure to produce a sophisticated muckraking expose even after Butts and his daughter notified the editors that the account was false.49 This evidence amply supports the finding of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from responsible publishing standards.50
The evidence in the Butts case satisfied the constitutional standard for imposing liability on the publisher.51
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White
Justice Brennan agreed that the evidence would support a judgment under the New York Times standard.52 He would nevertheless remand for a new trial because the jury charge on compensatory damages permitted liability on a finding of mere falsehood.53 The punitive damages instruction defined actual malice to encompass the notion of ill will, spite, hatred and an intent to injure one, and also to denote a wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence with regard to the rights of others.
This makes crystal clear that the standard announced authorized the jury to award punitive damages even though it found that the Post had in good faith relied on matters which had come to its attention.54 Brennan concluded that the charge failed to comport with New York Times and that the proper disposition is to reverse and remand for a new trial under correct instructions.5556
Whether the evidence in the Walker case satisfied the constitutional standard for imposing liability on the publisher?57
A public figure plaintiff may recover upon a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.
No. The Associated Press dispatch required immediate dissemination and was received from a correspondent who was present at the scene and gave every indication of being trustworthy and competent.58 The dispatches were internally consistent except for one minor discrepancy, and nothing in the series of events hinted at a severe departure from accepted publishing standards under the necessity for rapid reporting.59 The trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals both found the evidence insufficient to support more than ordinary negligence.60
The evidence in the Walker case did not satisfy the constitutional standard for imposing liability on the publisher.61
Whether punitive damages may be awarded in libel actions involving public figures upon the same showing of fault required for compensatory damages?62
Misconduct sufficient to justify the award of compensatory damages also justifies the imposition of a punitive award, subject to the limitation that such award is not demonstrated to be founded on the mere prejudice of the jury.63
Yes. Where a publisher's departure from standards of press responsibility is severe enough to strip constitutional protection, the state may act both to protect the injured individual and to safeguard others similarly situated.64 The jury in Butts was instructed to consider the reliability of sources and care in checking assertions when determining whether the defendant had proceeded with wanton and reckless indifference, and the evidence supported the findings under that standard.65 An unlimited punitive award does not constitute an effective prior restraint when judicial control over excessive verdicts remains available.66
Punitive damages may be awarded in libel actions involving public figures upon the same showing of fault required for compensatory damages.67
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Black viewed the differing outcomes in the two cases as an illustration that the New York Times rule is inadequate and leads to judges weighing facts like juries, which violates the Seventh Amendment.68 He argued that the Court is getting itself into the same quagmire in libel that it faces in obscenity, where no one can know what is constitutionally libelous under the varying rulings.69 Black concluded that it is time for the Court to abandon New York Times and adopt the rule that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments rather than continuing to determine liability based on how offensive a particular judgment appears to the Court.70