Concept
Limits on the Doctrine
Vagueness
Limits on the Doctrine
The vagueness doctrine does not require a legislature to define every offense with extreme particularity.1 Few words have the precision of mathematical symbols, and no legislature can foresee every variation of facts that a statute will meet. Some uncertainty is even deliberate, because a legislature that lists every detail hands would-be offenders loopholes that defeat the statute's purpose. A statute therefore survives when it is hard to say whether marginal conduct falls within it, so long as the general class of offenses it targets is plainly within its terms.2 The mere possibility of a hypothetical case in which doubt would arise does not defeat it.
The decisions follow no litmus test, and commentators have asked whether any thread of consistency runs through them. A reasonable consistency appears once the underlying bases of the doctrine are identified, and those bases are the three questions this chapter has used throughout: whether the law gives fair notice to the people it covers, whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and whether it leaves sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights.3 Each question asks about a consequence for a real person: someone who cannot find the line, someone exposed to an officer's unchecked choice, or a speaker who falls silent. The limits below apply those same questions to settings where the answers favor the government.
Four limits follow. Ordinary imprecision is not vagueness. An authoritative narrowing construction can save a law, within bounds. Civil laws and subsidy conditions draw more tolerant review than criminal penalties. And a scienter requirement can help in some regulatory settings but never supplies a missing line. A challenger who shows that the text supplies no workable standard stands on firm ground. A challenger who shows only that some cases at the margin are hard to call has described a feature of every legal rule.
Imprecision Is Not Vagueness
City of Chicago v. Morales struck down the Gang Congregation Ordinance for failing to give fair notice and for inviting arbitrary enforcement, but it did not make every unclear word in a penal law fatal. Due process does not require a criminal statute to define an offense with extreme particularity, and a statute is not void merely because it is hard to decide whether marginal conduct falls within its language.4 Three reasons support that rule. Every general term has a fringe where reasonable people disagree, so a rule that voided every statute with a fringe would void nearly all of them. Drafters choose general terms on purpose, because any act left off a detailed list escapes the law while a general term reaches variations the drafters could not name. And a challenger whose own conduct sits in the heart of a statute cannot defeat it by describing someone else's hard case, which is the clear-core limit from the previous subsection.
The Court has stated the test in two ways that seem to conflict until one sees the problem each addresses. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, the Court said that a statute forbidding or requiring an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process.5 Earlier, in Nash v. United States, the Court had observed that “the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”6 The two statements fit together because they address different problems. Nash governs when a person can tell the general sort of conduct to avoid although the exact line is unclear, and Lanzetta governs when a would-be law-abiding citizen cannot tell, even generally, what conduct the statute targets.7
An automobile driver illustrates the Nash side. She cannot know exactly how deviant her driving must be before it counts as reckless, but she knows the sort of driving to avoid, and the remaining uncertainty is tolerable.8 The Lanzetta statute sat at the other pole. It punished as a “gangster” any person without a lawful occupation who had been convicted of a crime and was “known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons,” and the meaning of “gang” left a person trying to comply unable to tell what conduct to avoid.9 The distance between the poles can be short. The Court accepted “undue restraint of trade” as a permissible standard in Nash, yet two years later it held in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky that “real value,” applied to a prospective price fixer, was unconstitutionally vague, because the prices to be avoided could not be ascertained in advance.10
United States v. Williams supplies the working distinction. Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute, so the possibility of one does not make a statute vague. What voids a criminal law is “the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is,” meaning the fact that triggers liability.11 Difficulty in deciding whether that fact was proved in a given case belongs to the burden of proof: a factfinder who cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct fell within the statute must acquit, so a vagueness ruling would add nothing there. A statute that never identifies its incriminating fact removes the thing doubt could attach to, because the factfinder has no fact to find, only an impression to form. Williams drew the contrast with statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether conduct was “annoying” or “indecent,” wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions. A law keyed to a defined category, such as words likely to cause an average addressee to fight, names its fact even when a particular case is close. That is the contrast this chapter drew earlier between Coates and Chaplinsky. A hard hypothetical alone does not make a law vague.
Vagueness also differs from ambiguity. An offense is vague when an individual is unsure what the illegal conduct is, while an ambiguous law allows multiple readings of the same text, none of which is inherently incorrect.12 Ambiguity calls for interpretation, and a court that faces competing readings must adopt one that avoids vagueness when it can do so consistent with the legislature's purpose.13 A choice among defensible readings still leaves a line the citizen can find. A vague law leaves no line to find under any reading.
Courts also ask whether the drafters had a better option. Under the principle of necessity, when the concern is arbitrary enforcement, a court asks whether some alternative formulation without that risk reasonably suggests itself.14 Uncertain language has survived when the subject matter would not allow more exactness and when greater specificity would interfere with practical administration, while statutes that appear to be the product of poor draftsmanship are more likely to fall.15 The principle explains why terms of degree are common in the criminal law. A jury is often asked whether a defendant acted “reasonably,” and no legislature can list every reasonable act in advance. A penal statute is therefore not void merely because it leaves some judgment to those who apply it; the question is whether a clearer formulation was realistically available.
Municipal ordinances face the same test. A city that acts within its power and delegates no unbridled discretion to its officials must still meet tests of definiteness and certainty.16 Two dog ordinances show how one drafting choice can change the outcome. In State v. Cole, an ordinance forbade keeping a dog that is in the habit of barking or howling, and the court upheld it because a person of common intelligence understands the word “habit.”17 In City of Spokane v. Fischer, the ordinance made it a nuisance to allow a dog to “disturb or annoy” any person by frequent or habitual howling, yelping, or barking, and the court held it void for failing to give adequate notice. It distinguished Cole because that case dealt only with the term “habit,” while this ordinance added other terms of questionable meaning.18 The Cole ordinance left hard cases at its edges, such as how many nights of barking make a habit, yet it identified the forbidden fact: a pattern of barking that a neighbor can observe. The Fischer ordinance added terms whose content depends on the listener, the same defect that sank the ordinance in Coates v. Cincinnati earlier in this chapter.
Ordinances about property and noise split the same way. In City of Independence v. Richards, an ordinance penalizing “unsightly” accumulations of refuse was held void, because the term is purely subjective and qualitative and so invites arbitrary enforcement.19 Anti-noise ordinances, by contrast, are often upheld when they prohibit disturbances that “unreasonably” bother other persons.20 City of Farmington v. Wilkins upheld an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to create unreasonably loud, disturbing, or unnecessary noise detrimental to the repose, life, or health of others, even though the ordinance set no decibel levels.21 The word “unreasonably” ties the offense to a community standard that a jury applies in context, as it applies reasonable care in a negligence case, so the line rests on something outside the enforcer's own taste. “Unsightly” rests on nothing but taste, and that difference explains why one word could decide the two outcomes.
The audience a law addresses and the settled meaning of its words also affect how much precision is required. Words with a well-settled meaning in the common law or in judicial decisions can satisfy fair notice, because the statute prompts a person to seek legal advice, and a law aimed at a particular trade needs only terms that someone in that trade can apply correctly.22 Negligence supplies the familiar example. A federal appellate court rejected a vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1115, which punishes a boat operator's “misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties,” where the operator never announced loudly that the yacht was departing, never counted heads, never checked behind the yacht before engaging the engines in reverse, and never posted a lookout.23 White-collar statutes draw vagueness challenges too. Their complexity can intensify the need for clarity, and courts commonly apply the rule of lenity to them, yet vagueness challenges there have been less successful.24
Narrowing Constructions
A court that meets a statute with unclear words has a third option besides striking it down and leaving it alone: it can read the words to mean something definite, and the statute is then tested with that reading attached. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is the standard illustration. The New Hampshire statute reached offensive, derisive, and annoying words, language open to the objection that doomed the ordinance in Coates v. Cincinnati, but the state's courts had construed it to forbid only face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the person addressed.26 Under that reading the test became what men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight, and the Supreme Court held the statute, as thus construed, narrowly drawn and not too vague for a criminal law.27 The state court had replaced the reaction of whoever happened to be listening with a category of words that ordinary people recognize as provoking violence.
A narrowing construction works because it changes what both vagueness grounds examine: the meaning the law carries when someone applies it. Fair notice improves when a citizen can read the court's gloss beside the text and locate the line. Enforcement improves when an authoritative reading binds the officer and the prosecutor, who can no longer treat the original breadth as permission. Courts have their own reason to prefer this route. Where constitutional definiteness is at stake, they have an obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness.28 Courts apply the same preference to ordinances, many of which survive when a reasonable reading is available.29 The saving reading keeps the legislature's work in force, and it relieves the chill on speakers, who learn from the construction where the law stops.
Buckley v. Valeo shows the Court performing that work itself on a federal statute. Section 608(e)(1) capped spending “relative to” a clearly identified candidate. To preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, the Court construed it to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.30 Because the statute was federal, the Court could settle its meaning without waiting for anyone else. In Yates v. United States it did the same for the Smith Act, which made it unlawful to “advocate, abet, advise, or teach” the desirability of overthrowing the government. The Court held that the Act did not reach mere abstract teaching but applied only where the audience was being urged to action rather than belief.31
State and local enactments are different, because the authority to say what they mean belongs to the state's own courts. In the ordinary case the highest state court supplies the saving construction for a state statute, and a federal court supplies it for a federal statute. Even a Supreme Court ruling that a state law is invalid speaks only to the law as the state courts had construed it at that moment, so a state court may later narrow the law and the legislature may rewrite it.32 In Morales the principle cut against the city. The Court said it had no authority to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the State's highest court had, and the Illinois Supreme Court had read the definition of loitering as giving police absolute discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering.33 The meaning of a state enactment is a question of state law, so a federal court that substituted a gentler reading would be testing a law that no state authority had adopted.
A court's reading can doom a law as readily as save it. The Illinois construction in Morales was the opposite of a saving construction: it confirmed that the unclear words had no definite edge. The city's arguments that the ordinance did not apply to people who are moving and did not permit an arrest until a dispersal order was disobeyed could not displace that reading. Neither limitation addressed how much discretion the police enjoy in deciding which stationary persons to disperse.34 A creative reading cannot rescue every vague-looking law. The rescuer must be the court with authority over the text, and that court's reading may go either way.
A saving construction must also stay within what the words can fairly bear. A court may not rewrite a law to conform it to the Constitution, because choosing among competing meanings is deciding what the crime is. In Jane L. v. Bangerter, a court of appeals rejected a district court's effort to cure a “fatal ambiguity” by grafting its own meaning onto the phrase “used for experimentation.” The district court had read the phrase to mean tests designed solely to increase a researcher's knowledge with no therapeutic benefit to the mother or child. The court of appeals held that the district court had blatantly rewritten the statute, choosing among a host of competing definitions, which was an improper use of judicial power.35
The airport litigation shows a proposed narrowing that fails on its own terms. In Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., the airport offered a reading that limited its ban to “expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes.” The rule came from a state government, so only the state courts could give it a final reading. The Court declined to wait for them, because there seemed to be so many possible interpretations that the state courts could not adopt a clear one without deciding a whole series of cases. It also found that the airport's proposed limit was itself overbroad and vague.36 Chaplinsky and this case differ on exactly that point. The New Hampshire gloss replaced a subjective standard with a measurable category, while the airport's proposal replaced one elastic standard with another. A narrowing construction helps only if the narrowed text is itself definite.
A narrowing announced after the defendant acted raises a further question: whether applying it to the earlier conduct is fair. The answer comes from fair warning, a due process limit on retroactive judicial changes and not a second vagueness test. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, the Court held that applying a state court's unforeseeable construction of a trespass statute to store patrons who had received no notice before entering violated due process, because deprivation of fair warning can come from vague language and also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of language that looks narrow and precise.37 The narrowed-statute cases follow that logic. In Osborne v. Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowed a nudity statute while the defendant's appeal was pending, and the Court held that the narrowed statute could be applied to earlier conduct “provided such application affords fair warning to the defendant.” Osborne could not have been surprised that his photographs of nude male minors violated the law, but the Court still overturned his conviction because the jury had not been instructed under the narrowed reading.38 In Massachusetts v. Oakes, the Court divided 5-4 over a legislative amendment. The majority refused to treat the amendment as retroactively curing an overbroad law, because legislatures would be encouraged to pass overbroad laws if they could always repair them afterward.39
The cases yield three requirements for applying a narrowing to earlier conduct. The judiciary must have done the narrowing, the defendant must have fair notice of the possible narrowing, and the jury instruction must match the revised reading.40 Fair notice is the hardest to satisfy, because a more creative narrowing of a more seriously defective statute is harder to call foreseeable, while a defendant whose conduct falls clearly within the core of the old statute has less to complain about.41
Civil and Subsidy Settings
In City of Chicago v. Morales the Court set the Chicago ordinance beside a different kind of law, one that “simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement,” and it described the ordinance before it as a criminal law with no mens rea requirement that infringed constitutionally protected rights.43 The contrast shows that the precision the Constitution demands rises and falls with the stakes. Most of this chapter has concerned penal laws and speech regulations, where a wrong guess costs the guesser liberty or silence. Where the consequence is milder and nobody is pushed out of protected speech, courts tolerate more imprecision. Four settings show how far that tolerance runs: civil regulation, business licensing, investigative directions, and government subsidies.
Courts tolerate more vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal ones.44 Some state courts express the idea by saying that mere uncertainty does not void a civil law, which must be so incomprehensible that it amounts to no rule or standard at all.45 The tolerance follows from the two jobs the doctrine performs. Fair notice matters most when a wrong guess costs liberty or property, and the chill on speech grows with the penalty, since a speaker facing a fine or a jail term steers well clear of anything doubtful. As the penalty falls, both protections matter less. The tolerance is a matter of degree, and civil laws remain subject to the doctrine, as the termination-of-parental-rights cases at the end of this subsection show.
Business regulation follows the same pattern. When there is no danger that a law will deter lawful speech, the Court enforces the vagueness requirement less strictly. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside upheld a licensing requirement for businesses that sell items “designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs,” because the Court did not believe the requirement deterred constitutionally protected speech.46 Morales later pointed to two features of that ordinance: it regulated business behavior, and it contained a scienter requirement.47 A retailer unsure whether a product is covered simply decides what to stock, and the cautious answer silences no one. The scienter feature has limits of its own, which the next subsection takes up.
A different kind of vague language appears when a law tells officials where to look and does not tell citizens what to do. In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., a licensing ordinance for coin-operated amusement establishments directed the police chief to consider whether an applicant had “connections with criminal elements.” The Court held the phrase not unconstitutionally vague, because it named only a subject for the chief to investigate before recommending to the city manager, and the city manager did not use it as the standard for approving or denying the application.48 The Constitution, the Court said, does not preclude a city from giving “vague or ambiguous directions to officials who are authorized to make investigations and recommendations.”49 The phrase never becomes the line that separates a licensed applicant from an unlicensed one. It points an investigator toward facts to gather, while the person who decides the application relies on other grounds, so no applicant has a standard to guess at. A direction that the deciding official had to apply as the ground for denial would be tested as an operative standard, because it would then fix the applicant's fate.
Government subsidies present the most distinctive setting. Where a statute's literal scope is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands greater specificity, because vague statutes cause citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone and to restrict their conduct to what is unquestionably safe.50 A subsidy sets no unlawful zone for anyone to steer around. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court rejected a facial vagueness challenge to a requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts judge grant applications by artistic merit while “taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” The vagueness doctrine does not necessarily apply to nonregulatory action of this kind, and the Court reasoned that “when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”51 A rejected applicant loses money he sought, but nothing he does is outlawed, and no one is fined or jailed for the work. The doctrine's central worry, a speaker coerced into silence by an unmarked line, has little to attach to. The same words in a criminal statute would present a different question.
Civil and subsidy laws are not exempt from vagueness review. The same words receive more tolerance when the consequence of imprecision is mild, and the tolerance shrinks as the law begins to punish or to chill speech.
The doctrine also reaches some civil schemes, though with restraint. Many constitutional attacks on statutes that allow involuntary termination of parental rights rest on vagueness. Some courts require that the statute tell a parent whether contemplated conduct is forbidden, so that he may act accordingly. Others require sufficient standards so that judges are not completely free to decide case by case what is prohibited. Even a broad statute may pass if it can be narrowly construed to establish reasonable standards, and statutes should not be held to impossibly precise standards.52 The stakes cut the other way here. A rigid application in a termination case may leave children exposed to serious harm that a valid statute could have prevented, while a rigid vagueness rule in a criminal case creates no similar danger. Courts therefore use much greater caution in invalidating termination statutes than in invalidating ordinary criminal ones.53
Judicial tolerance does not make vagueness a virtue. A statute, civil or criminal, is a command by the sovereign to do or refrain from doing certain things, backed by sanctions for noncompliance, and fundamental fairness requires that citizens be on notice of what it demands. Courts that excuse a vague civil statute are still looking at poor drafting and poor governing.54
Scienter Requirements
Morales sorted the Chicago ordinance by whether it carried a mental-state requirement. Scienter means a requirement that the offender acted knowingly, intentionally, or willfully, and mens rea is the broader label for whatever mental state a crime demands. The Court explained that the ordinance was not a law that “simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement,” like the licensing ordinance in Hoffman Estates, but a criminal law with no mens rea requirement that infringed constitutionally protected rights, and it held that vagueness permeating the text of such a law supports a facial attack.59 Scienter thus does work on both sides of the doctrine: its presence can help a law in one setting, and its absence helps a challenger in another. It does not follow that every mental-state element makes unclear words clear, and the rest of this subsection draws that line.
A scienter requirement can help a business regulation because it screens out the unwitting. In Hoffman Estates, a village required a license of businesses that sell items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs, and the Court upheld the requirement against a vagueness challenge.60 A law that reaches only those who act with knowledge spares the merchant who unwittingly stocks a covered item. The earlier discussion of that decision showed the Court enforcing the vagueness requirement less strictly where no lawful speech was being deterred, so the scienter element worked together with the business setting and the absence of a speech chill. It was one feature of a package and not a freestanding cure.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States marks the limit of that help. An Interstate Commerce Commission regulation required drivers of vehicles carrying explosives or inflammables to avoid congested thoroughfares and tunnels, so far as practicable and where feasible.61 The Court upheld the indictment because the statute punished only knowing violations. The regulation would reach only a driver who knew of a safer route and deliberately took the more dangerous one, or who willfully neglected to ask about a safer alternative.62 Justice Jackson dissented, and his analysis is the sounder one: scienter, as traditionally defined, cannot cure vagueness in a statute or regulation.63
The reason lies in what a person knows when the law demands knowledge. A person acts knowingly when he knows that his acts will bring about certain results, those the statute defines, and whether he knows that causing those results is forbidden is immaterial.64 What counts is knowledge of the consequences of one's actions, not knowledge of the existence or meaning of the criminal law, so uncertain statutory language is not clarified by a scienter element. In Boyce, a conviction required a finding that the driver willfully failed to take or discover a safer route “so far as practicable, and where feasible,” but that finding did not require proof that the driver actually knew or understood those words. It is possible to bring about certain results willfully and still lack fair warning that the conduct is proscribed.65 Scienter narrows the group of people who can be convicted, but vagueness is a defect in the line itself, and that defect survives.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Morales presses the opposing view. He argued that the only act the Chicago ordinance punishes is the failure to promptly obey a dispersal order, that no one could be convicted who did not hear the order or who was physically unable to comply, and that “[t]he willful failure to obey a police order is wrongful intent enough.”66 The answer follows from the same distinction. Willful disobedience shows that the defendant knew of the order and chose to ignore it, which is knowledge of an act. It says nothing about whether anyone could know in advance what it means to remain in one place with no apparent purpose, the definition the Court found uncertain.67 Scienter is far from irrelevant: its absence strengthens a challenger's hand against a criminal law, and its presence can help a business regulation. But an intent element alone never supplies the missing line.