Concept
Recognized Exceptions
Prior restraint
Recognized Exceptions
In Near v. Minnesota, Chief Justice Hughes met the objection that his principle was stated too broadly, since it seemed to forbid every previous restraint. He conceded the point as “undoubtedly true”: protection even as to previous restraint “is not absolutely unlimited.” But the limitation, he added, has been recognized only in exceptional cases.1 His examples fell into three groups. A government may prevent actual obstruction of its recruiting service and publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. It may enforce the primary requirements of decency against obscene publications. And it may protect the security of community life against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.2 The wartime example rests on Schenck v. United States, which observed that in wartime many things tolerable in peace so hinder the national effort that no court could regard them as constitutionally protected.3
The list is dictum, language the case did not need to decide, because Hughes added that none of the three limitations applied to the Minnesota statute.4 Nobody in Near had threatened to publish a convoy schedule. The Court was marking the edges of its rule from the middle of a case about a newspaper’s charges against public officers. Dicta guide later courts without binding them, so the reach of each category, and the procedure it demands, had to be worked out in later decisions. Hughes also drew a lesson from the brevity of the list. The exceptional nature of the limitations, he said, “places in a strong light” the general conception that liberty of the press means, principally though not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints.5 The presumption from the last section therefore keeps operating inside every exception. A government that invokes one must still prove its case, and the analogy to strict scrutiny suggests that its order may reach no further than the harm requires.6
One question runs through every exception: does the speech threaten a special societal harm that punishment afterward cannot remedy? The question reflects the reason for the whole doctrine. Punishment after publication works when a remedy can compensate or deter, which is why Near sent falsely accused officials to libel actions instead of injunctions.7 A convoy’s sailing date presents the opposite case. If the enemy learns it, the ships are lost, and no verdict or prison term brings them back. Some exceptions have a second footing. Obscenity is a category that receives no constitutional protection to begin with, so the speaker’s claim to be heard before the government acts is weaker. Even there, the government must use careful procedure, because the risk that an official will err in advance does not disappear when the speech is unprotected.
Three of the exceptions come from Near’s own list, and the Court has since recognized two more settings, contractual clearance and military bases. National security comes first because it supplies the clearest case of harm that no later remedy can undo.
National Security
The first exception in Near is the easiest to justify, because the harm it describes arrives with the publication itself. Hughes wrote: “No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”8 He took the example from Schenck, which said that in wartime speech tolerable in peace can hinder the national effort so seriously that no court could treat it as constitutionally protected.9 The passage is dictum, since the Minnesota statute fell outside it, yet it has come to be called the troopship exception, and it works as the rough equivalent of a very strict scrutiny test.10
Why do these examples qualify, and few others? A sailing date, or the number and location of troops, gives an enemy what it needs to strike identifiable ships and the soldiers aboard. The injury flows from the information itself, and no verdict or sentence after publication can restore a lost vessel. Near sat on the other side of the line. The harm complained of there was false accusation of public officers, and Hughes sent such officers to libel actions, which can answer the injury after the articles run.11 The exception thus follows the reason for the doctrine. An advance order is costly because it keeps speech from circulating before anyone can judge it, and the cost is worth paying only where waiting for punishment would let the harm occur first. A harm that is immediate, certain, and irreversible meets that condition. A generalized fear of damage does not, because a fear is a prediction, and the earlier discussion of speculation and institutional bias showed how predictions about unspoken words drift toward restraint.
The Court has construed the exception narrowly. In the Pentagon Papers case the executive branch sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified study, and the Court refused, even though the documents related to an ongoing military conflict.12 Classification and a wartime setting did not bring the case within the exception. Near’s examples involve information whose release would endanger identifiable ships and troops. A claim that publication might harm the national interest or the war effort is a prediction about diffuse effects, and a judge who accepts it acts on an executive’s forecast about words not yet printed, the posture that the earlier discussion showed to favor restraint. The troopship exception keeps that risk small by confining restraints to information whose danger is plain from what it says.
Justice Brennan, concurring, turned the dictum into a test. He read the cases to recognize a single, extremely narrow class of exceptions, available only when the Nation is at war, and he would allow even an interim restraining order only on governmental allegation and proof that publication “must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea.”13 Each adverb screens out a different weakness. Inevitably excludes harm that publication only might produce. Directly excludes harm that depends on other people’s later choices. Immediately excludes harm remote enough that ordinary remedies could still respond. He added that the Executive’s bare conclusions are never sufficient, because a government that asks a court for help must submit its basis to judicial scrutiny.14 His is the strictest formulation that still admits an exception, because Justices Black and Douglas would admit none.15 Apply it to a magazine article on building a thermonuclear device. If government experts could say only that publication would “possibly” help a medium-sized nation move faster, the standard would likely bar an injunction, since a possible speedup is speculative.16
Two questions remain open after the Pentagon Papers case: what circumstances beyond the troopship situations would justify a court order protecting national security, and what difference a statute authorizing a restraint would make. The Supreme Court has addressed neither since.17 The second matters because Justices White, Stewart, and Marshall hesitated to enjoin publication partly because no statute authorized the injunction.18 A case in which a provision of the Atomic Energy Act appeared to authorize an injunction against a magazine’s hydrogen bomb article, United States v. Progressive, Inc., never reached the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed after others published the same information elsewhere.19 An essay should treat the statutory question as unsettled and argue both sides, because the answer would turn on whether Congress has authorized the order and on how grave the harm is.
Two cautions follow. A denial of an injunction leaves open whether the publisher may be punished afterward, and several Justices in the Pentagon Papers litigation suggested that their reluctance to restrain would not necessarily extend to a later criminal prosecution.20 And the narrow construction leaves the exception alive: only the Justices who would bar every restraint reject it entirely, and the sailing-date scenario remains the example the Court itself treated as beyond question.21 The label “national security” gives the government a subject for argument, and the exception demands proof of concrete harm.
Obscenity
Obscenity is the setting in which prior restraints are most readily tolerated, and the one in which the Court hedges that tolerance most carefully. Near itself listed obscene publications among its exceptional cases.23 Later courts have allowed more prior restraint of allegedly obscene movies than of other speech, because obscenity falls outside First Amendment protection, but even there restraint remains suspect.24 The exception therefore carries a condition: government may enjoin obscene material only through careful procedure.
The permission and the caution have different sources. The permission comes from the category itself. The Court has held that the First Amendment does not protect obscene materials, so government may criminalize their production and distribution.25 A work correctly classed as obscene loses nothing the Constitution values when an order keeps it from circulating, which weakens the objection that drove Near, that an advance order removes ideas from public debate before anyone has judged them. The caution comes from the difficulty of drawing the category’s boundary. The Court has struggled to define obscenity and to separate it from protected material, so an injunction may be vague or overbroad and chill protected speech along with obscene speech, and any order issued in advance risks error.26 The Court resolved the tension by permitting injunctions against obscenity while insisting on elaborate procedural protections. Those protections are the price of the exception.27
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown shows the Court accepting an injunction. By a vote of 5-4, the Court sustained a New York procedure authorizing an injunction against the sale and distribution of allegedly obscene printed matter pending an expedited trial.28 Kingsley consented to a preliminary injunction, his books were found obscene after trial, their distribution was enjoined, and they were ordered destroyed. He did not dispute the finding of obscenity and attacked only the injunction as a prior restraint.29 Justice Frankfurter answered that the phrase “prior restraint” is “not a self-wielding sword.”30 He compared the two ways a state could proceed. A bookseller facing only a criminal statute must dread that offering a book may bring a prosecution without warning. The civil procedure, by contrast, assured the bookseller that no consequence could follow unless a court order, issued after a prompt and carefully circumscribed determination of obscenity, was ignored, and until then the bookseller could keep selling on his own judgment.31 That reasoning depends on features of the New York scheme, clear standards and a speedy hearing before a judge, so Kingsley supports injunctions of a particular kind and gives no general license for them.
The kind of injunction the Court accepts is aimed at a particular work after a judge has examined it. The model is Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, where the state sought a civil injunction against the exhibition of particular films and a judge decided the question of obscenity after a full adversary hearing, a contested proceeding in which both sides present evidence and argument.32 A court that finds a specific film obscene at the end of such a hearing may enjoin its further exhibition. The order in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. had a different shape. A court barred a theater from showing any obscene film in the future because the theater had shown some before, and the Court held that such a blanket order could not stand.33
What separates the two orders is what the judge had examined. In Paris Adult Theatre the films were before the court, the exhibitor was heard, and the ruling covered those films, so the order reaches only works already adjudicated. In Vance the findings concerned films already shown, while the order governs films no court has seen, so its reach depends on a forecast that some future title will be obscene. That is the structure Near condemned when past issues of The Saturday Press supported an order covering every later issue. A theater owner bound by the blanket order would also have to guess, for each new film and on pain of contempt, where the line of obscenity falls, and because the line is hard to draw, protected films would stay off the screen along with the obscene ones. The tempting shortcut, that obscenity is unprotected and a court may therefore bar it wholesale, overlooks what the category decides. Lack of protection means that a work found obscene can be kept from circulating. It supplies no basis for presuming that works nobody has examined are obscene.
The same demand for an adversary hearing governs physical removal of materials. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana requires an adversary hearing before a large-scale seizure of a store’s stock of allegedly obscene materials.34 A seizure of an entire inventory takes every title out of circulation at once, including works that no court has examined and that may be protected, and it does so as completely as an injunction would. The hearing that justifies stopping one film therefore cannot be skipped merely because the government acts through officers with a warrant instead of through a court order.
Freedman v. Maryland states the procedural price in the setting of a licensing system. A Maryland statute required films to be submitted to a censorship board before showing, and the Court held that such a noncriminal process avoids constitutional infirmity only under safeguards. The censor bears the burden of proving that the film is unprotected, only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding can impose a valid final restraint, and the censor must within a brief specified period either issue a license or go to court.35 The Maryland statute lacked those safeguards and fell.36 The section on procedural safeguards develops each requirement. They matter most in obscenity cases because obscenity is the one major area in which censorship by board review before court action still often occurs in practice.37
Incitement to Violence
The third exceptional case in Near v. Minnesota concerns the safety of the community itself. After conceding that protection against previous restraint is “not absolutely unlimited,” Chief Justice Hughes wrote that “the security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.”39 To support the category he again relied on Schenck, which quoted Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co. for the proposition that the guaranty of free speech does not “protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.”40 The Court listed this category together with the wartime troop-movement example and the obscenity example, and it described all three as exceptional cases, stated in dictum, that did not apply to the Minnesota statute.41
The reasoning treats words that operate as force as the means by which the violence happens, so an order against them prevents harm the way an order against the physical act would. The question that organizes the other exceptions explains why advance action is tolerable here. Violence injures people, and a judgment or a prison term imposed afterward cannot undo the injury. The objection that drives the whole doctrine also has less weight, because the order targets words whose harm lies in their operation as force, not in the ideas they ask an audience to weigh. Near itself shows the limit. Hughes stressed that press liberty was especially cherished for the immunity it afforded from previous restraint of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct, and the Court held that none of the listed limitations applied to the Minnesota statute.42 The Skokie episode points the same way. When American Nazis announced a march through a suburb whose residents included survivors of the concentration camps, the village sought injunctions and announced new ordinances to prevent it, and the Nazis’ First Amendment objections prevailed.43 Outrage at a message, even outrage as understandable as the village’s, did not by itself carry the village’s measures.
Near’s wording is only a starting point. The phrase “may have all the effect of force” is looser than the standard the Court now applies to advocacy of violence. That modern incitement doctrine is taught separately, and it is the test to run when a fact pattern asks whether particular words may be restrained as incitement. Near supplies the label and the reason for acting in advance, and the current standard decides whether the words qualify.
Contractual Clearance
Near’s three examples were only a sketch, and the Court has since recognized another setting: the speaker who promised the government to submit writings for review before publishing them.45 The leading decision is Snepp v. United States. A former CIA employee had agreed not to divulge classified information without authorization and not to publish any information relating to the agency without prepublication clearance, meaning the agency’s approval before release.46 Without submitting his manuscript, he published a book about CIA activities in Vietnam, and the government did not claim that the book contained classified data.47 That fact fixes what the case is about. The breach was the failure to submit the book for review, and the question was what the government could do to enforce a promise of advance review.
The remedy deserves care, because summaries sometimes describe the case as one that allowed an injunction.48 The court of appeals had held that Snepp could be subjected to punitive damages but had refused to impress a constructive trust on his profits.49 The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, decided without oral argument. It held that punitive damages were an inappropriate and inadequate remedy and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp’s profits.50 A constructive trust is a court-imposed remedy that treats a wrongdoer as holding certain money for the benefit of the party wronged, so Snepp had to surrender the earnings from the book to the government. By then the book was in print, and what the order reached was the money it had earned. The obligation the order enforced was the promise to submit to review in advance, a private version of the advance approval that the timing test identifies as the hallmark of a prior restraint.
The Court’s treatment of the First Amendment fit in a footnote. It said that its cases make clear that, even without an express agreement, the CIA could have protected substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that might be protected in other contexts.51 The footnote then identified the interest as a compelling one, the protection of both the secrecy of information important to national security and the appearance of confidentiality that a foreign intelligence service needs to operate, and it concluded that the agreement Snepp signed was “a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.”52
Two ingredients support the arrangement, and each has its own logic. The first is the government’s interest in the secrecy of intelligence. A foreign intelligence service depends on sources and partner services that share information only when they trust it will stay confidential, so the appearance of confidentiality matters as well as actual secrecy. A former agent who decides alone what is harmless to publish leaves the agency no chance to catch a mistake until the book is in print, and a disclosure that exposes a source cannot be undone by a later damages award. Review before publication puts the agency’s judgment between the manuscript and the public at the one moment when correction is still possible.
The second ingredient is the agreement. A person who takes a position carrying access to sensitive information, and who promises as part of that arrangement to submit writings for review, has consented to the restraint, so the usual objection that officials are imposing advance control on an unwilling speaker has much less force. The consent also limits the restraint’s reach, since it binds the person who made the promise and does not extend to newspapers or strangers who made none. The agreement is not the only support, though. The footnote says the agency could have imposed reasonable restrictions even without an express contract, so the compelling interest carries weight of its own, and the signed promise supplies strong evidence that the restriction was reasonable.
The newspapers in New York Times Co. v. United States stand on the other side of the line, and the difference is the promise. They had made no clearance agreement with the government, and the Court refused to enjoin publication of purloined classified documents even though the documents related to an ongoing military conflict.53 In both cases the government wanted information kept from the public, and in both the information traced back to someone with access to the government’s secrets. Snepp had promised review and the newspapers had not, so the clearance obligation could be enforced against the former, while the heavy presumption against restraint applied in full to the latter.
Three Justices objected to the decision in Snepp. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from the extraordinary procedure of deciding without argument an issue raised only in the government’s conditional cross-petition, and from the Court’s fashioning of a “drastic new remedy” to enforce “a species of prior restraint on a citizen’s right to criticize his government.”54 The dissent’s label shows why the case sits at the edge of the doctrine. Because the government did not claim that the book revealed classified information, the remedy penalized the omission of review, and the majority’s answer rested entirely on the interest in confidentiality and the voluntary agreement.
An answer on this topic stays accurate by keeping two points straight. The remedy in Snepp was a constructive trust on profits, so an essay should not say the Court enjoined publication. And the First Amendment received only a footnote in a summary disposition, so the justification to offer is the one the footnote gives: a compelling interest in the secrecy and confidentiality of intelligence, joined to an agreement that is a reasonable means of protecting it. The decision does not authorize the government to demand clearance from newspapers or other strangers to the agreement, and a restraint on them is judged under the heavy presumption taught earlier in this chapter.
Military Bases
Brown v. Glines upheld a licensing system of the kind the rest of this chapter treats with suspicion. An Air Force regulation barred members of the Air Force from posting or distributing printed materials at an installation without the commander’s permission, and it reached the circulation of petitions.56 A rule that makes speech wait for an official’s approval is a prior restraint in its plainest form, because the government acts before any communication occurs, which is the timing test taught at the start of this chapter. Such a measure ordinarily comes to court bearing a heavy presumption of invalidity, and the government must justify it by pointing to a special societal harm, such as a serious threat to national security. The Court in Glines nonetheless sustained the regulation.
The Court’s explanation rested on the commander’s job. It reasoned that “since a commander is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have authority over the distribution of materials that could affect adversely these essential attributes of an effective military.”57 The logic follows from how a military unit works. A unit functions only if orders are obeyed and members trust one another, so material that undermines that trust can do damage before anyone has a chance to respond. A commander who could act only after a petition had circulated would be reacting to harm already done, while a standing permission requirement lets the commander screen material when screening can still prevent the harm. On that view the military is a specialized community whose speech rules are measured against its own goals, and advance control that would be intolerable for a newspaper becomes an ordinary tool of command.
The regulation reached further than a typical restraint justified by concrete danger. It was not punishment for specific speech that threatened the military’s operation. It required permission for printed materials generally, so the government did not have to show that any particular petition endangered discipline.58 That sets Glines apart from Near’s wartime example, where the justification is a specific harm, such as publication of troop locations, that no later remedy can undo. The justification in Glines is institutional. It rests on the commander’s role and not on the content of any one message, and the Court accepted it on that footing.
Whether this deference is necessary or excessive remains an open question. One answer is that a commander cannot maintain readiness without gatekeeping authority over what circulates on the base. The competing answer is that the decision allows a system of prior restraint that would be permitted in virtually no other setting.59 An essay should state both positions and commit to one, because the case supplies a rule for the military and leaves its wider reach uncertain.
The airman’s permission requirement and the resident’s are identical in form, and the result differs because of the setting on each side of the base gate. An answer should first classify the regulation as a licensing prior restraint, then identify the commander’s responsibility for morale, discipline, and readiness as the reason it survives. Citing Glines to uphold a civilian permit rule treats a decision about a commander’s responsibilities as a general rule about licensing, which it is not.