315 U.S. 568 (1942)
Chaplinsky, a member of the sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon.1 Members of the local citizenry complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a racket.2 Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, and then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless.3 Some time later, a disturbance occurred and the traffic officer on duty at the busy intersection started with Chaplinsky for the police station.4 On the way, they encountered Marshal Bowering, who had been advised that a riot was under way and was therefore hurrying to the scene.5 Bowering repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky, who then addressed to Bowering the words set forth in the complaint.6
The complaint charged that appellant, with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of Rochester, to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat the words following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, “You are a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,” the same being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.7 Chaplinsky’s version of the affair was slightly different.8 He testified that, when he met Bowering, he asked him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance.9 In reply, Bowering cursed him and told him to come along.10 Appellant admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity.11 Over appellant’s objection the trial court excluded, as immaterial, testimony relating to appellant’s mission to preach the true facts of the Bible, his treatment at the hands of the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police.12
Chaplinsky was convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire.13 Upon appeal there was a trial de novo of appellant before a jury in the Superior Court.14 He was found guilty and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.15 By motions and exceptions, appellant raised the questions that the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it placed an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship, and because it was vague and indefinite.16
Whether the New Hampshire statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment by placing an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship?17
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.18
No. The New Hampshire statute comes to the Court authoritatively construed by the highest court of the state to prohibit only the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee.19 Chaplinsky was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon. He addressed to City Marshal Bowering the words "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists" on the public sidewalk near the entrance of the City Hall. These appellations are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace.20
The statute is narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power.21
The New Hampshire statute does not place an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Whether the statute is so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process?23
A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law.24
No. The New Hampshire statute as construed by the state court is narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power. This includes the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. Chaplinsky was convicted under Chapter 378, § 2 of the Public Laws of New Hampshire after a trial de novo in the Superior Court for addressing offensive derisive and annoying words to the City Marshal on a public sidewalk.25 The limited scope of the statute as thus construed does not contravene the Constitutional right of free expression.
Therefore it does not render the conviction a violation of due process.
The statute is not so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process.26
Whether the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech?27
Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech.28
No. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace. Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint with the exception of the name of the Deity while standing on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield Street near the entrance of the City Hall after a disturbance had occurred on a busy Saturday afternoon.29 The application of the statute to these facts does not substantially or unreasonably impinge upon the privilege of free speech.30
The application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record does not substantially or unreasonably impinge upon the privilege of free speech.31
Whether the refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances is open to constitutional objection?32
The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances is open to no Constitutional objection.33
No. The trial court excluded as immaterial testimony relating to Chaplinsky's mission to preach the true facts of the Bible, his treatment at the hands of the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police.34 Whether the facts sought to be proved by such evidence constitute a defense to the charge or may be shown in mitigation are questions for the state court to determine.35 The function of the Supreme Court is fulfilled by a determination that the challenged statute on its face and as applied does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.36
The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances is open to no constitutional objection.