444 U.S. 507 (1980)
Frank W. Snepp III entered into employment with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1968.1 As an express condition of that employment, he executed an agreement promising that he would not publish any information or material relating to the Agency without specific prior approval.2
Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp executed a termination secrecy agreement.3 That document reaffirmed his obligation never to reveal any classified information.4 It also barred disclosure of any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by the CIA without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.5
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without submitting the manuscript to the Agency for prepublication review.6 At the time of suit, Snepp had already received about $60,000 in advance payments.7 His contract with his publisher provided for royalties and other potential profits.8
The United States brought suit against Snepp in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.9 The suit sought a declaration that he had breached the contract, an injunction requiring him to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive trust on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book.10 The District Court found that Snepp had willfully, deliberately and surreptitiously breached his position of trust with the CIA and the 1968 secrecy agreement by publishing his book without submitting it for prepublication review.11 The court also found that publication of the book had caused the United States irreparable harm and loss.12
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the findings of the District Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.13 It upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation but concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust.14 The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari filed by both Snepp and the United States to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.15
Whether Snepp breached his 1968 agreement with the CIA by publishing a book without first submitting it for prepublication review?16
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Snepp signed the 1968 agreement as an express condition of his employment, promising not to publish any information relating to the Agency without prior approval.19 He subsequently published the book without submission.20 The District Court and Court of Appeals both found that this constituted a breach of the valid contract, and the Supreme Court affirmed that the failure to submit was a breach of his trust.21
The obligation to submit all material for review is independent of the classification status of the content, as the review allows the Agency to identify potential risks to sources and methods.22 The Government conceded that the book contained no classified information, but this concession does not undercut the claim of breach because the agreement required review of all material to protect against inadvertent disclosure.23
Snepp breached his 1968 agreement with the CIA.24
Whether the United States is entitled to a constructive trust on profits derived from Snepp's publication of the book?25
Yes. The established facts show that Snepp's employment involved an extremely high degree of trust, as he acknowledged in the agreement, and he was granted access to classified information.28 By publishing without review, he breached his fiduciary obligation.29 The Court of Appeals erred in limiting the remedy to nominal damages, as the constructive trust is the natural consequence of the breach of trust and protects the Government's interest without requiring disclosure of confidences.30
The remedy requires Snepp to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness, including the advance payments and royalties already received.31 This approach conforms relief to the dimensions of the wrong and provides a swift deterrent tailored to the national security context.32
The United States is entitled to a constructive trust on the profits from Snepp's book.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens argues that the constructive trust is not authorized by statute, by the contract, or by the common law.34 Although Congress has enacted criminal statutes punishing the unauthorized dissemination of classified information, it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive trust remedy.35 Neither of the contracts Snepp signed provides for any such remedy.36
The common law does not support imposition of a constructive trust because Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential information but only the contractual duty to obtain prepublication clearance.37 The profits from the book were not a product of the breach since the Government would have been obliged to clear the book for publication in precisely the same form.38
Whether punitive damages provide an adequate remedy for Snepp's breach of his prepublication review obligation?39
Punitive damages are not an adequate remedy for breach of a prepublication review agreement because they are speculative, may require the Government to disclose confidential information in proving tortious conduct, and do not reliably deter similar breaches.40
No. The established facts indicate that actual damages from such a publication are unquantifiable, making nominal damages hollow and punitive damages speculative and unusual.41 Requiring proof of tortious conduct for punitive damages could force the Government to reveal the very confidences Snepp promised to protect during discovery and trial, leaving it with no remedy at all.42 The constructive trust is swift and sure, tailored to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk without saddling the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain.43
Punitive damages do not provide an adequate remedy for Snepp's breach.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens maintains that punitive damages are the preferable remedy because a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment.45 He notes that the Government itself stated that the punitive damages remedy appears sufficient to protect its interests and specifically conditioned its cross-petition on the Court granting Snepp's petition.46 Stevens criticizes the majority for rejecting the punitive damages approach on grounds that the Government itself did not advance and for disposing of the novel issue summarily without full briefing.47